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“Old and new put their stamp to everything in 
Nature. The snowflake that is now falling is 
marked by both. The present moment gives the 
motion and the color of the flake, Antiquity its 
form and properties. All things wear a lustre 
which is the gift of the present, and a tarnish of 
time.”  
– Ralp Waldo Emerson, “Quotation and 
Originality” (1876)  
 
 
“I myself but write one or two indicative words 
for the future, / I but advance a moment only to 
wheel and hurry back in the darkness. / I am a 
man who, sauntering along without fully 
stopping, turns a casual look upon you and then 
averts his face, / Leaving it to you to prove and 
define it, / Expecting the main things from you.”  
– Walt Whitman in “Poets to Come” (1887)  
 
 
“There must be a revolution. Let the revolution 
come, and let one come breathing free into the 
earth to walk by hope alone.”  
– Ralph Waldo Emerson in his Journals (1838) 
 
 
“The presence of poetry is still to come: it comes 
from beyond the future and does not stop 
coming when it is here. A temporal dimension 
different from the one of which the time of the 
world has made us masters is at play in language 
when language lays bare, by the rhythmic 
scansion of being, the space of its unfolding.”  
– Maurice Blanchot, “The Book to Come” (1959) 

  
Introduction, or, “I no longer believe this” 
Reputedly, in the midst of preaching a sermon, Emerson interjected without 
stopping: “I no longer believe this” (see Mott 2003: par. 8). He then went on to 
deliver the rest of the sermon, failing to specify why he had made the peculiar 
little remark. This odd little moment, slight and coincidental as it may seem, can 
be read as an example of Emerson’s eccentricism, as an example of his flamboyant 
but somewhat excessive enthusiasm, more concerned with his performance than 
with the (systematic or typological) consistency of his sermons. Or, the quixotic 
little incident may be read as an instance in which Emerson lets on his special 
sense of a rhetorical sensibility or, rather, responsibility: In the middle of 
delivering the sermon, Emerson here allows his sermon to be inflected by the 
situation in which it is delivered, acknowledging, momentarily, that our uses of 
language are necessarily dependant not only upon their own logic but also upon 
the circumstances in which they are articulated. Emerson’s “I no longer believe 
this” then exhibits that we can never simply rely on a doctrine of words, but that 
we need to make the present moment conform with our writing and vice versa. It 
also suggests, that a poetic performance or Vollzug is always irreducible, it eludes 
the authoritative control of the system (rhetoric, doctrinal, typological, etc.) that 
brings it about. But because we cannot but pay tribute to this irreducibility of our 
uses of language in language, language is referred back to itself so that we 
discover that what may have been an authoritative articulation in one moment is 
destabilized by its rhetorical performance in the next. What Emerson calls “poetry” 
or “literature” is precisely characterized by such a moment of discourse being 
referred back to itself. As Emerson points out in a lecture in 1841 (“The Method of 
Nature”):  
“What is best in any work of art but that part which the work itself seems to require and 
do; that which the man cannot do again; that which flows from the hour and the 
occasion, like the eloquence of men in a tumultuous debate? It was always the theory 
of literature that the word of a poet was authoritative and final. He was supposed to be 
the mouth of a divine wisdom. We rather envied his circumstance than his talent. We 
too could have gladly prophesied standing in that place. We so quote our Scriptures; 
and the Greeks so quoted Homer, Theognis, Pindar, and the rest. If the theory has 
receded out of modern criticism, it is because we have not had poets. Whenever they 
appear, they will redeem their own credit.” (W, I, 210-1)  
For poets to “redeem” their “credit” would thus signal a double acknowledgment: 
on the one hand, of the irreproducible urgency of a present moment whose 
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fleeting forms can only be caught tentatively in language (“that which flows from 
the hour and the occasion”), and on the other, of the inevitable rhetoricity of any 
performance in language (“that part which the work itself seems to require and 
do”). Emerson thinks, as we will see, that the two moments can never quite be 
abstracted from each other, since the eventfulness of the present moment inflects 
the articulation of the poet just as much as his poetic expression changes the 
circumstances in which it is uttered. For Emerson, this is never merely a matter of 
poetic significance, rather, poetry’s special inclination towards figurality makes it 
the spark of everything that is political. Therefore, what Emerson terms the “radical 
correspondence” (W, I, 29) of the moment of writing, of poetry, and of figuration 
with that of the event of a present moment yet unregimented by historical 
discourse in Emerson is both the characteristic sign of a specifically American 
poetics as well as, more generally, the condition sine qua non of an American 
politics as a democratic politics.  
It has become fashionable in literary studies, to suggest all kinds of a return to 
politics. These returns commonly suggest a more ‘authentic’ ground for literary 
studies in politics and imagine an actualization of the literary by its exposure to the 
vicissitudes of everyday life. I am taking a different route in this study by arguing 
that there is in fact no such political a priori but that we need to look precisely at 
the literary or the poetic in order to find a moment of figuration or poiesis that is 
prior to any notion of politics. If we insist on this moment of figuration, as I will 
argue with Emerson, the literary will no longer be merely an extension of a more 
properly ‘authentic’ field of politics, rather, it will serve as the nucleus for any kind 
of political articulation. As a consequence, and as my introductory example 
suggests, I am not so much interested in uncovering the ‘programme’ of Emerson’s 
poetics. Rather, I am interested in the ways in which Emerson’s writing itself 
performs or elaborates what it purports: namely figuration as a political force and 
the moment of figuration as that which both describes and brings about the fleeting 
forms of a democratic politics.  
As a consequence, this study also proposes a different approach to Emerson’s 
writing. It does not aim to establish a systematic or consistent ‘Emerson’ – if there 
ever was such a thing as a single ‘Emerson’. And it does not attempt to read 
Emerson’s writing chronologically, comprehensively, or in its entirety. On the 
contrary: I will attempt to make obvious the import of single passages and how 
they connect to other passages in his work. This will also help to establish a 
terminological network that goes beyond the limits of a single essay, sermon or 
lecture. Even though I am convinced that there are a number of lasting thematic 
concerns in Emerson’s writing, these concerns cannot be reduced to a systematic 
treatment, or, for that matter, to the confines of a single essay. Emerson’s sermons, 
lectures, and essays call for a kind of intertextual reading that locates connections 
or continuities, but also disruptions and inconsistencies within his work. And it is 
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only if we are willing to give up an insistence on systematic consistency in favour 
of an attention to processes of figuration and re-figuration that we may begin to 
assess Emerson’s procedure.  
This characteristic procedure is the product of Emerson’s habits of reading and 
writing. His work is the result of sixty years of reading and excerpting the 
literature available in his time. His diverse interests range from the Classics, to 
Shakespeare, to British Historicism and Scottish Enlightenment, to Goethe, to 
German theological theory, to the Weimarer Klassik and German Idealism, to 
geology and botanics, to economics, and to political theory. What he gleans from 
his almost obsessive passion for reading, he amasses in his journals and notebooks, 
that themselves become the quarry from which he recirculates his material first 
into his sermons – themselves indexed in an elaborate system of concordances –, 
then into the essays. At the same time, he prepares topic and key word lists of his 
journals and frequently recirculates sentences and passages from early essays into 
later essays – sometimes verbatim, sometimes with small alterations.  
Because the structure of his work and writing does not conform to our 
preconceived notions of writerly development and systematic consistency, it 
cannot be presented as a chronological narrative (early radical Emerson to late 
acquiescent Emerson, idealist Emerson to pragmatist Emerson, from the “method of 
man” to the “method of nature”, etc.). Even if these tales of Emerson’s 
development bring to light the way in which he stuck to some of his favourite 
topics, the course of Emerson’s epistemological investigation and writerly 
experiment is never smooth or straightforward. His procedure of recycling earlier 
writing complicates any narrative of Emerson’s intellectual development or 
maturation. If material from his early and somewhat naïve experiments with the 
typological template resurface in later essays, then, obviously, the supposed 
maturity of these essays is disturbed. More generally, one could argue that 
Emerson resists the unifying tendencies of typology and a more properly 
‘philosophical’ systematics to propose a novel form of organization in his writing 
that is non-hierarchical or rhizomatic. Even if it is true that Emerson finds his topics 
early on and continues to read assiduously, it is not so much a development or a 
becoming more refined that characterizes his writing. Rather, it is a progressive 
complication, a progressive becoming critical (also of itself) that for me epitomizes 
Emerson’s thought and writing. As a consequence, we also need to think of 
different ‘Emersons’ and not just of the one distinctively Emersonian “voice” or 
“mood” that Stanley Cavell has attempted to abstract from Emerson’s essays (see 
Cavell 2003: 26). Rather, Emerson’s writing presents us with a plurality of voices – 
their tones and pitches sometimes at odds with one another – and a conflagration 
of moods – not always reducible to a characteristically Emersonian sentiment.  
Rather than to simply capitulate in front of the massive corpus of texts of 
Emerson’s work and rather than to simply limit my focus to single sermons or 
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essays, this study proposes an approach that tries to trace terminological, thematic 
and poetological continuities and discrepancies not only within the single essay, 
but across a complicated network of re-circulations and re-figurations. This will 
mean that we “take the trouble of learning the language of the country we are 
visiting”, to use a phrase coined by Mieke Bal (Bal 2002: 15). To learn Emerson’s 
language, I will have to keep returning to important concepts and phrases to show 
how they acquire their significance both within single passages or within the 
argumentative structure of an essay, but also within the larger context of Emerson’s 
writing. This obviously means a certain allowance for redundancy, since I need to 
at times read a passage twice to suggest how it links to different thematic strands 
in Emerson’s work. It also means that I liberally skip the boundaries of a single 
essay where necessary.  
While it is important to point out that my procedure itself comes as yet another 
refiguration of the material in Emerson’s essays, it needs to be said that every 
reading of classic American literature is always also a reading of our previous 
reading of that literature. This is especially true of my own study, since it profits 
from work done on Emerson’s writing in the last couple of decades. But as 
Emerson points out, every author necessarily “realizes and adds” (W, III, 11): 
American literature is essentially revisionist, even more so because in America 
each reading or writing needs to assess the previous writing’s claim for a 
specifically ‘American’ literature in its own time, in its own cultural present. Some 
of my own revisions in this field will be only minute, others more pronounced. 
With a writing as concentrated and, at times, as aphoristic as Emerson’s, however, 
even the inclusion of another sentence into a passage often cited may completely 
change the significance of that passage.  
Engaging the canon of American literature has always also meant to engage a 
revisionism that is specific to the field. Indeed, to talk about the canon of American 
literature means precisely to revise that canon. Some time has passed, obviously, 
since Emerson has been newly added to this canon, and it seems that now the 
appeal of his work has faded and American studies have found other forums of 
exchange and innovation. After three decades of assault on the writing and the 
dogmas that formed what Matthiessen had termed the “American Renaissance” 
(Matthiessen 1968), American studies have moved on to fresher pastures, to 19th 
century women’s literature or to early African-American writing, and many other 
aspects of American literary culture that are still left to be explored. I do not mean 
to devalue recent revisionism in the field, but it speaks of a dilemma that anyone 
engaging with the works of American Transcendentalists and especially with those 
of Emerson faces today: Is there a viable means of salvaging something from this 
wreckage?  
Rather than to write a kind of memorial, I would propose to attempt to reclaim 
the urgency with which the period saw itself, both as a conceptual or philosophical 
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problem and as one of literary form. This would also mean that we reinvent or 
relocate the idea of a culturally virulent present that we may have lost in 
postmodern theory. Therefore, this study finds its focal point in what Emerson 
variously calls the “moment,” the “present age,” or the “to-day” and it asks of the 
consequence of a culture and a kind of writing that insists on the urgency of its 
own historical, political, and cultural moment. The problematics of a “spirit of the 
age” will thus be both the methodological avenue on which I approach this 
writing, as well as the very problem or focus of the writing that I study.  
This is not to say that I do not acknowledge the validity of earlier critiques of 
the universal claims of Emerson’s writing and the canon of “American 
Transcendentalism” that it is a part of. I think that this study does itself contribute to 
this process of relativising. At the same time, however, I think we need to reassert 
a certain fascination with literature and how it concerns itself with transporting the 
ungoverned potentialities of a present moment into a form of writing. My text 
consequently seeks not only to present an account of Emerson’s thematic or 
philosophical interests, it also attempts to describe how literary texts themselves 
give form to such a kind of momentary experience. I must therefore also develop 
a practice of seizing on moments in literature that, on the one hand, seem 
ineffable but whose meaning, on the other hand, needs to be put into words. This 
practice, I will maintain, is both my method and my object of enquiry. As a 
consequence, I am not interested in the kind of discipline that close reading 
grants. Rather, I want to explore a practice in which the attention that the close 
reading affords is already bound up with the way in which the text performs its 
meaning. And this procedure is not just a matter of personal reading preferences: 
Emerson, in his own time, was strongly influenced by a theory of hermeneutics 
and, more specifically, by a hermeneutics of the moment. How literature can give 
form to the moment of a present not yet absorbed within historical discourses, that 
is precisely one of the challenges that Emerson’s poetics faces.  
Emerson’s poetics thus forces us to imagine an alternative to the prudishness of 
academic theory and its professionalized ways of wresting sense from texts. When 
professionalized practices of reading have tended to replace the vicissitudes of 
experience and an engagement with the world in favour of an increasing self-
reflexivity, they have ignored that literature is also a mode of discourse that allows 
for a representation and creative refiguration of experience. Obviously, the 
evasion of reality in the literary sciences has also been amplified by the waning of 
precisely those theoretical discourses that take recourse to reality or the real 
(Psychoanalysis, Marxist criticism, etc.). But my insistence on the ‘a-theoretical’ 
quality of experience and on the moment of a present not yet accustomed to 
historical narratives is, as I hope to show in the following, not meant to suggest a 
general debunking of theory. Rather, it asks us to reconsider theory’s very own 
historical moment, that is, the way in which our theorizing is caught up in the 
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theorizing of the texts that we read. Emerson is a good starting point here because 
we cannot fail to acknowledge how his writing is always already both theoretical 
and historic.  
I will open this book with an account of how Ralph Waldo Emerson receives a 
certain historical kind of writing and how he translates it into a poetics of ‘America’ 
(Chapter One: “The ‘spirit of the age’ and Emerson’s zwei Seelen” and Chapter 
Two: “The scholar and the ‘age of introversion’”). Here, I will follow the brief 
trajectory of Emerson’s writing in the first half of the nineteenth century to provide 
something one could call, following Claude Lévi-Strauss, a “hot chronology” (Lévi-
Strauss 1966: 259): Emerson’s emergence as a writer is linked to a period of 
particular eventfulness whose amount of textual production is hardly proportionate 
to the length of the period. The first two chapters of this book are, however, not 
about this eventfulness per se, but about how Emerson thinks he may transport it 
into a kind of writing. It therefore ask not only how a certain historicism emerged 
in America, but how American writers themselves considered their writing to be 
historic, both writing and making history. I am consequently interested in a double 
bind that I read as characteristic of Emerson’s writing: how is literature historicist, 
how does it ‘representatively’ express a “spirit of the age,” and how does it, on the 
other, itself produce this very spirit, make it by writing it? I will show how 
Emerson resists the historicist’s aim at rationalizing, at giving a total account of a 
period. Emerson’s historicism is critical, that is, it does not always or not yet 
understand what is at stake in the historical narrative that it tells. But while it may 
go beyond ‘representative’ ways of writing about ‘America’ in its creative 
refiguration of the potentialities of the present moment, it nevertheless clearly 
belongs to a certain historical moment, even if Emerson can only think of this 
moment as a kind of emergence yet to be fully realized. “Poetry” or “literature” – 
and precisely not historical discourses –, for Emerson, are the means that he thinks 
may be able to give form to such an unprecedented experience of the event of 
the present. And his poetics conceives of itself as an abandonment precisely to that 
which is yet unregimented by historical discourse and, simultaneously, opens the 
field of historical articulations for a creative, “incalculable” (EL, II, 9) refiguration, 
that itself becomes the condition of the possibility of all history.  
I will therefore also attempt to show that we are generally blind to a problem 
in Romanticism and, especially, in American Romanticism. Whenever we attempt to 
situate this writing historically, we may in fact already be caught up in the 
ideologies of historicism that it purports itself. As James Chandler points out, 
Romanticism is “itself constituted as a practice of specifying the dated state of 
historical cultures in and as literary texts” (Chandler 1998: 4-5). Historicist thinking 
leans toward making a work’s relation to its contemporary moment transparent. It 
tries to imaginatively situate a work’s concerns within the larger framework of a 
more general Zeitgeist and attempts to present individual texts as ‘representative’ 
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expressions of the culture in which they were produced. But historicism does 
generally not account for the eventuality where a culture and its literary 
expression can not effectively figure the structure of such a commonsensical “spirit 
of the age”. In fact, there are recurring moments in history when precisely the 
“spirit of the age” is no longer simply a matter of course, but eludes any kind of 
‘representative’ description. Obviously, historicism’s positivism is unavoidable, 
because the discourse of literary studies is never exempted from a kind of 
obligation to narrate, to link up cause and effect, individual aspects of culture and 
their representation in literature. But I think that another side of historicism – and 
a constituent of it from its very beginning at the end of the eighteenth century – 
remains yet to be investigated: What do we do with texts that precisely fail to 
make themselves understood historically? As Emerson puts the questions in “Fate”:  
“It chanced during one winter a few years ago, that our cities were bent on discussing 
the theory of the Age. By an odd coincidence, four or five noted men were each reading 
a discourse to the citizens of Boston or New York, on the Spirit of the Times. It so 
happened that the subject had the same prominence in some remarkable pamphlets and 
journals issued in London in the same season. To me, however, the question of the 
times resolved itself into a practical question of the conduct of life. How shall I live? We 
are incompetent to solve the times.” (W, VI, 3)  
What are the poetic implications of such a failure of the historicist relation of text 
and context, culture and time? Instead of a historicist “return to history” as a return 
to historical “specificity,” this study suggests that we look precisely at how the texts 
of the American Renaissance in their attempts at specifying a “spirit of the age” 
subvert the very historicist and ideological dogma that they put forward. Of course 
we can never simply forget about what one could call the documentary or 
contemporary aspect of a work of art. It is a general requirement for recognizing a 
given work’s participation in the culture of its time. It will, however, not explain 
the ways in which a work of art problematises its relation to history, even presents 
history as unreadable, or tries to imagine a state beyond the historic situation of its 
age. The incapacity to render a history or culture readable, the failure to say, in 
Emerson’s case, what the “spirit” of one’s age is, the failure to link up cause and 
effect in a given culture and thus, the failure to make a contemporary world 
transparent: these, if we recognize their self-reflexive tendency, may nevertheless 
be central aspects of a self-consciously complex literary culture. In other words: 
Especially in its failure to make the “spirit of the age” intelligible, this writing 
proves to be a significant contribution towards the ways in which a society 
conceptualizes its own historical moment. If we concede this kind of reflexivity, 
and if we are willing to acknowledge that, at times, the “spirit of the age” is 
ambivalent, then we also need to recognize these as ‘representative’ elements of a 
“spirit of the age,” as modes of historicist thought in a given epoch.  
One should therefore be careful not to quickly coerce all facts and symptoms of 
a time into a system of intelligibility or representativeness, especially if we are 
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concerned with cultures that try to (historically) think about the difficult passage of 
an epochal threshold. To render the precariousness of such a passage intelligible 
would mean precisely not to gloss over the contingency involved in this passage 
and to expose that which cannot be made commensurate with the historical 
narrative out of which the new age may be produced. Because the epochal turn 
ask for a different kind of writing that imagines the new possibilities of the coming 
age, it needs to be creative, poetic, or literary, rather than historical or 
documentary. Instead of looking at representative ways of historically documenting 
the spirit of an age, we need to therefore pay attention to the poetic procedures 
that an age uses to make its history by writing it. The aim of this study is therefore to 
reinstitute the failure of the historicist relation as a reinvigoration of poetic 
language. Emerson does not lament that we cannot give a representative answer 
to the question “Where do we find ourselves?” (W, III, 45). Rather, the failure of 
the historicist relation in Emerson becomes the moment in which Emerson locates 
the poetic potential of a spontaneous organization of language, that – because it 
cannot be predetermined or pre-contained, because it is not yet itself historic – 
may open a future that is qualitatively different from both our past and our present. 
But because we can only account for the epochal turn after the fact, because we 
cannot calculate its advent, the epochal turn itself comes as a risky moment of 
refiguration, as an excessive poetic moment in which the hold of commonsensical 
discourses is “poetically” loosened and new ways of talking about the world 
become possible. Emerson variously conceives of this risky moment as a “gulf,” a 
“verge,” or an “abyss,” but however risky he thinks it may be, to him this 
precarious moment in-between the strands of historical time is also the moment of 
poetic language, the moment in which poetry may potentially produce a new 
world.  
The standard term to describe the interest of transcendentalist writers in America 
tended to be ahistoricism. With the renaissance of American studies and its 
ongoing re-evaluation of the work of the Transcendentalists – led by, among 
others, Michael Lopez, Len Gougenon, Sacvan Bercovitch, Carolyn Porter, 
Lawrence Buell, Barbara Packer, and David Robinson –, this commonplace has 
been profoundly challenged. These critics, in various ways, all attempt to effect, as 
Michael Lopez has termed it, a “de-transcendentalizing” of the Emerson image, and 
they all suggest that this is precisely achieved by a “return to history,” that is, by 
locating Emerson within the historical, literary, and material culture of his time 
(see Lopez 1988). This has produced a multi-faceted image of an Emerson very 
much invested in the cultural and social concerns of his time. It has, however, 
gone unnoticed that the category of history, for Emerson is not entirely 
unproblematic. In the moment of the epochal refiguration, during the emergence 
of a new world that may or may not be ‘America,’ it is precisely the availability of 
history, the presence of the world – and how it can be made legible 
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‘representatively’ – that can no longer be taken for granted. The moment in which 
a world radically refigured announces itself is also, especially in Emerson, the 
moment of a profound scepticism in which the potential fulfilment of ‘America’s’ 
brilliant promise is simultaneously the risk of its catastrophe. Even though I share 
Enrico Cadava’s diagnosis of Emerson’s “turn” to history in his Emerson and the 
Climates of History (Cadava 1997), I would therefore nevertheless argue that this 
turn generally is much more problematic since the availability of what we term 
history for him is never self-evident.  
The third chapter of this study (“History, quotation, hermeneutics”) elaborates the 
sources and consequences of Emerson’s revision of contemporary historicism. It 
attempts to show how Emerson specifies the ‘American’ experience – though 
unquestionably a result of history - as the place of a poetic opening that is itself “in 
the present, above time” (W, II, 67). But it is precisely because the definition of 
‘America’ in the eccentric moment of the epochal turn (towards ‘America,’ 
‘freedom,’ or ‘democracy’) hinges on a poetic leap from tradition, that any account 
of ‘America’ must necessarily be referred back to itself. America’s self-description as 
a democracy, consequently reinforces an attention to the potential of poetic 
language because it will precisely be America’s readiness to poetically refigure 
itself that will guarantee its lasting success as a nation, as a political ‘messiah’ 
among nations, potentially bringing about the advent of democracy. We thus find 
in Emerson both a more general revision or criticism of historicism, as well as an 
insight into the prevalence or universality of interpretation in every historicism and 
all kinds of history.  
Usually, histories of philosophy or hermeneutics start this tradition of a critically 
refined historicism and a hermeneutics of self-implication with Nietzsche’s assertion 
in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft that there are no facts, only interpretations.1 But 
Nietzsche’s historicist critique – how he sees philosophy implied in the murky 
processes of interpretation and writing – has its precedent in Emerson, as 
Nietzsche himself repeatedly acknowledges. Nietzsche, both at the receiving end 
of seventy-five years of German historicist thought and an avid reader of 
Emerson’s writing, exhibits the full potential of something that is already a problem 
in Emerson’s ambiguous reception of European historicist and philological thought. 
We are thus concerned with a curious trans-atlantic detour, by way of which 
something eccentric is inserted into European epistemology and the continental 
school of philosophy. But it is precisely this eccentric something – the problem of 
‘America,’ of ‘freedom,’ of ‘democracy,’ but also of ‘poetry,’ as we will see – that 
will return into it via the twin inlets of Nietzsche and Heidegger (who, in specific 
 
 1 See for example the following passage from Nietzsche’s Nachgelassene Fragmente: “Gegen den Positivismus, 
welcher bei dem Phänomen stehen bleib ‘es giebt nur Thatsachen’, würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Thatsachen 
giebt es nicht, nur Interpretationen. Wir können kein Factum ‘an sich’ feststellen: vielleicht ist es ein Unsinn, so 
etwas zu wollen.“ (KSA, XII, 315).  
 “ I NO LONGER BELI EVE THIS ”  
 
20 
ways, have themselves made ‘America’ the place of their epistemological 
critiques). My study will repeatedly return to the philosophy of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and, to a lesser degree, Hegel, because they allow me to explain 
some of the conceptual problems that Emerson encounters in his writing. While 
this study is primarily about Emerson’s poetic refiguration of ‘America’ and not 
about its dispersed echo in European philosophy, I will juxtapose Emerson’s 
argument with that of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger in order to make explicit 
how unusually early Emerson came across a number of topics that are both central 
to his project – the renewal of ‘America’ – as well as to that of the more 
philosophical or systematic project of these European philosophers – namely that of 
a critique of metaphysics. It is precisely because the name ‘America’ collects, in 
Emerson’s essays, a number of tendencies that, avant la lettre, go against the grain 
of metaphysics that I am interested in this trans-atlantic exchange.  
I take my cue here from Stanley Cavell, who suggests that Heidegger, if 
apocryphically, reads Emerson, or rather, that he reads Emerson through Nietzsche. 
In other words: Nietzsche – who is said to have carried an edition of Emerson’s 
essays in his coat pocket at all times, who copied passages from Emerson’s essays 
into his journals, and whose early essays “Fatum und Geschichte” and 
“Willensfreiheit und Fatum” present a synthesis of Emersonian topics – looks to 
Emerson in an attempt to sort out his own dissatisfaction with historicism and 
hermeneutics. Heidegger, in his large-scale project of a comprehensive critique 
and reformatting of traditional metaphysics, again refigures some of the problems 
that Nietzsche had already gleaned from Emerson. The problem that runs through 
this exchange is the irreducible historicity of understanding as well as the problem 
of a general perspectivism of all interpretation. Furthermore, as Cavell remarks: 
“So I am faced with the spectacle of Heidegger’s in effect – unknowingly – facing 
certain of Emerson’s words, guiding himself in these fateful years by sins from, of 
all places, the waste of America” (1995: 41). In my analysis, I will complement 
Cavell’s account of America’s Abfall from Europe and of America as the Abfall of 
Europe by Hegel’s (dis)qualification of America as Europe’s “Überschuss” (TWA, 
XII, 109), by Nietzsche’s (dis)qualification of the American way of life and, more 
specifically, in Jenseits von Gut und Böse, of the American promise of “allgemeine 
Wohlfahrt” as “Brechmittel,” (KSA, V, 165), as well as by Heidegger’s denigration 
of what he considers the “Weltverdüsterung” (GA, 40, 34) inherent to American 
ideology.  
All of these European thinkers are fascinated and, to a certain degree, also 
disgusted by America because it comes as a nation and cultural concept that refutes 
historicist dogma as well as its assumption that a transparent kind of historical 
understanding can be posited. ‘America’ here becomes the disturbing case study 
that proves that history could also have proceeded otherwise. ‘America’ presents 
the unprecedented case of a country that produces its own history, that produces 
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itself out of itself, by way of a continual process of self-implication. In the writing of 
European philosophers, it therefore figures as a challenge to teleologic concepts of 
history, because its political forms are not the result of a governed process of 
improvement, as the European nation state had seen it in the late 18th and early 
19th Centuries, but the result of a continual self-referral and self-actualization.  
If I talk about hermeneutics, then, I do so not in the sense of an art or techné of 
interpretation, not in the sense of an instrumental practice but, rather, as 
Heidegger would have it, as a “mode of revealing” (Heidegger 1993: 319), as the 
(self-reflexive) questioning of how, at any given time, we are as interpreters (or 
readers, or writers) in the world. Emerson’s hermeneutics – itself, as I will show, a 
re-evaluation and revision of the evolving discipline of hermeneutics in his time 
(Böhme, Herder, Schleiermacher) – makes obvious that because American culture 
is itself historical, an elaboration of American culture cannot simply tell its 
genealogy but must, inevitably, ask what it means to be American at any given 
moment. In other words, a definition of American culture does not consist in a 
genetic account of the meaning of ‘America.’ Rather, in order to understand what 
‘America’ has meant at any given time, it needs to deconstruct the terms of 
‘America’ to show how they are themselves historic. To do this, Emerson’s 
exploration also needs to evaluate these terms by poetically rearranging them into 
new constellations so that their newly acquired significance questions the totality of 
‘American culture’ and the supposedly self-evident nature of common sense in 
‘America’.  
America’s reinvention, as Emerson imagines it, can thus not simply take recourse 
to the facts of American life. It does not simply consist in making the present 
cultural reality correspond with the political constitution of the American republic. 
Precisely because Americans cannot get a fix on the “spirit of the age,” precisely 
because the character of their nation eludes them when they “clutch hardest” (W, 
III, 49), as Emerson phrases it, they need to enter into a more “radical 
correspondence” (W, I, 29) so that a qualitatively different future will be possible. 
“[T]he most unhandsome part of our condition” (W, III, 49), as Emerson argues, is 
that Americans are presented with a “verge” precisely when they look at the 
ordinary circumstances of their lives, when they try to identify what, specifically or 
characteristically, ‘America’ is all about. As Stanley Cavell has argued, American 
must thus confront the field of ordinary experience, or rather, acknowledge what 
Cavell calls the “uncanniness” of ordinary life (Cavell 1988). And it is only by 
passing through this ambivalent and unintelligible everydayness that a new 
interpretation of their being-in-the-world is made possible. This is why I will 
repeatedly return to the notion of a specifically American Selbstverständlichkeit 
(self-understanding) and Selbstbezüglichkeit (self-implication), and how it is 
historically produced. What is at stake in this specifically American self-implication 
is how ‘America’ understands itself and how ‘America’ – both as a nation and as a 
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concept – has to be understood as precisely a result of a procedure of self-
implication. We will see, furthermore, that the advent of the ‘American’ age as an 
age of democracy in Emerson is also dependant upon this kind of self-implication, 
upon how America makes itself understood or, as the last chapter will ask, how it 
insists on making itself understood all over again.  
In contemporary American political discourse, this Emersonian topos of self-
implication has solidified into a political programme, for example when Barak 
Obama in the running up to the 2008 presidential elections repeatedly invokes the 
mantra of “We are the change that we seek”. Obama obviously exploits this 
gesture of a kind of self-registration to suggest his own legacy as standing in a line 
with that of the great sermon teachers that brought about America’s first ‘native’ 
culture and literature. But while Obama’s formula (“We are the ones we have 
been waiting for,” “Our time has come”) envisions the American promise as 
already fulfilled, its change already accomplished in America’s political subjects, in 
Emerson this self-implication signals a cultural logic that is much more precarious 
since it does not provide a stable ground from which to project a political 
programmatics for America.2 Rather, it presents Americans with a “verge” (W, II, 
315), it asks for a kind of thinking or writing that is itself, to use Heidegger’s term, 
“ab-gründig” (GA, 28, 136), self-reflexively investigating the grounds of its 
assertions so as to discover that what it is, is precisely the result not of a political 
calculus but of a continual self-reflection.  
And Emerson knows that for this process of self-implication not to itself settle 
into a normative or authoritarian cultural dogma, it needs to confront a “force” or 
“power” that will deflect ‘America’ from its projected course. To prevent the 
sedimentation of its cultural forms and to bring about the fleeting forms that secure 
the freedom of democracy, in other words, for ‘America’ to fully life up to its 
promise, it must be continually, as Emerson phrases it in “Circles,” “unsettled”:  
“This old age ought not to creep on a human mind. In nature every moment is new; the 
past is always swallowed and forgotten; the coming only is sacred. Nothing is secure 
but life, transition, the energizing spirit. No love can be bound by oath or covenant to 
secure it against a higher love. No truth so sublime but it may be trivial to-morrow in 
the light of new thoughts. People wish to be settled; only as far as they are unsettled is 
there any hope for them.” (W, II, 319-320)  
America’s advent as a nation and, more specifically, as a democracy, is thus not so 
much a question of a political process instrumentally governed, but a process of 
“emergence” (“the coming only is sacred”): it is not about a consolidation of facts 
or about a concretization of the ideals set forward by its constitution, but rather 
about the confrontation of a potential precisely not yet incorporated into the 
 
 2 For a critical assessment of Obama’s formula “We are the change that we seek,” see Joe Klein, “Inspiration vs. 
Substance” (Klein 2008). For a transcript of Obama’s Super Tuesday speech, see Barak Obama, “Our Time 
Has Come” (Obama 2008).  
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present state of culture. And if America’s future cannot be anticipated, this also 
means that it is incalculable, irreducible to historical narratives or a notion of 
historical progress. To conceptualize America’s exceptional or eccentric moment in 
history, “in the present, above time,” Emerson returns repeatedly to what he 
variously calls “life,” “love,” “experience,” “nature,” “poetry,” etc.: In Emerson’s 
writing, they all function as reserves of future meaning, an ungoverned potential 
for signification out of which America can reinvent or refigure itself. But in order 
to tap into this potential and to prevent it from being arrested within an 
authoritarian discourse, writing must itself open up towards a “radical 
correspondence,” and the writer must be poetically responsive towards everything 
that is not yet assimilated into America’s commonsensical discourses.  
Because this “radical correspondence” cannot be the result of a political 
programme, America’s future is one that must be produced “poetically,” time and 
again. In Emerson, this presupposes a specific writerly ethos, namely one of poetic 
experimentation. As he phrases it in “Circles”: “I unsettle all things. No facts are to 
me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker with no Past 
at my back” (W, II, 318). Emerson here anticipates the kind of philosophical 
problem that will later puzzle Nietzsche and Heidegger. If the world is the result 
of our own poetic creation, then obviously, we must also confront the danger of a 
more risky perspectivism.3 “The soul is the perceiver and revealer of truth” (W, II, 
279), Emerson argues, an insight that will later be echoed by Nietzsche who 
argues that “[z]u jeder Seele gehört eine andere Welt” (KSA 4, 272). This, in turn, 
is elaborately analysed by Heidegger in different places, most consistently in Logik. 
Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (GA, 21) where he deals with the Eigentlichkeit of 
being.  
“Das Dasein [ist] ständig ‘mehr’ als es tatsächlich ist, wollte man es als Vorhandenes in 
seinem Seinsbestand registrieren. Es ist aber nie mehr, als es faktisch ist, weil zu seiner 
Faktizität das Seinkönnen wesenhaft gehört. […] Und nur weil das Sein des Da durch 
das Verstehen und dessen Entwurfscharakter seine Konstitution erhält, weil es ist, was 
es wird, bzw. nicht wird, kann es verstehend ihm selbst sagen: ‚werde, was du bist!’” (SZ 
145, vgl. GA, 21, 413).  
Cavell applies this “become what you are” to Emerson’s peculiar individualism and 
his project of moral perfectionism. And in fact, Emerson phrases a similar insight in 
his journal when he reminds himself to consistently “[w]rite what you are” (J, IX, 
177). Cavell in the context of this Emersonian “become what you are” speaks of 
Emerson’s “onward thinking” (see Cavell 1992: 136-137), and I think that this term 
 
 3 This perspectivism, as Stanley Cavell has argued convincingly, also holds the danger of a characteristically 
Emersonian skepticism, the danger, that the world that I imagine, is only a figment of my own imagination and 
not the kind of shared communal vision that ‘America’ characteristically announces. For Stanley Cavell’s 
comments on Emersonian skepticism, see Cavell’s Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution 
of Emersonian Perfectionism (1990) and his comments in Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, 
Austin, Derrida (1995). For a comprehensive study of Emersonian skepticism, see John Michael’s Emerson and 
Skepticism (1988).  
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can be applied not only to Emerson’s reconception of American individualism but 
also to the nature and problem of historical understanding in his writings. Cavell 
takes recourse to Heidegger’s getting ourselves “on the way”, Unterwegssein, as a 
mode of Vollzug, that can also be a poetic performance (“write what you are”). 
Irreducible to a linear organization of history, its promise or potential has to be 
grasped in the here and now of the present, and only our grasping of this here and 
now (as weak or tentative that this grasp may be) will open a different future. And 
indeed, as I will point out, this comes very close to the kind of Hermeneutik der 
Faktizität in early Heidegger, a hermeneutics, that conceptualizes the movement 
or Bewegung of factical life as already bound up with our acts of understanding it 
(see GA 63, esp. 9-16). Emerson says that “[l]ife is an ecstasy” (W, VI, 41), a form 
that consistently goes beyond itself. Even if he sees a certain risk that this ecstasy 
may atomize the brilliant communal vision of America into a myriad of individual 
destinies, he nevertheless thinks that every American must confront this “greater 
possibility” (W, II, 306) in order to enable the arrival of the American age, in 
order to potentially enable the advent of ‘democracy’ or a specifically American 
‘freedom’.  
In chapters four (“Towards a ‘radical correspondence’”) and five (“The aporia of 
passage and the future of American democracy”), I will elaborate these findings 
and I will show how Emerson’s poetics of “radical correspondence” needs to be 
read politically. While Emerson is, rhetorically or poetically speaking, after 
potential moments of troping in which American language digresses from its prior 
uses, this focus on language’s potential for refiguration in Emerson is also the 
“groundless ground” (LL, II, 280) upon which he thinks an American politics can 
be built, even if this will not make for a political programmatics once and for all. 
At a moment when the democratic project in the eyes of many Americans came 
under the influence of a certain sedimentation, when the window of opportunity 
that the revolution had opened slowly began to close and the opportunities for 
radical democratic development began to grow sparse, Emerson opts for the 
undecidability of the writer’s confrontation with “nature,” with “experience,” with 
“life,” that is, with the ordinary fields of social practices precisely not governed by 
a political programmatics. We may tap into this potential, I take Emerson to say, 
only if we are willing to “poetically” correspond with this incalculable “nature”. 
“Nature,” or “experience,” or “life” – as spaces exempted from meaning beyond 
our everyday dealings with them – here consequently denominate a presence that 
interacts with ours, and that, if it is figured poetically, questions its very form. It 
comes as a divergent field of social praxis that continually reminds us of 
everything that is not reducible to a (philosophical) systematics or (political) 
programmatics. It therefore also functions as a corrective that counters any 
intentional or instrumental notion of politics.  
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I conclude my study thus not with one of the favoured returns to politics that 
we have grown accustomed to in contemporary cultural and literary studies. Also, 
I do not (re)discover a ‘political’ Emerson. Rather, I want to show how it is 
precisely a poetic Emerson that is inherently political. In other words, I am 
interested in Emerson’s refusal of a systematic politics and his favouring of an 
interest in the poetic as a posture that keeps the field of politics open because it 
continually questions and refigures its attributions. Poetry, because it must 
necessarily remain implied in the vicissitudes of language, cannot but work against 
the reduction of particulars to universal forms that is the inevitable sign of any 
politics. And because poetry does not dismiss language if it fails to express some 
final truth, it circumscribes the space of a democratic politics. Following Jacques 
Derrida’s comments on the nature of democracy as a political form yet-to-come, à-
venir, I will argue that it is, to use Derrida’s words, the “absence of a proper form, 
of an eidos, of an appropriate paradigm, of a definitive turn, of a proper meaning 
or essence and, at the same time, the obligation to have only turns, rounds, tropes, 
strophes of itself” (Derrida 2005: 74), in short, that it is the poetic constitution of 
democracy that makes for its specific political promise or hope. Because this 
promise cannot be fixed in a definite constitutional utterance, Americans must 
continue to poetically invest the name and notion of ‘America’ with meaning. They 
need to poetically “unsettle,” as Emerson has it, prior designations of ‘America’ in 
order to keep its democratic promise alive.  
The possibility to say “I no longer believe this”, to come back to Emerson’s 
remark, as a little poetic experiment in nuce also contains a theory of Emerson’s 
politics. It tells us that we must unsettle the things that have been said, even if 
these words were ours. And it tells us that a political or philosophical enterprise 
can only be kept open for the future inclusion of what is not yet a part of it, if we 
continually test its assertions and refute them if they do no longer correspond with 
what we think in the present hour, “to-day”.  

  
One 
 
The “Spirit of the Age” and Emerson’s zwei Seelen  
“It is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and 
displacement of domains of difference – that the 
intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, 
community interest, or cultural value are negotiated.” 
– Homi Bhabha 
 
 
Emerson’s assessment of his time is remarkably ambivalent. When Emerson 
anonymously publishes Nature in 1836, he begins by way of a pronounced 
condemnation of the culture of his time: “Our age is retrospective. It builds the 
sepulchres of the fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism” (W, I, 3). 
Looking back some thirty years later in “Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New 
England,” however, Emerson describes the beginnings of Transcendentalism as a 
time in which “[t]he ancient manners were giving way” and in which “there grew 
a certain tenderness on the people, not before remarked” (W, X, 325). He adds 
that “the key to the period appeared to be that the mind had become aware of 
itself. Men grew reflective and intellectual. There was a new consciousness” (W, 
X, 326). Emerson’s earlier assessment describes the times in which his work 
emerges as a time when all change and cultural innovation is stalled in favour of 
an affirmation of tradition and when American culture is pervaded by a strong 
sense of stagnation. The passages from “Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New 
England,” on the other hand, identify Emerson’s forming years as a time of hope 
and change, a time in which he gladly witnesses the emergence of new 
“manners,” new intellectual categories and, potentially, a “new consciousness” (W, 
X, 326). Earlier, in the late 1840s, Emerson makes a similar assessment when he 
remarks that “[w]ith this din of opinion and debate, there was a keener scrutiny of 
institutions and domestic life than any we had known” (W, III, 253).  
What then, I want to ask, is Emerson’s and/or Transcendentalism’s ‘true’ moment? 
What is the cultural spirit from which Emerson’s work emerges and for which it 
stands, ‘representatively’? The question is not merely of biographical relevance and 
the answer to it, as we will see, does not simply tell the stock story of the 
adolescent radical growing into the conciliatory writer of age, who with a mild 
eye looks back upon his early years of youthful radicalism. Rather, I am going to 
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argue in this chapter that the problem of defining or specifying a “spirit of the age” 
lies in fact at the heart of Emerson’s interest and that it is a combination of both 
moments – that of youthful radicalism as well as that of matured acquiescence – 
that provide the signature of Emerson’s and Transcendentalism’s times. Emerson’s 
ambivalent assessment of his time thus speaks simultaneously of a feeling of 
stagnation as well as of a hope for change and for an opening towards an 
American future that is yet unknown, unachieved.  
More significantly, this experience of an eventful present containing conflicting 
historical or cultural temporalities also pertains to a problem of cultural and 
historical “specificity”: it speaks of a culture that is at pains to assess or take hold of 
the ‘representativity’ of its contemporary experience, that finds it difficult to 
express, ‘representatively,’ its ‘spirit of the time’. In the American context and 
especially for what Sacvan Bercovitch has called “the symbolic construction of 
America” (Bercovitch 1993), the recognition of such a ‘representatively’ American 
experience is obviously of vital importance since America’s age and the existence 
of a culture specifically ‘American’ hinges precisely on, as Stanley Cavell has 
termed it in his The Senses of Walden, the identification of America’s “crossing” or 
“leaping” (1992: 136) from European culture and its assertion of a different, that is, 
‘American’ culture.  
Emerson’s most pronounced analysis of the ambivalent moment of America’s 
present and of the reality of historical change occurs in his lecture on “The Times,” 
where he uses epochal terms to specify the undecided character of his time 
between tradition and change. He sees, in his time, “a war between intellect and 
affection,” a veritable “crack in Nature” (W, X, 325), and argues that his time 
represents that moment in history, recurring occasionally, when “the party of the 
Past” and “the party of the Future” (W, X, 325) and the respective attitudes of 
traditionalism and radicalism clash with one another. While this collision defines 
the very process of history, it features most prominently when a culture’s destiny is 
undecided, when a culture’s present moment offers a choice of conflicting future 
destinies and possibilities. Such “eras of activity“ (W, X, 325), as Emerson calls 
them, are symptomatic of a period of transition, of a passage from what was to 
what is yet to come. And there are moments in which this conflict of the past and 
the future becomes so urgent, that it becomes the very preoccupation of a culture, 
as Emerson points out: “At times the resistance is reanimated, the schism runs 
under the world and appears in Literature, Philosophy, Church, State and social 
customs” (W, X, 325). America or American culture in Emerson’s diagnosis 
consequently finds itself in a sort of interregnum, in, to use Homi Bhabha’s term 
(Bhabha 1994: 2), an “interstitial” period in-between epochs or cultures in which 
something new is about to appear while the old has not quite loosened its grip 
yet. According to Emerson, contemporary American culture is precisely located in 
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such an interval, about to cross the threshold into a new era. It is, as he describes 
this moment of transition in “Circles”: on “the verge of to-day” (W, II, 315).  
This identification of a moment in-between cultures and cultural temporalities is 
not exclusive to Emerson, it also pertains to the rest of the heterogeneous group 
that assembles under the auspices of a “Transcendentalism.” They all feel that they 
are “living on the threshold of profound and glorious change,” as George 
Hochfield has argued, and “wrote of America as though its destiny was to be a 
messiah among the nations” (Hochfield 1966: xi, xxvii). Emerson formulation of 
the “verge of to-day,” however, adds a more troubled or ambivalent note to this 
celebration of America’s present: for him, the present moment is not decided, it is 
a present moment that, while not completely done with the past, has not yet 
realized its coming state. And it is precisely this con-temporaneity, this falling 
together of incommensurable ‘stratums’ of time – of both the past and the future – 
in the immediacy of a lived present that is the temporal signature of what Emerson 
variably calls the “to-day,” the “present” or, simply, the “moment.”1 His work is an 
examination of this peculiar contemporaneity as con-temporality, of the potentiality 
of the present moment at the crossroads or, rather, in-between the directions of 
historical time.  
In “The Times,” Emerson likens his endeavour to find a suitable expression for 
the precarious moment of the present to that of the Daguerreotypist who, “with 
camera-obscura and silver plate, begins to traverse the land.” And he proposes that 
in order to achieve the immediacy of presentation that is to become the genius of 
photography, the writer needs to “set up […] Camera also, and let the sun paint 
the people” (W, I, 264). Emerson thus associates his project of writing about 
America’s contemporary moment with the undertakings of the surveyors, landscape 
painters, mappers and, as of the late forties, photographers that begin to assemble a 
comprehensive picture of their country.2 But while the geographic surveys 
conceive of America first in Pacific terms and later in terms of the American 
interior and the West – that is: in geographical terms –, Emerson’s description of 
the nation is more interested in establishing a map or portrait of America’s 
conflicting cultural destinies in the present.  
The reference to the early daguerreotypists in “The Times” is nevertheless 
telling and certainly not a casual one: The daguerreotypist, for the first time, is 
able to arrest the world directly on the metal plate, but what is documented – and 
this applies exclusively to the Daguerreotype with its long intervals of exposure – 
also gives form to or documents a certain duration insofar as the graininess and 
haziness of the picture implies the process of time passing. The daguerreotype 
 
 1 On the metaphor of “Zeitschichten,” see Reinhart Koselleck “Einleitung” in Zeitschichten. Studien zur Historik 
(Gadamer 2000: 9-16).  
 2 One would have to add to this list the bureaucrats that carried out the 1840 United States Federal Census. For 
the first time, the 1840 census ascertained a comprehensive summary of America’s infrastructure, population 
and geographical expansion.  
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consequently suggests both the materiality of the moment documented in the 
picture as well as the very ephemerality of the impression left on the plate. The 
incomplete articulation of the daguerreotype – both eye-stopping and transitory, 
sharply defined at the centre but blurry at the margins –, for Emerson corresponds 
to his own search for a new cultural poiesis adequate to a contemporary 
experience of America.3  
Emerson’s interest in the daguerreotype suggests that the relevance of such a 
new cultural poiesis does not so much consist in providing a new Weltanschauung 
in the sense of providing a comprehensive picture of the contemporary moment. 
Rather, it is a question of approaching the world as fundamentally open, changing, 
and transitory. It comes as no surprise then, that the phrase “canvas of Time” (W, I, 
265) in Emerson’s essay is quickly replaced by the term of the “sketch” (W, I, 
265): what is at stake here is thus not so much a description of the country as an 
attempt to find modes of writing that will give an adequate expression of the 
transitoriness of America’s present moment. While the survey expeditions trek 
through a vast and formerly unknown landscape to claim it as American ground 
once and for all, Emerson is not interested in a lasting description or definition of 
‘America,’ rather, he wants to document the fleeting expressions of the present 
moment. His writerly project does consequently not aim at establishing an 
exhaustive account of his time or a kind of comprehensive Zeitdiagnose, rather, as 
he phrases his ambition in the lecture on “The Times”, “as each well-known form 
flitted for a moment across the wall, we should have a series of sketches which 
would report to the next ages the color and quality of ours” (W, I, 265).  
His allusion to the daguerreotype and the sketch suggest two characteristic 
elements of the new aesthetics that Emerson envisions: specificity and 
ephemerality. Just as a sketch preserves something of the urgency of the specific 
historic moment in which it was conceived, so does Emerson’s writing attempt to 
conserve the immediacy of the present moment that it writes about as a mode of 
writing. And just as the daguerreotypist can only produce a latent image that will 
then have to be developed into a picture by additional chemical processes, 
Emerson seeks to find modes of writing that reproduce, for the reader, the 
immediacy of America’s eventful present in writing. The difficulty of the project to 
make America present to itself, then, for Emerson consists not so much in a 
problem of mimesis or ‘representativity’. Just as Emerson describes photography’s 
process and its latent imaging as a “strange” process – “The strangeness of the 
discovery is that Daguerre should have known that a picture was there even when 
he could not see any” (J, VI, 110) –, Emerson’s struggle will be one of finding 
 
 3 As Beaumont Newhall and John Wood have noted, Americans saw the daguerreotype as an important element 
of new national aesthetics. See Wood’s America and the Daguerrotype (1995) and Newhall’s The Daguerreotype 
in America (1976). On Emerson’s interest in early forms of photography, see Sean Ross Meehan’s excellent 
article on “Emerson’s Photographic Thinking” (2006). 
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modes of writing that will express the restlessness and fluidity of the experience of 
being “on the verge of to-day”.  
If Emerson’s assessment of his times is ambivalent, then it is because for him, 
the experience of being on the verge of to-day, necessarily consists of 
contradictory or even incommensurable sentiments. It is no accident that Emerson 
should supplant the term “canvas” with that of the “sketch”: He is well aware that 
these conflicting sentiments cannot ultimately be integrated within the grander 
design of a historical narrative. Rather, it is within the provisional form of the 
sketch that some of the troubled spirit of the times can be documented. Emerson’s 
writing on the verge of to-day consequently is more interested in the mixed form 
of a present in which “fragments” – as remainders of the past – and “hints” (W, I, 
265) – as weak suggestions of what is yet to come – make up a present, that can 
never be entirely present to itself.  
And this is precisely the present that forms the conflictual stage upon which he 
imagines his ‘America’ and that poses the challenge which his writing needs to 
answer. Emerson, consequently, can be both: radical and committed reformer 
deeply involved in and as intrigued by the advent of the new, as well as distant 
observer and apologist, knowing that even in our boldest strides towards the new, 
we cannot completely leave the past behind us. And it is this fundamental and a 
priori self-difference of the present with itself that makes it impossible to 
comprehensively account for it in writing. As a consequence, it should come as no 
surprise if it should prove impossible to identify the one Emerson – even if we 
refer to ‘Emerson’ for convenience’s sake: just as Emerson’s ‘Americas’ are always 
‘many,’ so is Emerson’s ambivalent, undecided or contradictory, sometimes 
inconsistent characterization of his time itself ‘representative’ of an America 
essentially unsettled. It speaks of the heterogeneous moment of a present in which 
the common destiny is rapidly turning into a multitude of conflicting individual 
destinies that can no longer be extrapolated into a homogeneous cultural project 
named ‘America’.  
Indeed, Emerson’s assessment of his time is strangely inconclusive and critics 
have variously characterized him as either the very foundational genius of a 
specifically ‘American’ literary tradition or its first eccentric or, even, its first 
outspoken heretic. If the last qualification is correct with regards to Emerson’s 
position vis-à-vis the dogmas of the Unitarian church, taking him to be the solitary 
exponent of an eccentric or even idiosyncratic view of American society and 
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culture somewhat misses the point.4 In fact, Emerson understood himself to be part 
of a culture that itself, as a whole, considered its very own moment eccentric, 
poised on a threshold where tradition was no longer self-explanatory, the culture’s 
traditional narratives of a shared communal vision being exposed to a 
multiplication of individual antagonistic destinies in the present moment.  
In his essay on “The American Scholar,” Emerson thus locates American culture 
precisely within this eccentric, interstitial or ruptural space of an epochal threshold, 
posed between the splendid promise of an American future and its debt to 
(European) tradition.  
“Perhaps the time is already come when it ought to be, and will be, something else; 
when the sluggard intellect of this continent will look from under its iron lids and fill 
the postponed expectation of the world with something better than the exertions of 
mechanical skill. Our day of dependence, our long apprenticeship to the learning of 
other lands, draws to a close.” (W, I, 81) 
Emerson temporally qualifies America’s state of transition as a “postponed 
expectation.” America, in the present, is thus both still a brilliant promise as well as 
the constant deferral of that promise in ordinary life. And as a result of these 
ambivalent or antagonistic forces, America’s future is undecided yet. However, 
Emerson’s assessment of his era as essentially transitional and undecided is not 
merely a symptom of his own private penchant for eccentric positions, it is the 
symptom of a culture that considers itself as eccentric with regards to its traditions. 
Emerson is consequently not the outspoken radical and, as Robert Milder rightly 
points out, “his practical politics were instinctively conservative” (Milder 1999: 49), 
but he nevertheless accomplishes what Giles Gunn has called Emerson’s “thinking 
across culture” (Gunn 1992), that is, he attempts to expose a contradictory potential 
in the contemporary moment so that by rearranging the given terms of his culture 
into new constellations, he may come up with a potentially antithetical assessment 
of America’s present situation.5 Familiar with the kinds of historical writing that 
became popular at the beginning of the nineteenth-century, Emerson is thus not 
 
 4 On October 28, 1832, the Proprietors of Second Church in Boston dissolved Emerson’s pastoral connexion 
because he had, in a sermon preached several weeks earlier, explained that he could no longer administer the 
sacrament of the Lord’s Supper in good conscience. In a close textual and historical analysis, he had argued 
that evidence from the bible implies that “Jesus did not intend to establish an institution for perpetual 
observance when he ate the Passover with his disciples,” and that, very much like the dogma of the Trinity, the 
ordinance unreasonably shifted attention from God to his “Mediator.” Furthermore, he insisted that it was a ritual 
specific to a particular time and place that had long since passed and therefore had to be considered a 
distraction from religious life in Boston in 1832. Reading the text for the day literally – Romans 14:17: “The 
kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but righteousness and peace and joy in the holy ghost.” “This particular 
ordinance,” Emerson insisted, “is not consistent with the spirit of Christianity.” Even tough Emerson added that his 
refusal to perform the Lord’s supper were not out of a “hostility to this institution [i.e. the Unitarian Church]” 
(W, XI, 20), his statements caused an outrage among the Second Church, an outrage that would cause Emerson 
to leave his ministry at the end of the same year.  
 5 On the question of Emerson’s radicalism, see also Matthiessen’s classic American Renaissance. Art and 
Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (1968: 3-75).  
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merely a symptom of his time but, rather, manages to historically think about the 
contemporary moment, as Milder points out:  
“Far from being a mere symptom or signpost of history, Emerson was himself a historical 
thinker, conscious of the age both microhistorically in its immediate events and 
macrohistorically as these assumed significance within the kind of epochal analysis 
advanced in other frameworks by Tocqueville and Marx.” (1999: 49)  
But we will also see that Emerson realizes in his essays that epochal analyses – in 
literature as well as in literary history – are never ‘innocent’ or, for that matter, 
‘uninvolved’: while later attempts at defining the American strain in literature 
tended to presuppose a characteristic kind of ahistoricism, Emerson’s writing makes 
obvious that we cannot suppress or neglect the fact that American literature itself 
emerges as a particular kind of historical writing. Consequently, our attempts at 
providing a history for American literature and at locating individual writers within 
that history are therefore themselves already bound up with the very nature of 
American literature. Furthermore, and this is a point I will repeatedly return to, 
the concept of ‘America’ itself, as it is developed by Emerson and his 
contemporaries, is precisely a historical mode, one that is made self-reflexive, 
“critical,” as Emerson would say, by way of its elaboration in literature and, later, 
philosophy.  
Matthiessen’s coinage of an “American Renaissance” in his American 
Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (1968) is 
therefore something of a misnomer: It locates a rebirth where there is instead the 
more complex process of America’s self-implication in the ways in which it makes 
itself understood – historically, aesthetically, but also, as we have seen, 
‘geographically,’ etc. Also, Matthiessen’s study suggests that within a very short 
period of time and through the contribution of only a few ingenious minds, a 
supposedly novel cultural paradigm was simply created out of the blue.6 Although 
Matthiessen’s book at the time may have been helpful in bringing to attention a 
group of writings that had until then been largely overlooked, I think that it 
wrongly identifies an ardent enthusiasm for a new American literature as the only 
“spirit” of the age. Emerson and other writers of the age consider the development 
of a self-consciously American literature to be a much more painstaking and 
painstakingly slow process. For them, this process has only just begun and its 
results, let alone consequences, cannot yet be anticipated. They locate themselves 
 
 6 See David Reynolds, Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination in the Age of Emerson 
and Melville (1989). While Matthiessen tells a narrative in which his choice of authors and his reconstruction of 
the period suggest a beginning of American literature once and for all, others have told conflicting tales about 
those cultural narratives precisely ignored or even suppressed in Matthiessen’s account. For an excellent 
overview, see Walter Benn Michaels and Donald Pease, The American Renaissance reconsidered (1985). 
Matthiessen’s narrative of an American Renaissance was first challenged by Donald Pease in “New 
Americanists: Revisionist Interventions into the Canon” (1990). Benn’s criticism of Matthiessen has since been 
variously complemented, most convincingly again by Pease in National Identities, Post-Modern Artifacts, and 
Post-National Narratives (1992) and in John Wood Sweet’s Bodies Politic: Negotiating Race in the American 
North, 1730-1830 (2003).  
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not after some kind of rebirth, not at the end of a trajectory where American 
literature has finally arrived at itself, but right in the middle of the emergence of 
this new (literary) aesthetics. Matthiessen’s narrative of the first cultural flowering, 
“of the potentialities freed by the revolution” (Matthiessen 1968: xv) identifies a 
homogeneous group of writers sharing a joint concern – the celebration of a new 
and self-confident America that has finally fulfilled its promise –, but we can say 
today that this homogeneous culture posited by Matthiessen is indeed a 
mystification. But even if this has been repeatedly ousted as the simplistic 
reduction of a literary historian trying to provide the stable ground upon to 
establish the tradition or rather politics of a specifically ‘American’ literary history, it 
has nevertheless stuck with literary historians who find it difficult to accept that a 
text can be a haphazard or imperfectly provisional expression of the ambivalent 
promises of a time – in Emerson’s words: not a “canvas of Time” but a “sketch” (W, 
I, 265). And indeed, Matthiessen and others, in their attempt to construct a 
“continuity” of American (literary) history, have conveniently ignored that the 
narrative of a brilliant makeover in Emerson’s America also coincides with the 
“minor” narratives of Jackson’s Indian removal or with that of the mistreatment of 
the black population both in the South and in the North.7  
For Emerson and other authors of the era, the birth of a self-consciously 
American literature is still something that is left to be desired. It has not happened 
yet and it is only with the detached perspective of old age that Emerson will be 
able to look back upon the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century and say 
that “the ancient manners were giving way” (W, X, 325). The use of the 
progressive indicates, however, that when it happened, Emerson’s “new 
consciousness” (W, X, 326) was not something that simply arrived on the scene. 
The revolution or renewal of American culture that Emerson witnesses is slow, as 
a paradoxical description of this process by Emerson in “The American Scholar” 
suggests: “This revolution is to be wrought by the gradual domestication of the 
idea of Culture” (W, I, 107). If Emerson specifies the “revolution” as “gradual,” 
then this also means that the revolution will come about not by a sudden 
reformation of American culture, but rather by a slow process of change or 
transition. In other words: If the process of “gradual domestication” is itself the 
“revolution,” then Emerson frames a kind transitionality or liminality as the 
condition of the possibility of any cultural or individual change. This is why David 
Mikics has described both Emerson’s notion of culture as well as that of the 
individual as “not-yet-achieved entities” (Mikics 2003: 1). They are to be reformed 
according to the same slow procedure that also underwrites what he elsewhere 
 
 7 The argument for a “continuity” of American literature was first made by Roy Harvey Pearce’s The Continuity 
of American Poetry (1961). For a history of the exclusions pertaining to the construction of the body politic in 
America’s formative years, see Sweet’s Bodies Politic: Negotiating Race in the American North, 1730-1830 
(2003).  
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terms “perfectionism”: they cannot be reformed once and for all, they cannot 
simply be reborn (as the label of an American “renaissance” suggests), they must 
be changed and improved continually. The reason that Emerson nevertheless terms 
this “gradual domestication” a “revolution” is that because, as a philosopher of 
culture, he conceives of this wish to be perfected as both necessary and risky: in 
their compulsion to move on, both culture ‘at large’ as well as the individual 
immersed in it encounter a risk or “fate” that can threaten the possibility of change 
or improvement altogether.  
Specificity and transition 
Emerson’s writing articulates this experience of being in transition. An experience 
that, while attributable to emergent forces, cannot yet be seen as a completed next 
step in the achievement of the American destiny or promise. Emerson’s was a 
culture whose very identity then rested not so much upon a notion of “revolution” 
or a characteristically American “newness,” as Irving Howe has it (Howe 1986), 
but rather upon concepts of change and transition. But for a culture as deeply 
invested in historic or, rather, historicist discourses as America’s, for a culture 
obsessed with finding its ‘specificity’ and ‘originality,’ the formulation of such an 
experience of being in transition obviously poses a problem, since it challenges 
any claim for historical or cultural ‘specificity.’ Unfortunately, no attention has been 
drawn to this double problem of both Emerson’s investigation of early nineteenth-
century historicist discourse as well as of the problematic notion of historical 
specificity as implied by early America’s attempts to define a representatively 
‘American’ culture. I want to argue, however, that Emerson’s use of a temporal 
terminology – of the “today,” “the present,” “the moment,” “the contemporary,” 
etc. – cannot be adequately understood without early America’s recourse to and 
reception of historicist discourses at the beginning of the nineteenth century.8  
Especially pertinent here is a historicism that American imports from Britain: the 
first decades of the nineteenth century brought an innovation of English and, 
especially, Scottish historicism in which a sense of crisis was all-pervading and 
which set itself the goal of ascertaining what its authors called the ”spirit of the 
age.” Such an attention to the “spirit of the age,” as James Chandler has argued 
convincingly in England in 1819: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of 
Romantic Historicism, would also go to question the “naturalized familiarity” (1998: 
37) with which we restore works to their historical situation. Drawing attention to 
the “spirit of the age,” trying to read the “signs of the times” for these historically 
 
 8 For the classic treatments of the emergence of historicist thought in England and Germany, see Friedrich 
Meinecke’s Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook (1972) and R. G. Collingwood’s The Idea of History 
(1993).  
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minded authors of the first half of the nineteenth century means, as Chandler has 
it, to “call our attention to the historical specificity of our ways of specifying 
historically” (1998: 48). In other words: What is at stake here is not the standard 
(new) historicist injunction to “always historicize” (Jameson 1981: 9), but rather a 
set of problems associated with the ‘representativity’ or ‘specificity’ of historical 
experience itself. If new historicist critiques have drawn attention to the specific 
historical circumstances (of writing and reading literature, of literary production 
and reception) then it is precisely that specificity, as I will argue with respect to 
Emerson, that becomes a major issue and problem of a self-consciously American 
literature. It goes without saying that this would also necessitate a rewriting of the 
story of American literature that is now firmly and safely in the hands of a new 
historicist criticism. It would require us to ask not so much how literary texts 
express a situation that is historically specific, but rather how this criterion of 
‘specificity’ is a desideratum rather than a given in American literature and how we 
can talk precisely about those texts that are unable to specify any such specific 
“spirit of the time”.  
On the one hand, then, the American interest in history was often focused on 
discovering the specificity of the American historical situation and experience – as 
well as, of course, on how they were opposed to a specifically European history 
and experience. On the other hand, however, we find in at least some American 
writing of the first half of the nineteenth century a complex investigation of these 
discourses of historical specificity. And in Emerson’s case, I want to maintain, we 
find the introduction of a self-consciously historicist culture that precisely refutes 
any such claim to specifying ‘America’ and its place in history in favour of a more 
sustained analysis of the process of historical change and transition. America’s 
engagement with an inherited (British, Romantic) historicism can thus also be read 
as the discovery of a more complex problem of American self-reflection that 
realizes that its attempts to write the narrative of America’s history always already 
must be considered ‘generic’ insofar as they themselves precisely produce the 
grounds upon which inevitably yet another American history is written.9  
In America, just as in England, this “seek[ing] the means of making legible the 
historical peculiarity of their place and time,” as Chandler argues, amounts to “a 
project of making history by making it legible” (1998: 78). For Chandler, the first 
few decades of the nineteenth century are therefore “the age of the spirit of the 
age” (1998: 196). This British Romantic historicism fell on especially fruitful 
grounds in America because Americans had a natural interests in the workings of 
history: If America was to be a nation and culture distinct from the English, then it 
 
 9 For an elaboration of this aspect of ‘generativity’ inherent to all processes of history, see Paul Veyne’s Writing 
history. Essay on epistemology (1984: 59f.). For an account of the interaction between American nationalism and 
early republican literature, see Michael Warner’s The Letters of the Republic. Publication and the Public Sphere 
in Eighteenth-Century America (1990: 118-50) 
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would also need its own history. Furthermore, America’s “millennial expectations,” 
as Sacvan Bercovitch has pointed out in The American Jeremiad (1978: 42), 
required a special organization of history’s temporality that bent the future back 
into the present, so that fulfilment and initiative was to be located not in a distant 
future but in the lived present (see Bercovitch 1978: esp. 31-92). In order to 
become a manifest destiny, the American promise had to show itself in the 
materialities of everyday, ordinary lives.10  
Emerson’s “American” historicism itself develops out of a confrontation with the 
writings of pre-eminent British historicists such as William Hazlitt, John Stuart Mill, 
and, especially, Thomas Carlyle. Emerson, as Chandler suggests, “delivered his 
lectures in England, after much consultation with his mentor Carlyle, and in respect 
to such paradoxes this discussion certainly bears the marks of writings by both 
Carlyle and Mill about heroes, hero worship, characteristics, spirits of the age, and 
signs of the times” (Chandler 1998: 176). Carlyle’s influence and his extensive 
correspondence with Emerson are well-documented and Emerson would have 
been aware of other main exponents of the British historicist movement. But 
Emerson’s aim is not merely a matter of “out-Carlyling Carlyle”, as Edgar Allen Poe 
has suspected in a review of Emerson’s essays in the Graham Review in January 
1842 (see Poe 1902: XV, 260). He is not merely Carlyle’s docile disciple, rather, 
he enters into a long exchange with the Scottish essayist and in his letters to 
Carlyle as well as in his essays exposes some of the problems of his historicism.11  
Also, Emerson’s English Traits, published in 1856, is an attempt at turning the 
tables on British historians. Here, a prominent American critic dares to say 
something about British culture. This turning of the tables, however, happens with 
a twist that is significant with regards to what I have been saying about the 
discourse of historical and cultural specificity. If the British discussion of ‘America’ 
turned around a possible definition of its “spirit of the age,” and, therefore, around 
the question of the totality of its culture, then the return of this historicism to 
Britain via America comprises an important modification: Emerson speaks only of 
English traits, that is, of features, of fragments, of fleeting impressions. The title of 
the essay resonates with the term of the “sketch” that turns up repeatedly in 
historicist contexts in Emerson, and the traits indeed combine to give a sketch-like 
impression of England rather than the comprehensive totality of a historical 
narrative. The title of English Traits thus already foregrounds the problematics of 
historicism and its writing by promising to talk about a specific Culture – the 
English – while at the same time refusing precisely this historical specificity by 
providing only traits – implying both that what will be presented is characteristic 
 
 10 On the notion of „manifest destiny“ and its relevance to the literature of New England Romanticism, see Kris 
Fresonke, West of Emerson: The Design of Manifest Destiny (2003: esp. 88-127). 
 11 On Emerson’s life-long relation with Carlyle, se Kenneth Marc Harris, Carlyle and Emerson: Their Long Debate 
(1978).  
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of the English (as in “trait” of character), yet only sketch-like, hazy in its outline, 
etc. (“trait” as the stroke of a pen, touch of paint). 
Even in his early attempts at a “Historical Discourse” (W, II, 27-86) for his 
hometown Concord, Emerson attempts not only to identify the ‘specifiable’ facts of 
life in a small New England town, he also draws attention to the precarious 
transitional moments of this community (the inhabitants first encounters with the 
native population, the slow waning of religious fervour) to present a picture that 
exposes everything that is makeshift, everything that cannot be accounted for in 
terms of a historical genealogy. Emerson’s characterization of his age as transitional, 
viewed in this context, is then already a revision of a doctrine of cultural 
specificity because it finds the characteristic imprint of the epoch to be that no 
specific facts express the state of the nation. When Emerson’s substitutes British 
historicism’s “spirit of the age” with his own notion of a “present age,” then this 
also indicates that he views historicism’s obsession with specificity as problematic.  
Emerson is not alone in characterizing his age as transitional. His call for a 
radical shift in the nature of literary attention towards the transitional moment of 
America’s “present age” is echoed by a number of contemporary critics equally 
attempting to diagnose their contemporary moment and thus to prepare the ground 
for an assessment of America’s future: From Thomas Paine’s Common Sense and its 
qualification of the “[t]he present state of American Affairs” (Paine 1976: especially 
81-99), to Joseph Story’s 1826 talk on the “Characteristics of the Age” (Story 1852), 
to Emerson’s early attempt to inventarise the “Peculiarities of the present Age” (J, 
II, 164) in a long list in his journal in 1827, to Alexis de Tocqueville’s diagnosis 
America’s “present democratic age” in Democracy in America in 1835 (DiA, 827), 
to William Ellery Channing’s famous 1841 address on “The Present Age” (Channing 
1886: 164-171): an investigation or problematization of the specificity of America’s 
historical situation, of its Zeitgeist, and an elaboration of the ambivalence of its 
cultural promise develops into the central preoccupation of American arts and 
letters in the first half of the nineteenth century.  
As a consequence, the notion of a “present age” develops into a kind 
portmanteau term in a discussion in which not merely the nature of America’s 
transitional moment but the very constitution of ‘America’ is at stake. The various 
treatises on the “present age” symptomatically express that Americans are deeply 
anxious about a culture that is rapidly turning away precisely from the Puritan 
values and ideals that were commonly assumed to have founded America. 
Furthermore, the transitional developments that Emerson and his contemporaries 
hold to be characteristic of their age, are precisely no longer readily assimilable to 
a Puritan doctrine of providence because their results and consequences cannot be 
estimated, cannot be calculated or integrated into the general organization of 
historical temporality that the doctrine of providence suggested. In other words, 
the transitional moment of the present precisely explodes the historical continuum 
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and exposes an ambivalence that can no longer be easily reconciled with the 
narratives that America tells itself about both its past (the myth of passage, the 
genealogy of the founding fathers) and its future (providence, millennialism). What 
is at stake, then, in the rampant renewal of America in a present whose 
consequences prove increasingly hard to predict, is the very nature of ‘America’ 
and its history. 
Taking Emerson’s ambivalent assessment of his times seriously consequently also 
functions as a sort of historical caveat, preventing a too hasty identification of the 
writer and his socio-cultural background. It opens the possibility to think of 
different ‘Emersons,’ each brought to coherence not by the cultural whole, but 
rather by particular but significant developments within that cultural whole. If I am 
going to talk in detail about certain historical developments in Emerson’s time, this 
is then not meant to provide the kind of rock-bottom foundation for a new, more 
conclusive or comprehensive ‘Emerson’. Rather, I would like to show that 
Emerson’s ambivalent attitude towards his time develops both out of as well as 
against the ambivalent possibilities of his age. If Emerson’s case shows that some of 
the developments could only be assessed in hindsight, then this strengthens my 
argument about both the ambivalence of the character ‘Emerson’ as well as about 
the ambivalence of a contemporary American moment that comprises conflicting 
destinies and cultural temporalities. Emerson, in an entry in his journal in 1827, 
identifies precisely these crosscurrents of his time when he talks of the 
“peculiarities of the present age” (J, III, 70). Later, in the essay “Circles,” he argues 
that the age’s undecidability produces the precarious experience of being on “the 
verge of to-day” (W, II, 315). Because such an experience cannot be expressed in 
the terms of the historicism that had come to express ‘America,’ it also necessitates 
a revolution of the symbolic forms and modes of expression that articulate 
‘America’.  
Emerson, as a former member of the Unitarian ministry, would have been 
intimately aware of the theological implications of the jeremiad’s model of history 
and how it governed the organization of time in American culture. In his essays, 
however, the jeremiad’s suggestion of a specifically American organization of 
history is combined with an awareness of America’s historical difference here and 
now, in the present. Emerson receives this historicist impulse via Carlyle who, in 
the first chapter of Chartism, ponders on the “The Condition-of-England Question” 
(Carlyle 1840: 1ff.), and who, in Past and Present (Carlyle 1896-99) as well as in 
the essay “The Signs of the Times” (Carlyle 1896–99), proposes his own ‘theory’ of 
England’s “spirit of the age”. How central a similiar attention to America’s ‘spirit of 
the age’ is in Emerson’s early writing can be gauged from the program of his early 
lecture courses, written and delivered in Boston between the publication of Nature 
(1836) and his second book Essays, First Series (1841). Maybe it is because these 
lectures contradict the standard image of Emerson as a “transcendentalist” 
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philosopher ignorant towards the historicist obsession of his contemporaries that 
these lectures have not received much attention. They are especially relevant, 
however, because they show Emerson to be deeply invested in the historicist 
discourses and epochal analyses of his time. We find here the early imprint of 
Emerson’s elaboration and critique of contemporary historicist dogma that will, in 
less explicit terms, also form the basis of much of his later writing. The lectures 
courses on “The Philosophy of History” (EL, II, 1-188), on “The Present Age” (EL, 
III, 175-315), as well as on “The Times” (EL, III, 335-382) are especially pertinent 
to our concern here, because a young Emerson here evaluates and challenges his 
contemporaries’ obsession with the past. In the introductory lecture to his course 
on “The Philosophy of History,” the first lecture under Emerson’s own 
management, he confesses his profound interest in the topic of history, only to 
argue, against contemporary historicist habits, that any discussion of history needs 
to give account also of that which is not commensurable to historicist discourses: 
For history’s narrative to be “true” (EL, II, 9), he argues, it would have to be able 
to give account also of what he calls man’s “wonderful thoughts” and “the contrast 
between his wishes and his position which constitutes the tragic element” (EL, II, 
9). Already in these early lectures we can discern Emerson’s attempt to conceive 
of the other of history and of the implied discourse of ‘specificity,’ namely history’s 
potentiality, its “incalculable power” that is the result of “some faculty never yet 
unfolded” (EL, II, 9), its “idiosyncrasies,” contradicting the “abstractions” of history 
(EL, II, 12). That is, Emerson values precisely that which is not “commensurate” 
with “actual history” (EL, II, 9). To expose this potential inherent in any kind of 
history but usually glossed over when we give an account of it, we must thus 
‘defamiliarize’ our historical narratives precisely by looking at the antagonistic or, 
as Emerson phrases it, “tragic” potential of a present moment that comes as a 
rupture, as a stepping out of historical time: “The ancients are dead, but for us the 
earth is new today and heaven is raining influences. Let us unfetter ourselves of 
our historical associations” (EL, II, 11).  
British historicism and the case of America 
These early lectures can be read as a kind of blueprint for Emerson’s historical 
thought. But they are written out of and against a culture that was already deeply 
invested in the problems of historicist discourses. For America to become an 
independent nation, it was necessary that America began its own age, an age that 
had to be historically different from the epoch of Europe and, therefore, an age 
that had to be specified historically. America’s obsession with history is therefore 
both global and local. It concerns America’s position in a general history of nations 
as well as more local aspects of American culture. Early on in the nineteenth 
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century, Americans founded numerous historical societies to collect and record the 
historical data of the New World (see Ross 1984). For Maine alone, to provide an 
example, the busy accumulation of historical data amounted to several book-length 
histories: John Sullivan’s History of the District of Maine (1795), the two volumes of 
William Willis’ The history of Portland, from its first settlement: With notices of the 
neighbouring towns, and of the changes of government in Maine (1831-1833), or 
Rufus King Sewall’s Ancient dominions of Maine (1859).  
This American obsession with history, however, is the result of a trans-atlantic 
translation or transferral of British Romantic Historicism to New England. In the first 
few decades of the nineteenth century, there had been a remarkable inflation of 
historical writing in Britain. Much of this writing concerns itself with the question 
of the historical specificity of a given culture. Thomas Carlyle, John Stuart Mill, 
Edward Bulwer-Lytton, as well as William Hazlitt: all worked under the assumption 
that the aim of writing history was not so much to give an account of the past but, 
rather, to combine the diverse facts of the present into a narrative that would 
allow for an assessment of Zeitgeist, of the historical specificity of what they 
variously called “The Spirit of the Age” or the “Signs of the Times”.12 They were 
interested in such a “spirit of the age” because they thought that it would 
announce a change that was to fundamentally change British Culture. Carlyle and 
Mill, who both had strong ties to the St. Simonian program, held that the progress 
of industrialization in England would enable a sweeping reform of British society, 
but without the political violence that had devastated France after the Revolution.13 
The basic tenet of their historicism was the assumption that change and progress 
could be contextualized within the specificity of a given culture. This obviously 
also called for a specification of the circumstances of the time and culture that 
made change happen. As a consequence, these authors need to deduce from the 
known facts a kind of representative imprint or historical situation: the “spirit of the 
age”.  
Emerson had read Carlyle’s pieces on the “Spirit of the Age” in the Edinburgh 
Review, and it was with these pieces in mind that he decided, travelling in Italy on 
his trip through Europe in 1833, to spend the summer in England and to try to 
make Carlyle’s acquaintance. Carlyle had never been particularly successful in 
England but had a steady readership in America. The same is true for Carlyle’s 
version of historicism: it was not received well in England but obviously hit a 
nerve in America where Carlyle’s writings earned him a steady income. Emerson’s 
 
 12 See, for example, Thomas Carlyle’s “Signs of the Times,” (1829: 441-442), John Stuart Mill’s “The Spirit of the 
Age,” in Mill’s Essays on Literature and Society (1965: 31), William Hazlitt’s “contemporary portraits” in The 
Spirit of the Age (1935), as well as Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s “The Intellectual Spirit of the Time,” England and 
the English (1970: 286-7). 
 13 Significantly enough, the St. Simonians had themselves published a compendium on “Signs of the Times” in 
L’Organisateur in the early 1830s. See Richard Pankhurst’s The St. Simonians, Mill and Carlyle: A Preface to 
Modern Thought (1957). 
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American editorship of Carlyle’s writings later provided numerous occasions for 
correspondence, in which the topic of a “spirit of the age” turns up repeatedly.14 
Carlyle himself was strongly influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment, 
especially by the writings of William Hamilton – who serves as a kind of leitmotiv 
in Carlyle’s Past and Present –, as well as by those of Adam Smith and Walter Scott 
(see Jessop 1997). For Carlyle, and later for Emerson, the writings of the Scottish 
Enlightenment are a valuable source because the accelerated state of history in 
America to contemporary observers resembled the Ungleichzeitigkeit of Scotland’s 
history vis-à-vis that of England.15 With their “calibration of uneven temporalities” 
(Chandler 1998: 134) and their representation of layers of “archaic” cultural forms 
sedimented within the nation’s modern historical geography, Walter Scott’s 
historical novels, especially, proved fruitful because they provide a model for a 
representation of America’s own diversity of origins and its culture of 
heterogeneity. Clearly, Scott’s influence is also discernible elsewhere in American 
literature, for example in Cooper’s historical novels or Hawthorne’s romances. Also, 
we find in Carlyle‘s “heroes” and Emerson’s “representative men” the kind of 
central figure that, like the narrator in Scott’s novels, functions as the centre or 
focus of an epic historical crisis, attempting to fuse a diversity of facts and 
conflicting historical temporalities. More importantly however, and here we return 
to the theme of historical specificity, we may follow George Lukács who, in The 
Historical Novel, has credited Scott’s novels with being the first to document the 
“specifically historical,” defined as “the derivation of the individuality of characters 
from the historical peculiarity of their age” (Lukács 1963: 19). Emerson was well 
acquainted with Scott and the tradition of historical writing and historicist research 
that he acted as a patron to. In a short speech given at the Massachusetts Historical 
Society’s celebration of the centennial Anniversary of Walter Scott’s birth in 1871, 
he himself compiles a list of the exponents of this tradition: “Mackintosh, Horner, 
Jeffrey, Playfair, Dugald Stewart, Sydney Smith, Leslie, Sir William Hamilton, 
Wilson, Hogg, De Quincey” (W, XI, 467). Emerson’s trans-atlantic import of a 
historicist problem within British Romanticism is relevant here because it explains 
his own historical interest in America’s “spirit of the age” as well as a more 
particular fascination with America’s historical anomaly within the history of the 
Western world.  
Ronald Meek has argued, in a landmark essay on “The Scottish Contribution to 
Marxist Sociology“ (Meek 1967), that the Scottish Historical School was a decisive 
influence on Marx’s revision of historicist dogma and his conceptualization of a 
 
 14 I think that three letters of this exchange are especially relevant when it comes to this historicist them, all of 
them circle around the theme of a “Present Age”: letters from Emerson to Carlyle from December 12, 1839 
(CEC, 253-55) and from March 18, 1840 (CEC, 260-62), and a letter from Carlyle to Emerson from January 17, 
1840 (CEC, 257-60).  
 15 On the similarities between the American and Scottish relation to Britain and on the crucial legacy that Scottish 
authors left to American literature, see Robert Crawford’s Devolving English Literature (2000: esp. 176-215). 
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moment in the history of Western nations in which the smooth transition from one 
age to the next can no longer be taken for granted. Marx and Carlyle share this 
interest with other writers – with Goethe and Michelet, for example –, but it is 
Marx and, to a lesser degree, Carlyle who come up with theoretical descriptions of 
the complex period and process of transition, with conceptualizations of the 
epochal threshold as a revolutionary moment that is itself not reducible to the 
modalities of historical time. Hence, the increasing interest in a definition of the 
“contemporary” and of the “spirit of the age” as something that is ambivalent, 
comprising different cultural temporalities. Like in Marx’s well-known example of 
“The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” (Marx 1996), the “contemporary” 
precisely does not show itself as a mere presence, it is both an inheritance of 
forms (language, customs, social hierarchies, etc.) as well as the potential for 
something new (the new epoch, the language of revolution, etc). As Marx points 
out:  
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in 
circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present circumstances, 
given and inherited. Tradition from all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on 
the brain of the living. And just when they appear to be revolutionising themselves and 
their circumstances, in creating something unprecedented, in just such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis, that is when they nervously summon up the spirits of the past, 
borrowing from them their names, marching orders, uniforms, in order to enact new 
scenes in world history, but in this time-honoured guise and with this borrowed 
language.” (Marx 1996: 32) 
Marx’s dictum that human beings make their own history but under conditions 
given them from the past thus also identifies a paradox at the heart of the then 
predominant historicist dogma of ‘specificity’: history is made precisely in those 
moments in which it is impossible to say what, specifically, the “spirit of the age” 
is. But such a rupture of the continuum of history is necessary, if “something 
unprecedented” (the new age, the new culture, etc.) is to be created. Marx thus 
proposes a heightened attention to precisely those urgent moments in the present 
moment of culture that cannot be reclaimed within a historical narrative.16  
While a new historicisim was a decisive influence on the constitution of a 
specifically American vision of history, this exchange also runs the other way, 
since European historians and cultural critics were increasingly puzzled by the 
problem of how to judge American manners. American manners, in the early 
nineteenth century, become the case for British historicist thought. Again, the 
questions of historical specificity plays a certain role here, because European 
historians were uncertain whether American manners were in any way 
 
 16 In order to come to terms with the paradoxical potential of an eventful moment of the present, critical thinkers 
of the time attempt to develop a new theoretical language. Marx, for example, revises the historicist discourse 
of the Scottish Historical School so as to also integrate new theories of economic growth and of the liberal 
market, because for him it is the market that is responsible for this new kind of complex or contradictory 
temporality (see Meek 1967). 
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‘representative’ of a specific or particular culture, that is, a culture that had left 
behind its English origins to become ‘American’. Furthermore, historians were 
uncertain about whether America’s case did not pose a more fundamental 
methodological problem for historicism. This involved all shades and tones of 
English Anti-American sentiments, but it offered historicists an occasion to test their 
theories against the cultural specificity of the American historical “situation” in 
“cases” (manners, character, etc.). As Chandler argues: “For English writers of the 
post-Waterloo period, American manners had become a case, in short, a 
circumstantial challenge to a normative frame of reference” (Chandler 1998: 445). 
The emergence in England of a specific understanding of ‘American’ culture is thus 
precisely also the site of the appearance of a new British historicism concerned 
with the specificity of the historical “situation,” with the question of “climate” and 
“mentality”.17 Significantly enough, “America helped shape a concept of culture in 
which Britons could re-imagine their own culture in its historicity” (Chandler 1998: 
447). Britain’s meticulous ethnography of the early American republic and its 
peculiar manners thus also served, far from being uninterested, to inversely add to 
the specificity of the historian’s description of Britain itself. As Chandler points out:  
“[T]hese surveys of “American manners” need to be read as cutting both ways – that is, 
as carrying implication for both cultural identities at a crucial moment in their modern 
development and, further, an implication for the development of ethnographic practice. 
The case of post-Constitution America – U.S. culture – is crucial to understanding the 
“historical situation” of British Romanticism both in form and fact.” (Chandler 1998: 
448) 
Obviously, the animosity between America and Britain also developed alongside 
America’s rise as a market economy, and America’s anxiousness to define itself as a 
national culture resonated with growing concerns about a decline of British 
national identity on the other side of the Atlantic. Washington Irving, in his 1819 
The Sketch Book of Geoffrey Crayon (Irving 1978), is one of the first to frame this 
animosity between Britain and America as a matter also of (national) literature, 
when he argues in “English Writers on America”:  
“It is with feelings of deep regret that I observe the literary animosity daily growing up 
between England and America. Great curiosity has been awakened of late with respect 
to the United States, and the London press has teemed with volumes of travels through 
 
 17 There is a great deal of excellent literature on the influence of British Romanticism on American literature and 
on how American culture carried what is now commonly named, following Robert Weisbuch, “the Burden of 
Britain”. But presentations of this exchange commonly run in one direction only and do not concern themselves 
with how America itself became the constitutive case for an emerging British Historicism. Clearly enough, in 
England, this obsession with America also had internal reasons. After all, the British public and the authorities 
were growing anxious over the increasing middle-class emigration from what the émigrés thought to be a 
politically corrupt country. As it became obvious that English reform movements both from “below” as well as 
from “above” were not going to be successful, America served as a kind of outlet that made it possible to divert 
attention from increasing social conflicts in Britain itself. On “The Burden of Britain and the American Writer,” 
see Robert Weisbuch’s Atlantic Double-Cross. American Literature and British Influence in the Age of Emerson 
(1986: 3-35). For an account of how Emerson adopts the question of historical “climate” and turns it into a 
principle of his poetics, see Eduardo Cadava’s study on Emerson and the Climates of History (1997).  
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the Republic; but they seem intended to diffuse error rather than knowledge; and so 
successful have they been, that, notwithstanding the constant intercourse between the 
nations, there is no people concerning whom the great mass of the British public have 
less pure information, or entertain more numerous prejudices.” (Irving 1978: 43) 
England’s historicist curiosity for America in the eyes of American writers thus 
accentuates the need for an American self-description or self-definition, for a 
‘natively’ American literature expressing the specificity of America’s contemporary 
situation.18 But this self-description itself has to take recourse to ‘foreign” models of 
historicizing, the issue of defining a specifically American culture can therefore not 
be distinguished from that of the problem of ‘representative words’. In other 
words: the specificity of American culture must be expressed in ‘representatively’ 
American words and, therefore, the historicist problem of specifying America is 
tantamount to a problem of rhetorics, of literature, or of poetics. In Irving’s 
presentation of this “irksome and hackneyed topic” (Irving 1978: 45), the historicist 
perspective is therefore replaced by an awareness of a linguistic or rhetorical 
dilemma, by what he calls “the tissue of misrepresentation”:  
“The tissue of misrepresentations attempted to be woven round us are like cobwebs 
woven round the limbs of an infant giant. Our country continually outgrows them. One 
falsehood after another falls off of itself. We have but to live on, and every day we live 
a whole volume of refutation. All the writers of England united, if we could for a 
moment suppose their great minds stooping to so unworthy a combination, could not 
conceal our rapidly-growing importance, and matchless prosperity. They could not 
conceal that these are owing, not merely to physical and local, but also to moral causes 
– to the political liberty, the general diffusion of knowledge, the prevalence of sound 
moral and religious principles, which give force and sustained energy to the character 
of a people; and which, in fact, have been the acknowledged and wonderful 
supporters of their own national power and glory.” (1978: 45)  
But again: Irving’s Sketches are intended for a European audience and the very 
definition of American cultural indepedence is therefore voiced in the terms of an 
emerging British historicism, as a matter of “moral causes” and “character” rather 
than in terms of resources. 
While the American desire to define a specific national culture is dependant 
upon a British influence, for the British, the rapid “Americanization” of America 
serves as a case study that corroborates the truth of the dogma of “historical 
 
 18 In America, the question of historical specificity was not only tantamount to a successful definition of America’s 
status as a nation, it was also of central importance to the constitution of the early republic since it came to 
bear on questions of political organization. Charles Ingersoll, for example, in an influential address to the 
American Philosophical Society in 1823 (later published as Discourse Concerning the Influence of America on 
the Mind) asks whether America’s new political institutions would also produce new forms of citizenship, new 
manners, or new mentalities (Ingersoll 1823). In a way that had then become fashionable, Ingersoll attempts to 
explain how character results out of the institutions of private and public life. Descriptions of America’s 
specificity were consequently also attempts at outlining or defining the American political subject. Emerson 
partially absorbs this argument, especially when he tries to explain the American spirit with recourse to the 
institutions of ordinary American life.  
 THE “ SPI RIT OF THE AGE” AND EMERSON’S  ZWEI  SE ELEN  46  
 
situation” and “specificity”.19 Henry Bradshaw Fearon with his Sketches of America. 
Narrative of a Journey of Five Thousand Miles Through the Eastern and Western 
States of America, William Cobbett with his Journal of a Year’s Residence in the 
United States, Morris Birkbeck with his 1817 Notes on a Journey in America from 
the Coast of Virginia to the Territory of Illinois as well as with his Letters from Illinois 
in 1818: these writers put a new British historicism to the test by applying it to the 
case of ‘America,’ while at the same time contributing to what Irving calls the 
“tissue of misrepresentations” that many Americans felt was imposed on them from 
the outside. American publications, however, were indeed similar, equally 
invested in specifying America’s historical situation in what many still saw as a 
fantastic, almost otherworldly continent. John Mason Peck’s A Gazetteer from Illinois 
(1838), John Bristed’s America and Her Resources (1818), Meriwether Lewis’ and 
William Clarks’ History of the Expedition (1814) – accounts of the peculiar character 
of the American landscape with its vast plains, strange canyons and gargantuan 
mountain ranges, collected during their expeditions from 1804 to 1806 –, or John 
Bartram’s collection on the marvellous beauty of the American flora in his 
Observations: Just as their British counterparts, these writers, in attempting to 
inventarise American nature and life, take recourse to a historical discourse that is 
meant to specify America’s “spirit of the age” in the contemporary moment. While 
the American desire for self-understanding is consequently awakened by a feeling 
of being defined by the outside, American self-definitions are themselves based on 
or constituted by templates that American authors adopt from an outside 
perspective. In other words: America’s attempts at specifying what is ‘proper’ only 
to their own culture is derived precisely from an external perspective, the 
expression of a ‘natively’ American culture is therefore paradoxically also the result 
of a complex trans-atlantic exchange.  
The conundrum of America’s “present age” 
While I have limited my narrative of this trans-atlantic exchange to an exchange 
between British and American cultural concerns, the case of ‘America’ was also 
widely received as a historicist or cultural problem in continental literature and 
philosophy. And there is one French commentator among these observers of 
America that will play an important role in my analysis of Emerson’s writing: Alexis 
de Tocqueville. Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Tocqueville 2004) is 
interesting in our context because it similarly attempts to catalogue the cultural, 
political, and historical specificities of ‘America’. What is more important, however, 
is that Tocqueville carefully observes an element in American life, in America’s 
 
 19 On the discourse of “Americanization“ and how it influenced early literary development, see Göran Blix’s 
“Charting the ‘Transitional Period’: The Emergence of Modern Time in the Nineteenth Century” (2006).  
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situation in the present, that precisely goes beyond a notion of historical specificity. 
Sent on a trip across the United States together with Gustave de Beaumont to study 
the American penitentiary system – published in 1832 as Du système pénitentiaire 
aux Etats-Unis et de son application (Tocqueville 1979) –, Tocqueville collects 
what he thinks are representatively American ways and moeurs américaines, and 
he hopes that these impressions will provide a comprehensive picture of America’s 
departure from Europe. Tocqueville applies the kind of historicist writing that he 
had learned in a lecture course given by François Guizot’s at the Sorbonne. 
Guizot’s course, later to be published as the General History of Civilization in 
Europe (Guizot 1997), serves as a preparation for his official journey to the United 
States, but there is a qualitiy of American life that Tocqueville discovers that cannot 
quite be made to conform with the kind of historicist discourse that he had 
learned. He finds, in America, an anomaly, an irritation to that discourse that he 
will grow increasingly concerned about: interspersed with Tocqueville’s 
description of scenes of American life, we find rather anxious remarks about a 
specifically American unrest, that Tocqueville cannot quite get a fix on. Also, his 
qualification of American manners is frequently interrupted by comments on the 
unpredictability or even inconsistency of the democratic sentiment and mentality in 
America. At the heart of Tocqueville’s depiction of a ‘specifically’ American culture, 
we thus find a quality that he cannot quite pinpoint, an anomaly in America’s 
present situation that seems to be a reminder of the ambivalent promise of 
democracy as well as of the uncertain future of the American project in general.20   
Tocqueville is thus the first to locate, above and beyond any historical 
specificity, the contradictory potential of an American present that cannot yet be 
made commensurate with a historical narrative.21 The following two passages 
illustrate this Tocquevillean vacillation between a discourse of historical specificity 
and his discovery of the ambivalence of a present moment. Significantly, 
Tocqueville uses the metaphor of the stream or river for both conflicting models of 
historical progress: 
“It is clear to anyone who pays attention that in every century there is one singular, 
dominant fact to which all other facts are related. This fact almost always gives rise to a 
fundamental thought or principal passion that ultimately attracts all other feelings and 
ideas to itself and carries them along, as a great river seems to absorb its tributaries.” 
(DiA, 582)  
And:  
 
 20 Following Elisabeth Bronfen, I take the term “American project” to suggest precisely such a simultaneity of a 
the cultural modalities of the (imminent) “promise” and that of the (potential) “catastrophe”, see Elisabeth 
Bronfen, “Der ‘American Dream’: Versprechen und Katastrophe eines Begriffs” (2007).  
 21 Probably it is no coincidence that it should be a French philosopher of history that comes up with the first 
formulation of the urgency or the danger of history in America. After all, the failure of the revolution and the 
tiresome process of rebuilding constitutional authority under Louis Philippe made French historians particularly 
susceptible to the contingencies implied by the process of history. 
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“A world that is totally new demands a new political science. To this need, however, 
we have given little thought. Immersed in a rapidly flowing stream, we stubbornly fix 
our eyes on the few pieces of debris still visible on the shore, while the current carries 
us away and propels us backward into the abyss.” (DiA, 7) 
The first passage, taken from the second book of Democracy in America, highlights 
standard historicist procedure by virtue of which “some peculiar and 
preponderating fact” is taken to provide the key to an epoch. Once the historian 
has identified this fact, he is able to produce a comprehensive picture of the age, 
because, like a “great river”, it functions as a universal historical narrative that 
attracts all minor or particular stories. Tocqueville applies this procedure 
particularly in those passages in which he recounts the pre-constitutional formation 
of American democracy, where he argues that the conditions of colonial 
settlements seamlessly or quasi automatically unfolded into the forms of “communal 
liberty” that later became the basis of American democracy (see Maletz 1998). The 
second paragraph, however, taken from the introduction, frames a more precarious 
concern: here, Tocqueville imagines a moment of historical transition, the urgency 
implied by a moment of epochal change, in which the old is left behind but, 
thrown into the event of an unpredictable and tumultuous change, the new has not 
yet been attained. Democracy in America frequently returns to this scene, to this 
zone of indeterminacy, and to what Tocqueville thinks is, essentially, the 
precariousness of American politics. At the heart of the American project, 
Tocqueville locates a creative but risky time of transformation that cuts across the 
known grammars of historical progress and gives rise to transitional moments that 
do not allow for an anticipation or calculation of America’s future. Tocqueville’s 
ulterior motive in Democracy in America is obviously to explain and conceptualize 
the volatile political situation after the revolution in France, but his attempt to 
conceptualize “France’s transition from a feudal monarchy to a democracy” (Pease 
1999: 98) happens with recourse to an America that he describes as the 
paradoxical historical example of such a transitional period.22 In yet another 
instance of a trans-atlantic exchange, then, we have here the case of Europe trying 
to conceive of its own transition in the terms of and with the example of ‘America’. 
But more than in British historicist writing, America here becomes the scene of a 
different kind of historicism, of something that resists its easy integration within the 
contemporary historical paradigm. It suggests the possibility of a radical change and 
that history, for that matter, could proceed otherwise.  
 
 22 For an account of the development of the notion of the “transitional period” in French Romantic writing see (see 
Blix 2006). Tocqueville is not the only one trying to assess his country’s transitional state by looking at America. 
This is how Tocqueville’s contemporary Alfred de Musset expresses the conundrum in The Confession of a 
Child of the Century in 1836: “The whole sickness of the present century stems from two causes: everything 
that was is no more; and everything that will be is not yet. … Behind them lay a past for ever destroyed, still 
writhing on its ruins, along with all the fossils of the centuries of absolutism; before them lay the dawn of an 
unbounded horizon, the first lights of the future; and between these two worlds … something resembling the 
Ocean that separates the old continent from youthful America.” (Musset 1973: 48-49) 
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Reading ‘America’ as a kind of historical ‘Romanticism’ transcending the strict 
template of cause and effect usually associated with the historical procedure, 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America qualifies America’s present age as an unstable, 
even “violent” “transitory state” (DiA, 459) that does precisely not allow for an 
estimation of its future. Rather, as Tocqueville argues, in America, the future does 
have “no harbinger, no premonitory sign”:  
“If republican principles are to perish in America, they will succumb only after a long, 
frequently interrupted, repeatedly renewed period of social travail. They will more than 
once seem to be reborn, and will disappear forever only when an entirely new people 
has taken the place of the one that exists right now. […] Such a revolution can have no 
harbinger, no premonitory sign. What strikes you most upon arriving in the United 
States is the tumultuousness of the political society. The laws change constantly, and at 
first sight it seems impossible that a people so uncertain of its wishes would not soon 
decide to replace its present form of government with an entirely new one. (DiA, 459) 
But paradoxically, as Tocqueville acknowledges, it is precisely the fact that 
American democracy is not yet fully developed, that it is still “uncertain of its 
wishes,” that provides it with its specific political ethos. He realizes, that it is 
precisely this “tumultuous” or undecidable state of American culture in the present, 
that may open a potential for a future politics, a potential, I take Tocqueville to 
imply, that is absent from the political landscape of Europe. ‘America’ thus comes to 
stand also for a different historical paradigm in which the homogenizing or 
universalizing tendencies of the discourse of historical specificity are replaced with 
a notion of historical flux or transition. And for some European philosophers and 
historians, ‘America’ is the place where history can take place in a different 
manner. In Tocqueville, the appearance of such a historical other irreducible to 
history and the discourses that regiment it is taxed with a characteristic kind of 
anxiety. For Emerson, as we will see, it is the condition of the possibility of a 
different American future and thus, the condition of the possibility of America’s 
democracy, of its ‘freedom,’ etc.  
Tocqueville’s account of America’s “transitory state” does, however, precisely not 
imagine an American ‘exceptionalism’. Rather, it considers America’s state as 
eccentric with regards to itself. Tocqueville’s qualification of America as a nation in 
transition should thus not be read as necessarily expressing that “end of history” 
that Alexandre Kojève envisioned in 1948 when he stated in his Introduction to 
the Reading of Hegel that “the North American extensions of Europe” were the 
dominion where “the end of History was not yet to come, but was already 
present, here and now” (Kojève 1980: 160).23 Rather, America turns European 
notions of history inside out, criticizes them not from the perspective of some 
supposed end of history, but from within by exposing, critically, what had always 
 
 23 For a comprehensive overview on criticism on America that invokes the topos of an “end of history,” see 
Joseph G. Kronick’s formidable American Poetics of History. From Emerson to the Moderns (1984).  
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already been a part of it even if it had not been visible. As a consequence, I will 
be less interested in the notion of an American “exceptionalism” – in the sense of 
a nation exempted from the perils of history or historicity altogether – but rather, 
in Emerson’s description and poetic implementation of an America that understands 
its history as being eccentric, that is, non-congruent or ‘uncontemporaneous’ with 
other nations but also, I want to insist, with itself.24  This will also go to show that 
the Transcendentalist movement, considered to be entirely indisposed towards 
historical interests by Matthiessen’s classic study on the American Renaissance 
(Matthiessen 1968), is very much a movement that gains its momentum in 
precisely the historicist debates that I have outlined above. But, it “transcends” 
these not to simply leave history by positing an “end of history,” but by revising 
historicist dogma and attracting attention to its discontent, by exposing the inherent 
paradoxes of historicist discourse.  
A “multitude of affinities” 
In what follows, I will argue that in the American context it is Emerson who most 
fully investigates the implications of a discourse of historical specificity. More 
decidedly than Tocqueville, where the acknowledgement of a paradoxical moment 
of historical flux is an anxious one, Emerson is prepared to receive the full weight 
of this complication of historical epistemology and tries to conceptually come to 
terms with such an added calculus of chaos, with something I want to call, 
following Étienne Balibar, the ungoverned or unregulated “vacillation” inherent in 
the process of history (Kojève 1980: 160; Balibar 1988). For Emerson, this 
vacillation is the very condition of the possibility of historical change and, thus, the 
very condition of the possibility of ‘America’. Other than continental historicists 
who attempt to integrate the particular histories of particular nations or societies 
within the larger order of a supposed world history, the notion of ‘America,’ as it is 
developed in Emerson’s essays, is made possible only by an exposure to precisely 
such a “gulf” (W, I, 208), an “abyss” (W, II, 305), a “verge” (W, II, 315), or a 
“crack” (W, X, 325) itself not readily integrable in a historical narrative.  
In Emerson’s time, the most influential version of a traditional vision of historical 
progress as a succession of stages was the one that had been elaborated by Hegel. 
In Hegel’s developmental model of Weltgeschichte, in his Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Geschichte (TWA, XII), a fixed series of historical “stages” progress 
from the public freedom of the polis and the citizenship of the Roman Republic to 
the ‘individualized’ freedom of the Protestant Reformation and further to the civic 
freedom of the modern nation state. In his course on “The Philosophy of History” 
 
 24 For an overview of the history and ideology of “American exceptionalism” see Deborah Madsen’s excellent 
American Exceptionalism (1998).  
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(1836-37), as well as in the later course on “The Present Age” (1839-40), Emerson 
notably revises the Hegelian paradigm by describing America’s state as that of a 
present moment not yet made commensurate with the periodisation suggested by 
the notion of a Weltgeschichte. America is thus to be historically located, Emerson 
argues, in an ambivalent “present age” (W, I, 269), its temporality with respect to 
a supposed Weltgeschichte is uneven or eccentric because the integration of its 
national development and a more general pattern of the history of nations will not 
‘calculate’ its historical status. Inherent in this present, in this “manifold world” (W, 
II, 4) of the “present day” (W, II, 22), is the exuberant ambivalence of the con-
temporary that for Emerson is an unwritten promise (of change, of freedom, etc.). 
If we are willing to acknowledge this promise, Emerson argues, then it may 
challenge any given state of society within a given historical situation of the world, 
because it lets us envision other possible courses of history. Continental 
historicism’s tendency towards periodisation is consequently thwarted here by a 
strong focus on that which cannot be represented in the dialectical interaction of 
particular nations and historical periods: namely the moment of a “present hour” 
(W, I, 162) yet unmediated by the historical paradigm and a “present age” that is 
still a “mountainous miscellany” (W, IV, 289) not sorted out by history’s 
universalizing tendency.  
This also goes to explain why Emerson’s “representative men” – other than 
Hegel’s “welthistorische Individuen” (see TWA, XII, 45) – are ‘representative’ 
precisely not by conforming but by going beyond the historical matrix of their 
time. Tough they clearly belong and come out of an age or an epoch, they 
imagine cultural possibilities whose veracity cannot be asserted with regards to the 
present state of culture. Their ‘representativity’ thus lies precisely in drawing 
attention to a historical potential that has not yet been actualized. In their writing, 
Emerson’s heterogeneous group of “representative men” give form to the 
experience of an eventful present not yet absorbed into a historical narrative and 
so expose an ambivalent potential inherent in the moment of the present. 
Emerson’s redefinition of what it means to be “representative” thus concerns not 
the material of a culture, not the present state of a culture: his “representative 
men” are representative because they attempt to think the contingency involved in 
any historical process. As literary figures, they accumulate the unrelated particulars 
that go into the present moment. And by fictionalizing or imagining their potential 
relation, they also make those historical alternatives possible that, if actualized, 
they will representatively stand for. Emerson’s representative men are 
consequently oxymorons, just as for him the thinking of history must necessarily be 
oxymoronic and contradictory, that is, both part and parcel of history as well as 
going beyond it. As he remarks in “Fate”: “We are sure that, though we know not 
how, necessity does comport with liberty, the individual with the world, my 
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polarity with the spirit of the times” (W, VI, 4). How these relations operate, we 
can only imagine.  
This oxymoronic vision of history that locates operative contradictions as 
providing the potential for historical change, may be distinct from Hegel’s roughly 
contemporary formulation of historicism. But the Hegelian vision of history 
certainly shares with this historicism the preoccupation that cultures or nations 
need to give account of their history in order to become historical. In Hegel’s new 
historiography, elaborated in his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, 
he argues that every modern nation is confronted with an entirely unprecedented 
situation that it can only understand itself, in its own terms (TWA, XII, 11-141). 
Both For Hegel as well as later for Marx and Engels, the “great man” (Hegel) and 
the “spirit of the people” (Engels) thus function as “the ‘spirit of the age’ realizing 
itself,” as Balibar suggests (1988: 193). For Emerson, however, this experience of 
history as something that is in the making does not merely apply to the “great 
man” that Hegel imagines. It is necessarily true for all: every man, Emerson 
argues, is yet “another history that goes daily forward” (W, II, 35), so that he 
himself is a “compend of time” or the “correlative of nature” (W, II, 35-36). And 
“[h]is power consists,” as Emerson points out, “in the multitude of his affinities, in 
the fact that his life is intertwined with the whole chain of organic and inorganic 
being” (W, II, 36). Individual history and that of the nation have in common that 
they are irreducible to just one or a limited number of causes. As a “multitude of 
affinities” or relations, they outrun the historical grammar of cause and effect. They 
are to be thought of, as Emerson points out, as “a bundle of relations, a knot of 
roots, whose flower and fruitage is the world” (W, II, 36). In other words: there is 
necessarily a minimal but unbridgeable distance between the causes of historical 
change and its realization in history. This is also why the contemporary world 
cannot be inventarized, its “spirit” cannot be abstracted into a historical fable 
because it yet realizes itself only by a “wild freedom” and by an “unceasing 
succession of brisk shocks of surprise” (W, II, 34). But Emerson points out that 
these “wonderful events and experiences” (W, II, 39) are irreducibly also part and 
parcel of historical experience, even if its result (history, the epochal turn, etc.) is 
more than the sum of the elements that went into its making. As a consequence, 
Emerson in “History” also argues for a shift in the historians’ attention:  
“I am ashamed to see what a shallow village tale our so-called History is. How many 
times we must say Rome, and Paris, and Constantinople! What does Rome know of rat 
and lizard? What are Olympiads and Consulates to these neighboring systems of being? 
Nay, what food or experience or succor have they for the Esquimaux seal-hunter, for the 
Kanàka in his canoe, for the fisherman, the stevedore, the porter? Broader and deeper 
we must write our annals,—from an ethical reformation, from an influx of the ever new, 
ever sanative conscience,—if we would trulier express our central and wide-related 
nature, instead of this old chronology of selfishness and pride to which we have too 
long lent our eyes. Already that day exists for us, shines in on us at unawares, but the 
path of science and of letters is not the way into nature. The idiot, the Indian, the child 
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and unschooled farmer's boy stand nearer to the light by which nature is to be read, 
than the dissector or the antiquary.” (W, II, 40-41) 
Emerson’s calls for “broader and deeper annals” suggests that we must precisely 
look at the kind of ambivalent experience of the ordinary, of the contemporary – 
resulting from the past, but potentially bringing about a qualitatively different 
future – that has not yet been assimilated into a historical narrative. It goes without 
saying that this for Emerson also means that historians change the ways in which 
they write history. Instead of relating causes and effects, instead of assessing facts, 
instead of applying a dialectics, they need to look at the ambivalence of our 
ordinary, everyday experience, at how, as he phrases it, “that day […] shines in on 
us unawares”. Only such an attention to the unregimented event of the 
contemporary moment will expose a contingent potential in history that prevents 
us from anticipating its next step.  
Emerson’s revision of historicist discourse under the sign of a paradoxical 
experience of a present or contemporary temporality could thus be framed in 
terms of what Althusser has conceptualized as “overdetermination”. Although the 
term is now generally used in the sense of a general antinomy – as suggested by 
Fredric Jameson in The Political Unconscious (Jameson 1981: 146) –, Althusser 
originally deploys the term to talk about the workings and resolutions of 
contradiction in Hegelian and Marxist conceptions of history and periodisation:  
“If, as in this situation, a vast accumulation of ‘contradictions’ comes into play in the 
same court, some of which are radically heterogeneous – of different origins, different 
sense, different levels and points of application – but which nevertheless ‘merge’ into a 
ruptural unity, we can no longer talk of the sole, unique power of the general 
‘contradiction’ Of course, the basic contradiction [between the forces and relations of 
production] dominating the period (when the revolution is the “task of the day”) is 
active in all these “contradictions”: and even in their fusion. But, strictly speaking, it 
cannot be claimed that these contradictions and their fusion are merely the pure 
phenomena of the general contradiction. The “circumstances” and “currents” which 
achieve it are more than its phenomena pure and simple. […] This means that if the 
‘differences’ that constitute each of the instances in play (manifested in the 
‘accumulation’ discussed by Lenin) ‘merge’ into a real unity, they are not ‘dissipated’ as 
pure phenomena in the internal unity of simple contradiction. The unity they constitute 
in this ‘fusion’ into a revolutionary rupture is constituted by their own essence and 
effectivity, by what they are, and according to the specific modalities of their action. In 
constituting this unity, they reconstitute and complete their basic animating unity, but 
at the same time they also bring out its nature: the ‘contradiction’ is inseparable from 
the total structure of the social body in which it is found, inseparable from its formal 
conditions of existence, and even from the instances it governs; it is radically affected 
by them, determining, but also determined in one and the same movement, and 
determined by the various levels and instances of the social formation it animates; it 
might be called over-determined in its principle.” (Althusser 1996: 102)  
Althusser’s significant revision of the conditions of revolution is relevant to our 
concerns here because it refutes any claims as to the specificity of the historical 
situation under which the revolution can occur. In other words: Althusser argues 
that when revolution is “the task of the day,” it may be impossible to specify the 
individual instances, motives, etc. out of which this taks is generated. On the 
contrary, it is precisely that which refuses to be harmonized into a totalized 
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account of the historical situation (the “contradiction” of “differences,” the 
“circumstances” and “currents”) that creates a potential for change that is more than 
the sum of its (historically specifiable) parts. After the vanishing moment of 
historical change (the revolution) has occurred, however, this vacillation or 
ambivalence inherent in all historical processes is glossed over, it becomes 
invisible because it necessarily needs to be incorporated into a (historical) 
narrative of cause and effect that gives the present its ‘proper’ place. This 
ahistorical ambivalence is thus constitutive of history itself, but it is “repressed,” as 
Balibar argues (Balibar 1994: 152), precisely in the moment in which a new 
historical situation is constituted or specified in a historical narrative.  
Consequently, historicist discourses are only able to describe what has been 
institutionalized, or ‘specified’ as a completed stage or history, they cannot account 
for “affinities,” that is, for the emergent forces and transitory phenomena that 
necessarily reappear when, as Emerson phrases it in his “Historic Notes of Life and 
Letters in New England,” “at times the resistance” between “the party of the Past 
and the party of the Future; the Establishment and the Movement” is “reanimated” 
so that the “schism [that] runs under the world” (W, X, 325) reappears. This schism 
is the very condition of historical change, but it only comes to the surface in the 
urgency of a moment of historical decision. The “reanimiation” of the ambivalence 
that goes before any historical constitution does precisely not figure in historicist 
discourse, it only “appears,” as Emerson argues, “in Literature, Philosophy, Church, 
State and social customs” (W, X, 325). Against a contemporary obsession with 
documenting historical specificity, Emerson’s interest consequently focuses on 
everything that does not yet amount to a history or ideology of ‘America’. 
While Emerson argues in the introduction to Nature that the “age is 
retrospective” (W, I, 3), he believes at the same time that its promise is essentially 
prospective, because the present’s “wild freedom” (W, II, 34) comes as a challenge 
to the prevailing notion of a unified, commonsensical “spirit of the age”. His 
estimate of the age thus sees its “spirit” not in a representative atmosphere or 
mood but, rather, in a contradiction of sentiments. Much like William Hazlitt, who 
already in 1819 had attempted to conceive of the “spirit of the age” as a “spirit of 
contradiction” (Hazlitt 1931: VII, 14), Emerson aims to make visible those 
contradictions, those conflicting parties and institutions that are not yet harmonized 
within a singularized “spirit” of the age. To Emerson, it is precisely such a 
contradiction (of sentiments, of moods, of opinions, of temporalities, etc.) that may 
let us conceive of alternative histories.  
But Emerson’s argument is not one of ahistoricism or anachronism. Although his 
procedure investigates the limits of historicism, it is interested in the sites where 
historicism interacts with complex American myths of passage, of revelation, of 
conversion and transition. If I have argued that the historical and cultural 
construction of America is heavily dependant upon the emergence of certain forms 
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of historicism in British Romanticism, then America’s historical self-description as 
imagined by Emerson must be understood as a departure from the tenets precisely 
of this historicism. But it imagines America not as a nation outside of history, not as 
a site of anachronism, but rather, as history’s other: as a nation that is built precisely 
on a complex renegotiation of historical problems and as a site that constantly 
needs to assert its own eccentricity with regards to its history. Emerson’s America 
consequently stands for some of the paradoxes that abide in the notion both of 
“history” as well as of ‘America,’ while still being a historical mode.25   
This recurrence of ‘America’ back upon itself points towards a capricious 
turbulence in the conceptualization of time, itself a central concept in the 
construction of America. It has become the standard view in theories of time that a 
homogeneous, linear sense of time was an achievement of the late 18th and early 
19th centuries. As Reinhart Koselleck has argued, this discovery of time’s steady and 
linear progress – contingent upon the development of a number of social and 
technical innovations – led to a temporalisation of all experience (see Koselleck 
2000, 1989). But theorists of time upheld the distinction between the routinely 
shaped time of everyday practice and the more difficult times of historicizing. 
Emerson notes, however, that even at the most basic level, when it comes to 
ordinary life, time is a complex phenomenon. Although we need to necessarily 
take our contemporaneity for granted, although necessarily the “day shines in on 
us unawares” (W, II, 40), he insists that the present moment is characterized by a 
complex configuration of con-temporaneity, that is, by an amalgamation of different 
cultural temporalities that we cannot reduce to the suggestion of one shared 
cultural or historical project. “[M]en […] cannot answer by a superior wisdom these 
facts or questions of time,” Emerson insists in “History”. In the last instance, there is 
always something – an “antagonist power” (W, II, 36), a moment of “conversion” 
(W, I, 115) or a vanishing “moment of germination” (W, VII, 38)– that resists its 
integration into time. Therefore, Emerson’s present is not a present once and for 
all. Rather, his present is a singular event, it has to be repeated all over again. To 
insist on the self-presence of the “to-day” would bring about its essentialisation so 
that it would become an ideological fetish, unable to instigate new movement. 
This, I believe, is why Emerson’s revision of historicist thought keeps a strong 
sense of that which is temporally indeterminate, of that which cannot be framed in 
terms of a representative “spirit of the age”: the transitory, the spontaneous, the 
eventful.  
 
 25 For a summary and critique of this commonplace of “ahistoricism” in critical work on American literature, see 
Carolyn Porter’s “American Ahistoricism,” in Seeing and Being: The Plight of the Participant Observer in 
Emerson, James, Adams, and Faulkner (Porter 1981).  
 THE “ SPI RIT OF THE AGE” AND EMERSON’S  ZWEI  SE ELEN  56  
 
The future, present today?  
Emerson, in his elaboration of the peculiar temporality of the “present age,” does 
not merely address the questions implied by contemporary historicist usages. At 
times, his diagnosis also turns to the concrete forces of America’s development in 
the present moment. In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, America 
goes through a rampant makeover.26 Emerson’s year of birth, 1803, marks the 
advent of the era of America’s grand and, considering the vast stretches of land yet 
unpopulated, almost limitless expansion: Thomas Jefferson, for the total amount of 
fifteen million dollars, buys Louisiana which is subsequently subdivided into 14 
states. Under its seventh president, Andrew Jackson, America lives through a time 
of relative peace as the formerly agrarian republic rapidly changes into an 
industrialized powerhouse. Following the completion of the Erie Canal, henceforth 
serving as the backbone for settlement and trade in the west, American trade is 
bustling and grows at fabulous rates.27 U.S. population, at a meagre nine million at 
around 1820, will have tripled by 1850. Soon, however, many Americans grow 
anxious about America’s furious makeover, fearing that the pastoral peacefulness of 
the American landscape that had previously suggested the equality of the people 
inhabiting this landscape was to give way before the onslaught of commerce and 
machinery. As Carolyn Porter points out,  
“protests about the ill effects of the factory system, the declining status and waning 
autonomy of farmers and mechanics, the wage earner’s impotence to halt the growing 
disparity between wages and prices – all effects of an expanding market economy 
which served the interests of the rising men of the period – persisted.” (Porter 1981: 23) 
The incorporation of the machine into the garden, to paraphrase the title of Leo 
Marx’s classic study (Marx 2000), in a coutry “poised on the verge of the most 
accelerated capitalist development in history” (Porter 1981: xiv), for some was 
merely a matter of “internal improvement”.28 Others, however, suspected that the 
evolving factory system, far from complementing the revolution, would betray its 
 
 26 On the fundamental change that America went through in the 30s, 40s and 50s of the 19th Century, see the 
chapter “Emerson’s America” in Carolyn Porter’s Seeing and Being: The Plight of the Participant Observer in 
Emerson, James, Adams, Faulkner (1981: 57-90) as well as the chapters “The Jacksonian Impulse” and “The 
Dynamics of Growth” in George Brown Tindall’s and David E. Shi’s America: A Narrative History (2004).  
 27 As William Charvat points out in The Profession of Authorship in America, 1800-1870 (1992), the great land 
boom that started with the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 coincides with America’s first great literary 
boom. Just as the infant industries developed and grew, so did the profession of authorship. The collapse of the 
land boom in 1837 was also a significant turning point in the career of many American writers. On the spirit of 
improvement in the Jacksonian era, see Feller’s The Jacksonian Promise: America, 1815-1840 (1995: esp. 
14ff.).  
 28 A phrase originally coined by Daniel Webster but later adopted by the advocates of liberalism to describe the 
advantages of America’s market economy. See especially Webster’s “Reply to Haine” (1993: 435-440).  
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very promise of individuality and independence.29 Again, Emerson cannot quite 
solve the conflict and remains decisively inconclusive in his comments about 
Amerca’s renewal. Sacvan Bercovitch, in “Emerson, Individualism, and the 
Ambiguities of Dissent,” points out a distinction of “individualism” – as a kind of 
laissez-faire acquisitiveness – and “individuality” – as a belief in the “absolute 
integrity, spiritual primacy, and inviolable sanctity of the self” (Bercovitch 1990: 
632). With regards to the advent of liberalism, Bercovitch suggests that in 
Emerson, “individuality” serves as a kind of “Utopian rallying point against liberal 
ideology” (1990: 633). I am not sure, however, whether Bercovitch’s observation 
applies unreservedly to Emerson’s understanding of liberalism. In Emerson, the 
material and the spiritual are complementary aspects of selfhood and it is the very 
working together of both that for him defines the “liberal.” This is why Emerson, 
on the one hand, regards capitalism as the “economic manifestation of 
contemporary individualism,” as Milder points out (Milder 1999: 55), and, on the 
other, as its most serious threat. For Emerson, and for a growing number of free-
market Democrats, capitalism held (according to a historical teleology specific to 
American culture) the promise of a better and freer world that included the 
progressive transferral of power from the church and the state to the people. 
Capitalism was thought to lead to a sort of culmination of history, and the excesses 
of the age – Emerson speaks of a “scornful materialism” (W, XI, 531) – were 
merely considered to be phenomena of transition in an age that would eventually 
end in America’s (economic and political) maturity.  
Emerson’s direct confrontation with the forces America’s economic revival is 
then also less controversial than Bercovitch would have it. Speaking to a group of 
young American traders and merchants in 1844, Emerson remarks:  
“The philosopher and lover of man have much harm to say of trade; but the historian 
will see that trade was the principle of Liberty; that trade planted America and destroyed 
Feudalism; that it makes peace and keeps peace, and it will abolish slavery. We 
complain of its oppression of the poor, and of its building up a new aristocracy on the 
ruins of the aristocracy it destroyed. But the aristocracy of trade has no permanence, is 
not entailed, was the result of toil and talent, the result of merit of some kind, and is 
continually falling, like the waves of the sea, before new claims of the same sort. Trade 
is an instrument in the hands of that friendly Power which works for us in our own 
despite. We design it thus and thus; it turns out otherwise and far better. This 
beneficent tendency, omnipotent without violence, exists and works. Every line of 
history inspires a confidence that we shall not go far wrong; that things mend. That is 
the moral of all we learn, that it warrants Hope, the prolific mother of reforms. Our part 
is plainly not to throw ourselves across the track, to block improvement, and sit till we 
 
 29 It has often been neglected, however, that the supposedly egalitarian structures of early American society were 
essentially supported by another divide, namely the racial one. On the formation of the early republic, as well 
as race and class in antebellum America, see Michael Rogin’s excellent Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson 
and the Subjugation of the American Indian (1975), Michael A. Morrison’s Race and the Early Republic: Racial 
Consciousness and Nation-Building in the Early Republic (2002) and John Wood Sweet’s Bodies Politic: 
Negotiating Race in the American North, 1730-1830 (2003).  
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are stone, but to watch the uprise of successive mornings, and to conspire with the new 
works of new days. Government has been a fossil; it should be a plant.” (W, I, 378-9) 
The important thing to note here is not merely that Emerson’s resistance to liberal 
market theory is not as pronounced as Bercovitch wants it to be. Clearly, he shares 
the optimistic outlook of most Americans that the new market economy will help 
solve America’s “national defects” (W, I, 389). The interesting thing about “The 
Young American,” from which I have been quoting, is that Emerson sees trade not 
as a kind of culmination, but, rather, as essentially a transitional phenomenon: 
“Trade was one instrument, but Trade is also but for a time, and must give way to 
somewhat broader and better, whose signs are already dawning in the sky” (W, I, 
379). This is also why, in the same essay, he wants to “speak of the signs of that 
which is the sequel of trade” (W, I, 379).  
“In consequence of the revolution in the state of society wrought by trade, government 
in our times is beginning to wear a clumsy and cumbrous appearance. We have already 
seen our way to shorter methods. The time is full of good signs. Some of them shall 
ripen to fruit. All this beneficent socialism is a friendly omen, and the swelling cry of 
voices for the education of the people, indicates that Government has other offices than 
those of banker and executioner.” (W, I, 379-80)  
Again then, Emerson’s qualification of his time is not merely a documentation of 
what is, it does not pretend to be able to representatively depict or predict the 
American experience. Emerson is interested in a potential yet unrealized, in a 
potentially different and better future for America that is yet only a “friendly 
omen” or noticeable but inconclusive change in the pitch of the masses (the 
“swelling cry of voices”). Emerson then is not the radical dissenter. Because the 
tendencies of the present age are in themselves contradictory, he believes that a 
radical stance could actually find it difficult to find its point d’attaque. Because the 
“to-day” presents itself as a heteroverse, as a configuration of emerging forces, the 
shape of America’s future cannot be asserted by any kind of radical intervention.  
It is telling, however, that Emerson has to recuperate what had then widely 
become the development of a nation in which the individual had no say anymore, 
as the story of an individual. In other words: precisely because the evolution of 
the nation was now governed by market forces and no longer by the teleological 
path provided for it by the myth of manifest destiny, Emerson has to conceive of it 
as the story of an individual. In an early lecture, Emerson insists on the value of 
the individual in bringing about historical change: “Progress is not for society, 
Progress belongs to the Individual” (EL, II, 176). Later, in the essay “Human 
Culture,” the argument is already more complex:  
“The modern mind teaches (in extremes) that the nation exists for the individual; for the 
guardianship and education of every man. The Reformation contained the new 
thought. The English Revolution is its expansion. The American Declaration of 
Independence is a formal announcement of it by a nation to nations, though a very 
limited expression. […] The Vote, – universal suffrage – is another; the downfall of war, 
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the attack upon slavery, are others. The furious democracy which in this country from 
the beginning of its history, has shown a wish […] to leave out men of mark and send 
illiterate and low persons as deputies, […] is only a perverse or as yet obstructed 
operation of the same instinct, – a stammering and stuttering out of impatience to 
articulate the awful words I am.” (EL, II, 213-4)  
Emerson’s equation of nation and individual, his recuperation of the nation’s 
“furious” makeover as a narrative of adolescence will also be revisited in later 
essays. It is precisely because he knows that America’s destiny is currently framed 
by forces larger than individualism that he insists on a kind of ethical imperative to 
assert the centrality of the individual, of individualism. In “Human Culture,” he 
argues that “[t]here is historical progress in man” and so tries to relocate a historical 
progress that has become inscrutable as the working out of individual destiny 
rather than a contingent historical process. The “stammering and stuttering” that 
goes with this process of coming-of-age, however, already hint at the difficulties it 
implies. Finally, in “Experience,” the individual ceases to serve as a rallying point 
of historical change. Now, Emerson argues that “the results of life are uncalculated 
and uncalculable” (W, III, 69). I think that the two movements – the 
Wechselverhältnis of the changing individual in the world and of the individual in a 
changing world – in Emerson combine to provide the kind of double bind that he 
identifies with any kind of historical change. It locates an ambivalence in which 
the individual is inextricable from the world and vice versa, the individual, as 
Emerson says in “History,” “cannot live without a world” (W, II, 36). Similarly, in a 
journal entry in 1827, he suggests: “We are the changing habitants of a changing 
world” (J, 3, 72-73).  
Again then, in the context of Emerson’s assessment of America’s (capitalist, 
ideological) renewal, his vision of historical change is essentially ambivalent: on 
the one hand, he knows that the dissolution of traditional bonds is an essential step 
in opening the route towards liberal democracy. On the other, he is aware of a 
certain materialism and, sometimes, anti-intellectualism that goes with it. He knows 
that principle of liberalism that marks America’s advent as a world power also 
creates the very paradox of American politics and culture: The autonomy of the 
individual can no longer be paramount in country whose model of political and 
social evolution is founded upon the unrestrained activity of market economy. 
Various attempts have been made, in Emerson’s life-time, at healing these 
contradictions inherent in the American project. Most of which cannot successfully 
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mediate between the forces of an unleashed, self-governing market economy and 
America’s desire for an unchecked individualism.30 
In “The Method of Nature,” Emerson presents a remarkable analysis of the 
interaction between the preponderance of America’s “material interest” and the 
peculiarity of American character in his time. He states that “[w]e are a puny and a 
fickle folk” (W, I, 191) and goes on to associate the agitatedness of his 
contemporaries with the growth of America’s wealth.  
“The rapid wealth which hundreds in the community acquire in trade, or by the 
incessant expansions of our population and arts, enchants the eyes of all the rest; the 
luck of one is the hope of thousands, and the bribe acts like the neighborhood of a 
gold mine to impoverish the farm, the school, the church, the house, and the very body 
and feature of man.” (W, I, 191)  
Emerson here identifies a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the early 
nineteenth century remaking of America: the solidarity of the pastoral “community” 
is threatened by the very wealth it produces. For Emerson, the particularization of 
America’s shared vision by the rapid accumulation of wealth by select individuals 
betrays the communal institutions (farm, school, church, family, etc.) that have in 
the past secured the success of the American model. In other words: While 
America’s entry into the league of wealthy nation and its “incessant expansion” 
may rightfully make Americans proud, it can only be had at the price of a betrayal 
of the American project. The glorious expansion of the American nation for 
Emerson is consequently always already overshadowed by a concomitant 
“impoverishment” or decadence attributable to the particularization or 
‘individualization’ of the common national destiny. It this particularization of the 
national destiny under Andrew Jackson’s laissez-faire constitutionalism that 
researchers now commonly term the predominance of “self-interest” in early 
nineteenth-century America.31 While Americans could still hope that there was a 
commonality of American goals and needs, America’s ascent to a world mercantile 
power and its rapid social makeover changed it into a country in which the 
individual reigned supreme. Now, a strong tendency towards “self-interest” is the 
point of departure for a renovation American culture.  
 
 30 The numerous utopian projects springing up in Emerson’s time – the Fourier-inspired enterprise of George 
Ripley’s Brook Farm, the utopian family at Charles Lane and Bronson Alcott’s Fruitlands, but also Thoreau’s 
“community of one” at Walden Pond, to name but a few –, are all responses to America’s change. They all try 
to vaguely address the contradictions caused by the hurried implementation of new forms of production and 
social organization. See Richard Francis’ Transcendental Utopias: Individual and Community at Brook Farm, 
Fruitlands, and Walden (1997: 2). For an overview of American utopian movements in the early 19th Century, 
see Carl Guarneri’s seminal The Utopian Alternative: Fourierism in Nineteenth-Century America (1991) as well 
as Michael Fellman’s, The Unbounded Frame: Freedom and Community in Nineteenth Century American 
Utopianism (1973). For Emerson’s assessment of Fourierism, see his “Fourier and the Socialists” (Emerson 
1842) “New England Reformers” (W, III, 249-285), as well a letter to Carlyle, in which he mocks 
contemporary reform efforts (CEC, 334-35). 
 31 For a history of “self-interest” in America, see for example John P. Diggins study on The Lost Soul of American 
Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (1986: on Emerson, esp. 192-228, on 
Tocqueville, esp. 230-275).  
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Because the consequences of these developments are yet unobservable, 
contemporary commentaries frequently return to the topos of a specifically 
American agitatedness or restlessness. Tocqueville, for example, speaking of the 
characteristic “restlessness” (inquiétude) of the American people (DiA, 328, see 
also 620-628), precisely means to identify these “restless passions” (DiA, 328) as 
something that is not yet made commensurate with the American project. Just as 
for Emerson, for Tocqueville the recent developments make this American age a 
transitional one. Its promise lies not in what it currently offers, but in what 
unforeseeable consequences – Tocqueville terms them “miracles” – it may entail. 
This is why Tocqueville holds that America’s political future is yet inscrutable.32  
“Democracy does not give the people the most skillful government, but what it does 
even the most skillful government is powerless to achieve: it spreads throughout society 
a restless activity, a superabundant strength, an energy that never exists without it, and 
which, if circumstances are even slightly favorable, can accomplish miracles.” (DiA, 280-
1)  
This is then Tocqueville’s paradoxical equation: precisely because the Americans 
are essentially a “commercial people” (DiA, 365), the United States are a country 
of “superabundant strength” and “energy” where “constant flux” and “universal 
movement” (DiA, 466) “combine to keep the soul in a sort of febrile agitation” 
(DiA, 466), so that “the ceaseless agitation that democratic government introduces 
into politics then spreads to civil society” (DiA, 279). Tocqueville also observes, 
that this is also responsible for the flexibility of America’s body politic, but he is 
never quite sure what to make of this American unrest:  
“All [Americans] consider society a body in progress and mankind a changing tableau in 
which nothing is or should be fixed forever, and they admit that what seems good to 
them today may be replaced tomorrow by something better but as yet hidden from 
view.” (DiA, 432, see also 246 and 365)  
Tocqueville identifies this transitionality as the outstanding feature of the American 
experience and his Democracy in America is in large part an attempt to give an 
adequate theoretical description of this experience. Yet Tocqueville, the French 
aristocrat, in the last instance is not willing to follow through the implications of his 
analysis as he calls for a strict organization and control of democracy’s “savage 
instincts” and wants to “regulate its impulses” in order to “educate democracy” 
(DiA, 7). Tocqueville is indeed anxious about the unlimited freedom that the 
dogma of the sovereignty of the people (essentially expressed in terms of 
 
 32 When Tocqueville speaks of the notion of “association,” he does so clearly with reference to Channing’s 
elaboration of the notion as outlined above. Both Channing and Tocqueville – who had met to discuss religion, 
democracy and economy in Boston on October 3, 1831 – are intuitively aware that the principle of random, 
ungoverned “association” provides an explanation for the workings of American democracy in the present 
moment. I believe, however, that there is an elitist side to Tocqueville that is greatly concerned about the 
ungovernability of association. For Tocqueville’s interview with Channing, see Pierson’s Tocqueville in America 
(1996: 421-423). 
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individual independence and free associations) promises. This unlimited freedom to 
him is the “deficiency” of democracy and, anxious about the ungovernability of 
society in democracy, he calls for a strict governance of the relations among its 
citizens, i.e. for a hierarchisation of society in terms of what he calls a “natural 
aristocracy” (DiA, 58). Democracy in America consequently has to be read as 
Tocqueville’s attempt at imagining how the unbridled movement of democracy can 
be limited and turned into more stable democratic institutions.33  But what makes 
Tocqueville’s account of his journeys in America especially relevant to our 
concerns here is that his descriptions repeatedly identify not just the current, actual 
state of American democracy but, rather, elements that cannot be incorporated 
within the standard procedure of historical documentation that Tocqueville was 
commissioned to complete. Tocqueville himself acknowledges that his topic, 
‘America,’ would in fact require a different mode of documentation because how it 
evolves cannot yet be made to conform to the standard historical template of cause 
and effect.  
“A world that is totally new demands a new political science. To this need, however, 
we have given little thought. Immersed in a rapidly flowing stream, we stubbornly fix 
our eyes on the few pieces of debris still visible on the shore, while the current carries 
us away and propels us back into the abyss.” (DiA, 7)  
Tocqueville’s account of the American experience is thus more effectively an 
account of the uncertain passage from one political state to another. But the 
“rapidly flowing stream” of current events (the emergence of democracy) cannot 
yet be described without sorting out those “pieces of debris” left behind by older 
forms of political organization. In Tocqueville’s narrative, we find ourselves in a 
kind of interregnum, in a strange kind of Zwischenzeit, in which the old 
(aristocracy) is no longer universally valid while the new (democracy) has not 
been fully realized yet. And indeed, Tocqueville’s account of the democracy in 
America is not so much an account of democracy itself as it is an attempt at coming 
to terms with that transitional or intermediary state that will potentially lead to 
 
 33 Tocqueville describes the American West as the place where democracy has been brought to its extreme limit: 
“In the West it was possible to observe democracy pushed to its ultimate limit. In these states, in a sense 
improvised by fortune, people lived on land to which they had come only a short while before. They barely 
knew one another, and none knew the history of his nearest neighbor. In this part of the American continent, 
the population therefore escaped the influence not only of great names and great wealth but also of that natural 
aristocracy which derives from enlightenment and virtue. … The new states of the West were already inhabited, 
but no society existed there.” (DiA, 58) Tocqueville’s main objection is that the principle of equality, taken to its 
full potential, would not result in a society but a “dis-society,” as Pierre Manet has phrased it in his Tocqueville 
and the Nature of Democracy: “[The West in Tocqueville] is the exaggerated image of democracy. The radical 
severing of the social links that democracy introduces opens us to the image of democracy as a ‘dis-society’” 
(1996: 12). 
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democracy.34 But Tocqueville realizes that traditional models of historical writing 
can only inadequately convey the urgency of such an intermediary phase in 
history. This is why he calls not only for a new “political science” but for new 
modes of writing that would effectively render the urgency of the new world. 
Because this urgency cannot be documented in a historical narrative – that is: as a 
matter of development and linear evolution –, Tocqueville clearly lacks the 
descriptive means to specify more precisely America’s state as that of an emerging 
form.  
Both Emerson and Tocqueville thus conceive of the emergence of America’s 
political form as a process of transition whose final outcome cannot yet be 
assessed. We can conceive of this transition as the waning of Puritanism or as the 
transition from a democracy that is authoritatively led by its founding fathers to a 
democracy that is governed by the all-encompassing laws of free market economy. 
But what is more important in our context is that for Emerson and his con–
temporaries, America’s transition exposes a contradiction inherent in the American 
project: it shows that the relation of self-interest and the advancement of the 
common good – that America as a cultural concept stood for and that late-
eighteenth-century political theory had still held possible – can never quite be 
coordinated or balanced. One necessarily needs to exploit the other in order to be 
successful.35  
The conundrum of the interaction of individual aim and the common good was 
not only a concern in America. But its theoretical elaboration in the works of 
Adam Smith and, later, Hegel, roughly coincides with the constitution of America 
as an independent nation. The conundrum gains special weight in America because 
America grants special privileges to the individual while also insisting on its 
communal values. Emerson, who had read Adam Smith, was skeptical about his 
solution to the riddle of the difficult coordination of individualism – the individual 
seeking profit – and communal improvement or evolution – through the 
mechanism of an unregulated market. His reading of Cousin’s introduction to 
Hegelian philosophy – Cours de l’histoire de la philosophie moderne (Cousin 1846) 
– would also have made him aware of the problems involved in Smith’s account 
 
 34  Furthermore, there are passages in Democracy in America that speak of a complex exchange when it is not 
entirely clear whether Tocqueville speaks of the American situation or of the complex process of change by 
which the political European feudal system is replaced by new forms of government. This may also explain 
why Tocqueville’s definition of democracy constantly has to change, the tropical movement of the term 
“democracy” suggesting the instability of the processes by which the political state of democracy is achieved. 
For the characteristic ‘instability’ of the term “democracy” in Democracy in America, see (1996: 158-159).  
 35 Emerson was also familiar with Adam Smith’s answer to the paradox of coordinating communal evolution and 
individual good in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1976) in which Smith 
describes, how what he terms the “commercial” or “mercantile system”, with its principle of stock 
accumulation, is radically incommensurable with forms of individual labor. While Smith’s book advocates 
policies that stimulate private enterprise, it must also concede that private enterprise effectively hinders the 
workings of a commercial society. Smith solves this conflict by introducing the famous principle of the “invisible 
hand”. 
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who proposed that the coordination of the individual and the social would be 
ensured by the conduit of an “invisible hand”. Emerson knew from Hegel, that the 
puzzling out of the interaction of an individual “Zweck” and a more generally 
understood “Beförderung des Allgemeinen” (TWA, XII, 38) was always 
problematic. But while Hegel still thinks that to follow individual goals will also 
serve the common good, Emerson registers that Hegel is at a loss to explain more 
precisely how this transaction takes place. It is, as Hegel says, necessarily 
“incalculable,” a term that Emerson adopts and uses frequently.36 Gustaaf van 
Cromphout describes how Emerson conceives of the dialectical workings of the 
Soul in history, and I think that this description can also be read to apply to 
Emerson’s understanding of America’s historical transition (from an ‘extension’ of 
Europe to a ‘natively’ American democracy):  
“The Soul progresses by means of a continual dédoublement, a continual Entzweiung, a 
continual self-division. It moves from living experience and expression in an individual 
to “death” in a tradition or institution – a “death” from which the Soul can escape only 
through revolt, that is, through a new individual who experiences and expresses the 
Soul afresh.” (van Cromphout 1976: 54-65, 56).  
Alienation is therefore both the necessary cause as well as the result of historical 
development. To illustrate this, Emerson uses the example of religion, in which he 
himself had to leave what he perceived to be a culture that had grown into a 
‘dead’ tradition. As he argues in a lecture on George Fox in 1835:  
“The creed, the rites of an age can never fit the next. Let the Reformer define his creed 
never so accurately or establish what severe Rule of Discipline he will, in a short time 
he dies, and his friends who shared his spirit die, his own fire cannot be transmitted 
and soon their places are filled by a generation who read their prayers and observe their 
ceremonies with excessive punctuality, but the essence of religion, that is, its origin in 
the worshipper’s soul is wanting. But Nature never fails. Instantly the divine Light 
rekindles in some other obscure heart who denounces the deadness of the church and 
cries aloud for new and more appropriate practices. Thus every church, the purest, 
becomes speedily old and dead, and only a new church is alive. Thus the Protestants 
reformed the Catholic church; the Presbyterians, the Protestant; the Independents, the 
Presbyterian; the Quaker, the Independent; but of the same new impulse arose still later 
the Methodist and now the Swedenborgian or New Jerusalem Church.” (EL, I, 174) 
The moment of transition, I take Emerson to say, is unconceptualisable and 
unnarratable: it can only be reconstructed after the fact, once its consequences 
have been fully realized. If we want to be attentive to the possibility of epochal 
change, however, we need to precisely not look into the common sense historical 
accounts of who we are, but rather, at that “obscure heart […] that cries aloud for 
 
 36 Hegel’s conundrum of an “Umschlag” from individual aim to common good as a transaction that cannot be 
calculated was correctly conceptualized only by Marx. Marx was the first historical thinker who went beyond 
Hegel’s more mechanical historicism to suggest that it is in fact the individual who produces his world himself, 
so that he is effectively always the source of his own history. On the American reception of Hegel in the early 
19th Century, see J. H. Muirhead, How Hegel Came to America (1928).  
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new and more appropriate practices”. Properly speaking, then, if America’s 
transition is to be effected, it cannot simply be a question of politically 
administering it, because it is cause by the marginal forces or voices that have not 
yet been made a part of America’s ideology or cultural imaginary.  
“Emerson’s emergence,” to use a phrase coined by Mary Kupiec Cayton (Cayton 
1989), and his formation as a young intellectual consequently happens both within 
and against the predominant beliefs of his time. Indeed, „Emerson’s emergence” is 
intimately connected to the historical developments and the transformations that 
New England undergoes in the first half of the nineteenth century but it also has to 
be understood as precisely a critical reaction against these developments and 
transformations. This may explain why Emerson’s assessment of his time remains 
ambivalent. For him, America’s makeover during the time in which he started his 
career was always the source both of an enthusiasm – because it implied change – 
as well as of an anxiety – because the nature of that change could not be 
anticipated.37 For Emerson and others, the discrepancy of the time between 
radicalism and conservatism makes this a peculiar time: it spawns the random 
phenomena of a present or, rather, Zwischenzeit whose conflicting destinies have 
not yet been decided and whose legacy cannot be known yet.  
Emerson frequently returns to the moment of a such an ambivalent “present 
age” that he reads as an intermittent but recurring period in history that calls for a 
decision, a “revelation” (W, I, 135) or, as he calls it in “The American Scholar,” a 
“conversion of the world” (W, I, 115). Alongside his enthusiasm, however, a more 
defeatist attitude subsists, for example when Emerson, in “The Young American,” 
talks about the “clumsy and cumbrous appearance” (W, I, 380) of his time, or 
when, in “Gift,” he remarks that America’s capitalist makeover makes the 
interaction between individuals themselves “oblique” (W, III, 164). Also, in the 
same essay, he says: “Besides, our action on each other, good as well as evil, is 
[…] incidental and at random” (W, III, 164).  
Emerson’s attempt at conceptualizing this kind of Zwischenzeit and his lifelong 
poetic venture to find a mode of expression adequate to the urgency of America’s 
change in the present, consequently also speaks of a more general conundrum of 
self-location and, again, of specifying America’s “spirit of the age”. Just as 
Tocqueville –, who was unable to find an answer to his question “Where, then, do 
things stand?” (DiA, 13) – Emerson asks Americans: “Where do we find ourselves?” 
 
 37 For a discussion of the origins of Transcendentalism, see Barbara Packer, “The Transcendentalists: Prose Writing 
1820-1865” in the Cambridge History of American Literature (Packer 1995) and Perry Miller, The American 
Transcendentalists, Their Prose and Poetry (Miller 1981: 16-105). As Kenneth Sacks has argued with respect to 
Emerson’s essay “The American Scholar” in his Understanding Emerson: “Unitarians suffered the inevitable fate 
of a group that had effected half a revolution” (2003: 24). Andrew Delbanco has also argued that Unitarians 
“moved with deep insecurity, less in celebration than in flight form an old house collapsing. The Unitarians, in 
the end, committed themselves to living in a world of ambiguity between two worlds of clarity, the orthodox 
and the romantic. And they knew it” (Delbanco 1981: 85). Delbanco’s essay concerns itself primarily with 
Channing, but much of what he has to say would also be a fitting description of Emerson’s situation.  
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(W, III, 45), but he knows that the answer to this question will not be a straight-
forward one. If the signature of America’s current age cannot be discovered, then 
it is because for Emerson America is exactly a political exigency or urgency, 
rushing headlong into an unknown political future. Tocqueville, a mere decade 
ago, had viewed America’s “wild freedom” (W, II, 34) with utmost reservation and 
had called for its strict regimentation by the authorities. Alike, many Americans 
themselves considered America’s ungoverned growth to be a mere idiosyncrasy, 
resulting from a political system that had not yet been properly installed or was 
deficient in the first place. Emerson, on the other hand, is prepared to receive the 
full impact of such an ungoverned Zwischenzeit because he sees in it a more 
radical potential for change that could uproot what America had meant all along 
and thus make a qualitatively different future possible.  
Emerson’s Journals of the 30s and 40s show him to be a studious examiner of 
the “peculiarities of the present age” (J, II, 164). These journals provide an astute, 
almost encyclopaedic record of the conflicting tendencies of American culture 
during these decades. But already in the early journals we see another tendency 
that concerns itself less with what can be verified, less with what can be specified, 
but rather with a potential for what he in his essays later calls “conversion” or 
“revelation”. Even tough he is a historical thinker that contextualizes his thought 
within the historical situation, he is, even in early texts in the journals, interested 
in symptoms of flux or transition. Combined then with a general ambition to 
specify a uniquely American experience, we find in Emerson a concurrent interest 
in the potential of a liminal moment of transition, as he carefully observes how a 
supposedly commonsensical vision of America is troubled by the emergence of 
cultural rifts and of antagonistic destinies. Personally, Emerson is strongly involved 
in the conflict between liberals and conservatives within New England 
Congregationalism and performs America’s transition from the Puritan age to mid-
nineteenth-century American culture as his very own biographical crisis. But in our 
context, such a moment is not merely of biographical importance, I think it also 
speaks of a more profound reconfiguration of the American cultural imaginary. 
Along the strongly foundational tones of American scripture, there is a special kind 
of preparedness for such moments of transition in American culture. It was not 
merely the young Unitarian ministers who tried to synchronize their religious 
training with the vision of a more secular conversion. The legacy of American 
religious doctrine, even tough rapidly waning in Emerson’s lifetime, also for 
Emerson and his contemporaries provides some of the resources and structures to 
deal with the change at hand.  
In his study on the American Jeremiad, Sacvan Bercovitch has presented a 
convincing argument that American religious doctrine and especially the jeremiad 
were a rich source of stories, themes, as well as metaphors and symbols that 
provided and perpetuated the narrative of a shared American experience and 
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identity (Bercovitch 1978). He argues that the cultural values and topics of the 
jeremiad spread well beyond their religious origin so that the Puritan vision of a 
history divined for the American people became coterminous with “America.” 
Bercovitch argues that the cohesiveness of this vision, and this is especially 
pertinent in our context, derives from its peculiar organization of a cultural 
temporality: it effectively combines the Puritan ethos and the rhetoric of the errand 
into the wilderness with the promise of the Revolution to make the future present 
in a “cultural, not a national, myth of consensus” (1978: 69). Because the Puritans 
saw themselves as God’s chosen people who had been given a second chance in a 
new world hitherto hidden from the old by God’s special providence, they had to 
bend the future back into the present: America is the promised land and the 
American people need no longer wait for their hopes to be accomplished in some 
distant future. The typological system of Puritan scripture is precisely meant to 
guarantee a transfer in which the biblical prophesies are made to bear upon life in 
America in the present moment. Given enough religious devotion and hard labor 
they could all be made manifest in the present. Of course this cultural myth of 
consensus, as Bercovitch is right to point out, is all predicated on a (sectarian) Old 
World eschatology, but it nevertheless finds a new focal point in the reorganization 
of a temporal chronology with the culture’s present at its centre. This vision of 
America in which America comes to be present with itself, in which the myth of 
America is firmly installed in the land that was named America, in which the 
promised land is the present and not some distant future hard to predict, remains 
with Americans even after America’s modernization or ‘secularization’ in the late 
18th and 19th Centuries. What is at stake, consequently, in this temporal 
reconfiguration of American culture and of the American imaginary, is America’s 
self-presentation and with it the Puritan proposition of a destiny manifest in the 
present. If America is the promise of the providential future become manifest in 
the present than the failure to live up to this promise would yield catastrophic 
consequences: it would not only abash Puritan doctrine, it would also confound the 
existence of ‘America’ per se, that is, both as a nation and as a cultural concept.  
As a trained Unitarian minister, Emerson was well aware of the theological 
discussions concerning the nature of the times in America. After all, the first half of 
the nineteenth century in America was also shaped by a general religious re-
mobilization and the formation of a great number of new sectarian groups (the so-
called Second Great Awakening). Emerson himself would have scanned the sign of 
the times with “the attention of a latter-day millennialist looking for signs of second 
coming”, as Robert Milder has argued (Milder 1999: 51). For Emerson, the circular 
identification of ‘America’ with its millennial promise, with a certain temporal 
structure and cultural myth harbours both a promise and a danger. On the one 
hand, this peculiar temporal and cultural organization of the American imaginary, 
this focus on a “spirit of the present age” is what makes ‘America’ different from 
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the Old World. It identifies America’s fundamental freedom “to begin the world 
anew,” as Thomas Paine (Paine 1945: I, 21) and Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur 
(St. John de Crèvecoeur 1972: 230) have both expressed it. On the other hand, 
Emerson realizes that the promise of a promised land already installed in the 
present harbours a tyrannical possibility, namely that of the tyranny of facts. If the 
future is present today, if it is manifest now, then why would we insist on change, 
why would we want to become something different from what we are now? 
Emerson believes that a potential for change is tantamount to his creed of moral 
perfectionism. He insists that American self-culture must necessarily insist on a 
moment of “revelation” (W, I, 3), or, as he would later phrase it, of “abandonment” 
(W, II, 321) or even “madness” (W, I, 4), that is, of something that could be seen 
as a “secularized analogue to religious conversion” (Milder 1999: 56), as Milder 
points out. Milder reads Emerson’s insistence on a moment of “conversion” or 
“revelation” as Emerson’s very own brand of political radicalism, a stance that 
becomes radical precisely by not accepting the factual. Emerson witnesses the 
waning of the Puritan age and the advent of laissez-faire capitalism as a “moment 
of cultural self-definition” (Milder 1999: 55) that presents itself as a conflict of 
individualism and materialism. A radical political stance, for Emerson, means to cut 
the ties between selfhood and materialism or commercial achievement altogether 
and thus to clear the way for a more sustained “revelation” or “conversion”. As 
Emerson argues in a passage in his journal early in 1834:  
“Men are convertible. […] They want awakening. Get the soul out of bed, out of her 
deep habitual sleep, out into God’s universe, to a perception of its beauty & hearing of 
its Call and […] your prosy, selfish sensualist awakes a God & is conscious of force to 
shape the world.” (J, III, 278)  
Emerson’s Faustian dilemma  
Emerson defines the present cultural moment as being “in the present, above time” 
(W, II, 67), beyond the perceived continuum of tradition, a continually vanishing 
moment between the directions of historical time. America’s ‘spirit of the time’ can 
consequently not be specified and America is the counter-example to historicist 
doctrine. And Emerson believes that any specification of America’s spirit of the 
time must necessarily remain inconclusive. It cannot be deduced from the nation’s 
short history, just as it seems impossible to predict its future. Looking back a few 
decades later, in a lecture on the “Fortune of the Republic” in 1863, Emerson 
argues that the prevalence of the present moment in American culture can explain 
why it finds it so difficult to specify its place in history: “Our estimate of America is 
variable. Yesterday is insignificant; today, all-commanding (LL, II, 326).  
We therefore need to revisit Emerson’s peculiar ambidexterity, that is, the odd 
ways in which his writing endorses both what David Reynolds has called a 
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“Reform Impulse” (Reynolds 1989: 72) as well as more conservative agendas. This 
undecidedness on Emerson’s part functions as an important modification of the 
discourse of cultural and historical specificity established by his contemporaries: 
Emerson denies that the specificity of the “age” can be determined because for 
him the potentiality of the present is always greater than the historical narrative in 
which it will be integrated. This is why both conservative and radical-progressive 
agendas necessarily carry a moment of dogmatism in them because they do not 
take into account the actual, as yet unorganized potentiality of a lived present. As 
he phrases it in a central passage in “Self-Reliance”:  
“[M]an postpones or remembers; he does not live in the present, but with reverted eye 
laments the past, or, heedless of the riches that surround him, stands on tiptoe to 
foresee the future. He cannot be happy and strong until he too lives with nature in the 
present, above time.” (W, II 67) 
As a consequence, if Emerson’s assessment of America’s present moment is 
occasionally incoherent, at times even unintelligible, then this is precisely because 
he pays attention to the radically contingent nature of events in this present. Any 
attempt at coming to terms with the present both in terms of the agendas of the 
past as well as those of the future can therefore only be successful if it does attend 
to the multiplicity of voices in the present. But these will always resist historical 
periodisation, and no historicism can bring them to coherence. Emerson’s 
qualification of the moment of the present as “above time” is thus not only meant 
to suggest that the present’s events have not yet been ‘digested’ by historical 
discourse. It also reminds us that the facticity of the present – its contradictory 
forms and incalculable events – for Emerson is necessarily composed of both 
remainders of the past – Emerson calls this the “sediment” (W, I, 197) – as well as 
of the potential for a future that is yet to come, for a future that is qualitatively 
different from the past and the present moment – the “seed of the world” (W, II, 
346).  
The two Emersonian voices, contradictory as they may be, should therefore not 
be severed too easily. If Emerson lets them speak simultaneously, then this is also 
meant to imply that the present stage of culture cannot be depicted 
representatively and that there is thus no representative expression of the spirit of 
the age. Emerson thus presents himself as both the transcendentalist, imagining a 
Hegelian America at the end of history, as well as the argus-eyed observer that 
points out the internal contradictions and concrete failures of the American vision. 
One should therefore not easily divide Emerson into what Cary Wolfe has called 
“the transcendentalist trying to make his break and his peace with the religious 
tradition” and Emerson the “social and cultural critic” (Wolfe 1994: 137) eager to 
describe Jacksonian America: Emerson is always both radical and conservative, and 
he at once participates in and distances himself from the developments of his time. 
Also, I do not think that these different stances can be narrated in the terms of a 
 THE “ SPI RIT OF THE AGE” AND EMERSON’S  ZWEI  SE ELEN  70  
 
biographical development. In Emerson, the moods of activism or engagement and 
distancing or “abandonment” are always simultaneous, they modify and condition 
each other, but they are the two necessary poles of any political action or thought. 
He thinks that the political, as we will see in Chapter Five, happens precisely in 
the undecidable space between political projects and programmes. For Emerson, 
the dilemma of politics thus consists not so much in a decision for one or the other 
political stance, but rather in the fact that this decision can never effectively be 
made.  
It is important therefore to spot under Emerson’s cheerful transcendentalism a 
more introverted or melancholy discontent. This is why the high spirits of the 
decades of Jacksonian progressivism for Emerson coincide with “the age of 
severance, of dissociation” (W, X, 326). And in “The Transcendentalist,” he insists 
that the two moods necessarily combine to provide transcendentalism’s “double 
consciousness” (W, X, 353).38 Looking back in 1884, Emerson describes his age as 
a time in which the power of association seemed to decline. The mood of the age 
therefore suggested solitude and not the communal values and warmth that the 
Arcadian ideal of America stands for.  
And he famously writes: “The young men were born with knives in their brain, 
a tendency to introversion, self-dissection, anatomizing of motives” (W, X, 329). In 
this context, it seems only relevant that Emerson should refer to Goethe’s Faust to 
further specify the spirit of dissociation: “The most remarkable literary work of the 
age has for its hero and subject precisely this introversion” (W, X, 328). Why Faust: 
Goethe had come up with the central portrait of the soul divided between the 
sensual and the spiritual, the material and the rational. Certainly Emerson would 
have known the famous lines in which Faust defines his crisis:  
„Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! In meiner Brust,  
Die eine will sich von der anderern trennen;  
Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust,  
Sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organen;  
Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dunst  
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.“ (Goethe 1999: l.1112-1117)39  
Just as Faust’s dilemma is not just the dilemma of an individual, but that of the 
precarious passage across an epochal threshold, so is Emerson’s double 
consciousness not merely his own idiosyncrasy. For Emerson, this kind of 
ambidexterity expresses precisely the logic of a historicism that refuses to reduce 
the chaos and crisis of history into a neat and inclusive narrative. Wanting to 
 
 38 My account of Emerson’s “double consciousness” is indebted to Joel Porte’s article on “Emerson, Thoreau, and 
the Double Consciousness” (Porte 1968).  
 39 Emerson was introduced to Goethe by his brother William, who sought the counsel of the great German writer 
in Weimar during his studies in Göttingen. For the Emerson – Goethe connection, see Sigrid Bauschinger, The 
Trumpet of Reform: German Literature in Nineteenth-Century New England (1998; and McCarthy 1994) and 
John McCarthy, “Emerson, Goethe und die Deutschen” (1994).  
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embrace the present world while knowing that one can never completely leave 
behind the past: this, for Emerson, is the sign of America’s modernity.  
Emerson called Goethe, in the portrait of him that he presents in Representative 
Men, “the soul of his century”. But when Emerson takes recourse to the Faustian 
problem, then he does so precisely to complicate a nineteenth-century discourse 
of heroism and representative men. Because Faust, as Emerson reads him, serves 
as an example that contradicts this discourse’s basic tenets of representativeness. In 
1795, Goethe posed the question “Wann und wo entsteht ein klassischer National-
autor” and argued that a prerequisite was a “glückliche und bedeutende Einheit” 
(Goethe 1963: 240). Emerson, when he revisits the writing of Goethe in his 
“Representative Men,” judges such a unity to be always illusory. Rather, he argues 
that Goethe – or Faust, for that matter – are epoch-makers precisely because they 
possess a potential that overflows the possibilities offered by their age. In 
Emerson’s understanding, Goethe becomes “representative” precisely because he is 
not reducible to a kind of exemplary representativeness, precisely because he 
expresses more than just his specific historical circumstances.  
If modern life is a “multitude of things” (W, IV, 271), Emerson writes in 
“Representative Men,” then Goethe is the first writer that able to render this 
multitude as a multitude in writing. Emerson sees Goethe – himself “coming into 
an over-civilized time and country” (W, IV, 271) – situated in the cleft between 
two epochs, facing a “mountaineous miscellany” (W, IV, 289). And Goethe for 
Emerson becomes a representative man not because he expresses a unified spirit 
of time, but rather because he himself and his writing are complex symptoms of 
transition.40  
“Goethe was the philosopher of this multiplicity; hundred-handed, Argus-eyed, able 
and happy to cope with this rolling miscellany of facts and sciences, and, by his own 
versatility, to dispose of them with ease; a manly mind, unembarrassed by the variety of 
coats of convention, with which life had got incrusted, easily able by his subtlety to 
pierce these.” (W, IV, 271)  
Goethe’s writing, Emerson argues, does not simply express an exemplary 
contemporariness, it becomes “reflective” or “critical” because it poetically 
transcends its historical context. Therefore, his works are not simply  
“wild miraculous songs, but elaborate forms, to which the poet has confided the results 
of eighty years of observation. This reflective and critical wisdom makes the poem more 
truly the flower of this time. It dates itself. Still he is a poet, - poet of a prouder laurel 
than any contemporary, and, under this plague of microscopes (for he seems to see out 
of every pore of his skin), strikes the harp with a hero’s strength and grace.” (W, IV, 272) 
The double consciousness is thus also to be found in the discrepancy between a 
mere recording of historical facts and the power of a poetics that suggests its very 
 
 40 For an account of Goethe as a writer in-between times, see Stefan Blessin’s seminal Goethes Romane. Aufbruch 
in die Moderne (1996).  
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own temporality by transcending the historical situation from which it results. As 
Emerson learns from Goethe, the poem “dates itself,” that is, its rhetorical structures 
perform a temporality that is not reducible to the time of history. But it may be – 
as in the case of Goethe and other “representative” writers – that poetry’s 
suggestions of a different temporality will let us establish a sense of history that 
may have been lost to us before. Against the dilemma of the historian – “the 
plague of microscopes” – Emerson promotes the moment of poetry – a “strik[ing] 
of the harp with a hero’s strength and grace” – as a moment of form-giving, of 
bringing into harmony.  
Emerson therefore maintains that Goethe’s contemporariness, his 
representativeness as an individual of his time, is not something that can be taken 
for granted. It is only asserted in writing where Goethe gives a (poetic) form to 
the “detached atoms” of contemporary experience.  
“He was the soul of his century. If that was learned, and had become, by population, 
compact organization, and drill of parts, one great Exploring Expedition, accumulating 
a glut of facts and fruits too fast for any hitherto-existing savans to classify, this man’s 
mind had ample chambers for the distribution of all. He had a power to unite the 
detached atoms again by their own law.” (W, IV, 273) 
What makes Goethe the soul of his century is consequently not the fact that he 
“representatively” documents contemporary experience. Rather, he becomes a 
representative man because he has, as Emerson expresses it, “clothed our modern 
existence with poetry” (W, IV, 273).  
“Amid littleness and detail, he detected the Genius of life, the old cunning Proteus, 
nestling close beside us, and showed that the dulness and prose we ascribe to the age 
was only another of his masks: – ‘His very flight is presence in disguise’.” (W, IV, 273) 
The mythological figure of Proteus with its mutable forms for Emerson thus 
expresses a mode of poetic existence that alone can bring together the 
disassociated states of mind implied by the age’s double consciousness. Poetry in 
Emerson’s exemplary analysis of Goethe’s “great Exploring Expedition” (W, IV, 
273) is thus the medium in which we may come to terms with the conflicting 
potentialities of our age.  
“The wonder of the book is its superior intelligence. In the menstruum of this man’s wit, 
the past and the present ages, and their religions, politics and modes of thinking, are 
dissolved into archetypes and ideas. What new mythologies sail through his head! The 
Greeks said that Alexander went as far as Chaos; Goethe went, only the other day, as far; 
and one step farther he hazarded, and brought himself safe back.” (W, IV, 272-3) 
In “The Transcendentalist,” Emerson applies the dilemma of zwei Seelen explicitly 
to his own age when he points out that America’s state of mind constantly oscillates 
between an idealist and a materialist “state of thought”: “These two states of 
thought diverge every moment, and stand in wild contrast” (W, I, 353). Even 
tough he praises the former, he professes that there can be no pure idealists and 
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that even the most radical of Transcendentalists have to accept their dual nature 
between the material and the ideal. This is because the transcendentalist – leaping 
beyond the actualities of contemporary life of the 1830s and early 40s, imagining a 
different future for America – cannot do without the realist precisely because the 
promise of a future revolution has to be wrested from the conflicting potentialities 
of the present, of the contemporary.  
Emerson’s different personae in the essays position him flexibly between radical 
and conservative agendas. His early radicalism curiously coincides, for example, 
with his refusal to take part in the utopian project of Brook farm. His intervention 
on behalf of abolition – beginning with the 1844 address on “Emancipation in the 
‘British West Indies’,” – make him a “committed social activist […] very much 
involved with, and interested in, the abolition of slavery” (Gougeon 1990: 19). At 
the same time – in some of the essays of the Second Series, most notably in 
“Experience” –, he abandons the hope for a general cultural reform. Emerson’s 
doubleness, his indecision or indetermination in political matters, becomes even 
more obvious if we consider that the time in which Emerson refused to comment 
on the problem of slavery in America – a time that Len Gougenon has called his 
“silent years” (Gougeon 1982) – was precisely the period in which he resolutely 
voiced his opposition to free market ideology.  
Emerson’s indecision thus speaks of a situation in which America’s competing 
destinies have not yet been decided. It would therefore be a mistake to reduce 
Emerson’s doubleness to one consistent persona (the “Transcendentalist”, the 
“Pragmatist”, etc.) in his essays. Joel Porte suggests that the young 
Transcendentalists, suffering from this double consciousness, “were all New 
England Fausts” torn between “earthly lust” and “spiritual strivings” so that hence 
“they were dualists” (Porte 1968: 42). But just as Faust’s tension is not merely one 
of character but much more one of two irreconcilable worlds, so Emerson’s 
“double consciousness” also applies both to the mood of his age as well as to his 
own conflicting sentiments between radical reformer and skeptic aquietist. Rather, 
with Emerson’s lecture about the “Present Age” his stance becomes critical: critical 
insofar as he examines carefully both the “drama of engagement” as well as that of 
“proselytism” (Milder 1999: 51).  
For Emerson, the existence of conflicting cultural values and attitudes goes 
without saying. America’s problem is that Goethe’s achievement, to have brought 
to common knowledge the conflicting attitudes of his culture in writing, has not 
yet found its corresponding expression in a natively American literature. Emerson 
consequently contends that the problem does not simply lie in the double 
consciousness itself. Rather, he argues, it is the lack of a shared cultural imaginary, 
the lack of a willingness to confront conflicting cultural destinies in writing, in 
philosophy, etc., that is the cause of America’s predicament in the present moment. 
As he argues in “The Transcendentalist”:  
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“The worst feature of this double consciousness is, that the two lives, of the 
understanding and of the soul, which we lead, really show very little relation to each 
other, never meet and measure each other: one prevails now, all buzz and din; and the 
other prevails then, all infinitude and paradise; and with the progress of life, the two 
discover no greater disposition to reconcile themselves.” (W, I, 353)  
In “Circles,” Emerson condescends that “[o]ur moods do not believe in each other” 
(W, I, 306), but he insists that it is precisely this kind of conflictual Zwiesprache 
that brings to light the open and contradictory constitution of American culture and, 
consequently, it may alert us to the present’s potential for change. Emerson then 
places his hope in the artist or the writer because he thinks that he alone can 
imaginatively heal the drama of the two minds and creatively see a union in the 
multiplicity of things. And this is precisely what makes the writings of Goethe and 
other “representative” men so extraordinarily valuable to Emerson.  
Various attempts at outlining a “de-transcendentalized” Emerson (Lopez 1988) 
have overlooked that a characteristic attribute of the poet, of the “American 
Scholar,” or of the “Representative Man” in Emerson’s essays is their disposition 
towards “transcendence,” “conversion,” “abandonment,” or “madness”. That is: even 
tough the writer, scholar or genius necessarily responds to the facticity of his 
situation and, in fact, needs to respond to it if he wants to change it, the 
occurrence of the metamorphosis (of the age, of the writer, etc.) itself is 
inexplicable, it happens as an incalculable moment of “conversion” (W, I, 115), 
“transcendence” (W, III, 181) or “madness” (W, I, 4). This admittance of a moment 
of radical difference or alterity, I think, makes Emerson’s model of the 
“representative man” a much more radical one than that of Hegel’s “welthistorische 
Individuen” as described in the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte 
(TWA, XII, 49). Both the “representative man” and the “welthistorische 
Individuum” – which clearly forms an important subtext for Emerson – exhibit a 
historical intuition precisely by not being reducible to their contemporary age. 
Emerson, however, radicalizes Hegel’s model when he exemplarily talks about the 
admired Wordsworth as the writer that is a “genius that hath epilepsy, a deranged 
archangel” (J, II, 534). Especially the poet, through his exposure to a certain 
potential in and of language, can give form to that which is entirely without 
precedent, to that which does not conform to any kind of expectation. For 
Emerson, consequently, any “representative” writer needs to on the one hand read 
“the signs of the times” (J, VII, 402). On the other, he needs to extrapolate from 
these signs something that he calls a “tendency” (W, I, 340), an “intuition” (W, I, 
127), or, even, an “apotheosis” (W, IV, 31). It is precisely in the idiosyncrasy of 
something that is not reducible to contemporary moods and manners that Emerson 
finds the “ability to perceive” and the “courage to espouse the inevitable next step 
in the Soul’s historic march,” as Gustaaf van Cromphout argues (van Cromphout 
1976: 56). But this is effected not by a strategic act of writing, but by an 
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incalculable, creative or “poetic” leap beyond the actualities and utterances of a 
given age.  
When Emerson confirms what he calls “the fact which is the upshot of all 
history,” namely “that a true man […] is the centre of things,” that he can make “all 
circumstances indifferent” and is “a cause, a country, an age” (W, II, 60-61), then 
we also need to remember that this “true man” for him, just as later for Nietzsche, 
necessarily is beyond common morality. And even though he believes in the 
centrality of man, he also insists that it is a result not of an individual will or 
decision, but rather the consequence of a certain exposure to the facticity or 
contingency of his situation, of the “to-day”. Writing is the medium in which this 
changing or contingent relation of man and the world can be recorded, can be 
given a form, as he argues in “Circles”:  
“There are no fixtures to men, if we appeal to consciousness. Every man supposes 
himself not to be fully understood; and if there is any truth in him, if he rests at last on 
the divine soul, I see not how it can be otherwise. The last chamber, the last closet, he 
must feel was never opened; there is always a residuum unknown, unanalyzable. That 
is, every man believes that he has a greater possibility. Our moods do not believe in 
each other. To-day I am full of thoughts and can write what I please. I see no reason 
why I should not have the same thought, the same power of expression, to-morrow. 
What I write, whilst I write it, seems the most natural thing in the world; but yesterday I 
saw a dreary vacuity in this direction in which now I see so much; and a month hence, 
I doubt not, I shall wonder who he was that wrote so many continuous pages. Alas for 
this infirm faith, this will not strenuous, this vast ebb of a vast flow! I am God in nature; 
I am a weed by the wall. (W, I, 306-307) 
Man’s “greater possibility” is thus a consequence of not being fully “analyzable”. 
But his “residuum unknown” does not simply come into being as the exception to 
the rational structure of the human. As Emerson explains, it is alerts us to the 
“unanalyzable” facticity of human life, its shift of moods, attitudes, and sentiments. 
Writing can express this facticity, but it does so not by providing a “representative” 
expression of the facts of the “to-day”, but, rather, by exhibiting its very own logic 
and temporality (“What I write, whilst I write it, seems the most natural thing in 
the world”). It is precisely, Emerson argues, because there is such a a “power of 
expression,” such a kind of poetic Eigensinn that writing can express man’s 
“greater possibility” in the moment of the “to-day,” in-between the ages. And 
equally strong focus on the irreducible facticity of both the moment of human 
experience and that of writing can also be found in the lecture on Goethe in 
“Representative Men,” where Emerson explains why even the most ingenious 
creation necessarily commences from it. He concedes that even what he considers 
to be the most original artist among his representative men would have been 
“impossible at an earlier time,” and that the man of greatness “finds himself in the 
river of thoughts and events, forced onward by the ideas and necessities of his 
contemporaries. He stands where all the eyes of men look one way, and their 
hands all point in the direction in which he should go” (W, IV, 270, 190).  
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Even if Emerson would later admit in a more sombre mood in “Fate” that he 
was in fact “incompetent to solve the times” (W, VI, 3), I think that his writings 
nevertheless point to the difficult task of what it might mean to transcend time or 
history, to anticipate the new, to be able to talk, at least in fiction, about 
competing destinies and incommensurable worlds, thereby establishing an 
awareness of the unfulfilled potential and the hidden contradictions implicit in the 
age. Goethe and the other representative men in Emerson’s illustrious group are 
therefore contemporaries in a double sense: on the one hand, they are necessarily 
the products of their time. On the other, they possess a sensorium that alerts them 
to that which is con-temporary, that is, belonging to different cultural temporalities 
‘layered’ on top of each other in the present. And it is because they are responsive 
to this kind of ambivalence inherent in the present moment that they can hint at a 
future that would have been imperceptible without them. As Emerson states in a 
journal entry from the same year in which his collection of essays on 
“Representative Men” was written: “Be an opener of doors for such as come after 
thee and do not try to make the Universe a blind alley” (J, IX, 117).  
Roughly at the same time, Karl Marx, in the last of his theses on Feuerbach, 
formulates a similar insight when he argues that “[d]ie Philosophen haben die Welt 
nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern” (Marx 
1961: III, 535). Marx too imagines a sort of paradigm shift that does not stop at 
changing our interpretation of the world but continues to change the very facts or 
materialities of our lives. Marx envisions a reinterpretation of the world that itself 
becomes real, that effects a real metamorphosis of the world. Very much like 
Emerson, Marx knows about the difficulties of establishing a new paradigm and in 
his philosophy he can only account for it by introducing – ex machina – the class 
subject that functions as the harbinger of the revolution and, thus, the new age. 
But Marx here is influenced more strongly than is generally admitted by a 
nineteenth century language of heroic individualism that does not allow him to 
make an admission for forces of social change that are beyond a notion of the 
individualistic or beyond human agency.41 Emerson’s take on the subject seems to 
be less attuned to the realities of the nineteenth century than Marx’s account, 
specifically because he ignores so many of the most pressing contemporary issues. 
But in his complex elaboration of the rhetorical structure implied by this transition, 
he is much more willing to allow for the difficulty or incalculability of the 
vanishing moment of historical change. He is interested in the vanishing moment 
of refiguration, of recoding, in what he terms “that indescribably small interval” 
(W, XII, 44) that occurs in-between two different accounts of the world and which 
 
 41  It was Louis Althusser who later framed this problem in Marx when he complemented his theory of 
revolutionary change with the important notion of “overdetermination,” arguing that the moment of revolutionary 
change and the transition it effects can never be explained by recourse to a limited number of causes and 
agents only. See Althusser’s “Contradiction and Overdetermination” (Althusser 2005).  
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cannot be attributed to singular human agents. His “representative men” must thus 
all expose or, to use Emerson’s term, “abandon” themselves to forces larger than 
themselves.  
The problem of zwei Seelen in Emerson is more generally also a problem to be 
located at the intersection of the fields of language and history. It is itself the 
symptom of a complex historicist double bind that sees history changing language 
changing history, etc. in an endless succession. Louis Montrose, in an altogether 
different context, has described this interlacing of text and history as a chiastic 
structure that exhibits both “the historicity of texts and the textuality of history” 
(Montrose 1989: 20). We thus find in Emerson poetry something that is both 
geschichtsbedingt and geschichtemachend, to use the terms that Brecht famously 
used in his reading of William Wordsworth’s „She was a phantom of delight” in Die 
Lyrik als Ausdruck:  
„Lyrik ist niemals blosser Ausdruck. Die lyrische Rezeption ist eine Operation so gut wie 
etwa das Sehen oder Hören, d.h. viel mehr aktiv. Das Dichten muss als menschliche 
Tätigkeit angesehen werden, als gesellschaftliche Praxis mit aller Widersprüchlichkeit, 
Veränderlichkeit, als geschichtsbedingt und geschichtemachend.“ (Brecht 1988: 26, 418)  
When Emerson’s poetically reassesses the meaning of ‘America,’ then ‘America’ 
always has to be understood as an oxymoronic structure, that is, as essentially a 
poetic structure that simultaneously names and subverts the name and the speech 
act that brings ‘America’ into existence. I consequently want to read the 
characteristic doubleness of Emerson in his essays not merely as indicative of some 
kind of biographical indecision. It is a symptom of his sustained critical 
engagement with historicism and the question of America’s place in history: a 
problem that can precisely not be resolved with recourse to the discourses of 
historicism and historical specificity, but only by an investigation of how history 
and ‘America’ mean, that is, by performing poetically or rhetorically the very 
discourses that express them.  
Mikhail Bakthin has argued that periods of intense political or cultural struggle 
very often also express themselves in a complex literature (Bakhtin 1981: 418). 
While social historians have well documented the diverse social, economic and 
cultural developments finally culminating in the American Civil War, the 
complexity of the period’s literature as literature has not received enough 
attention. The kind of historicist “de-transcendentalization” that Emerson has gone 
through in the last few decades, has tended to neglect the inherently literary or 
poetic quality and complexity of his writing. As a result, Emerson’s politics have 
also often been dismissed as inconclusive or vague. But I think that political import 
of Emerson’s writing lies precisely in its openness to a certain poetic undecidability, 
lies in its inability to resolve America’s present fix or situation. But this does not 
make Emerson an apolitical author. As Barbara Johnson has argued in A World of 
Difference: “[T]he undecidable is the political. There is politics precisely because 
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there is undecidability” (Johnson 1987: 193). And Johnson insists correctly that 
poetry is the discourse in which this undecidability may be effectively investigated 
(Johnson 1987: 4).  
This also explains Emerson’s interest in individual and collective moments of 
danger in which the cultural possibility for change is always simultaneously the 
threat of complete cultural and individual disintegration. His symbolics of culture 
aims at developing ways of dealing with America’s epochal turn, that first comes as 
a turning away from Europe and then as a turning away from itself. While 
European historicism is all about guaranteeing the smooth epochal transition by 
narrating and thus anticipating it, Emerson wants to expose the moment of the 
advent of the American age as a moment of risk in which, potentially, the 
meanings of ‘America’ are radically refigured. This is because he believes that 
despite America’s radical Jacksonian programme of self-renewal, it is only a passing 
through the unbridled potentialities of the present that will lead to a potentially 
altogether different future. The ethical promise implied by the concept of 
‘America,’ for Emerson can only be kept alive if Americans are willing to risk what 
they are for the unbridled possibilities that the present moment offers. The 
incalculability of individual life, of experience and, more importantly, of time in 
general, these for Emerson are the conduits through which ‘America’ or ‘freedom’ 
or ‘democracy’ can potentially be obtained. As he states in “The Over-Soul”:  
“The philosophy of six thousand years has not searched the chambers and magazines of 
the soul. In its experiments there has always remained, in the last analysis, a residuum it 
could not resolve. Man is a stream whose source is hidden. Our being is descending 
into us from we know not whence. The most exact calculator has no prescience that 
somewhat incalculable may not balk the very next moment. I am constrained every 
moment to acknowledge a higher origin for events than the will I call mine.” (W, II, 
267) 
Emerson knows that philosophy – or writing or poetry, for that matter – will never 
get at that “residuum it could not resolve”. But he thinks that there needs to be a 
constant experimentation with the rhetorical forms that we use to talk about our 
contemporary experience. Just as Tocqueville who called for a new political 
science adequate to America’s unprecedented political situation a decade earlier, 
Emerson thinks that the current phase of transition in America’s history necessarily 
calls for new means of (self-)description. Just as Tocqueville or Channing, Emerson 
attempts to come up with a description of his time, but he takes a bigger leap than 
his contemporaries when he insists that we can only talk about the present if we 
attempt to make our modes of writing themselves correspond with the fluidity of 
American experience. Emerson’s analysis of the American situation must therefore 
always also be seen as an attempt to develop new forms of writing somehow 
more adequate to America’s transitional state. Emerson’s sustained experimentation 
with American oratory is thus meant to give form to the immediacy of a present 
about to happen, on the “verge of to-day” (W, II, 315) as he phrases it. The 
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fluidity of Emerson’s words is thus meant to correspond to a present that is itself a 
heteroverse, that is itself composed of shifting textures and materialities. Emerson’s 
writing thus purports, as Jane Bennet has phrased it when talking about Thoreau’s 
very similar writerly politics in Thoreau’s Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild, “an 
ideal that articulates the experience of being ‘part and parcel’ of one’s surrounding 
even as those surroundings exceed full comprehension” (Bennett 1994: 59).  
Again then, we find here that curious double bind or process of self-implication 
that I take to be the methodological principle of Emerson’s essays: The world itself 
is of an eventfulness that spills over into the written text and its rhetorical or 
poetic procedures. But poetry or literature, precisely because its existence 
depends on a feature of rhetoricity, also produces or performs an eventfulness that 
spills over into the world. In Nature, Emerson will explicitly conceptualize this 
structure of a mutual implication as a more “radical correspondence” (W, I, 29; see 
also Chapter Four), but there are many other passages that highlight the very same 
structure. To provide just one example, from “Fate”: “[I]n the history of the 
individual is always an account of his condition, and he knows himself to be party 
to his present estate” (W, VI, 13). And he continues to say that “[t]he secret of the 
world is the tie between person and event. Person makes event and event person. 
[…] He thinks his fate alien, because the copula is hidden” (W, VI, 21).  
America’s sublation of history  
What Emerson discovers in this structure of mutual implication is the conundrum of 
America’s place in history. The discovery of this structure also means that America’s 
place in history cannot be specified with recourse to standard historicist discourses. 
America’s exceptionalism with regards to world history is, obviously, not only 
Emerson’s theme.42 For Emerson’s Romantic role model Percy Bysshe Shelley, 
America is “a brighter Hellas” (Shelley 2002: 407) the utopian terrain where 
equality between men will be finally realized. For Locke, “in the beginning all the 
world was America” (Locke 1966: 145); according to Thomas Paine, America has 
the power “to begin the world anew” (Paine 1945: I, 21); and to Whitman, in the 
poem “Starting from Paumanok,” America is the “world primal again” (Whitman 
1959: 187). In these examples, America is the myth of a finding, a founding, a 
beginning, a grounding, a discovery. Emerson here takes a somewhat different 
stance in that he considers America’s promise to lie in its future and not in its past. 
America for him is less a discovery than an invention. There is then, a fundamental 
difference to be grasped here: either America is the promised land discovered, a 
land that already fulfils the promise – the system of Puritan typology obviously was 
 
 42 For an overview of the history and ideology of “American exceptionalism” see Deborah Madsen’s excellent 
American Exceptionalism (1998).  
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meant to secure this promise as one that had been fulfilled already –, or, as in 
Emerson’s essays, it is a land that has yet to achieve its potential, a land that needs 
to become something qualitatively or fundamentally different from what it is today.  
To further accentuate Emerson’s position I want to turn to one of the most 
influential diagnoses of America’s place in history. Roughly contemporary with 
Emerson’s elaboration of his own position, it comes, again, as a sending from 
European philosophy. In his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, 
Hegel presents the following account of America’s place in history that on first 
sight seems to be similar to Emerson’s position (America as a future promise):  
“Amerika ist somit das Land der Zukunft, in welchem sich in vor uns liegenden Zeiten, 
etwa im Streite von Nord- und Südamerika, die weltgeschichtliche Wichtigkeit 
offenbaren soll; es ist ein Land der Sehnsucht für alle die, welche die historische 
Rüstkammer des alten Europa langweilt. Napoleon soll gesagt haben: Cette vieille Europe 
m’ennuie. Amerika hat von dem Boden auszuscheiden, auf welchem sich bis heute die 
Weltgeschichte begab. Was bis jetzt sich hier ereignet, ist nur der Widerhall der Alten 
Welt und der Ausdruck fremder Lebendigkeit, und als ein Land der Zukunft geht es uns 
überhaupt hier nichts an. denn wir haben es nach der Seite der Geschichte mit dem zu 
tun, was gewesen ist, und mit dem, was ist, - in der Philosophie aber mit dem, was 
weder nur gewesen ist noch erst nur sein wird, sondern mit dem, was ist und ewig ist - 
mit der Vernunft, und damit haben wir zur Genüge zu tun.” (TWA, XII, 86-87) 
Emerson most probably had not read Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der 
Geschichte, delivered in Vienna in the years from 1822 to 1831 and published in 
1837. But he had read Victor Cousin’s summary account and interpretation of 
Hegel’s lectures and would have been well aware of the chief implications of 
Hegel’s radical reformulation of continental historicism. Also, even tough Hegel 
may have been the pre-eminent exponent of this new historicism, the emergence 
of the new dialectic had been prefigured by other authors that Emerson knew 
well. Goethe is here but one example.43 In his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
der Geschichte, Hegel comes up with a system for historicizing that will prove to 
be highly influential in European historicist thought since it suggests a model that 
connects the historical evolution of European nation states to a more general 
world-historical process. It is in this context of elaborating his new system of 
historicism that Hegel comes to speak of ‘America’ as an example. His description 
of ‘America,’ cited above, does not only propose the often-cited account of 
‘America’ as land of the future. The passage and its context in Hegel deserve our 
attention because they are, I think, more problematic than is generally admitted.44  
The passage as it has been read in American studies, is taken to suggest that 
‘America,’ in its present state, is already the land of the future, and has thus 
realized the promise of the ages. Hegel’s comments are thus often used to illustrate 
 
 43 On the emergence of historicism, see Friedrich Meinecke’s classic study Die Entstehung des Historismus (1936).  
 44 See, for example, Walter Kaufmann’s account of Hegel’s myth of America as the land of the future in his Hegel: 
A Reinterpretation (1966: esp. 4) or David Marr’s in his American Worlds Since Emerson (1988: esp. 56-62).  
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a vision of a specifically American exceptionalism in which America leads other 
nations into a splendid future. However, if we look at the context of the passage 
in Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, it becomes clear that 
what he is actually saying is that America is not yet a nation and that it is very 
unlikely that it will become one in the near future. For Hegel, America does not 
stand for the future of nations, and it does not realize a future, progressive state of 
Spirit. Rather, the passage taken from the chapter “Geographische Grundlage der 
Weltgeschichte” (TWA, XII, 105-141) in his lectures is a collection of received 
resentments and stereotypes about the nature of the American soil and its people.  
Speaking about the geographical conditions responsible for bringing about the 
accession of the nation state in Europe, Hegel comes to speak of the counter-
example of ‘America’ and argues that the weakness of the American soil and 
physique had always prevented the forming of a native subject comparable to the 
subject of history present in Europe. In Hegel’s words, America’s culture is entirely 
‘natural,’ and it is one “die untergehen musste, sowie der Geist sich ihr näherte. 
Physisch und geistig ohnmächtig hat sich Amerika immer gezeigt und zeigt sich 
noch so” (TWA, XII, 108). In order to mediate between the sturdy European 
subject newly arrived on the continent and the pity state of existence of the native 
American people, Hegel brings in the Negro: „Die Schwäche des amerikanischen 
Naturells war ein Hauptgrund dazu, die Neger nach Amerika zu bringen, um 
durch deren Kräfte die Arbeiten verrichten zu lassen” (TWA, XII, 108-9). And 
Hegel continues:  
„Da nun die ursprüngliche Nation geschwunden oder so gut wie geschwunden ist, so 
kommt die wirksame Bevölkerung meist von Europa her, und was in Amerika geschieht, 
geht von Europa aus. Europa warf seinen Überfluss nach Amerika hinüber […].” (TWA, 
XII, 109)  
‘America’ thus figures as an excess, an Überschuss, it comes into being merely as 
an accumulation of the leftovers discarded from Europe’s history. This obviously is 
hardly the America of the future that many commentators want to read into Hegel’s 
famous passage. For Hegel, America does in no way qualify to be a nation, 
because it lacks the internal tension that would call for the constitution of a 
national structure.  
„Was nun das Politische in Nordamerika betrifft, so ist der allgemeine Zweck noch nicht 
als etwas Festes für sich gesetzt, und das Bedürfnis eines festen Zusammenhaltens ist 
noch nicht vorhanden, denn ein wirklicher Staat und eine wirkliche Staatsregierung 
entstehen nur, wenn bereits ein Unterschied der Stände da ist, wenn Reichtum und 
Armut sehr groß werden und ein solches Verhältnis eintritt, dass eine große Menge ihre 
Bedürfnisse nicht mehr auf eine Weise, wie sie es gewohnt ist, befriedigen kann. Aber 
Amerika geht dieser Spannung noch nicht entgegen, denn es hat unaufhörlich den 
Ausweg der Kolonisation in hohem Grade offen, und es strömen beständig eine Menge 
Menschen in die Ebenen des Mississippi. Durch dieses Mittel ist die Hauptquelle der 
Unzufriedenheit geschwunden […] Eine Vergleichung der nordamerikanischen 
Freistaaten mit europäischen Ländern ist daher unmöglich. (TWA, XII, 113) 
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America then lacks the characteristics of a proper nation and in Hegel’s world-
historical scenario, it does not even qualify for a comparison with the European 
nations with their long and complex history. Lacking any kind of historical 
orientation, ‘America’ is beyond comparison because it is not characterized by an 
overarching historical ambition but by an “Überwiegen des partikularen Interesses, 
das sich dem Allgemeinen nur zum Behufe des eigenen Genusses zuwendedt” 
(TWA, XII, 112). This, Hegel argues, explains the bad reputation of America’s 
merchants (TWA, XII, 112) as well as the “ungebändigste Wildheit aller 
Einbildungen” (TWA, XII, 113) omnipresent Hegel’s depiction of ‘America’. Also, 
the abundance of the American space in his opinion destroys all tension that would 
be necessary to put the progressive self-realization of Spirit in progress. As Hegel 
remarks in an aside: “[H]ätten die Wälder Germaniens noch existiert, so wäre 
freilich die Französische Revolution nicht ins Leben getreten” (TWA, XII, 113).45  
Hegel’s is not the only commentary that disqualifies America in such a manner. 
We have already met another elitist (though generally more cheerful) European 
observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, who equally puzzles over what seems to him the 
incompatibility of individual freedom and equality in America. On the one hand, 
total equality suggests to him the danger of an atomistic society in which everyone 
lives in ‘equal’ anonymity and mediocrity. On the other hand, he sees in the 
extension of equality to all the threat of a tyranny of the many that would curfew 
the liberty of the individual. And, very much like in Hegel’s commentary in 
“Geographische Grundlagen der Weltgeschichte,” Tocqueville also argues that 
America’s place in history is characteristically unconcretizable since its destiny, the 
success of its political system, has not yet been proven.  
But while Tocqueville has a genuine interest in the political experiment of 
democracy, in Hegel’s historicist project the example of America is included to 
denounce the existence of ‘America’ as a nation per se. America, he argues, lacks 
the internal tension that has brought about the nation state in Europe. Its utter 
mediocrity prevents the appearance of the dialectic of self-alienation and 
progressive concretization that he deems essential to the appearance of the nation 
state. This absence of tension, for Hegel, is tantamount to America’s non-existence 
with regards to history. America is not, as he phrases it, part of “was ist und ewig 
ist.” It is not something that can be talked about in terms of “being” or of 
 
 45 Hegel in his comments on America obviously blatantly underestimates the conflicts for land that had been a 
steady companion to early settlement. America was precisely not an uninhabited country. In Emerson’s time, 
the plight of the Cherokee attracted sympathy (tough only among Andrew Jackson’s opponents). In the 1830’s, 
longstanding enclaves on legally established reservations were removed and Emerson writes a letter protesting 
the Cherokee’s displacement from their ancestral lands to president Van Buren in 1838. But even in 
“progressive” New England, this sympathy did usually not extend to Indians who were in the way of regional 
settlements. For an account of the politics of race in post-revolutionary America, see John Wood Sweet’s Bodies 
Politic. Negotiating Race in the American North, 1730-1830 (2003: esp. 398-474).  
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“existence”.46 America’s constitution, Hegel argues, is only written, it is not 
geäussert, its state is not yet produced because the frontier functions as a continual 
deferral of the self-realization of its spirit.47  Hegel is consequently less concerned 
with the America of the future as he is concerned with the America of today and 
its contradiction: it is at once a new land (the place where the very notion of the 
State seems to be replaced by the notion of democracy and its abolition of social 
classes) and an echo, repetition, quotation of something that was before (the Old 
World). The America of today is but a sublation of a tradition that has its proper 
place in the Old World. Its destiny is a self-overcoming, an abandoning of ground 
in favour of some new ground, but before this happens, it does not qualify for a 
comparison among nations. Until then, America is not merely the Aufhebung of 
history: it is its very cancellation. 
Against this cancellation of America’s place in history, we find in Emerson a 
complex maneuver that tries to locate America in terms of something that is not 
yet a dialectic, but only a weak force, namely the emerging potentiality of a 
present that both is and is not. Emerson’s focus on the present’s self-difference with 
itself – how it is both the ground we stand on as well as a “groundless ground” 
(LL, II, 279-280) that “slip[s] through our fingers then when we clutch hardest” (W, 
II, 49) – is meant to suggest a logos that is different from Hegel’s dialectical model 
of history. If America, in Hegel’s account, abandons or leaves the ground of 
History altogether – “Amerika hat von dem Boden auszuscheiden, auf welchem 
sich bis heute die Weltgeschichte begab“ – and therefore cannot fulfil the ambition 
of Geist and Freiheit, then for Emerson America’s promise lies precisely in its 
peculiar position vis-à-vis history: to live the idea of democracy for him means to 
come to terms with the irreducible contradiction of a moment “above time, in the 
present” (W, II, 67), that is, to come to terms with a cultural moment that is not 
reducible to the workings of a historical dialetics.  
This Emersonian assessment of an America beyond time develops into a familiar 
topos in later qualifications of America. America, as Charles Olson has phrased it, 
for example, is always already “the second time” (Olson 1967: 113), a repetition, 
an echo of the Old World, both at the end of history as well as beyond all history. 
And because America is a cultural entity that does not result from the unfailing 
progression of a dialectic, it has to be procured poetically and thus also comes as a 
decisive semiological critique of every notion of history. If we follow Jacques 
Derrida, we can also read the poetic nature of America as an implicit critique of 
any notion of dialectics, because semiology precisely means the downfall of any 
 
 46 As Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner has pointed out in “Heideggers Amerika als Ursprungsort der Weltverdüsterung” 
(1997), this to Martin Heidegger was precisely America’s quandary and the reason why he saw America – the 
nation as well as the concept – as the origin of a more general “Weltverdüsterung”.  
 47 Hegel here argues in a sharp contrast against later American commentators who saw the frontier as the 
guarantee of America’s self-renewal. See, for example, Frederick Jackson Turner’s classic study on The 
Frontier in American History (Turner 1996). 
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dialectic (see Derrida 1976: 24-26): because America is a sign, because it is a 
semiological structure that cannot be reduced to a question of historical being, it is 
utterly nondialectical and counterhistorical. Precisely as an “Ausdruck fremder 
Lebendigkeit,“ to use Hegel’s words à contre-coeur, precisely as an Ausdruck or 
expression, America is something not reducible to the workings of historical 
progress.  
The anticipatory promise that ‘America’ names is not one that follows Hegel’s 
logic of the dialectic. Emerson’s perception of the present describes it as a 
transitory stage that is yet undecided and thus outruns the grammar of a dialectic. 
This is why the meaning of ‘America’ – as a nation and as a concept – is essentially 
and necessarily contradictory, internally split and continually submitted to 
reinterpretation. But precisely because it is itself implied in the poetic processes 
that produce it, ‘America’ exhibits, more generally, the semiological processes that 
bring about all history – something that Hegel cannot make explicit, as Derrida has 
shown, because he needs to suppress it in favour of the systematics of his 
genealogical (or dialectical) model.  
Again then, we see here Emerson’s interest in an adequate description of 
society’s evolution as an incalculable process of accretion or as the accumulation of 
particulars rather than as the working out or revelation of a providential history. 
This is because for him the future of the idea of democracy cannot follow the law 
of the dialectic, it needs follows the law of chaos or entropy, a law of non-
difference rather than that of the dialectic. The Umschlag, the step into the next 
epoch can only be attained by an “incalculable power” (EL, II, 9). This insight is 
even expressed in passages where Emerson chooses to talk about the historical 
process as an achievement of the individual:  
“The one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, to be 
surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory and to do something 
without knowing how or why; in short to draw a new circle. Nothing great was ever 
achieved without enthusiasm. The way of life is wonderful; it is by abandonment. The 
great moments of history are the facilities of performance through the strength of ideas, 
as the works of genius and religion. ‘A man,’ said Oliver Cromwell, ‘never rises so high 
as when he knows not whither he is going.’ Dreams and drunkenness, the use of opium 
and alcohol are the semblance and counterfeit of this oracular genius, and hence their 
dangerous attraction for men. For the like reason they ask the aid of wild passions, as in 
gaming and war, to ape in some manner these flames and generosities of the heart.” (W, 
I, 321-2) 
Emerson’s peculiar brand of historicist thought consequently identifies a black spot 
in Hegel’s theory of the historical process, namely that liminal, intermediary state 
that cannot be described in terms of a logic of sublation, superimposition or 
cancellation, that in fact cannot be described in terms of a logic at all. Following 
Emerson, the present is the heterogeneous, factitious, or chaotic space through 
which American culture has to travel again and again. America thus exhibits the 
impossibility of the synthesis of the dialectic, precisely because its present and past 
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can always only incompletely be fusioned with its future: The attainment of its 
future requires a “crossing, or leaping,” to use Cavell’s words (Cavell 1992: 136), it 
requires the insertion of an incalculable poetic or semiological difference. This 
leap, this difference is then not a matter of soil or people, as Hegel wants to have 
it, but rather a question of expression, of Audsruck, or, to use Emerson’s term, of 
poetry. If Emerson claims that it is only poetry, writing, or literature than can effect 
this leap, then he also argues for the defectiveness of the Hegelian sublation, since 
the synthesis (‘America’ in the future) here is not so much the addition of two parts 
(“Europe” and a more recent “American” past) but rather the partial destruction of 
both. America’s “way onward” (W, II, 319) necessarily comes as a destruction of 
what it was before since it comes in the form of a transfiguration of the elements 
that go into it. Maybe we find here a reason why Goethe, among Emerson’s 
collection of representative men, was the ‘most’ representative of his great idols: 
Goethe himself refused to organize the world into a system – “Goethe was the 
philosopher of this multiplicity; hundred-handed, Argus-eyed, able and happy to 
cope with this rolling miscellany of facts and sciences, and by his own versatility” 
(W, IV, 271). Emerson admires Goethe because he sees in him a knowledge that 
the role of chance cannot entirely be systematized if one does not simultaneously 
want to eradicate the potential of such a multiplicity. He thus concedes in his late 
years that he himself was “incompetent to solve the times” (W, VI, 3). While 
Hegel’s dialectics finds its focal point precisely in describing the probable 
Aufhebung or sublation of history, Emerson believes that “true character appears 
not in heroic rebellion from society,” as it would be typical of Hegel’s 
weltgeschichtliches Individuum, “but in a stark and sufficient participation in 
society,” as Stephen Whicher has argued (Whicher 1971: 131).  
The idea of historiography and its critique is an important concern in many of 
Emerson’s essays. However, I will argue in the following chapter that it is 
overridden by a focus on the signification of history, on how history is read and 
written. While Emerson’s introduction of the sign into historicizing cuts against 
dialectical models, it more significantly exposes ‘America’ as an idea that calls for a 
continual “conversion of the world” (W, II, 115), for a repeated “transfiguration” 
(Cavell 2003: 9) or figural “invention” (Riddel 1995: 31-32). We thus begin to see 
more clearly in what ways ‘America’ functions, to again use Hegel’s words à contre 
coeur, as an Überschuss: America is the “Abfall der Idee von sich selbst” (TWA, IX, 
28), it figures as its own refiguration. In Emerson’s essays this focus on the poetical 
or figurative nature of ‘America’ is intrinsically connected to the question of 
America’s promise and potentiality in the present. The question of ‘America’ here 
and now is consequently combined with an ethical consideration of what it means 
to express ‘America,’ here and now. ‘America’s promise is underwritten by a radical 
principle of occasionality (manifest destiny), since its expression is always 
connected to the concrete materialitites of a “to-day.” Emerson thus insists so 
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strongly on his own cultural moment because he knows that the production of 
‘America’ cannot be adjourned, it cannot be left to future generations. America’s 
promise precisely ask us to respond to it now, if it is to have any meaning, it 
needs to be continually actualized, it needs to be continually referred back to the 
occastion from which it results. This is not to say that Emerson expects America’s 
„emphatic & universal calamity (J, IV, 241) to be resolved quickly and in the 
present age. The change he hopes for is both slower and more sustained, but it 
has to be started in the “present hour” (W, II, 66). He imagines a “revolution” that 
is, as he phrases it in “The American Scholar,” “gradual,” requiring us to locate the 
possibility of conversion not in some kind of ultimate support or ‘ground,’ but in a 
constant work on the idea of culture itself:  
“Men, such as they are, very naturally seek money or power; and power because it is as 
good as money, – the “spoils,” so called, “of office.” And why not? for they aspire to the 
highest, and this, in their sleep-walking, they dream is highest. Wake them and they 
shall quit the false good and leap to the true, and leave governments to clerks and 
desks. This revolution is to be wrought by the gradual domestication of the idea of 
Culture. The main enterprise of the world for splendor, for extent, is the upbuilding of a 
man. Here are the materials strewn along the ground. The private life of one man shall 
be a more illustrious monarchy, more formidable to its enemy, more sweet and serene in 
its influence to its friend, than any kingdom in history. For a man, rightly viewed, 
comprehendeth the particular natures of all men.” (W, I, 107-8)  
 
 
  
Two  
 
The Scholar and the “Age of Introversion”  
At some point in “The American Scholar,” Emerson invokes Hamlet’s conundrum to 
characterize the American scene: 
“Our age is bewailed as the age of Introversion. […] We, it seems, are critical; we are 
embarrassed with second thoughts; we cannot enjoy anything for hankering to know 
whereof the pleasure consists; we are lined with eyes; we see with our feet; the time is 
infected with Hamlet’s unhappiness, ‘Sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought.’” (W, I, 
109) 
Hamlet’s unhappiness: that is the oppression of a past that sends its ghosts to haunt 
the present; it is the hypersensibility (“we are lined with eyes, we see with our 
feet”) of the critical spirit that turns upon itself (“introversion”) and dissolves 
certainties with “second thoughts”; it is the inability to simply renounce tradition or 
knowledge thought to be irrefutable; and, most importantly, Hamlet’s case is 
exemplary for an experience located in the interval between past and future, for 
an existence in the eccentric temporality of a moment, that is, “out of joint,” in the 
words of Hamlet’s famous soliloquy. Just as Shakespeare characterizes Hamlet’s 
eccentricity at the court of Elsinore – no longer a part of the inner circle of power 
at the court of Denmark –, so Emerson identifies the present state of America as 
one that cannot be brought to coherence with America’s short but eventful history. 
Emerson’s vision of the American Zeitenwende, of a moment that leaves the 
continuity and succession of the epochs, much like Shakespeare’s two centuries 
earlier, consequently identifies a moment in the history of the nation that, with 
regards to the perceived continuity of America’s history since its founding, is “out 
of joint,” not yet made commensurate with a narrative of ‘America’. And this being 
in the cleft, in-between times, haunted by the ghosts of the (European) past, 
looking into a yet unsecured (American) future, for Emerson, is where America 
finds itself in the present, torn between ultimately antagonistic destinies. Emerson’s 
vision is one of an America that stands beside itself: in its present, in the way it is, 
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here and now, there is something fundamentally not or not yet reducible to the 
idea of ‘America’: eine Welt aus den Fugen.1  
The reference to Hamlet’s somber dream identifies one of Emerson’s persistent 
concerns: How can America wake up to itself? And, how can it shed that “pale cast 
of thought,” the dead weight of a European tradition that prevents America from 
waking up to itself, to its ‘true’ identity? If such an awakening is to take place, 
Emerson argues in “The American Scholar,” then the scholar must first wake “to the 
time and to this country” (W, I, 108); that is, he must shift his attention to the 
concrete materialities and potentialities of an America ‘here and now’ instead of 
corroborating a tradition that once promised liberty but has now become, as 
Emerson expresses it in Nature, a “paper currency” (W, I, 30).  
Emerson identifies the epochal turn even more explicitely when he states that 
he “look[s] upon the discontent of the literary class as a mere announcement of the 
fact, that they find themselves not in the state of mind of their fathers” (W, I, 109). 
And using the metaphor of “learning to swim” – that in Emerson always stands for 
a certain epistemological daring, for the danger of thinking – he argues that just “as 
a boy dreads the water before he has learned that he can swim” (W, I, 110) the 
literary class “regret the coming state as untried” (W, I, 110). For Emerson, 
however, this daring, this confrontation with a cultural space and moment that is 
in-between, untried but full of possibilities, is exactly the ambivalence implied by 
America’s contemporary situation. In the following, I want to read “The American 
Scholar” not primarily as providing a portrait of the ideal scholar but, rather, I want 
to focus on how Emerson here provides an account of this temporality of a 
vanishing moment of the present and the cultural opening that it (potentially) 
presents.  
Emerson’s qualification of his time in “The American Scholar” – reminding us of 
the problem of double consciousness examined in Chapter One – acknowledges 
the essential ambivalence of a present in-between the times, undecided between 
“historic glories” and the “rich possibilities” of an approaching age:  
“If there is any period one would desire to be born in, – is it not the age of Revolution; 
when the old and the new stand side by side, and admit of being compared; when the 
energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope; when the historic glories of the 
old can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new era? This time, like all 
times, is a very good one, if we but know what to do with it.” (W, I, 110)  
It is because of cheerful passages like this one that Oliver Wendell Holmes has 
called “The American Scholar” “our intellectual Declaration of Independence” (qtd. 
in Garnett 1888). Holmes suggests that while America had already attained 
 
 1 I am using Heidegger’s German translation of Hamlet’s words here because it lets me hint at yet another 
narrative of a peculiar trans-atlantic translation from Shakespeare to Emerson to Nietzsche to Heidegger and, 
finally, to Derrida, who in his essay “The Time is Out of Joint” has talked at length about Nietzsche and 
Heidegger’s reception of Hamlet’s conundrum of a “time ouf of joint”. The same essay also links the question of 
“eine Welt aus den Fugen” to the question of the meaning of ‘America’ in and for deconstruction (Derrida 1995).  
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economical independence for a few decades, its intellectual independence still had 
to be asserted. Holmes’ assertion subsequently became a commonplace in 
American studies and Emerson’s address was taken to have laid the foundation for 
a literature that was natively ‘American’.  
There is, however, a more sinister subtext to Emerson’s cheerful and optimistic 
outlook for the American nation and a problematization of the simple origin 
precisely in the text in which Holmes sees it posited: Emerson’s caveat “if we but 
know what to do with it” alerts us to the possibility that the revolutionary present, 
in its absolute unpredictability and unprecedentedness, may hold futures that are 
not commensurable with each other. The revolutionary present is characterized not 
so much by either “fear” or “hope,” but, rather, by the con-temporariness of these 
conflicting sentiments. What if, Emerson suggests, these conflicting histories will 
not finally be resolved to provide a common trajectory for what, already in 
Emerson’s time, was a diversity of American cultures? What if we do not know 
what to do with the possibilities of the new era? What if the “rich possibilities of 
the new era” will not present themselves because we will not let them happen as 
something that is unprecedented, not prefigured by our cultural legacy? Again, we 
encounter Emerson’s peculiarly ambidextrous attitude towards his time: on the one 
hand, we have his certain sense that change is imminent but, on the other, his 
inability or, rather, unwillingness to specify America’s future. In the spirit of its 
Shakespearean motto, Emerson in “The American Scholar” is deeply aware both of 
his own eccentricity – belonging neither clearly to the “Party of the Past” nor to 
the “Party of the Future” – but also of something that one could term the 
irreversibility of history, namely that the past cannot be changed. And Emerson 
here chooses to define America or the cultural concept of ‘America’ – if they are 
not the same thing – in precisely these terms of eccentricity and irreversibility:  
“Perhaps the time is already come, when it ought to be, and will be something else; 
when the sluggard intellect of this continent will look from under its iron lids, and fill 
the postponed expectation of the world with something better than exertions of 
mechanical skill. Our day of dependence, our long apprenticeship to the learning of 
other lands, draws to a close.” (W, I, 81)  
Again: Emerson does here not so much cash the check of America’s final cultural 
liberation than assert his predication of America’s transitional state before any such 
liberation, in-between epochs. It is important to note that what Emerson promises 
here is not the actual existence of an ‘American literature,’ or even that of an 
“American Scholar”, rather, he significantly prefers to talk about the “postponed 
expectation” (W, I, 81) of such a literature and of ‘America’ in general. The 
particular temporality of this “postponed expectation” is again one that consists of a 
simultaneous progress – the expectation of a different world – and regress – the 
continual postponement of this expectation. Both ‘America’ and ‘American literature’ 
or ‘American writing’ are therefore in Emerson not yet the terms representing a 
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particular kind of literature or a particular kind of nation. Rather: they are empty 
containers that have yet to be filled, that have yet to be fully realized.  
After all, it is a strange declaration of independence that decrees that the past 
state still has a hold on us. For Emerson – as I have already argued in the previous 
chapter – America’s full-blown industrialization and the rampant remaking of 
America that came with it does not yet amount to more than just a more proficient 
“exertion of mechanical skill.” America is still “learning from other lands,” or 
worse, it is no more than an “apprentice” to the “learning of other lands.” The 
difficulty that Emerson confronts and does not want to dismiss light-heartedly, is 
how to bring about something new, how to address an expectation (a ‘promise’, a 
‘declaration’) without taking its realization for granted. And this is why Emerson’s 
description of ‘America’ – as a nation and a concept – cannot be phrased as a 
statement of facts – specifying America’s achievements up to the present moment – 
but, rather, it has to be expressed in the linguistic form of the “ought.” Phrased, 
much like Hamlet’s suspended imperative to revenge, as a “resisted imperative,” to 
use Geoffrey Harpham’s phrase (Harpham 1992: 2). And very much like Hamlet’s 
discontent, America’s “unhappiness” results from the dilemma of wanting to commit 
oneself to action or to reform when one does not really know from which grounds 
to start from in the first place.  
The contradictory sentiments of a continually postponed expectation and a 
reluctance to act also determines Emerson’s “double consciousness” between 
conservative and radical agendas, as we have seen in Chapter One. His adherence 
to the here and now is not reducible to a politics because it pertains to a moment 
that is both within and beyond time, irreducible to a linear workings of history. 
Emerson defines America’s place precisely in this eccentricity, in this moment 
evacuated from historical time. He thus means to establish an understanding of 
America’s idiosyncrasy as a nation both within and outside its own history, both 
within and outside the history of the world. Other than some of his fellow 
Transcendentalists who attempted to reform their lifes according to various more or 
less esoteric reform plans, Emerson insists that we have yet to see a much more 
fundamental change, namely that of the ways and means by which America 
expresses itself. He agrees that America’s change in the present is urgent and 
incisive, but he contends that if this is also to be a change of Americans 
themselves, there will have to be a reformation also of the poetic means by way 
of which Americans express themselves. As he remarks in “The American Scholar”: 
“The millions that around us are rushing into life, cannot always be fed on the 
mere remains of foreign harvests. Events, actions arise, that must be sung, that will 
sing themselves. Who can doubt, that poetry will revive and lead in a new 
age[…]?” (W, I, 82). While reform agendas in Jacksonian America often had a 
patent plan of how to change America, Emerson thinks that the consequences of 
America’s remaking are as yet inscrutable and not easily assimilable to particular 
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agendas of reform. He is convinced that we cannot simply control historical change 
and that our interventions may produce results that are themselves completely 
‘incalculable’.  
“I have been floated into this thought, this hour, this connection of events, by secret 
currents of might and mind, and my ingenuity and wilfulness have not thwarted, have 
not aided to an appreciable degree.” (W, II, 328)  
To confront the risk implied by historical change consequently means to wilfully 
accept that real change is not reducible to an agenda of reform but necessarily 
comes as something that is “incalculable […], unforeseen, unimaginable” (W, II, 
328). And even if Emerson means this description to describe every individual’s 
walk of life, it also applies to the development of the nation, since he believes that 
America’s democratic promise of change can never be reduced to the programme 
of this or that reform politics. “Events, actions arise, that must be sung, that will 
sing themselves”: if we return to the passage from “The American Scholar,” we can 
see that Emerson here inscribes the unforeseeability of America’s future already in 
poetic terms, that is, as the failure of a national aesthetics. And Emerson’s remarks 
here are a provocative departure from the standards ways in which the topic of 
America’s national literature would have been presented in earlier years for the 
Phi Beta Kappa orations at Harvard. Emerson, too, insists that an American “poetry” 
will enable the transition into the next age, but what he terms “poetry” is precisely 
not the national aesthetics that had previously been chosen as a topic for the talks 
at the Society. On the contrary: Refusing to specify that which is ‘American’ in 
American literature, Emerson identifies a poetic Eigensinn at the heart of an 
American literature yet to be achieved. He insists on something that will not be 
domesticated by an elite of intellectuals and their call for a programmatically 
American literature. America’s “events” and “actions” – though they will no doubt 
later be made the objects of literary descriptions –, “will sing themselves,” as he 
phrases it. Still, Emerson’s intimation of a failure of a national aesthetics for 
America’s present moment is of course nothing less than another inscription, a 
definition, and a characterization of an ‘American literature,’ if only in inverted 
commas. Paradoxically enough, then, the ‘father’ of American thought and literature 
is also the first person who rejects the notion and concept of American thought and 
literature per se, but “thereby in the same gesture defining it: as a double 
inscription,” as Joseph Riddel has argued (Riddel 1995: 42). Emerson’s complication 
of historicist discourse, his refutation of earlier descriptions of ‘America’ thus also 
comes as a decisive change to what Sacvan Bercovitch has called “the symbolic 
construction of America” (Bercovitch 1993). It reconceives of ‘America’ as a poetic 
idea that is essentially linked to a continual process of poetic revision or 
refiguration rather than to the institution of an authoritative national literature or 
culture.  
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In “The American Scholar,” Emerson most pronouncedly argues for such a 
reconstruction of ‘America’ as a poetic or symbolic construct. “The American 
Scholar” is given in August of the panic year 1837 and Emerson here elucidates 
the activity of the scholar with regards to the present situation of America (he will 
do so again in “Literary Ethics”). America, so Emerson’s perception, has been 
hugely successful politically and economically, but it has failed to come up with a 
national culture and forms of expression that would adequately articulate the 
American experience. Because of this failure, scholars, writers, etc. must still 
express themselves by imitating the thought and art of the Old World.  
Barbara Packer has argued, that this non-existence of a specifically American art 
and thought was a surprise for both Europeans and Americans:  
“[O]ne of the reasons for the interest English writers of the era had taken in America’s 
possible cultural flowering lay in their fear that the genius of English literature had 
exhausted itself in the mother country, and that a new Renaissance, if it ever occurred 
would need virgin soil. But by the 1830s it had become apparent that the predictions of 
the cultural historians had been wrong on both counts: the arts had not taken root in 
America, and in England they had gloriously revived.” (Packer 1982: 103). 
America’s failure to inaugurate a national literature was a disappointment on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Obviously, other cultural hopes were connected to America’s 
taking of the virgin land. Its expression in a new national literature would have 
served as an authentication of America’s claim to a different, more specifically 
democratic culture. When the continental literary conjunction went through a 
significant decline in the late eighteenth century, Europeans had closely followed 
the development of a republic of letters on the other side of the Atlantic, hoping 
that the new nation would come up with a similarly new culture. Instead, 
American authors found themselves struggling with the legacy of the traditions of 
the Old World. The writer’s fear that the burden of the past would be so great that 
it would prevent him from making his own stand, is obviously not a peculiarly 
American conundrum. But since America had defined itself as a republic of letters 
in the last decades of the eighteenth century, the non-existence of an American 
national literature came as a disappointment to many observers.  
At times, Emerson accepts this gloomy faith and identifies with what he would 
later describe as the characteristic situation of every American writer, namely that 
he was „late in the World too late perchance for fame” (J, II, 244). The writer, or 
scholar, or poet in Emerson is a marginal figure: As someone who has always 
already come too late, he is also eccentric with regards to the historical progress 
that is taking place. He has no hand in it and cannot enable the transition from the 
past to the future. As Emerson says in “Prudence”: “There is a certain fatal 
dislocation in our relation to nature” (W, II, 230). For Emerson, human nature is, 
by definition, eccentric and he repeatedly returns to the figure of Nicolaus 
Copernicus to more generally conceptualize the human as something that has been 
displaced from the centre (see, for example, W, VII, 223). The writer’s 
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eccentricity, more specifically, results from what Emerson calls the “great 
influence” of “the mind of the Past” (W, I, 87). This indelible influence of the past 
stands in a sharp contrast to Emerson’s call for the scholar to wake “to the time and 
to this country” (W, I, 108).  
Ideally, then, the notion of ‘America’ in Emerson stands for the possibility to 
throw off what he calls, quoting from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the old “cast of 
thought” (W, I, 109). But in order to throw off this cast, to overcome America’s 
fixation with its own and with the European past, the writer needs to recognize 
that the present, in itself, holds conflicting potentials. The writer thus needs to 
acknowledge the present moment as undecided, as an “age of Revolution,” as 
Emerson expresses it, “when the energies of all men are searched by fear and by 
hope” (W, I, 110). It is only by opening and confronting such a cultural “verge” 
(W, II, 315) or “abyss of possibility” (W, I, 205) in which the hold of the past 
tradition is loosened, that we can potentially find a new expression of ‘America.’ 
Consequently, in order to articulate a new ‘America,’ old expressions of and 
preconceptions about ‘America’ need to be disarticulated; what has sedimented into 
an organic but finally authoritarian totality of culture needs to be upset so that 
America can live up to its democratic promise of freedom, so that its “song” can be 
sung. This disarticulation of ‘America,’ as Emerson conceives of it, comes as a 
disclaiming of the very tropological system that posits the object and ideology that 
is ‘America’. The aim of this disarticulation is the reconfiguration and refiguration of 
the terms that originally went into the ‘making’ of ‘America,’ and it is precisely this 
process of a tropological re-turning of the terms that signify America that can alone 
guarantee the advent of its future.2  
The “casualty” of the ordinary 
As Emerson argues in “The American Scholar,” it is precisely the task of the scholar 
to ensure the attention to the present moment as an undecided, transitory phase of 
culture. To enable the advent of the future, the scholar needs to explore “the near, 
the low, the common” (W, I, 110), that is, he needs to focus on the present terms 
of America’s emergence as a democracy rather than on the tradition that it inherits. 
If the scholar lives up to America’s promise, he does so not by trying to bring 
America’s infant culture on a par with European traditions. He lives up to America’s 
promise precisely by advocating the ordinary cultural material in the present 
around him: “Give me insight into to-day and you may have the antique and 
future worlds” (W, I, 111). The scholar thus functions as an agent who can only 
initiate a process that can then no longer be controlled in terms of artistic genius. 
 
 2 The notion of disarticulation is Paul de Man’s, for a definition see his essay “Phenomenality and Materiality in 
Kant” in (De Man 1996: 90). 
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Again, this is because an attention to America’s present moment “may” provide us 
with a different future, but the advent of that future itself is incalculable. Emerson 
ideal is then not simply that of an unhindered vision of America, of an America 
whose present is exhaustively present to itself. Like other American authors, he 
complicates this dream of an unmediated “democratic vista” by insisting that the 
moment, in which America will fully live up to its promise, will be continually 
adjourned. For Emerson too, ‘America’ is like Gatsby’s “single green light” 
(Fitzgerald 1998: 20) that always recedes from view, because the unhindered 
view of “the near, the low, the common” (W, I, 110) is inevitably already bound 
up with a tropic economy that transgresses the myth of things.3  
Emerson does not believe that America can simply leave the “historische 
Rüstkammer des alten Europa” (TWA, XII, 114), as Hegel suggests in his 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Even the American writer begins 
his venture in the tradition out of which he is supposed to effect the new novel, 
writing, song. But Emerson believes that a tropical reconfiguration, a refiguration 
of received discourses is possible if we confront them with the yet ‘unhistoricised,’ 
contradictory potential of the present moment. He is well aware, however, that 
such a refiguration of the discourse that went into the making of the American 
republic of letters, may be a dangerous undertaking. The effects that such an 
attention to “the near, the low, the common” may have, is, in Emerson words, 
“incalculable” (W, II, 268). It may bring about the new language that potentially 
expresses ‘America,’ but the precise moment of the turning or troping of the old 
language into the new cannot be predicted, cannot be ‘planned’ as a matter of a 
national aesthetics.  
Emerson’s interest in the ordinary material of everyday life is consequently not 
meant to suggest that it may function as a stable ground for a new foundation of 
America. For him and other Transcendentalists, the ordinary always exhibits a 
„mysterious indeterminacy,“ as Thomas L. Dumm has phrased it (Dumm 1999: 2). 
Or, as Emerson says in “Experience,” it precisely “slip[s] through our fingers then 
when we clutch hardest” (W, III, 49). The success of an American pursuit of 
happiness is thus continually postponed because the ordinary, everyday ways of 
our lives can never be brought into complete coordination with our dreams, 
visions, etc. This is why the fulfilment of this desire necessarily addresses a 
“postponed expectation,” it orients itself towards a receding horizon, towards what 
Emerson calls “this new yet unapproachable America” (W, III, 72). Emerson’s 
 
 3 Even in Walt Whitman’s more assuringly phrased formulation of a “democratic vista,” the outlook onto the future 
state of America is projected from a present moment that lets us only hazily see the outline of the coming 
democray. As Whitman has it: “America, filling the present with greatest deeds and problems, cheerfully 
accepting the past, including feudalism, … counts, as I reckon, for her justification and success, … almost 
entirely on the future. Nor is that hope unwarranted. To-day, ahead, though dimly yet, we see, in vistas, a 
copious, sane, gigantic offspring. For our New World I consider far less important for what it has done, or what 
it is, than for results to come” (Whitman 2002: 757).  
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phrase also aptly describes how the moment of our ordinary present always 
already comes as the disappointment of an American promise of happiness. The 
American literature of two centuries has repeatedly returned to this disappointment 
of a promise of an ‘approachable America’ and has shown that this disappointment 
is, too, a constitutive element of the ideology of the American dream.4 The 
happiness envisioned by this dream is thus one that appears where it had been 
overlooked, it is a happiness that has a fleeting existence in the everyday and that 
cannot be achieved by a planned pursuit. The danger is consequently one of 
sentimentalizing the ordinary as the unproblematic ground for individual and 
communal biographies.  
My focus here is thus not on the kind of ‘commonsensical ordinary’ that forms 
the substance of liberal democracy and its democratic promise.5 Also, I am not 
concerned with the unproblematic everyday that the theorists of liberalism must 
posit as the foundation for their rational actors. I think that the relation of the 
ordinary and the practices of American society is much more problematic. As 
Thomas L. Dumm argues:  
“Constantly threatened by the habits it sustains, the ordinary might be said to (con)front 
the forces of its diminishment […] The ordinary has been approached in relationship to 
a transcendentalist vision of nature, discussed as a front of the wild we mortals 
supposedly revere. It has cautiously been apprehended as a font of common meaning, 
an immeasurable measure of common sense, unerring because it has no fixed point that 
might subject it to refutation, frustrating to think about for the same reason; confused 
with the sites that surround and yet never contain it; an aspect of language, yes, but not 
yet or ever synonymous with language; infinite in aspect, resistant to totality.” (Dumm 
1999: 3-4)  
Seen from this perspective, the ordinary is a paradoxical formation that is always 
both near and far, both present and absent. It is an ordinary that political theory 
has always struggled with because it comes as a danger to the autonomy of 
individual actors and because it troubles the notion of an intentionally plannable, 
pragmatist agency. The ordinary I am interested in here precisely resists its 
intentional organization, even if we must still presuppose it as a context of human 
life. As a consequence, the ordinary is never an originary culture, rather, it is 
comparable to what Michel de Certeau has called the “cultural activity” of the 
everyday. According to de Certeau, the everyday is the „cultural activity of the 
non-producers of culture, an activity that is unsigned, unreadable and 
unsymbolized“ (Certeau 1984: xvii). And according to de Certeau, this cultural 
activity cannot easily be narrated in the terms of the predominant ideologies or 
discourses of a culture. The ordinary – as a culture that is lived and experienced 
 
 4 For a similar account of the disappointment inherent in the American dream, see Elisabeth Bronfen, “Der 
‘American Dream’: Versprechen und Katastrophe eines Begriffs” (Bronfen 2007).  
 5 On the complex relation of „common sense“ and the „ordinary,“ see Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition 
(Deleuze 1994: 31-37).  
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but that cannot be symbolized or represented – always contains an ambivalent 
kernel that is not objectifiable. Because it resists its integration into a (national) 
narrative, the relation of fields of ordinary, everyday practices and explicit, 
narrated accounts of (a national) culture must necessarily remain ambivalent too.6 
Cavell has similarly described this phenomenon of the “moving ground” of the 
everyday as the “uncanniness of the ordinary” (Cavell 1988). Following Cavell, 
modernity has come up with two different reactions to the ambivalent structure of 
the ordinary: on the one hand, skepticism imagines the disappearance of the 
world, it assumes that I can never trust the ordinary that surrounds us as a ‘world’. 
On the other, modernity has maintained a naïve belief in the presence of things, 
assuming that the things and our perceptions of them coincide. Cavell argues that 
both reactions lead to a dead end since the world –this is the fundamental insight 
that Cavell discovers in Wittgenstein and in an analytic philosophy in the footsteps 
of Austin – is never simply present or absent, but always both present and absent 
at the same time (Cavell 2002: 238-265).  
According to Cavell, what Wittgenstein discovers when his philosophy moves 
towards skepticism, is paradoxically precisely the ordinary, the everyday. 
Scepticism thus leads to a discovery of precisely what it wants to repudiate:  
“I might epitomize Wittgenstein’s originality in this regard by saying that he takes the 
drift toward skepticism as the discovery of the everyday, a discovery of exactly what it is 
that skepticism would deny. It turns out to be something that the very impulse to 
philosophy, the impulse to take thought about our lives, inherently seeks to deny, as if 
what philosophy is dissatisfied by is inherently the everyday.” (Cavell 1988: 170)  
As a consequence, Cavell argues that we can only aspire towards the ordinary, but 
that it will never be available to us as a mere presence. We have always already 
lost it: “The everyday is what we cannot but aspire to, since it appears to us as lost 
to us” (Cavell 1988: 171). And if we finally, following our skepticist questioning of 
the reality of things, accept the ordinary as a ‘world,’ then this world carries within 
itself the memory of this doubt as an irreconcilable ambivalence: 
“The return of what we accept as the world will then present itself as a return of the 
familiar, which is to say, exactly under the concept of what Freud names the uncanny. 
That the familiar is a product of a sense of a return means that what returns after 
scepticism is never (just) the same.” (Cavell 1988: 166)  
It is precisely this double structure – Emerson calls it our “fatal dislocation” (W, II, 
230) – of the ordinary that becomes a focal point in Emerson’s attempt to assess 
America’s present moment. For him, America is something that has been firmly 
established on the one hand, but is characterized by a certain potential, possibility, 
or promise (of freedom, of democracy, etc.) not yet achieved in the present. I 
 
 6 On the concept of a problematic, ambivalent everyday, see Catherine Driscoll’s “The Moving Ground: Locating 
Everyday Life” (Driscoll 2001), Henry Lefebvre’s Everyday Life in the Modern World (Lefebvre 1984), and Lois 
McNay’s “Michel de Certeau and the Ambivalent Everyday” (McNay 1996).  
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think Cavell’s notion of the ordinary can help to explain the characteristic doubling 
of the present moment in Emerson, because it links the question of the 
‘uncanniness’ of the ordinary with an investigation of the ways in which we mean 
with language. Cavell argues that even ordinary language is prone to repudiate 
itself, that it may lose its power to express or “word the world”:  
“[F]or me the uncanniness of the ordinary is epitomized by the possibility or threat of 
what philosophy has called skepticism, understood (as in my studies of Austin and of 
the later Wittgenstein I have come to understand it) as the capacity even desire, of 
ordinary language to repudiate itself, specifically to repudiate its power to word the 
world, to apply to the things we have in common, or to pass them by. […] I might 
describe my philosophical task as one of outlining the necessity, and the lack of 
necessity, in the sense of the human as inherently strange, say unstable, its quotidian as 
forever fantastic.” (Cavell 1988: 154)  
The example that Cavell provides to illustrate the characteristic doubleness of the 
ordinary is that of the letter in Edgar Allen Poe’s story on “The Purloined Letter“ – 
itself obviously an exemplary case when it comes to explaining all things 
American. The everyday or ordinary, Cavell argues, follows the same logic as the 
famous letter in Poe’s story: it remains undiscovered precisely because it is readily 
accessible. Cavell thus reads “The Purloined Letter” as a parable on the guessing 
game that we know as „odd and even“ and that asks us to decide whether 
something has taken its ordinary course (“even”) or whether something 
remarkable (“odd”) has happened. As Cavell notes: „[I]t [the letter] is also to be 
read as the work of one who opposes me, challenges me to guess whether each 
of its events is odd or even, everyday or remarkable, ordinary or out of the 
ordinary.” (Cavell 1988: 168)) 
The connection that Cavell establishes between the ordinary and the problem of 
skepticism can also be referred back to what I have been saying about the 
peculiar temporal quality of the present, the contemporary: the present too is 
characterized by a fundamental ambivalence, it is never entirely present or absent. 
The present and the ordinary share the peculiar logic of something that is either an 
absent presence or a present absence. The temporal space of the present thus 
becomes a prototype of a third space, in which things are undoubtedly present, but 
can never be entirely localized or categorized.  
Cavell calls for a sustained philosophical investigation of the ordinary and its 
ambivalence. Even if the association of human agency and the ordinary is 
problematic – since the indeterminacy of the ordinary makes it a kind of quicksand 
–, Cavell sees a necessity of establishing a relation to the ordinary, “since there is 
nothing beyond the succession of each and every day; and grasping a day, 
accepting the everyday, the ordinary, is not a given but a task” (Cavell 1988: 
171). To establish such a relation to the ordinary, Cavell pleads for what he calls 
acknowledging: acknowledging comes as a continual approximation of the present, 
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as a working out of its ambivalences without attempting to integrate them directly 
into the paradigms or the knowledge of a culture.  
In later studies and essays, Cavell shows how what Wittgenstein discovers in the 
Gewöhnliches can also be seen at work in an American tradition of thought that 
has it most prominent exponents in Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. And 
Cavell repeatedly quotes a passage from Thoreau’s Walden to illustrate this process 
of acknowledging: “Not till we are lost [or turned around], in other words, not till 
we have lost the world, do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are 
and the infinite extent of our relations” (Thoreau 1966: 162). Cavell insists that 
such an acknowledgment of the irreducible diversity of the present both in 
temporal and cultural terms can never be translated into authoritative social 
practices or into a comprehensive knowledge or narration of how things ‘really’ 
are. But such a responsiveness to the unacknowledged potential of the present 
moment, by exposing resistances within the hegemonious practices of the present, 
can disperse the sedimented structures of our cultures to enable new cultural 
articulations. And this is why for Cavell, acknowledging becomes the paradigmatic 
sign for a specifically ‘American’ ethos of democracy. 7 
In Emerson, an attention to the unavowed and ambivalent potential of the 
present is tantamount to achieving America’s democratic promise. But to expose 
oneself to the ambivalence of the ordinary for him also means to more specifically 
confront a profound risk. As he explains in a note in his journal in 1833:  
“Such is the inaction of men. We have an obscure consciousness of our attributes. We 
stand on the edge of all that is great, yet are restrained in inactivity and unconscious of 
our powers, like neuters of the hive, every one of which is capable of transformation 
into the Queen bee. We are always on the brink, etc. Much preparation, little fruit. But 
suddenly in any place, in the street, in the chamber, will the heavens open and the 
regions of wisdom be uncovered, as if to show how thin the veil, how null the 
circumstances. As quickly, a Lethean stream washes through us and bereaves us of 
ourselves. What a benefit if a rule could be given whereby the mind, dreaming amid the 
gross fogs of matter, could at any moment CAST ITSELF and FIND THE SUN! But the 
common life is an endless succession of phantasms; and long after we have deemed 
ourselves recovered and sound, light breaks in upon us and we find we have yet had 
no sane hour. Another morn rises on mid-noon.” (J, V, 239-240) 
Our consciousness of our position in the world, as Emerson argues, is “obscure” 
and it may not provide sufficient grounds upon which to enact that transition to “all 
that is great”. Even if the distance between our ordinary existence in the present 
and the achievement of our promise (as an individual, as a culture) is only minimal 
(“a thin veil”) the “rule” of this transition cannot be given, its advent precisely 
eludes our grasp, so that we can only remain always “on the brink”. The risk that 
Emerson frames here as inherent to the ordinary is what Cavell is interested in 
 
 7 On the notion of “acknowledging” and how it is conceived as an alternative to “knowledge”, see (Cavell 2002: 
238-66).  
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when he alerts us to the common or the ordinary as something that happens 
“casually” but may sometimes cause a “casualty”:  
“What seems to be signature in Emerson is the weight he puts on the obvious, where 
the difficulty is taking him at his word. A favorite instance of mine is his liking for the 
connection between something happening casually and something creating a casualty. 
He is, in effect, calling attention to a point that language is making for us on its surface, 
namely, that what we do casually, every day, unthinkingly, distractedly – the 
hierarchies we assume, the slights we deliver and suffer, our adaptations (Emerson calls 
it our conformity) to the unconscionable – are as permanent in their effects, as matters 
of life and death, as are catastrophes.” (Cavell 2003: 6)8 
To “take Emerson at this word,” as Cavell phrases it, would mean to not just pay 
attention to the ordinary, to the unorganized, unhistoricised materials of our lives. 
It would mean, more specifically, to pay attention to how the ordinary in Emerson, 
as “a point that language is making for us on its surface,” is intrinsically connected 
to the promise and danger of writing. Cavell reminds us that Emerson’s call to 
action, then, is first and foremost a call for modes of writing that become attentive 
of the present moment as the stage upon which both individual as well as 
communal development is enacted. But this move does not secure the ground, 
since it is precisely in our use of language that we become aware of the “casualty” 
of the ordinary. On the one hand, then, we see here yet another echo of 
Emerson’s religious training because for him, as Gouldner expresses it, the 
“reconceptualization of the social moment had the appeal of a secular religion, 
with the convert reoriented toward communal life, animated by a new sense of 
values, possessed of a new cultural language, and committed to new actional ends” 
(Gouldner 1976: 47). On the other hand, however, it is important to maintain that 
Emerson frames the problem of America’s ‘conversion,’ of its transition to the next 
age as a matter of working through prior designations in order to expose them to 
a process of rhetorics, of troping and refiguration.  
From “calculation” to “force” 
In terms of the American historicist impulse that I have outlined in Chapter One, it 
becomes obvious that Emerson, even in the early lectures on the “Present Age,” is 
not so much concerned with specifying America’s place in history, about 
historicizing America’s current state within a larger history of nations, but rather 
interested in what one could term, with Raymond Williams, the “emergent forces” 
(Williams 1977:123) of cultural change.9 For Emerson, America’s transition is 
 
 8 For a similar comment on the potential casualty of the cause, see also Cavell’s “Excerpts from Memory”(Cavell 
2006: 790).  
 9 In his Marxism and Literature, Raymond Williams has described how any historical epoch is founded upon an 
interplay of “dominant,” “residual,” and “emergent” forces; see (Williams 1977: 123).  
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simultaneously both about its rampant commerce as well as about its spiritual 
renewal. Both contribute to the feeling that America is “on the verge” (W, VIII, 
338) of something to come. And both Emerson and Whitman hope that the activity 
of the scholar and writer would enable the advent of a qualitatively entirely 
different future.  
While it signalled America’s advent as a world power, commerce had led, as 
Emerson argues in “The American Scholar”, merely to a culture of “second 
thoughts” (W, I, 109). Earlier, in the lectures on “The Present Age”, he complains 
that commerce has established a general spirit of “calculation” (EL, III, 199) and 
had weakened all communal “ties and ligaments” (EL, III, 189) that were 
characteristic of America’s culture in the past. This definition of the present age sets 
the scholar’s epochal task: “Born in an age of calculation and criticism we are to 
carry it with all its triumphs and yield it captive to Universal Reason” (EL, III, 199).  
Emerson’s redefinition of the scholar thus suggest, in its own rather peculiar 
way, a healing of the conflict between individualism and the principles of market 
economy: “Whilst the multitude of men degrade each other, and give currency to 
desponding doctrines,” Emerson argues, “the scholar must be a bringer of hope, 
and must reinforce man against himself” (W, I, 193). But to “reinforce man against 
himself” means to effectively come up with “a new set of distinctions,” and “a new 
order of ideas” that will “set a bound to the respectability of wealth, and a bound 
to the pretensions of the law and the church” (W, I, 194). And this impetus, as 
Emerson argues provocatively, cannot be simply delegated to the scholar: 
“Nothing solid is secure; everything tilts and rocks. Even the scholar is not safe; he too 
is searched and revised. Is his learning dead? Is he living in his memory? The power of 
mind is not mortification, but life. But come forth, thou curious child! hither, thou 
loving, all-hoping poet! hither, thou tender, doubting heart, which hast not yet found 
any place in the world’s market fit for thee; any wares which thou couldst buy or sell, – 
so large is thy love and ambition, – thine and not theirs is the hour. Smooth thy brow, 
and hope and love on, for the kind Heaven justifies thee, and the whole world feels 
that thou art in the right.” (W, I, 193-94) 
If America wants to overcome its fixation with the market, Emerson argues, it will 
have to trust its scholars and writers because they are the ones that have access to 
that which escapes the market’s spirit of “calculation”. And even if the scholars 
cannot be instrumentalised – because they are themselves “not safe” –, Emerson 
insists on the centrality of a “force” or a “power” that resists its integration into the 
system of an all-encompassing market economy. The advent of America’s epochal 
turn precisely hinges on its readiness to let its “curious children” and “all-hoping 
poets” come forth to radically refigure the prevailing doctrine of ideas and to again 
establish “a life of discovery and performance” (W, I, 221).  
America’s ‘healing,’ the advent of its glorious age, consequently depends upon a 
“sublime prudence” that, for Emerson, is the general sign of the human as well as 
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a specific quality of what he terms “genius” or “character”. As he explains in “Man 
the Reformer”:  
“There is a sublime prudence, which is the very highest that we know of man, which, 
believing in a vast future, – sure of more to come than is yet seen, – postpones always 
the present hour to the whole life; postpones talent to genius, and special results to 
character. As the merchant gladly takes money from his income to add to his capital, so 
is the great man very willing to lose particular powers and talents, so that he gain in the 
elevation of his life.” (W, I, 256)  
The sacrifice of giving up the past is thus outweighed by a promise: The scholar’s 
willingness to refute the comfort of old traditions and to “believe in a vast future” 
can potentially be “the conversion of our harvest into seed” (W, I, 256), as he 
phrases it in “Man the Reformer”. The figure of the scholar or the reformer thus 
announces an age “when we too shall hold nothing back, but shall eagerly convert 
more than we now possess into means and powers, when we shall be willing to 
sow the sun and the moon for seeds” (W, I, 256). We see here, consequently, a 
concrete instance of Emerson’s signature ‘refigurative’ procedure: the process that 
he describes – America’s transition into the future, the advent of a new age of 
American thought, of a “vast future” – is also signalled by a refiguration of the 
terms that went to signify the notion of ‘America’ – “wares,” “buy,” “sell,” “possess”. 
America’s transition is therefore no longer a matter merely of programmatic 
reform, it is found out to be a poetic or rhetoric challenge. Precisely because the 
scholar (the writer, the poet) expresses himself in words, he is, Emerson believes, 
the true harbinger of the age to come. He is a kind of Spielleiter of the epochal 
turn, because he alone is capable of poetically arranging the conflicting 
potentialities inherent in the contemporary. As he expresses it in an early lecture:  
“He who shall represent the genius of his day; he who shall, standing in this great cleft 
of Past and Future, understand the dignity and power of his position so well as to write 
the laws of Criticism, of Ethics, of history, will be found an age hence neither false nor 
unfortunate, but will rank immediately and equally with all the masters whom we now 
acknowledge.” (EL, III, 200)  
Again, Emerson carefully avoids phrasing the matter in such a way that it would 
suggest that the poet’s writing can be instrumentalised to bring about the “age 
hence.” The “genius of his day” ambivalently refers to both the genius of the 
scholar as well as to the genius of the age and thus suggests that there is always an 
eventfulness that goes beyond the scholar’s intentions. The scholar, very much like 
Emerson’s representative man – who, by virtue of being representative, is more 
than what he is consciously aware of – thus functions as a kind of receptor who by 
receiving what he terms an “influx […] of power,” an “inspiration” or an “exctasy” 
(W, I, 335), “unconsciously” or “genially” (J, V, 80) transforms what he receives by 
poetically refiguring it in the act of representation.  
Emerson’s repeated return to the scene of America’s troping also needs to be 
read as a response to his disappointment with the progress of American culture. 
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Although having broken free from European command and having adopted a more 
enlightened form of government, Emerson and his contemporaries are 
disappointed to see that America does not (yet) surpass Europe in the arts and 
letters. While Emerson at times reflects a certain pride in the American polity in 
his journals, he also acknowledges what he perceives to be America’s lack of 
cultural imagination.10 Emerson sometimes attempts to explain this lack of a 
specifically American form of imagination in almost Hegelian terms as an 
expression of a broader historical tendency:  
“The history of America since the Revolution is meager because it has been all that time 
under better government, better circumstances of religious, moral, political, commercial 
prosperity than any nation ever was before. History will continually grow less 
interesting as the world grows better.” (J, I, 220) 
Emerson will continue to insist that “there is yet a dearth of American genius” (J, 
3, 306) and maybe it is important to remember at this point that for him American 
society is not per se a culture of letters.11 The vision of the properly poetic 
organization of America is decidedly the vision of an America yet to come, and 
“The American Scholar” is the programmatic rather than descriptive representation 
of that future state of culture in which the American genius will finally come to 
fruition.  
The provocation of “The American Scholar” 
The audience that assembled to hear Emerson’s lecture on the “The American 
Scholar” on August 31st, 1837, was an illustrious crowd, including James Russell 
Lowell, Wendell Philips, Unitarian ministers, members of Harvard’s faculty as well 
as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story. The intellectual heavyweights that 
had assembled for the annual Phi Beta Kappa society address, however, knew 
very well that they lived in turbulent times. Following the towering success of 
Andrew Jackson’s presidential campaign, American politics tended to be more 
populist and many were no longer interested in the Great American Enlightenment 
that the Federalists had promoted a generation before. Consequently, the Phi Beta 
Kappa society, itself part of that old intellectual elite, was well aware that 
intellectuals were increasingly mistrusted and, even, marginalized in contemporary 
society.  
The crowd that gathered at Brattle Street Church, rather than contemplating the 
challenges of the new era, was instinctively conservative and viewed America’s 
 
 10 On contemporary fantasies at surpassing Europe, see Merle Curti’s Growth of American Thought (Curti 1982: 
140-48) as well as Barbara L. Packer’s Emerson’s Fall: A New Interpretation of the Major Essays (1982: 85-95).  
 11 Indeed, the foundational link is probably one that is to be found rather between aesthetics and politics in a 
society that feared the arts but developed a detailed legal understanding of the artificiality of the state. 
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recent political and cultural development with mistrust. Having seen the 
multiplication of American destinies during Jackson’s presidency, they were 
anxious about a potential loss of an American culture common to all its inhabitants. 
After all, this was an eagerly patriotic society that, in its annual orations, had 
always been celebrating American culture. Already in 1818, Edward Tyrell 
Channing (later Professor of rhetorics and oratory and one of the forming 
influences for Emerson and other Transcendentalists) insisted on the “American 
Scholar” and urged Americans to “cultivate domestic literature”, so “that your 
countrymen, in every part of the union may feel a close […] intimacy” and “a 
source of national pride and unity” (qtd. in Sacks 2003: 26). It goes without saying 
that Emerson’s audience would have been acutely aware of the textual history of 
these orations.  
But Emerson, who was the second choice of the organizing committee after 
Reverend Jonathan Mayhew Wainwright withdrew, in “The American Scholar” (W, 
I, 79-115) boldly subverts what had then become a well-established topic. More 
significantly, he subverts the well-established phrase of the title by simply refusing 
to deal with it in the standard terms. Emerson does precisely not specify, as the 
title would suggest, the character or political programme of the American scholar. 
He refuses to perpetuate what had repeatedly been defined “with nationalistic and 
moral overtones” (Sacks 2003: 31) by previous orators. Clearly, his definition of 
the American Scholar “without dwelling on what is uniquely American” (Sacks 
2003: 31) disturbed the contemporary audience and many – Channing, for instance 
– criticised Emerson for suggesting that not individual but common genius was the 
gold standard for American culture. What is even more significant is that Emerson 
does not really talk about the scholar, rather, he talks about ways of reading and 
writing. The title is thus somewhat of a misnomer because the principal argument 
of “The American Scholar” consists in its not being about the American Scholar. 
Needless to say that his audience, trained in the system of American typology and 
thus acutely aware of Emerson’s violation of the form, would have shifted 
nervously in their chairs.  
Emerson’s principal provocation in “The American Scholar” is that he turns away 
from the idea of a ‘government by the best’ – which for the Unitarian audience 
could only mean the Harvard men – to insist on a kind of popular sovereignty also 
in the realm of art and culture. The Harvard elite advocated an elitarian 
democracy, because they feared that the principle of a dispersion of power that 
was characteristic of democracy would be transferred to the realms of art and 
culture and that America could therefore only hope for a mediocre culture. From 
Alexis de Tocqueville to Henry James and beyond, commentators have repeated 
this topos when they described America as a prosaic nation, “a characteristic that 
[…] leads to the production of a second-rate literature – romance” (Kronick 1991: 
163), as Kronick summarizes the well-known stereotype.  
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Romance, in Hegelian terms, is the expression of a country that lacks a certain 
historical gravity. And Hegel argues in his Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik that “[d]er 
Roman im modernen Sinne setzt eine bereits zur Prosa geordnete Wirklichkeit 
voraus” (TWA, XV, 392). It seems that the Harvard men imagined themselves as 
Hegel’s weltgeschichtliche Individuen, advocating an elitist project of moral 
guidance. For them, the development of a national literature was less an 
investigation of the culture of the American people than a claim for moral 
leadership. As Channing states the claim: “We know nothing so fitted to the 
advancement of society, as to bring its higher minds to bear upon the multitude; as 
to establish close connexions between.” Literature, argues Channing, “is plainly 
among the most powerful methods […] of forming a better race of men” (Channing 
1845: 248)). Against the intuition of the Harvard elite and impartial to the moral 
example of Harvard men, Emerson in “The American Scholar” makes a strong 
claim for popular sovereignty not just in the field of politics but in those of arts and 
culture as well. The period had seen other orators who had approached the 
society with different agendas of legal, social, or political reform. Here, however, 
comes an orator who provokes his audience because he calls for a reform of their 
souls, because he wants to change them from “scholar” to “Man thinking” (W, I, 
84, 89, 91). No wonder then that Emerson’s address is met with fierce resistance 
by the two-hundred or so present, who consider themselves New England’s elite. 
After “The American Scholar” (and after the no less controversial Divinity School 
Address in the following year), it will be almost thirty years before Emerson is 
again welcomed to speak at Harvard. When he finally returns under the auspices 
of Harvard’s Charles William Eliot – who cites Emerson as the inspiration for his 
curricular reforms – the writer that was once chastised a dangerous thinker is now 
the central figure in American literature and thought.  
While earlier Phi Beta Kappa orations had stressed the importance of the classics 
and attempted to establish a link between the massive canon of Western literature 
and what Americans themselves still considered an infant American literature, 
Emerson here puts his focus on the individual writer and reader, and on the 
concreteness or materiality of the ‘American’ moment in which he writes or reads. 
Instead of suggesting how American literature can match the example of the 
classics, Emerson thus radically particularizes or localizes knowledge and the 
practice of reading and writing in the individual and in the contemporary moment. 
This is how Emerson summarizes the traditional attitude towards literature: “We 
read the verses of one of the great English poets, of Chaucer, of Marvell, of 
Dryden, with the most modern joy, – with a pleasure, I mean, which is in great 
part caused by the abstraction of all time from their verses” (W, I, 91-92). But 
Emerson argues that our contemporary moment needs to be brought to bear upon 
our reading of literary texts. And this can only happen if we are willing to expose 
ourselves to a potential in language, namely the potential of meaning and of 
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figuration: “One must be an inventor to read well” (W, I, 92), Emerson says to 
suggest how every individual process of reading is essentially irreducible because 
it is always implied in the temporality of its own contemporary moment as well as 
in that of its own performance in reading. “There is then creative reading as well 
as creative writing. When the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of 
whatever book we read becomes luminous with manifold allusions. Every 
sentence is doubly significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the 
world” (W, I, 93). Against the mere perpetuation or extension of the European 
classics to American culture, Emerson posits a moment of unbridled meaning, of a 
troping that is performed as an actual performance or Vollzug of sense.  
Taking into account Emerson’s interest in instances of troping, one begins to 
wonder how the address could have nevertheless been taken to suggest the 
beginning of an American literary nationalism. There is, I want to insist, a strong 
sense in which “The American Scholar” is not about the wholeness of a national 
culture or about the identity of the scholar. Rather, Emerson’s ‘American’ writing is 
involved in a complex relationship with other writings and readings, and the call 
for intellectual independence leads us back to an even more pronounced 
statement that there is nothing original in the statement of the scholar. This is 
phrased more explicitely when Emerson acknowledges, nearing his conclusion, 
that “I have dwelt perhaps tediously upon this abstraction of the scholar. I ought 
not to delay longer to add what I have to say, of nearer reference to the time and 
to this country” (W, I, 108). He then calls on the audience to study everyday, 
popular culture, mentioning as models European writers – Goldsmith, Burns, 
Cowper, Goethe, Wordsworth, Carlyle, and Swedenborg. “The American Scholar” 
then, is defined by Emerson in terms of its European models. That Emerson had 
the audacity to define the American Scholar without dwelling on what is uniquely 
American shocked an audience that had grown accustomed to the ritual of Phi Beta 
Kappa orations.  
“I accept the topic which not only usage, but the nature of our association, seem to 
prescribe to this day, – the AMERICAN SCHOLAR. Year by year we come up hither to read 
one more chapter of his biography. Let us inquire what light new days and events have 
thrown on his character, and its hopes.” (W, I, 82) 
Emerson’s conclusion is that there is strictly speaking no such thing as the 
American scholar yet. In fact, and this is the reason why his address causes such a 
stir, that there is, yet, no such thing as an ‘American’ Literature. Rather, Emerson 
hopes that the American scholar will be the result of a process that has only just 
begun. But, because what is uniquely American is still a category not adequately 
defined, it cannot be presupposed and needs to be ‘effected’ in America’s very 
own contemporary moment. This is further underwritten by the fact that Emerson’s 
essay almost programmatically replaces the figure of scholar with that of the writer. 
And simultanously, the supposed representation of a world that is characteristically 
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‘American’ is replaced by an eventfulness and, therefore, the present of a text, a 
text that happens, a text that is itself “creative.” The writer or scholar thus comes 
into play as a kind of medium, as a vehicle of transference that enables complex 
processes of troping so that a new text may be produced, finally, in writing. In 
and out of his own contingent moment in the present, the scholar can alone secure 
America’s transition by abandoning himself to a process of textual refiguration or 
troping.  
Let us then briefly return to America’s Hamletian dilemma that Emerson outlines 
in “The American Scholar”: “We, it seems, are critical,” Emerson argues and 
suggests that America’s current epoch is characterized by a turning of thought 
against itself – Emerson terms it America’s “age of Introversion” (W, I, 109). 
America’s contemporary situation for Emerson is thus marked by the advent of the 
modern, by a situation in which rationality comes full circle to confront itself. It is 
the moment in which American thinking forces the very adjective ‘American’ out 
of its hiding, turns upon itself, becomes critical and reflects upon its own reflection 
of America. Jacques Derrida has described this modern moment of self-reflection as 
the moment of dissemination, and I think his comments are relevant in our 
context12 : Emerson does not attempt to establish a stable framework in which the 
meaning of America can be sorted out once and for all. Rather, he is interested in 
what he later calls “the moment of germination” (W, VII, 38), that is, in a moment 
where the text itself becomes creative, and thus produces new meaning. The 
resulting play of meaning speaks of “the impossibility of reducing a text as such to 
its effects of meaning, content, thesis, or theme” (Derrida 1981: 7), and attests to 
the fact that America – both as a nation and as a concept – needs to be produced 
poetically, needs to undergo a continual process of poetic revision.  
For Emerson, the moment of America’s ‘dissemination’ and subsequent poetic 
refiguration can alone guarantee and maintain the promise of America’s next age. 
And the exit from its current “age of Introversion” is effected not simply by a 
repudiation of everything that is old, but by way of a subsumption of the 
“contributions of the past” (W, II, 113) into a new figuration that will itself be 
creative because it displaces earlier articulations of ‘America.’ As Derrida has it: 
“Even while it keeps the text it culls alive, this play of insemination – or grafting – 
destroys their hegemonic centre, subverts their authority and their uniqueness” 
(Derrida 1981: 378). America’s criticism, its introversion or self-implication, 
because it makes the terms of tradition available, is consequently the necessary 
condition for its transition into the next age. As Emerson argues: “I look upon the 
discontent of the literary class, as a mere announcement of the fact, that they find 
themselves not in the state of mind of their fathers, and regret the coming state as 
 
 12 See also Derrida’s comment in Dissemination: “Germination, dissemination. There is no first insemination. The 
semen is already swarming. The ‘primal’ insemination is dissemination. A trace, a graft whose traces have 
been lost” (1981: 334).  
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untried” (W, I, 109-110). America’s obsessive self-inspection thus marks a liminal 
moment in American culture and it suggests a temporal moment that goes beyond 
a Hegelian model of history. Here, the transition into the next epoch includes a 
moment of risk, it is incalculable, “untried,” as Emerson phrases it. America, “as a 
boy dreads the water before he has learned that he can swim” (W, I, 110), stands 
on the verge of something new but is unable to specify the new state yet. This is 
why the “signs of the coming days” are “auspicious” (W, I, 110), only 
“glimmer[ing] […] through poetry and art, through philosophy and science, through 
church and state” (W, I, 110).  
“Give me insight into to-day, and you may have the antique and future worlds” 
(W, I, 110): Emerson’s elaboration of a liminal or transitional moment of American 
culture is further underscored by the peculiar temporal perspective that he asks 
the scholar to adopt. While Emerson acknowledges a strong American 
individualism – the “new importance given to the single person” (W, I, 113) –, he 
asserts the value of the individual scholar or writer only insofar as he himself 
becomes an “unsearched might” (W, I, 114) that opens to the world to become a 
“university of knowledge” (W, I, 113):  
“The scholar is that man who must take up into himself all the ability of the time, all 
the contributions of the past, all the hopes of the future. […] The world is nothing, the 
man is all; in yourself is the law of nature, and you know not yet how a globule of sap 
ascends, in yourself slumbers the whole of Reason” (W, I, 113-114).  
This is then not simply Emerson’s endorsement of an American individualism. 
Rather, when the scholar and the world are brought to equal terms, when the 
individual is made to correspond with the world, then a radical decentring of the 
individual is effected. He is no longer the instance that controls the processes that 
he is supposed to have instigated. He becomes a kind of transferential medium that 
is exposed to forces always larger than himself. Again we see here at work 
Emerson’s peculiar mise-en-scène of a correspondence, of a Wechselverhältnis – 
Emerson simply calls it a “relation” – of man and world. The writer or scholar 
needs to be a “being […] without bound” (W, I, 120), he needs to extend beyond 
himself and into the world. His temperament is therefore characteristically a certain 
responsiveness to the world. It makes him a permeable membrane, prepared for 
the “influx of light and power” (W, I, 335) as Emerson phrases it in “The 
Transcendentalist.”  
It is important to maintain, however, that already here in “The American 
Scholar” – and despite the title of the address –, Emerson starts to imagine a 
tentative solution to America’s cultural conundrum that it is no longer simply 
dependant upon a discourse of the individual genius. Here he proposes that genius 
itself is produced by popular culture and thereby also conceives of a possible 
mediation between what he perceives to be the increasing conflict between 
American individualism and the American culture of community. In America, the 
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meaning of the scholar’s words effectively needs to be “unlocked” by the 
“resounding tumult” (W, I, 95) that they produce. This “other me” (W, I, 95) of the 
communal world around the scholar consequently suggests that it is precisely a 
principle of multiplicity – the manifold conduits between the scholar and the 
responding audience – that will ensure America’s cultural transition.  
Emerson’s argument here obviously comes as a challenge to the arguments of 
the Phi Beta Kappa orations in the years before that had suggested that the volatile 
social conditions called for a limitation of majority rule. More specifically, it 
responds to Brown University president Wayland’s address in the year before 
Emerson delivers “The American scholar.” Wayland’s 1836 talk is lost, but we have 
a record by John Pierce, longstanding secretary of the Board of Overseers at 
Harvard University and a devoted chronicler of academic life at Harvard. Wayland, 
so Pierce,  
“alludes with deep feeling to the dangers of our Republic from the despotism of the 
many, in the language of the passionate and unprincipled appeals to the prejudice of 
the vulgar, and in the form of mobs and other ways in which justice is anticipated or 
perverted by those not immediately authorized to dispense it.” (Pierce qtd. in Sacks 
2003: 27)  
Before Wayland, it was William Ellery Channing who in 1830 established the topic 
of a specifically American literature in his “Remarks on National Literature” 
(Channing 1845). And a number of passages in Emerson’s journals show that he 
was aware of the discussions surrounding a national literature at Harvard.13 
Emerson must have known that his remarks on what he considered to be the 
failures of a national culture were to provoke those who considered themselves to 
be the very elite of that culture. On top of that, Emerson also does not respect the 
familiar procedures of Unitarian philosophy, but mixes its terms with examples 
taken from everyday life to suggest how beauty and writing develop out of the 
ordinary by way of a “strange process”:  
“It is the raw material out of which the intellect moulds here splendid products. A 
strange process too, this, by which experience is converted into thought […] The 
manufacture goes forward at all hours. The actions and events of our childhood and 
youth, are not matters of calmest observation. […] Not so with our recent actions, – with 
the business which we now have in hand. On this we are quite unable to speculate. 
Our affections as yet circulate through it. […] The new deed is yet a part of life, – 
remains for a time immersed in our unconscious life. In some contemplative hour, it 
detaches itself from the life like a ripe fruit, to become a thought of the mind. Instantly, 
it is raised, transfigured; the corruptible has put on incorruption.” (W, I, 95-6)  
This is obviously a far cry from Unitarian doctrine since Emerson suggests that this 
“strange process” of things becoming language or writing, is itself an event, a 
transfiguration. Arguing against philosophical common sense, Emerson states that 
 
 13 See, for example, J, I, 399; J, III, 38; J, III, 275; J, IV, 315; J, V, 86-87.  
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“[l]ife is our dictionary” (W, I, 98) and locates a potential in the ordinary that can 
not be controlled by philosophical doctrine. Only by abandoning himself to the 
spontaneous movement of life, of experience, Emerson argues, can the scholar 
prepare the grounds for a national literature. Emerson also implies that this 
literature will come as a challenge to the traditions of thought that the short history 
of America has established. “The mind now thinks; now acts; and each fit 
reproduces the other” (W, I, 99), Emerson says, and insinuates that the translation 
of the ordinary into writing happens in a “fit,” that is, in a vanishing moment of 
creativity or geniality that always already eludes the artistic control of the scholar, 
the writer, or the poet.  
“When the artist has exhausted his materials, when the fancy no longer paints, when 
thoughts are no longer apprehended, and books are a weariness, – he has always the 
resource to live. Character is higher than intellect. Thinking is the function. Living is the 
functionary.” (W, I, 99)  
No wonder, then, that Emerson’s claim must have seemed highly counter-intuitive 
to the contemporary elite assembled at Harvard. While Harvard philosophers 
strove to find ways to match the achievements of continental thought, Emerson 
argues for a renewed attention to the objects of everyday life: “The meal in the 
firkin; the milk in the pan; the ballad in the street; the news of the boat; the 
glance of the eye; the form and the gait of the body; – show me the ultimate 
reason of these matters” (W, I, 111). We find here, then, an instance of what 
Cavell has called Emerson’s “investment in the ordinary” (Cavell 1990: 35). And 
Emerson himself notes in his journal that “the roots of what is great and high must 
still be in the common life” (J, IV, 213).  
Emerson’s argument in “The American Scholar” can further be read as a tentative 
attempt at healing the rift between the scholar (the writer, the poet, etc.) and the 
life of the community. Emerson imagines a way in which the ordinary 
circumstances of life ‘produce’ genius and thereby suggests that the sign of 
America’s revolution will precisely not be a literature that aspires to represent the 
“sublime” or the “beautiful” but, rather, one that finds ways of “poetizing” the 
“familiar” or the “low”:  
“One of these signs [of the revolution taking place in the present age] is the fact, that the 
same movement which effected the elevation of what was called the lowest class in the 
state, assumed in literature a very marked and as benign an aspect. Instead of the 
sublime and beautiful; the near the low the common, was explored and poetized. […] 
The literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, the 
meaning of household life, are the topics of the time. It is a great stride. It is a sign, – is 
it not? – of new vigor. […] I ask not for the great, the remote, the romantic. […] I embrace 
the common, I explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low.” (W, I, 110-111)  
I am not sure, however, whether Emerson is able to resolve the conflict between 
the idiosyncrasy of genius and the force of collective culture here in “The 
American Scholar.” He never quite establishes or attains a balance between the 
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two. Even tough the essay makes a very strong argument against what Emerson 
considers to be the prevailing elitism at Harvard, it goes back behind Nature in 
asserting the influence of individual elements of society.14 
It is only by giving up on his philosophical ambitions that the scholar may 
become a true paradigm giver. By abandoning himself to the ordinary, he is no 
longer one who merely represents, describes or understands. “Thinking now” and 
“acting now”, as Emerson phrases it, the scholar can write the very law of history, 
because when he, in a “fit,” translates the material of common life into writing, his 
representation will refigure the world and will make the advent of a new age 
possible. The scholar thus becomes the active agent of history because by 
refiguring it in the light of present experience, he may change the course of 
history altogether.  
“Yes, we are the cowed, – we the trustless. It is a mischievous notion that we are come 
late into nature; that the world was finished a long time ago. As the world was plastic 
and fluid in the hands of God, so it is ever to so much of his attributes as we bring to it. 
[…] [A]s a man has any thing in him divine, the firmament flows before him and takes his 
signet and form. […] They are the kings of the world who give the color of their present 
thought to all nature and all art, and persuade men by the cheerful serenity of their 
carrying the matter that this thing which they do, is the apple which the ages have 
desired to pluck, now at last ripe, and inviting nations to the harvest. The great man 
makes the great thing.” (W, I, 105)  
The American scholar’s attention to the contemporary moment of his culture is thus 
essential in sustaining America’s epochal promise. And it is by “giving colour,” that 
is, by a process of figuration that American will finally fulfill this promise.  
As Steven Weisbuch has argued in his study Atlantic Double-Cross. American 
Literature and British Influence in the Age of Emerson, there is then, in Emerson and 
other writers of the time, the discovery of something that Weisbuch calls 
“actualism”:  
“To the extent that American history was brief and the American present consequently 
undefined, possibility could flourish. For the first time in a long time, literary vision 
could be socially implemented. If, as the American writer had discovered, history could 
be created by thought, so too thought could create a living history. History could be 
imagined as a creative invention and then implemented. Actualism, then, meant reverse 
verisimilitude, life modelled on the mind’s design.”15  
To Emerson, this “creative invention” also means, as we have already seen, the 
“gradual domestication of the idea of Culture” (W, I, 107). And he believes that it 
is a collective process rather than an individual act of genius: “The human mind 
cannot be enshrined in a person, who shall set a barrier on any one side to this 
 
 14 For an insightful reading of “The American Scholar” focusing on some of the conceptual problems of the essay, 
see see Kenneth Sack’s Understanding Emerson: “The American scholar” and His Struggle for Self-Reliance 
(Sacks 2003: 21-47).  
 15 See Steven Weisbuch in Atlantic Double-Cross. American Literature and British Influence in the Age of 
Emerson (1986: xiv.).  
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unbounded, unboundable empire” (W, I, 108). His oration before the Phi Betta 
Kappa society consequently executes both a problematization of history as well as 
of the ability of the scholar to alter its course. “[H]im the past instructs; him the 
future invites” (W, I, 84), but the vanishing moment of transition between the past 
and the future itself cannot be preordained by the scholar’s intentional activity. The 
scholar and the writer too face a “power” that “returns into itself” and that cannot 
be entirely controlled by them. And like “nature” in Emerson’s thought, the scholar 
and the writer are themselves self-reflexive structures, they are defined by the 
effects they produce. As Emerson phrases it:  
“There is never a beginning, there is never an end, to the inexplicable continuity of this 
web of God, but always circular power returning into itself. Therein it resembles his 
own spirit, whose beginning, whose ending, he never can find, – so entire, so 
boundless. Far too as her splendors shine, system on system shooting like rays, upward, 
downward, without centre, without circumference, – in the mass and in the particle, 
Nature hastens to render account of herself to the mind.“ (W, I, 85) 
Emerson insists that a possible answer to the dilemma of American belatedness – 
the “mischievous notion that we are come late into nature; that the world was 
finished a long time ago” – lies precisely in this self-reflexivity of the human: 
because he knows about the burden of the past, the scholar, turning to his own 
contemporary moment, can discover something yet to be realized, can conceive of 
more relations to be stumbled upon. But Emerson is well aware the relation 
between man and world is only a tentative one. “That which he venerates is still 
his own, though he has not realized it yet. He ought” (W, I, 120-121). But, as in 
other places, this call for cultural renovation is here too phrased as an optative, as 
something that may momentarily heal the rift between man and world but may, 
the very next moment, again be dissolved. The scholar or writer, as “Man 
Thinking” may consequently bring about the “conversion of the world” (W, I, 
115), but only if he is willing to expose himself to the world, to open up to a 
potential or promise of contemporary existence not yet fulfilled. “The preamble of 
thought, the transition through which it passes from the unconscious to the 
conscious, is action. Only so much do I know, as I have lived” (W, I, 95). Poetry 
or, for that matter, philosophy, both acquire their function or meaning not because 
their value has been established by tradition. They can only effect a potential 
conversion of the world and the writer if they respond to the multiplicity of life in 
the present and if they themselves function as a medium of a poetic Vollzug. 
Instead of perpetrating a philosophical system familiar to his audience, Emerson 
thus argues that action, coming out of the ungovernable multitude of life, may 
transform the world. But it does not do so in an instrumental or pragmatic sense: 
this willingness to be exposed to the variety and variability of life does not secure 
the ground. Occasionally, it may make the writer the guarantor of a new world. 
But, as Weisbuch has argued, this attitude also includes the moment of an 
“epistemological daring” (Weisbuch 1986: xiv) that may endanger our world as we 
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know it. This is why “a different, sometimes contradictory attitude” (Weisbuch 
1986: xiv) always develops alongside Emerson’s trademark optimism. It imagines 
that the world may be lost and that the scholar’s optimistic expectation of a different 
future is disappointed. Emerson’s empowerment of the writer and the scholar thus 
always comes at a price: the individual is radically thrown back upon itself: “[A] 
man is made the Providence to himself” (W, I, 123), as Emerson phrases it in the 
“Divinity School Address” of the following year. And this necessary self-implication 
is also the fundamental risk that always underwrites the optimistic assertion of what 
Emerson will later elaborate as the doctrine of “Self-Reliance.”  
 
  
Three 
 
History, Quotation, Hermeneutics 
The literature of colonial American has often been read as the representative 
depiction of an experience that is, quintessentially, ‘American’. It has often served 
as a privileged point of reference out of which critics have projected a trajectory of 
a specifically ‘American’ literature. Thus, these texts have been read as early points 
of departure for a literary tradition that eventually solidified into a specifically 
‘American’ literary canon. Concentrating on cataloguing the various topoi 
americanii in these early texts, trying to establish a canon of exemplary yet 
representative works, critics have ignored, however, that even these early texts 
do not lend themselves easily towards a definition of ‘Americanness’. The literature 
of colonial America does not directly represent what it may have produced: 
‘America’. Therefore it may ultimately be questionable to simply assume its 
‘representativity.’ I want to argue, on the contrary, that it describes an essentially 
nascent or transitional state, a state in which ‘America’ is not yet a stable frame of 
reference and, therefore, the qualities of ‘Americanness’ are yet unsecured. 
Consequently, early descriptions of the dangerous passage as well as of the arrival 
upon the foreign shore as well as accounts of the laying of the land are not so 
much a point of origin for a specifically ‘American’ culture, and not so much the 
discovery of a new experience that could be called ‘American.’ Rather, these early 
texts present themselves precisely as a complication of such an origin insofar as 
they identify the lack of a common vision or national myth shared among the early 
settlers. If we still want to refer to these early texts as quintessentially ‘American’ 
texts, then this has far-reaching implications for our taxonomy of American culture: 
transitionality, then, is not merely a characteristic feature of this early culture in-
between old Europe and the new continent. Rather, to call these early texts 
‘American’ would mean to in fact locate this aspect of transitionality as the 
characteristic feature at the heart of ‘American’ culture. And ‘America’, then, would 
be precisely another name for this experience of transitionality. This definition is 
far from unproblematic: if we identify the transitional as being at the heart of the 
‘American’ experience, then it may indeed be very difficult to fix the meaning of 
the term ‘America’.  
I will illustrate early ‘American’ literature’s complication of a shared point of 
origin, its being no longer European but not yet ‘American’, by making a case in 
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point: John Winthrop’s sermon “A Modell of Christian Charity” (Winthrop 1996: 33) 
was delivered on board the Arbella. Winthrop’s sermon strongly foregrounds 
transitionality right in its opening paragraph:  
“A MODELL OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY.  
WRITTEN ON BOARD THE ARBELLA, ON THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.  
By the Hon. John Winthrop Esqr.  
In his passage (with a great company of Religious people, of which Christian tribes he was the Brave 
Leader and famous Governor;) from the Island of Great Brittaine to New-England in the North 
America. Anno 1630.” (in Morgan 2003: 76) 
If for a moment we imagine the precarious scene – Winthrop’s audience assembles 
on the weather-beaten deck of the Arbella in the middle of a stormy autumnal 
Atlantic – then it becomes obvious that Winthrop’s description of a moment of 
passage is not yet the beginning of a characteristically ‘American’ experience. On 
the contrary: the way in which Winthrop’s text forefronts the historical singularity 
of the event of this passage does precisely not allow for a historical projection. The 
passage is an event, both a crossing from one place to another as well as a 
rupture, radically disconnecting what is left behind from what is yet to come (the 
arrival upon the foreign shore, the laying of the land, the discovery of what it 
means to be ‘American,’ etc.). All there is, here and now, on the ship somewhere 
between England and the New World, is the faint and doubtful vision that  
“wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are 
uppon us; soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our god in this worke wee have 
undertaken and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us wee shall be 
made a story and a by-word through the world […] [T]he Lord our God may blesse us in 
the land whether wee go to possesse it: But if our heartes shall turne away soe that wee 
will not obey […] it is propounded unto us this day, wee shall surely perishe out of the 
good Land whether wee passe over this vast Sea to possesse it.” (in Morgan 2003: 93) 
Therefore, Winthrop’s sermon is an exceptional or, rather, eccentric piece of text 
that attempts to tell the story of a land that does not have a history yet, of a people 
and a land that can only imaginatively be conjured up by Wintrhop’s words. The 
Pilgrims assembled on the deck of the Arbella thus find themselves in a place in-
between, transitional and liminal, with a future that is as promising as it is 
precarious. Consequently, Winthrop’s text is not, as has often been suggested, just a 
prophetic statement about or an uncomplicated anticipation of American culture. By 
focusing on the eventfulness of the passage, it stresses an intermediary moment of 
the present effecting the transition between past and future. Later sermons, those 
by Emerson included, keep this focus on the present moment as a passage that 
mediates between the past and the future.  
Interestingly enough, this ‘spirit’ of transitionality is also preserved by the texts 
that were written by the settlers after their arrival. In these descriptions of the 
laying of the land following the arrival on virgin soil, the writers often exhibit a 
certain perplexity that the discovery of the new land is not followed by the 
communal discovery of an ‘American’ experience. Of Plimmoth Plantation 
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(Bradford 1959), for example, contrary to a narrative that equals the arrival on the 
new shores with the finding of a new sense of community, speaks of a certain 
vexation over the decline of communal zeal and the erosion of (Puritan) 
conviction, that American settlers had to come to terms with. Bradford explicitly 
laments the weakening of the “bonds of love” as the primitive early economy 
shifted its focus to cattle raising and the colonists left the town of Plymouth to be 
closer to their farms.1 Maurice Stein has shown convincingly in The Eclipse of 
Community (Stein 1972) that the transition from a collectivist or communal Puritan 
culture to a prospering agricultural colony foreshadows the fragmentary tendencies 
that will later come to characterize American social life. Also, he argues that the 
growing concerns over the transformation of their communities are a much more 
frequent topic in early American literature than is generally admitted. Undeniably, 
they outweigh celebrations of the early settler’s achievements. That is: The 
communal bonds established by the passage (e.g. the various kinds of contracts 
signed by the settlers during the crossing), start to dissolve immediately after the 
settlers’ arrival upon the new shores and the lament of the decline of community 
with its Tocquevillean overtones of incipient individualism makes obvious, as 
Thomas Bender noted in Community and Social Change in America (Bender 1978: 
23-24), that the new settlements are not going to hold as ‘germ cells’ for a new 
‘American’ society. This also means that even the very first texts of the ‘American’ 
tradition are, strictly speaking, an expression of a transitional state rather than of an 
early ‘American’ culture. Early American texts, do not so much express a ‘common 
sense’ but draw attention to the makeshift nature of the cultural make-up of 
‘America’. By identifying America’s state as liminal, they problematize and 
undermine exactly those characterizations of American culture that have since 
become the standard tropes and originary commonplaces of American Studies.  
Rites of passage 
These texts, then, rather than providing a representative account of early America 
that, as a point of origin, allows for the projection of a continuous American 
tradition, offer multiple meanings for America. Refusing to accept Roy Harvey 
Pearce’s classic argument about the “continuity” of American poetry, critics have 
 
 1 The Restoration in 1660 greatly changed the situation of the Puritan settlements in New England. The 
government in London wanted New England to remain English and was alarmed by the strong Puritan hold 
upon these settlements. In England, Charles II started a campaign that made the passage to North America 
promising also for Anglicans, Quakers, and Methodists. The influx of a secularly-minded and economically 
ambitious people significantly weakened the Puritan communities. While the Colonists decided to respond with 
persecutions, the pressure from the home land as well as a growing secularism that was the result of a 
burgeoning trade soon made what was a closely-knit religious culture break up. The Puritans consequently lost 
not only their exclusive control of the coastal settlements. With the defeat of the Indian nations and the 
successive settlement of the New England back country, the last Puritan communities were lost.  
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elaborated how early American literature is reluctant or even outright refuses to 
fix the meaning of ‘America’ and of ‘providence’ (see Stein 1972; Rosenmeier 
1972).2 Again, Bradford’s Of Plimmoth Plantation may serve as a good example 
here. Although it is usually read as a ‘history,’ Of Plimmoth Plantation is not a mere 
chronographic description suggesting the organic continuity of American history. 
Douglas Anderson has shown in his revisionist reading of the textual complexity of 
Bradford’s book (Anderson 2003) that, if this is to be the origin of the American 
tradition, then this origin is more unstable and more complex than is generally 
acknowledged. Anderson argues convincingly that the signature of Plimmoth 
Plantation is nothing but its textual and narrative complexity, the way in which it 
revises, quotes, collects, and compiles from older texts. Anderson successfully 
applies his elucidation of the textual “complexity” of Bradford’s text to complicate 
its status as an origin for American culture and he shows that Plimmoth Plantation 
fails to fix the meaning of ‘America’ because it is already complicit in a process of 
quotation, adaptation, and revision. Consequently, the text that serves as the origin 
of the tradition that is to bear the name ‘American’ cannot specify what ‘American’ 
means but, rather, attempting to do so gets caught up in a complex textual process. 
Furthermore, Anderson argues for a double meaning of complexity: both literature 
and ethical practice are here made to mirror each other in the way in which 
Bradford comments in his “carefully interwoven” (Anderson 2003: 107) pages both 
on his own writing as well as on that of others (Mourts, Brewster, Winslow, the 
letters by Chauncy integrated into the History, etc.). The textual complexity then is 
not only a sign of the instability of the alleged tradition. In a more general sense, I 
want to argue, it is also the sign of the instability and contestedness of the meaning 
of ‘America’. What has been widely regarded as the first text of the American 
tradition, is thus exposed as a fundamentally displaced origin, an origin that is itself 
already caught up in a complex process of quotation and revision.  
Maybe, the early settlers’ almost obsessive impulse to chronologize is a good 
indication of the precariousness and essential unsecuredness of their venture in 
early America. Bradford’s Of Plimmoth Plantation and Winthrop’s “History of the 
New England” (Winthrop 1996), as well as lesser known histories, chronicles, and 
diaries may serve as a reminder that Americans were anxious, even long after 
their settlements had been securely established, about the essentially unsecured 
nature of ‘American’ culture and experience. The obsession to chronologize, then, 
 
 2 The case for the “continuity” of American literature was made persuasively in Roy Harvey Pearce’s The 
Continuity of American Poetry (1961). However, in his search for continuities and coherent historical clusters, 
Pearce ignores the significant disparities of ‘American’ literature. By reducing American writing to two labels, 
the “Adamic mode” and the “Mythic mode,” and then by trying to bring these together on some sort of neutral 
‘middle ground,’ Pearce ignores the influence of antinomianism in the field of American literature. And even if 
Pearce repeatedly highlights the lack of an American sense of communitas, he nevertheless unquestioningly 
posits an American experience as the ground of an American poetics. Pearce’s narrative consequently reduces 
American poetry into overly simple categories and takes no notice of texts that disrupt the continuity of 
American writing by insisting on something that is irreducible to the narratives of ‘providence,’ ‘America,’ etc.  
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betrays the lack of a historical fundament for ‘America’. Of course, if we read these 
early texts as points of origin for a new culture and as early examples of a 
description of a characteristically ‘American’ experience, then we will encounter a 
tradition that has always already been ‘American’. However, and as an analysis of 
Winthrop’s and Bradford’s sermons would confirm, early American literature does 
not so much express the sudden discovery of a new point of origin for a natively 
‘American’ culture and literature, rather, these early texts draw attention to the fact 
that ‘America’ is, essentially, another name for a culture of liminality, for a culture 
that continually needs to leave its own origins behind and define its history anew.  
These early texts consequently define America’s situation as one of always 
already not having arrived. America’s cultural situation can thus be described in 
terms of what Bernhard Waldenfels has called a Zwischenereignis (an “event in-
between” or an “in-between events”): it is to be located in the space between 
different orders of the world, characterized by an unusual temporality that does not 
conform to standard models of history (Waldenfels 1994: 46). Emerson’s interest 
and elaboration of the present moment, of something that he calls the “verge of to-
day,” concerns precisely this paradoxical structure of a present always already 
divided in itself, exhibiting the temrporal structure of an ‘originary’ posteriority, 
irreducibly a remainder of the past but also a potential opening towards the advent 
of the future. And, as we will see, it is precisely in its capacity of not having 
arrived, of not being wholly present with itself, that the Emersonian “to-day” also 
provides a general description for the culture that is ‘America.’ How America 
critically turns back to or upon itself, how it complicates its present by 
investigating its connection with the past or its potential connections with a 
(qualitatively different) future, that, for Emerson, defines ‘America’ as a culture.  
But maybe this is not so much Emerson’s singular apprehension: a similar insight 
has simply been overlooked in early American literature. In Winthrop’s sermon, 
the slogan with which he charges his audience on the Arbella to start an 
‘American’ life comes in the form of both an optative as well as a quotation: “[W]e 
shall be as a city upon a hill.” The ideal for the new society is one derived from 
an old text, the Old Testament. The vision of a coming American communitas is 
upheld via the quotation of the Old Testament’s description of Zion, the city of 
Enoch. Paradoxically enough, then, the spiritually renewed society expresses itself 
in the oldest terms, and the society that is to go beyond the beliefs of the old 
continent can only phrase its founding in the diction of the old.  
The passage described so arrestingly by Winthrop and Bradford has to be 
retaken continually if the idea of ‘America’ is to make any sense. Americans 
consequently are, to use a term coined by Victor Turner, “liminars”. Turner’s 
description of liminars and liminality may be helpful in our context because it 
allows for an application of the terms both on an individual as well as collective 
level. Turner argues in On the Edge of the Bush that “’[l]iminars’ […] may be 
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initiands or novices in passage from one sociocultural state and status to another, or 
even whole populations undergoing transition […]” (Turner 1985: 159). And 
although rituals of liminality are typically associated with a preservation of order 
and power, liminality itself can be a condition in which the possibility of freedom 
can be experienced. Turner in Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: “[I]n this gap 
between ordered worlds almost anything may happen. In this interim of 
‘liminality,’ the possibility exists of standing aside not only from one’s own social 
position but from all social positions and of formulating a potentially unlimited 
series of alternative social arrangements” (Turner 1974: 13-14). Liminality may 
occasion a radical restructuration of the current structures of a society. It may bring 
about a communion of equals, which Turner calls communitas, “a liminal 
phenomenon, consisting of a blend of humility and comradeship” (Turner 1985: 
173), but it may also lead to the occlusion of what used to be a transparent social 
or communal arrangement. The anxiety characteristic of states of liminality is then 
counterpoised by the experience of choice and multiplicity that it grants. The 
passage, therefore, is both a dislodgment, a transposition form one world to 
another, as well as a potentially a rupture, precariously disconnecting the history of 
the new world from the old.  
The Pilgrims’ writing provides plenty of references to this kind of liminality, of a 
people standing on the threshold (the limen) between two worlds. One of the 
most remarkable instances is again to be found in Of Plimmoth Plantation where 
Bradford describes the curious experience of arriving upon the new shore as a sort 
of hiatus:  
“[F]or being now passed the vast ocean, and a sea of troubles before them in 
expectation what could they see but a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wilde 
beasts, and wilde men? and what multitudes of them there were, they then knew not: 
for which way soever they turned their eyes (save upward to Heaven) they could have 
but little solace or content in respect of any outward object; for summer being ended, 
all things stand in appearance with a weather-beaten face, and the whole country full 
of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage hew; if they looked behind them, 
there was the mighty ocean which they had passed, and was now as a main bar or 
gulph to separate them from all the civil parts of the world.” (Bradford 1975, 62) 
The ordeal of the “mighty ocean” finally behind them, the settlers set foot on the 
promised land for the first time. But it is not yet clear what the new world has in 
store for them: Bradford is careful not to present the first vision of the new 
continent in Arcadian terms. The coast of New England does not present itself as a 
pastoral idyll but, rather, as a chaotic, wild, and intimidating natural disorder – and 
indeed half the colony perishes before the first winter is over. The paragraph from 
Bradford’s Of Plimmoth Plantation consequently stages the moment of an unsettled 
present, a moment before the institution of a national myth for ‘America’. It presents 
the liminal moment of passage as an event that explodes the continuum of 
historical time, as a moment occurs in an eccentric temporality that is neither 
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commensurable with the received traditions (of the old continent left behind) nor 
indicative of a future life in a land that is yet to become ‘America’. Bradford’s 
account also shows that it is not able to contain this moment of revolutionary 
freedom. Of Plimmoth Plantation, as Robert Daly has argued, “begins 
magnificently, diminishes into a tedious account of unsorted administrative details, 
and ends, uncompleted, in silence” (Daly 1973: 557). The vision of the liminal 
moment between an old and a new world, also meant to be the textual point of 
departure for a splendid providential history, cannot finally be contained within a 
text and the account of how the new world would prove itself to be the promised 
land soon loses direction and, finally, breaks off and remains a fragment. It is as 
though the textual domestication of the revolutionary moment of passage into a 
chronologizing account produces nothing but a cumbersome accumulation of 
details.3  
Even if the precariousness and volatility of the moment of passage was soon 
appeased by an overwhelming obsession to historicize – think of all the histories, 
chronologies, and journals that make up the corpus of early American literature –, 
the scene of the arrival has nevertheless proven to be of lasting fascination for 
Americans. Maybe this is because, as Andrew Delbanco has argued, the “process of 
change in ideas and feelings” in America “can be understood only in conjunction 
with the large material fact that stands at our beginning as a nation: the migration 
from one continent to another,” the “journey out of one culture into another,” that 
has not only defined the Pilgrims but all later immigrants too. Americans are, 
Delbanco’s contends, following “the belief that our lives can be radically renewed” 
(Delbanco 1989: 250-251). Before there was an ‘America,’ then, there was the 
liminal experience of the event of the crossing.  
Winthrop’s and Bradford’s accounts of the passage as a precarious moment have 
often been emulated in later American literature and the scene of the arrival itself 
has never failed to fascinate Americans: Henry David Thoreau, who himself 
“crossed the Cape half a dozen times”, records his fascination in Cape Cod (Thoreau 
1985: 851), but also draws attention to the topos in the following passage from The 
Maine Woods:  
“I am reminded by my journey how exceedingly new this country still is. You have only 
to travel for a few days into the interior […] to come to that very America which the 
Northman and Cabot, and Gosnold, and Smith, and Raleigh visited. If Columbus was 
the first to discover the islands, Americus Vespucius and Cabot, and the Puritans, and 
we their descendants, have discovered only the shores of America. While the republic 
has already acquired a history world-wide, America is still unsettled and unexplored.” 
(Thoreau 1985: 654) 
 
 3 For an assessment of the incoherent or fragmentary nature of Bradford’s text, see Douglas Anderson’s excellent 
William Bradford’s books: Of Plimmoth Plantation and the printed word (2003: IV, 85, 209) and Robert Daly’s 
comments “William Bradford’s Vision of History” (Daly 1973).  
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With Walt Whitman, the twin visions of the liminal space of the beach and the 
turbulent sea abound in Leaves of Grass and come to be the central topoi of his 
(poetic) theory of democracy in the poem “Sea Drift” (2002: 206-21). George 
Santayana, in Character and Opinion in the United States, makes the scene of 
arrival stand for the Americans’ continuing and “endless migration of the mind”:  
“It is notorious how metaphysical was the passion that drove the Puritans to those 
shore; they went there in the hople of living more perfectly in the spirit. And their 
pilgrim’s progress was not finished when they had founded their churches in the 
wilderness; an endless migration of the mind was still before them, a flight from those 
new idols and servitudes which prosperity involves, and the eternal lure of spiritual 
freedom and truth.” (Santayana 1991: 4-5) 
Emerson, too, repeatedly alludes to the scene of this arrival and it is part of a 
series of recurring images that he uses to characterize American culture. In “The 
Transcendentalist” (1841) he uses the image of the “sea-beach” to picture his time 
and its “modes of living” as essentially transitional. Only that Emerson transposes 
the ritual of the passage from an extraordinary event in the history of the nation 
into the eventfulness of the nation’s everyday experience, into the eventfulness of 
an ‘American’ ordinary. In other words: the passage, for Emerson, is no longer the 
point of departure or the origin of the American people and nation. Rather, it is 
something that happens continually, all around us, in our everyday lives. Emerson’s 
use of the image of the “sea-beach” functions as a symbol of ‘America’s’ continual 
arrival, of its strange, everyday rite of passage, of the continual discovery and 
invention of ‘America’ in ordinary life. It is this passage, this strange eventfulness of 
the ordinary that, for Emerson, is ‘America,’ “for ever renewed to be for ever 
destroyed”:  
“Soon these improvements and mechanical inventions will be superseded; these modes 
of living lost out of memory; these cities rotted, ruined by war, by new inventions, by 
new seats of trade, or the geologic changes: - all gone like the shells which sprinkle the 
sea-beach with a white colony to-day, for ever renewed to be for ever destroyed.” (W, I, 
359)  
Clearly it is no coincidence that Emerson chooses to use the image of the “sea-
beach” to talk about the transitional character of ‘American culture’: but it is 
essential to note here that Emerson attempts to make the scene of the arrival 
resonate with a more general assessment of ‘American’ culture and with his interest 
in what he calls the “verge of to-day”, the epochal threshold or shift. The passage 
from one geographical space to another is here transformed into a more general 
principle of the cultural constitution of America: the continual arrival upon a new 
shore, the eventfulness of the passage, is precisely, Emerson suggests, America’s 
cultural medium. Being forced to continually start anew, being forced, so to speak, 
to exercise its freedom, the event of the present, a simultaneous becoming and 
dissolution of America (“for ever renewed to be for ever destroyed”) is both 
America’s genius as well as its greatest peril. Because the evanescent medium of 
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the today, that brief and incalculable hiatus always also poses the risk of a possible 
suspension of a fragile tradition and of acquired ways of ordinary communal life. 
As Emerson argues in The Conduct of Life:  
“In history, the great moment is, when the savage is just ceasing to be a savage, with all 
his hairy Pelasgic strength directed on his opening sense of beauty - and you have 
Pericles and Phidias - not yet passed over into the Corinthian civility. Everything good 
in nature and the world is in that moment of transition, when the swarthy juices stil l 
flow plentifully from nature, but their astringency or acridity is got out by ethics and 
humanity.” (W, VI, 70-71) 
Emerson’s persistent interest in this “moment of transition” has to be assessed also 
in respect of an American tendency to over-emphasize the value of tradition. 
Because America’s history is, as it were, up for grabs, Americans have been 
particularly anxious about establishing traditions, discourses of identity, etc. To 
Emerson, however, this American fixation with the past and a distant future means 
nothing but an occlusion of the present moment and, therefore, a negation of the 
present’s potential for intermission, disruption and change – something that for 
Emerson is tantamount to the possibility of freedom. The central American creed 
that it is possible “to begin the world anew”, as Thomas Paine has famously put it 
in Common Sense (Paine 1945: I, 21), for Emerson does not carry any significance 
lest we begin here and now, out of the aporia of a precarious today. The occlusion 
of the present moment, almost total with the millenarian movement but also 
virulent elsewhere, for Emerson annuls the freedom to begin over again.  
America’s “cumbrous and embarrassed speech” 
Emerson’s thought is essentially poetic and his work provides a poetic response to 
the conundrum of America’s passage. Emerson does never elaborate this response 
systematically, but this is precisely the point: It is exactly by abandoning his 
writing to poetic and rhetoric processes that it initiates a radical departure from the 
doctrine of “representative words” so influential in America. To adequately account 
for the moment of transition in writing, Emerson repudiates the notion of a 
language that is “one with things” (J, III, 492) and rejects the idea that language 
can guarantee a secure grip on the world. For Emerson, language’s mediation or 
representation of the world necessarily remains problematic, just as the advent of a 
specifically American culture must remain a “postponed expectation”. American 
speech, as he phrases it in his journal, is necessarily always “cumbrous, 
embarrassed speech,” because America’s “language itself is young and unformed” 
(J, III, 492).  
We can only understand Emerson’s approach to rhetoric – his attempts to find in 
it an adequate means to represent the “moment of transition” – if we keep in mind 
the extensive import of a doctrine of “representative words” in the second half of 
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the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century. This doctrine was not only 
meant to provide the words to representatively talk about the newness of 
American experience, it was also meant to provide a focus to gauge the 
representativity of American experience. In other words: the country’s very own 
“representative words” were taken to be instrumental in forming this American 
experience. As Thomas Gustafson argues in his seminal study on Representative 
Words: Politics, Literature, and the American Language, 1776-1865:  
“[T]he American quest for representative words can be considered to include not just 
attempts to guard or renovate worlds of the English language and the governing texts of 
America, but to change Americans themselves – to convert, reform, or inspire them – so 
that their actions would be guided by the Word of God or by the words of the 
Declaration and Constitution.” (Gustafson 1992: 3)  
The doctrine of “representative words” answers a number of efforts in the 18th 
century to establish a fixed vocabulary and language for America. These efforts 
were not merely academic – as was Dr. Samuel Johnson’s efforts to remodel the 
English Language in the 1740s – but also undertook “to renew the words, to make 
them representative, to redeem their value, [in order that] people must perform 
anew the acts of liberty, revolution, sacrifice, brotherhood, and charity, 
underwritten by the rhetoric of America’s first revolution” (Gustafson 1992: 3). This 
renewal of words, so Americans hoped, would eventually result in a vocabulary 
that was ‘proper’ only to citizens of America, a kind of ‘jargon’ spoken by a 
democratic people, representatively expressing their shared rituals and beliefs. The 
revolutionary spirit of the young nation, its alleged stepping out of the continuum 
of European history, called for a new language, for new tropes, or, at least, for old 
tropes turned. Consequently, the unsettling of the relationship between words and 
meanings, words and things and the resulting process of neologization was seen 
merely as a preliminary stage instrumental in fastening down an American dialect 
and vocabulary (Gustafson 1992: 301). It was, then, a process of neologization that 
should, eventually, restore the nexus of word and action that Americans insisted so 
much upon. This was also, as is widely known, the vital linguistic problem of the 
discussions about the Constitution: The revolutionary system of government, some 
argued, would also require a similarly ‘revolutionized’ political discourse, because 
the old terms ‘aristocracy,’ ‘monarchy,’ or even ‘democracy’ could no longer 
accommodate the ‘meaning’ of the new nation. This is why the framers of the new 
constitution quickly realized that the American project would need a radically new 
political lexicon to adequately represent the spirit of its revolutionary society. And 
indeed, as Federalist No. 37 (“Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in 
Devising a Proper Form of Government”), written by James Madison makes 
obvious, much of the struggles over the new constitution concerned this lack of 
suitable terms: “New ideas, such as presented by our novel and unique political 
system, must be expressed either by new words, or by old words with new 
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definitions” (Madison 1865: III, 435).4 Thomas Jefferson, in a different context, 
makes a similar point: “The new circumstances under which we are placed call for 
new words, new phrases, and for the transfer of old words to new objects” 
(Jefferson 1984: 1295-6).  
But America’s obsession with its language and rhetoric was by no means over 
after the declaration of independence. Uncannily echoing the famous passage in 
Karl Marx’s “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte” – “the 
beginner who has learned a new language always translates it back into his 
mother tongue, but he assimilates the spirit of the new language and expresses 
himself freely in it only when he moves in it without recalling the old and when 
he forgets his native tongue” (Marx 1996: 15) – Walt Whitman acknowledges that 
America’s revolution will not be complete until its people are fluent in a novel 
tongue. Whitman himself revisits the doctrine of “representative words” in his 
American Primer:  
“In America an immense number of new words are needed, to embody the new political 
facts, the compact of the Declaration of Independence, and of the Constitution – the 
union of States – the new States – the Congress – the modes of election – the stump 
speech – the ways of electioneering – addressing the people – stating all that is to be 
said in modes that fit the life and experience of the Indianian, the Michiganian, the 
Vermonter, the men of Maine – also words to answer the modern, rapidly spreading, 
faith, of the vital equality of women with men, and that they are to be placed on an 
exact plane, politically, socially, and in business, with men.” (Whitman 1904: 6)  
Whitman argues for a spirit of continual experimentation in which the developing, 
provisional state of language equals the improvised state of the union and its 
culture. Only by pressing onward and beyond the canon or lexicon of inherited 
denominations and representations, Whitman argues, will it possible to “give the 
spirit, the body, the man, new words, new potentialities of speech” (Whitman 
1904: 6). The process, as Whitman conceives of it, is both endless and circular: 
The new “potentialities of speech” engendering new circumstances, new “political 
facts,” that will then again call for new words. For Emerson, Whitman, and other 
nineteenth-century writers, this potential inexhaustibility (Unabgeschlossenheit) and 
continual self-affection of America’s signification is nothing but the mark and 
guarantee of its democratic promise: New political realities will here be reflected 
in a change in the political lexicon and this change will potentially bring about 
further progress that will then again cause for an extended and revised vocabulary. 
America’s poetic self-affection consequently gives birth to a process of revision that 
continually posits its own origin.  
As Gustafson argues, the process of neologization in fact became one of the 
early focal points for the discussions around the development of the republic: 
“Neologization and the transfer of old words to new objects became synonymous 
with America. The two linguistic processes throve in a world of invention, 
 
 4 Madison also discusses the problem of the political lexicon of the United States in Madison 1865: III, 519.  
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discovery, and social change – the world of democracy, the world of the frontier” 
(Gustafson 1992: 302). But because this also meant that there was no bedrock 
foundation for America, it wasn’t long before some Americans grew anxious about 
the advance of America’s linguistic makeover. The framers themselves had not 
been overly concerned about the process of neologization. As Jefferson remarks: “I 
am no friend […] to what is called Purism, but a zealous one to the Neology 
which has introduced these two words without the authority of any dictionary. I 
consider the one as destroying the nerve and beauty of language, while the other 
improves both, and adds to its copiousness” (Jefferson and Peterson 1984: 1295). 
And in 1816, in a letter to Joseph Milligan, he may see the possibility of what he 
calls “uncouth words” but he argues that “the public will judge them,” and, 
therefore, no artificial restrictions (i.e. standardizations, norms, etc.) need to control 
the emergence of new words (Jefferson 1905: XIV, 464).  
Soon, however, many thought that the proliferation of new words was to 
endanger common sense. William Fowler, a professor of rhetoric and oratory at 
Amherst, would argue in 1851 in his English Language in its Elements and Forms 
that “[i]n this country, in this ‘wilderness of free minds,’ new thoughts and 
correspondingly new expressions spring up spontaneously to live their hour or to 
be permanent” (Fowler 1851: xii).5 Some thought this “wilderness of free minds” 
to be a mixed blessing, if not a danger. Fowler himself, concerned that the process 
of neologization might be running out of hand, wrote the first American textbook 
of English grammar to be used in colleges. As they “spread westward” and “in the 
use of their liberty,” Fowler worried, Americans would “break loose from the laws 
of language, and become marked not only by one, but by a thousand Shibboleths” 
(Fowler 1851: xii). Fowler and others grew anxious about a declension of 
language if new words were not sanctioned by the learned elite, and soon, the 
criticism of Dr. Johnson’s and the King’s English standardizing influence is replaced 
by demands for a standardization of the republicanized language.  
But the discussions around neologization also made Americans especially aware 
of the power and potential of language and rhetoric. The large number of spellers, 
grammars, and dictionaries that the revolutionary generation published may serve 
as a reminder that this was not merely the leisurely pursuit of the learned elite. 
But once the potential for radical linguistic renovation had become unearthed, 
once the American lexicon had been extended and the grammar had been 
changed, many feared that a process of linguistic corruption would necessarily 
ensue and lead to a deterioration of common sense. This anxiety about the 
linguistic development of the republic finds its expression also in the literature of 
the period. There is a memorable scene in Washington Irving’s “Rip van Winkle,” 
 
 5 See H. L. Mencken’s introduction to his The American Language: An Inquiry into the Development of English in 
the United States (1980) for an early overview of the discussion among American philologist about the state of 
the American language.  
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when Rip, after the revolution, awakens to a “singularly metamorphosed” 
landscape and, upon entering the village, observes that “[t]he very character of the 
people seemed changed” (Irving 1983: 779). But Rip is especially puzzled by the 
“Babylonish jargon” that he hears in his town: “[R]ights of citizens – election – 
members of congress – liberty – Bunker’s hill – heroes of seventy-six […]” (Irving 
and Tuttleton 1983: 779). If Irving’s account makes fun of the anxieties over a 
denigration of the American dialect, it nevertheless identifies a dilemma implicit in 
the rapid development of the American language. Irving’s point is not simply that, 
because Rip has slept for twenty years, he cannot connect elements of the new 
political jargon with the respective historical events. Rather, Irving is interested in 
the way in which the linguistic development brought about by the revolution has 
disbanded the bonds of community and communication. Irving’s ironic vision is of 
an America in which the ‘national’ dialects become so diverse to in fact prevent 
efficient communication among the community: linguistic change, assumed to 
shape American identity in the first place, has now exploded the hopes for a 
united community.  
Clearly, Irving’s highly ironic and detached stance vis-à-vis the linguistic 
makeover of the republic was an exception. But there were other disturbed 
surveyors of the American penchant for linguistic innovation. Among them Alexis 
de Tocqueville, who found the United States’ laissez-faire politics with regards to 
language deeply unsettling. This American desire for linguistic innovation so 
unnerves Tocqueville that, in the second volume of Democracy in America 
(Tocqueville 2004), he devotes an entire chapter to the topic: “How American 
Democracy has Changed the English Language” (Tocqueville 2004 547-553). The 
source of this innovation, according to Tocqueville, are constant agitation due to 
competition, the American love of “change for its own sake” (Tocqueville 2004: 
548), and the Americans’ general ignorance of classical languages: “Men who live 
in democratic countries have little notion of the languages spoken in Rome and 
Athens” (Tocqueville 2004: 549). Tocqueville, very much like Fowler, castigates 
that Americans “become used to employing words indiscriminately” and argues that 
in America, “[t]he rules laid down by style are all but abolished: Seldom does one 
encounter expressions that seem, by their very nature, either vulgar or refined.” 
The result, as Tocqueville argues, is that “the origins of words are lost, like the 
origins of men, and confusion develops in language as in society“ (Tocqueville 
2004: 551). Tocqueville, the aristocrat, finds the mutual mobility of people and 
words equally disturbing.  
Tocqueville is especially interesting in our context because he himself connects 
the question of linguistic innovation with that of America’s “transitory” or 
“unsettling situation” (in the French original, the phrase is “situation ambulatoire”). 
Because their “situation is constantly changing”, Tocqueville argues, Americans 
“make the expression more rapid and the idea less clear.” And he adds that 
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“[w]hen it comes to language […] democratic people prefer obscurity to effort” 
(Tocqueville 2004: 553). Tocqueville negatively assesses this as the “unfortunate 
consequence of democracy” (Tocqueville 2004: 550) and sees no potential for 
improvement as Americans “rely on their own unaided intelligence” (Tocqueville 
2004: 553). No wonder then that Tocqueville’s assessment is a rather harsh one:  
“Men who live in democratic countries will therefore often have vacillating ideas, they 
need very broad expressions to contain them. Since they never know whether the idea 
to which they are giving voice today will fit the new situation in which they may find 
themselves tomorrow, they naturally develop a taste for abstract ideas. An abstract word 
is like a box with a false bottom: you can put in any ideas you please and take them 
out again without anyone being the wiser.” (Tocqueville 2004: 553)  
Like Emerson, Tocqueville associates America’s linguistic condition with the 
political situation of being in transition. But for Tocqueville, it is precisely the fact 
that America has not yet arrived at its final destination that explains what he see as 
the linguistic deficiencies of the young nation. The country is in a changing state, 
Tocqueville asserts, and this is why its words essentially unfixed:  
“An author begins by slightly bending the original meaning of a known expression, 
and, having altered it in this way, he does his best to adapt it to his subject. Another 
author comes along and bends the meaning in another direction. A third takes it down 
yet another path, and since there is no common arbiter, no permanent tribunal that can 
fix the meaning of the word once and for all, it remains in a state of transition.” (DiA, 
550)6  
Tocqueville’s aristocratic defamation of the republican dialect as transitional and 
unsettled is not to go away because he has already identified an element of unrest 
in his study that he takes to be the central characteristic of American democracy. 
But Tocqueville is not alone with his perplexity over the indeterminacy of words 
in America. The evolution of an American dialect led to violent efforts against all 
formal differentiation of English and American not simply by observes from outside 
the United States. The pioneer(ing) dictionary of Americanisms, John Pickering’s 
Vocabulary or Collection of Words and Phrases which Have Been Supposed to be 
Peculiar to the United States of America (Pickering 1816), the work of a 
Massachusetts lawyer, was harshly criticised and seen to be utterly inappropriate. 
Even Noah Webster, who was later to publish what became the standard American 
dictionary, saw no use for it (see Mencken 1980: 8). Most of the American 
philologists of the early days – Witherspoon, Pickering, Worcester, Fowler, Cobb, 
de Vere and others – were stubborn advocates of conformity, and challenged all 
indications of a national independence in speech. Fowler, for example, proposed 
 
 6 I have slightly changed Arthur Goldhammer’s translation in order to reflect Tocqueville’s identification of an 
element of transitionality in America’s linguistic and national ‘makeup’. In the original, the passage reads: “Un 
auteur commence par détourner quelque peu une expression connue de son sens primitif, et, après l’avoir 
ainsi modifiée, il l’adapte de son mieux à son sujet. Un autre survient qui attire la signification d’un autre côté ; 
un troisième l’entraîne avec lui dans une nouvelle route ; et, comme il n’y a point d’arbitre commun, point de 
tribunal permanent qui puisse fixer définitivement le sens du mot, celui-ci reste dans une situation ambulatoire” 
(Tocqueville 1840: 128).  
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harsh measures when he argued that all “Americanisms are foreign words and 
should be so treated” (see Mencken 1980:33).  
Significantly enough, then, the politicians’ call for a regulation of an unrestrained 
individualism an their attempts at limitating the power of the majority is echoed by 
the early philologists’ call for a control of linguistic freedom and of the 
advancement of popular dialects (Mencken 1980; Gustafson 1992). Very much like 
Tocqueville, early American philologists are anxious about the indeterminacy of 
American speech and about the characteristic vagueness of American political 
discourse – terms such as the American people, democracy, and free government 
were, after all, still contested territory. Later attempts at defining an American 
vocabulary, culminating in Noah Webster’s dictionary, therefore found their focus 
in fixing “loose definitions” (Gustafson 1992: 322) and in defining the words that 
had led to such a controversy during the process of framing the constitution. But 
the unease about American speech was there to remain and soon become a 
commonplace in the political discourse of Emerson’s time. As Gustafson argues:  
“The connection Webster made so often in his career between political and linguistic 
disorders had become in the 1830s a political axiom, and American political debate in 
these years was preoccupied with the problem of settling the meanings of words or 
countering their force” (Gustafson 1992: 323) 
For some, however, the “transitional state” of words and the indeterminacy of 
American political liturgy was a potential rather than a shortcoming. To them, the 
very flexibility of words in America left room for changes and for the continual 
work of interpreting its politics. It made obvious that any given political fixture of 
words (for example in the constitution) was only the expression of a particular 
time and had to be amended continually in order to fit the needs of present and 
future generations. Thomas Jefferson, for example, clearly belonged to the faction 
of those willing to make amendments when he comments on the inception of the 
“Declaration of Independence” and the “Virginia State Constitution” in a letter to 
Henry Lee on May 8, 1825, that “all its [the declaration’s] authority rests then on 
the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in 
letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, 
Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.” (Jefferson 1944: 719). Texts, as Jefferson’s argument 
goes, especially those texts that found a nation, are only expressions of a 
harmonization of the sentiments of the day, nothing more, and they will have to 
be amended in order to reflect the sentiments of a future generation. If there is no 
room for such amendments, they will inevitably loose their authority. Jefferson’s 
comment, made a few decades after the Declaration of Independence and when it 
was already obvious that the declaration would become a sort of political 
orthodoxy, was directed against a kind of textual absolutism that saw the 
Declaration of Independence as a timeless document that was valid unalterably for 
all future American generations. In her study on the process of revision and 
 HISTORY , QUOTATION , HERMENEUTI CS  128 
 
review that went into the making of the Declaration of Independence, The 
Declaration of Independence: The Evolution of the Text, Julian P. Body has shown 
that even as a document “harmonizing [the] sentiments of the day,” to use 
Jefferson’s words, the Declaration was far from unproblematic. From the “original 
rough draft” to the declaration as we know it, the document was revised 
significantly and by a number of different contributors. Therefore, its inception was 
less the ingenious accomplishment of a single man but the collaborative effort of 
many. At the same time, it is thus not so much the representative expression of a 
representative mind of the era, but, rather, a highly contested compromise, a text 
countlessly revised and rewritten. So again, whenever we look at the textual 
origins of the American nation, we encounter a textual network that is marked by 
its very own complexity, marked by its exhibition of textuality insofar as it draws 
our attention to the ways in which its function as a textual origin is complicated by 
its textual complexity.7  
Maybe it is precisely because Americans knew all along about the fragility of 
their political origins and the potential instability of the (textual) compromise 
established by the Declaration of Independence, that they insisted so much on a 
union of words and things. But it is certainly true, as Gustafson argues, that the 
Declaration of Independence was thought to re-establish the “equivalence 
between words and things, speech and action, definition and political decision,” 
that then was thought to have become “an American fact of life the moment the 
states ratified the Constitution. In America, the written law is a king[…]” (Gustafson 
1992: 324). But after the compromise had held for a couple of decades, it began 
to be severely criticized in Emerson’s time. The debate was started in the 1830 
with Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun furiously disputing the meaning of the 
constitution, but it finally came to a head in the constitutional crisis in the early 
1850s (see Gustafson 1992: 323f.). Many now considered a degradation of the 
correspondence between word and things the cause for an increasing ‘rottenness’ 
not only of American language but of American culture in general. They believed 
that the business of protecting assent through language and writing had finally 
failed and needed to be reinstituted by an authoritarian gesture.  
Again, we see echoes of this discussion in the literature of the period. The 
diverse dialects of the “Isolatoes” spoken on board of the Pequod in Moby-Dick are 
to be read as Melville’s commentary on the constitutional crisis of the early 1850s. 
The Pequod reproduces a situation in which American language had rapidly 
developed into a set of mutually exclusive idioms. The loss of a correspondence of 
things and words for many also meant that the United States’ authentic promise – 
 
 7 On the complicated textual history of the Constitution, see also Pauline Maier’s American Scripture: Making the 
Declaration of Independence (1997) and Garry Will’s Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence (1979). On some of the rhetorical problems implied by the Declaration, see Jay Fliegelman, 
Declaring Independence Jefferson. Natural Language & the Culture of Performance (1993).  
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that it was a nation founded upon a Declaration of Independence and a 
Constitution based in the people’s ideas, nature, and God – was jeopardized 
(Gustafson 1992: 348ff.). Above all else, the crisis made obvious that the meaning 
of the ‘Constitution’ as well as the meaning of ‘America’ was no longer perceived 
to be self-evident or self-explanatory. As Gustafson points out, this period saw the 
Constitution as “the epitome of an open-ended text subject to the politics of 
interpretation” (Gustafson 1992: 326). 
Even if the efforts at fixing the meaning of the constitution and establishing a 
commonly sanctioned rhetoric and ideology for America’s social and political life 
were not or could not be successful, they did still produce an insight whose 
importance cannot be overestimated: the early republic’s debates circling around 
rhetorical questions and dilemmas made Americans deeply aware that the rituals of 
consensus promised by a common language were deeply problematic (see Brown 
1989; Warner 1990; Fliegelman 1993; Davidson 2004). The insistence on a 
commonly sanctioned rhetoric made many, as Gustafson argues, “question […] that 
rhetoric or the uses to which it has been put by confidence men, demagogues, 
Indian haters, slave masters, lawyers, presidents, ministers, and other members of 
the word-slinging class” (Gustafson 1992: 4). And, as Gustafson points out, we can 
find this dissenting discourse, this counterjargon, in many seminal literary texts of 
the nineteenth century, for example in “the dialect of Huck Finn” or the 
“polyphonic oratory of reality of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Moby-Dick” (Gustafson 
1992: 4). To make Gustafson’s point somewhat stronger: in America, one could 
argue, literature develops precisely in this place of a counterjargon, as a mode of 
examining the limits of common sense diction and of experimenting with the 
potential of a language that has become unsettled.  
When Emerson argues for an such unsettling of language, then his comments 
must be read as a response to the discussions surrounding the question of 
“representative words” in America. A telling instance of Emerson’s reappropriation 
of the contemporary debate can be found in his late essay on “Eloquence.” Here, 
Emerson quotes from Dr. Samuel Johnson’s “Preface to Shakespeare”:  
“There is in every nation a style which never becomes obsolete, a certain mode of 
phraseology so consonant to the analogy and principles of respective language as to 
remain settled and unaltered. This style is to be sought in the common intercourse of 
life among those who speak only to be understood, without ambition of elegance. The 
polite are always catching modish innovations, and the learned forsake the vulgar, 
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when the vulgar is right; but there is a conversation above grossness and below 
refinement, where propriety resides.” (W, VIII, 125-126) 8  
But, as Emerson comments, the “style” and “conversation” of “propriety” is only a 
“gymnastics,” it is destined to remain “an education of eloquence” (W, VIII, 126) 
because it does not have a “beautiful and prodigious surprise in it” (W, VIII, 111). 
Emerson, however, is interested precisely in a moment of poetic troping, a 
moment in which we are “surprised out of our propriety” (W, II, 321), where 
styles become obsolete and where “phraseologies” that once were “consonant” 
with common diction become defamiliarized. Just as Whitman obsesses with 
America’s “loud, ill-pitch’d voice” (Whitman 1996: 1017), Emerson imagines a point 
where the representativity of a given use of language is disturbed, unsettled, or 
even lost. If the founding of the American republic thus roughly coincides with 
what Michel Foucault, in the Order of Things, has described as the epistemic 
rupture of 1800, then its advent will also be marked by a crisis of representation 
that, for Foucault, symptomatically marks the waning of classicism and the advent 
of modernity (Foucault 1973: xii). This is not meant to suggest that America is 
merely to be localized in the historical epoch of that crisis of representation. 
Rather, and more specifically, ‘America’ is precisely another name for this crisis of 
representation. Because the crisis of representation is especially virulent in a 
context in which national culture is essentially a culture of words, that is, where 
national culture is precisely the continual transmission and renewal of a canon of 
founding texts, ‘America’ is its own second order observer, it becomes implied in a 
recursive structure where the description of ‘America’ brings about and guarantees 
its existence. For Emerson, ‘America,’ as a nation and as a cultural concept, is an 
answer to this crisis of representativity. It acknowledges that the textual re-
presentation of what we are, always already means that we have lost “our 
propriety,” that we have always already departed from representativity, from the 
Eigentlichkeit of our words. Instead of a representative origin, instead of a stable 
genealogy, America is all about this hybrid origin, receiving the full potential of a 
linguistic freedom implied by this crisis of representation.  
The discussion circling around the doctrine of the representativity of words 
forms an important background to Emerson’s writing. Emerson is certainly aware of 
the debates about the meaning of American political liturgy and, as a writer 
 
 8 The original passage is from Samuel Johnson’s “Preface to Shakespeare” and reads as follows: “If there be, 
what I believe there is, in every nation, a style which never becomes obsolete, a certain mode of phraseology 
so consonant and congenial to the analogy and principles of its respective language, as to remain settled and 
unaltered; this style is probably to be sought in the common intercourse of life, among those who speak only to 
be understood, without ambition of elegance. The polite are always catching modish innovations, and the 
learned depart from established forms of speech, in hope of finding or making better; those who wish for 
distinction forsake the vulgar, when the vulgar is right; but there is a conversation above grossness, and below 
refinement, where propriety resides, and where this poet seems to have gathered his comic dialogue. He is 
therefore more agreeable to the ears of the present age than any other author equally remote, and among his 
other excellencies deserves to be studied as one of the original masters of our language” (qtd. from Allen et al. 
1962: 76).  
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heavily dependant upon the Lyceum’s sponsorship, these debates also had practical 
ruminations for him. Like other orators engaged in the mass education project of 
lecturing the public at the time, he complements these disputes with an interest in 
questions of rhetorical performance, of speech and, especially, of eloquence. The 
Unitarian sermon had already come a long way from the so-called Puritan ‘plain 
style’. Daniel Howe has remarked how much the “sparse utilitarianism” of the 
Puritan-style sermon had been replaced by a “graceful sentimentality” in the 
Unitarian sermon: “In fact, could the Puritans have heard a nineteenth-century 
Unitarian sermon, they would probably have found its style similar to the flowery 
‘carnall eloquence’ they detested in Anglican preachers” (Howe 1988: 197). The 
American Puritan ministry had always been skeptical of figurative language and 
verbal artistry (see Bercovitch 1994: 226-254). When John Cotton published a 
new translation of the Psalms in 1640 – The Whole Book of Psalms Faithfully 
Translated into English Meter (also known as The Bay Psalm Book) – it was meant 
to replace what had been considered an overly figurative and playful translation 
used by the Anglicans. Cotton, in his preface, can be quoted as an example of how 
Puritans tended to disapprove of figurative language:  
“Neither let any think, that for the meter’s sake we have taken liberty or poetical license 
to depart from the true and proper sense of David’s words in the Hebrew verses; no; but 
it hath been one part of our religious care and faithful endeavor to keep close to the 
original text. […] If therefore the verses are not always so smooth and elegant as some 
may desire or expect; let them consider that God’s Altar needs not our polishings.” (qtd. 
in Bercovitch and Patell 1994: 227)  
Obviously, this strong rejection of the figurative and a preference for plainness and 
literalism is ideologically significant, since language inevitably contains figurative 
elements. In fact, research into early American literature has shown that Puritan 
writing itself was highly figurative – not lest of all because it is highly allusive and 
containing references to not only the bible, but also to Ovid, Cicero, Virgil, 
Horace, and other classical authors. Also, Puritan rhetoric is, essentially, a 
“conversion rhetoric” that attempts to bring about an experience of conversion as 
the essence of Puritan religious life (see Caldwell 1983). Emerson “recapitulates,” 
as Alan D. Hodder correctly points out, “the constructional schemes and strategies 
of Puritan conversion rhetoric” (Hodder 1991: 428). But he reappropriates Puritan 
doctrine by suggesting that it is precisely the turning or troping power of poetic 
words that bring about this conversion. As Hodder argues: “[P]art of what is crucial 
about the term ‘conversion’ to Emerson is the troping (!"#$%& – ‘turning’) that it 
authorizes, its sanction for his own program of literary turns and conversion” 
(Hodder 1991: 432).  
Emerson’s notion of eloquence thus assumes that there is a moment when the 
performance of words effects a moment of conversion in which not just the 
speaker or the audience, but the world itself is changed. This conversion in 
Emerson rhetorics or poetics comes as a moment of figurative language, as a 
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moment of an incalculable rhetoricity or poeticity that changes both the speaker 
and the listener, the writer and the reader. This dependence on the performativity 
of words and of public oratory is also strong elsewhere in American culture and 
Politics. Jay Fliegelman has shown in his study on Declaring Independence: 
Jefferson, Natural Language, and the Culture of Performance that it is a central 
corner post of the American amalgamization of politics and rhetorics in the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries (Fliegelman 1993). It assumes that a moment of 
conversion guaranteed by the performativity of figurative language presents a 
possibility to establish a simultaneity between processes of language and their 
context in ordinary life. Words, for Emerson, have the power to make something 
happen not only in language, but also in the audience or the reader.  
There is a constant tinkering in Emerson between the two poles of a Puritan 
plain style and the demands of the orator. In his writing, the doctrine of an 
equivalence of words and things finds a strong echo. In the journal, Emerson notes 
that “[i]n good writing words become one with things” (J, II, 401). But alongside 
this interest – and as he becomes more and more engaged with the seventeenth-
century prose masters Donne, Jonson, Bacon, and Browne – he questions his own 
goal of “put[ting] on eloquence as a robe” (J, I, 367) and strives to stripe away 
rhetorical decorum in favour of simplicity. Upon reading Sartor Resartus in 1834, 
Emerson expresses his incredulity at Carlyle’s “grotesque teutonic apocalyptic” style 
(CEC, 99) and says that he “look[s] for the hour with impatience when the vehicle 
will be worthy of the spirit when the word will be as simple & so as resistless as 
the thought, & in short, when your words will be one with things” (CEC, 99).  
Only a year later, however, we find Emerson’s position reverted when he 
realizes that the perfect blending of word and thing may not be possible after all 
and that a distance between the two is itself the source of the power of rhetoric or 
poetry:  
“There is every degree of remoteness from the line of things in the line of words. By and 
by comes a word true and closely embracing the thing. […] The aim of the author is not 
to tell truth – that he cannot do, but to suggest it. He has only approximated it himself, 
& hence his cumbrous and embarrassed speech: he uses many words, hoping that on, if 
another, will bring you as near to the fact as he is. For language itself is young & 
unformed. In heaven, it will be […] ‘one with things.’ Now, there are many things that 
refuse to be recorded, – perhaps the larger half. The unsaid part is the best of every 
discourse.” (J, III, 491-2) 
The entry in Emerson’s journal is obviously an implicit fling at the rhetorics of 
Webster and others for whom ‘Americanness’ was located in precisely an 
equivalence of word and things. By the time Nature is published in 1836, 
Emerson’s view that language is necessarily distant both from things and truth gives 
way to a more aggressive hostility: Words, he argues, “cannot cover the 
dimensions of what is in truth. They break, chop, and impoverish it” (W, I, 45). If 
you carefully use and define your words, as implied by the different projects 
attempting to sanitize the American dialect, this will still not lead you closer to 
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truth. The writer who excessively qualifies and defines, ends in an “Iceland of 
negations” (W, I, 354). It is this fundamental rejection of the doctrine of the 
equivalence of words and things that forms a focal point of Emerson’s poetics. 
Here, the American project of a unison between words and things, the attempt to 
make words correspond to things, is rejected in favour of what Emerson calls a 
rhetorical “violence of direction” (W, III, 185). He urges American writers to “omit 
all negative propositions” (W, VII, 309) and asks for their commitment to a 
specifically rhetorical Eigensinn: Instead of calling for a reestablishment of the 
equivalence of words and things for an American political liturgy, Emerson wants 
writers to commit to processes that are specifically rhetoric or poetic, not bound by 
the dogma of ‘representativity’. The resulting maxim of ““[w]e aim above the mark 
to hit the mark” (W, III, 185) already makes explicit how much Emerson wants 
the American writer to invest in rhetorics, that is, in the movements of troping and 
figurality.  
The result is, as Barbara Packer has pointed out, “[a] style that suggests rather 
than tells, that refuses to defend,” and “that combines excess with reticence” 
(Packer 1982: 5). Emerson is however well aware his style carries its very own 
danger, namely that of being “misunderstood”. He nevertheless insists:  
“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and 
philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He 
may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now 
in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, 
though it contradict every thing you said to-day. – ‘Ah, so you shall be sure to be 
misunderstood.’ – Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was 
misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and 
Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be 
misunderstood.” (W, II, 57) 
The misunderstanding that Emerson describes is a result of the radical 
contemporariness and occasionality of the words uttered at any given moment. 
“To-morrow” already, they will no longer be understood. Of course it is this kind 
of rejection of the standard forms of argument (typology, etc.), together with his 
refusal to qualify, to define, and to more explicitly explain assertions made in the 
essays that quickly made Emerson’s reputation as an antinomian. But for Emerson, 
the danger of misinterpretation is negligible when compared to the danger for 
words to become a “paper currency” (W, I, 30), as he argues in Nature. This is 
why he will later define the potential illegibility of a text as a mark of its superior 
quality. As Packer points out: “Obscurities, enigmas, lacunae – like Biblical 
parables – are tests of the reader’s intelligence and generosity; […] The reader can 
hear only those texts, or portions of texts, for which he has ears” (Packer 1982: 6).  
Furthermore, Emerson’s disregard of the conventions of nineteenth-century 
philosophical writing directly involve the reader in the production of the text. If 
the standards of the philosophical treatise and the conventions of popular essayistic 
style in the Lyceum tradition were meant to facilitate the reader’s understanding of 
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a text or lecture, then Emerson’s abrupt transitions and argumentative 
inconsistencies call on the reader to fill in the gaps.  
But Emerson’s stylistic revolution does not just pertain to the level of textual 
conventions. The most remarkable feature of Emerson’s style is the way it dissolves 
connections between paragraphs and, even, between sentences. This makes for its 
characteristic vagueness: often his topic sentences can be read in more ways than 
one, and we have to provide a tone or dramatic context. Consequently, Emerson’s 
prose stages a veritable drama of eloquence and oratory, but it forsakes the 
situationist context that would supply the correct tone. It is not just that we lack 
the sound of Emerson’s Lyceum-trained baritone. This indeterminacy of tone is 
deliberate, even tough it is something that only the written text can sustain. 
Although Emerson’s writing could only develop in a culture of practiced oratory, it 
anticipates Thoreau’s more decisive renunciation of spoken discourse in favour of 
writing. I think that Packer is wrong to point out that Emerson’s texts belong “to 
the oral, not the written, tradition” (Packer 1982: 8). Certainly the influence of the 
“plenoloquence” of popular oratorical style is clearly visible in Emerson’s writing, 
but his exploration of stylistic possibilities remains contingent on the potential of 
written discourse for indeterminacy. And it is of course precisely the lack of the 
situationist context that guarantees the text’s potential for multi-accentuality. This 
openness is both the promise and the peril of the American text.  
Emerson could be certain that his readers, well trained as attentive listeners by 
the Lyceum, would recognize a great number of registers or ‘voiced’ styles – 
cadences of King James’ bible, the sermon style, passages in the register of the 
philosophical treatise (Packer 1982: 8) – as well as recognizable persona – the 
cold empiricist, the quiet and patient rationalist explaining something to an 
imaginary interlocutor, the furious demagogue, the fervent preacher, etc. But 
Emerson chooses to superimpose these styles, he multi-layers them in order to 
challenge their expectations by defamiliarizing acquired reading and listening 
practices, in order to, in his own words, “shock” his readers and listeners “out of 
all patience” (J, V, 83). And much like the style of his successor Nietzsche, 
Emerson presents us with a specific difficulty that can be described in terms of 
irony. Just as with the stock character of the eiron in Greek comedy, whose 
pretension of stupidity masks a higher intelligence and thus lets the audience 
question his ambitions, the multi-layering of ‘voiced’ styles in Emerson’s essays 
effects a certain understatement by means of which our safe grip on a text, our 
‘automatic’ reconstruction of its ‘ordinary’ situation, and our ‘patient’ comprehension 
is called into question. The elusiveness of Emerson’s oratory or writerly styles – 
how they become indeterminate at the very moment that we think we have 
recognized a characteristic style – then is a structural principle that functions along 
the lines of irony. It undermines the certainty of the reader or listener in the text 
that he hears or reads. Closer to Emerson, Friedrich Schlegel suggested in his 
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definition of irony in his Aphorisms that irony speaks of the “Unmöglichkeit […] 
einer vollständigen Mitteilung” (Schlegel 1959: II, 160). Schlegel’s insight, I think, 
is applicable to Emerson’s poetics since, like irony, his multi-layered style leads to 
an awareness of a certain discrepancy or even incongruity between words and 
their meaning, between the orator’s discourse and its situationist context. It makes 
us aware that the text is not merely a transparent medium of communication but 
that it is itself in production and that we, as readers, play a part in this production.9  
Emerson style, however, his complication of established forms of eloquence and 
oratory earned him a great deal of criticism both on the Lyceum cycle as well as at 
Harvard. The “Divinity School Address”, delivered in the “refulgent summer” (W, I, 
119) of 1838 to the senior class of the school is a case in point. Emerson’s address 
caused a major commotion at Harvard and got him barred from what was then the 
Cambridge Theological School. That he refused to enter into a public dispute with 
his critics even after the publication of the address further caused furious reactions. 
Emerson himself preferred to call the discussion, in a letter to Carlyle on October 
17, 1838, a “storm in our washbowl” (CEC, 99). And indeed, as we read the 
Address today, it seems hard to see why it would have caused such excitement, 
after all, the argument of the Address was geared towards the young students at 
Harvard and pretty uncontroversial at that. In order to understand the reaction to 
the Address, then, we need not concern ourselves with its content, but rather with 
its challenge to conventionalized ways of rhetorical presentation. Emerson does not 
write in the prose style that characterizes the treatises of his day. He introduces a 
decisive poetic touch, later to become the trademark of his style, and it was 
precisely his decision to favour a poetic style over plain style oratory that explains 
the angry protest of his contemporaries.  
Emerson’s critics reproached him for his penchant for “lofty ideas” and “beautiful 
images of spiritual life.” Also, the ministers at Harvard reprimand him for his refusal 
to attribute personality to God (“the soul knows no persons”), something that to 
them came close to a dangerous “pantheism” (L, II, 146-50). For an audience that 
was accustomed to the condensed diction of New England Puritan typology, 
sentences such as the following certainly struck an unusual chord:  
“This sentiment is divine and deifying. It is the beatitude of man. It makes him 
illimitable. […] Wherever a man comes, there comes revolution. […] When a man comes, 
all books are legible, all things transparent, all religions are forms. […] Man is the 
wonderworker. He is seen amid miracles. […] He saith yea and nay, only. […] He 
speaketh, not spake. O my friends, there are resources in us on which we have not 
drawn. There are men who rise refreshed on hearing a threat; men to whom a crisis 
 
 9 Emerson – via Carlyle, who had written an essay about Novalis in 1829 (Carlyle 1904, II, 1 - 55) – would have 
been familiar with the theory of irony in German Romanticism. On irony, see Jonathan Culler’s Structuralist 
Poetics (1975: 154 and 178-187) and Wayne C. Booth’s A Rhetoric of Irony (1974), the classic study on irony 
and Romanticism is Cleanth Brooks’ “Irony as a Principle of Structure” (Zabel 1951: 729–741).  
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which intimidates and paralyzes the majority […] comes graceful and beloved as a 
bride.” (W, I, 122-129) 
Emerson consistently overstates and attempts to make his statements more 
indeterminate. Emerson, in a letter to Henry Ware Jr. explaining his motives for 
the Divinity School Address, confesses his “incapacity of methodical writing” and 
characterizes himself as “a chartered libertine […] free to rail” (L, II, 167-67). 
Emerson was aware that this would cause a stir and, in hindsight, refuses to enter 
into a process of explanation or differentiation. “I could not give account of myself 
if challenged. […] I don’t know what arguments mean in reference to any 
expression of a thought” (L, II, 167-67). Rather, a passage in his journal makes 
obvious, that Emerson’s tendency for overstatement and indeterminacy – and, 
therefore, his rejection of the doctrine of representative words – was a 
premeditated choice: “[W]hilst I see this that you must have been shocked & must 
cry out at what I have said I see too that we cannot easily be reconciled for I 
have a great deal more to say that will shock you out of patience” (J, V, 83). 
Emerson’s statements in the context of the address to Divinity School thus form a 
first tentative outline of his poetological programme. The “rottenness” of Emerson’s 
“rotten diction” (W, I, 30), his refutation of the conventions of typological writing, 
as well as his faible for “shocking” his readers out of their patience by means of 
saying precisely that which his readers do not expect: these are the rhetorical 
strategies that in Emerson challenge the standards of “representativity” in order to 
unsettle a linguistic or poetic potential that, for him, is the potential of language in 
America.  
Two passages – one taken from his Journals, the other from “Circles” – make it 
apparent just how much Emerson’s style is the result of a series of careful and 
apparently conscious stylistic and editorial decisions. Here, indeterminacy is not 
simply a contingency of Emerson’s style of writing, rather, it is ‘determinate’ 
because it is the result of a careful layering of different registers and because it is 
produced by means of a laborious editorial process. When adapting a passage out 
of his journal in “Circles,” Emerson chooses to make its meanings more 
indeterminate by editing out the sources that were included in his notes:  
“And thus, o circular philosopher, you have arrived at a fine Pyrrhonism, at an 
equivalence & indifferency of all actions & would fain teach us that if we are true, 
forsooth, our crimes may be lively stones out of which we shall construct the temple of 
the true God. The good Swedenborg was aware, I believe, of this wonderful 
predominance & excess of the saccharine principle in nature & noticed that the hells 
were not without their extreme satisfactions” (J, V, 480). 
In “Circles,” the passage reads as follows:  
“I own I am gladdened by seeing the predominance of the saccharine principle 
throughout vegetable nature, and not less by beholding in morals that unrestrained 
inundation of the principle of good into every chink and hole that selfishness has left 
open, yea, into selfishness and sin itself; so that no evil is pure, nor hell itself without 
its extreme satisfactions” (W, II, 317-8).  
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By way of editing out direct references (to Swedenborg) and by way of 
completely stripping the passage’s topic sentence (focusing on the notion of the 
“saccharine principle”) of its rhetorical as well as explanatory or argumentative 
context, Emerson’s diction here comes to contradict all conventions of typological 
argument. But, and that is the flip side of the coin here, this procedure is meant to 
redirect his readers’ attention away from argumentative organization and towards 
rhetorical processes. Just notice, for example, the complex chiastic organization of 
“no evil is pure, nor hell itself without its extreme satisfactions.” His challenge of 
the doctrine of “representative words” then is one that reintroduces a linguistic and 
rhetoric creativity where typology aimed for as much coherence and method as 
possible and tended to exorcise all remnants of a process of poiesis.  
Emerson’s famous aphorism in Nature that “[t]he corruption of man is followed 
by the corruption of language” (W, I, 29) has often been read out of its context in 
Nature and as a direct reference to John Locke’s comments in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (Locke 1990) on the “ill use of words” (476) and the 
“mischiefs of confounding the signification of words” (493). “[H]e that makes ill use 
of [language]” by using “obscure and equivocal terms, and insignificant and 
doubtful expressions,” Locke argues in the Essay, “though he does not corrupt the 
fountains of knowledge, which are in things themselves, […] does, as much as in 
him lies, break or stop the pipes, whereby it is distributed to the public use and 
advantage of mankind” (476). “Corruption” thus in Locke is caused by an unsettling 
of what is conceived to be a direct rapport between things and words. Emerson, 
in contrast, turns the argument on its head and does not locate “corruption” in an 
unsettling of the equivalence of words and things, as many of his contemporaries 
and followers of Locke’s did. Whereas Locke and his American adherents saw 
themselves as part of a long tradition of writing that connected political disorders 
with a corruption of language, Emerson insists that it is precisely the absence of 
the poetic, the absence of language’s potential for plurisignation, and its 
sedimentation into ‘dead’ or regimented forms that make for language’s “rottenness” 
and, thereby, for America’s present incapacity to express itself. For Emerson, it is 
when “new imagery ceases to be created,” when “a paper currency is employed” 
that there is “no bullion in the vaults,” that the “fraud is manifest,” and “words lose 
all power to stimulate the understanding or the affections” (W, I, 30). Emerson’s 
essays and, particularly, Nature offer a “guidebook to reform,” as Thomas Gustafson 
has phrased it (Gustafson 1992: 351): they establish a tradition of linguistic and 
rhetoric thought that takes its starting point in the linguistic concerns of the early 
republic but then radically depart from the doctrine of “representative words” to 
trace in America’s “cumbrous and embarrassed speech” (J, III, 491) both its 
linguistic quandary as well as its poetic wisdom and promise.  
Later, Emerson’s groundbreaking insight will be taken up by other writers who 
share the conviction that all travesties of language are inherently democratic 
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because they relate to conventionalized linguistic customs in the same way as the 
individual relates to the community in America. The central figure of this 
antinomian tradition will be Walt Whitman with his fascination for America’s “loud, 
ill-pitch’d voice, utterly regardless whether the verb agrees with the nominative” 
(Whitman 1996: 1017) and his assertion, in An American Primer, that a “perfect 
writer would make words sing, dance, kiss” (Whitman 1987: 7). But we also have 
more toned down versions of this, for example in what Malini Schueller has 
described as Thoreau’s “carnival rhetoric and extra-vagance” (Schueller 1986). In 
literature’s and poetry’s “carnivalistic” potential for polysemy – in its “extra-vagant 
maneuver[s]”, as Thoreau expresses it in Walden (Thoreau 2004: 324) – these 
writers find ways to loosen the grip of old conventions and challenge the 
assumptions of recent but already firmly established doctrines concerning the 
nature of language and texts. In an age obsessively concerned with making words 
a transparent means for establishing and perpetuating assent, these writers look 
into language’s materiality, its rhetorical Eigensinn, to gauge both its dangers and 
promises. Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman, among others, all offer new definitions 
of language by way of a certain use of language, that is, they understand that any 
definition of language will itself be mutually implicated in its rhetorical 
presentation. The way in which language affects writing that affects language that 
affects writing, and so on, in Emerson’s essays is precisely the way in which his 
texts are prepared to accept and investigate the full self-reflexive potential of 
language.  
The present and facticity  
Considering the scope and implications of Emerson’s disclaimer of the doctrine of 
representative words, it is obvious that his argument concerning the “loose 
definitions” and the linguistic “obscurity” (Tocqueville) of American national diction 
is turned into a much more general one. It does no longer concern the meaning 
of the constitution or the potential of words to be representative. Emerson turns his 
contemporaries’ inquiry into the equivalence of words and things into a more 
general examination of the meaning of ‘America’ itself. In other words: the nexus 
of word and action is here radically exposed in order to question the relationship 
of a name (‘America’) and an experience that carries that name (‘America’). The 
issue, then, is no longer one of representativity – is the name equivalent to the 
experience? –, but rather the discovery of a hermeneutic riddle or circle in which 
the name both founds and challenges the reality or experience that it describes. 
‘America’ for Emerson is thus precisely a movement of self-reflexivity, of a critical 
turning-upon-itself effected in language. And it is “only by coming again to 
themselves” (W, I, 132), as Emerson describes this self-reflexive move, that 
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Americans will be able to account for their situation. ‘America’ is thus the name for 
a hermeneutic situation or challenge, in which the place of enunciation, the 
locality of utterance, America, itself becomes the object of understanding. And, as 
we have seen before, this is what makes the present the scene of and endless 
progression of reinterpretations, where the need for a definition – of ‘America’ and 
of the ‘American’ experience – is continually both desired and deferred, promised 
and postponed. ‘America’ thus is all about reinterpretation, about a questioning of 
founding myths and of narratives that at any given irrepeatable moment specify the 
meaning of ‘America’. One could argue, that from the very beginning, this paradox 
of self-implication is in fact the sign of America’s modernity, both its threat as well 
as its cultural promise.  
Again, this conundrum of making America present to itself, of founding America 
yet again, and of fulfilling the promise that ‘America’ designates for Emerson is 
always already a problem of poetic expression. As he states in “Poetry and 
Imagination”:  
“To the poet the world is virgin soil; all is practicable […]. He is a true re-commencer, or 
Adam in the garden again. He affirms the applicability of the ideal law to this moment 
and the present knot of affairs.” (W, VIII, 19)  
“To the poet, the world is virgin soil; all is practicable”: this is how Emerson 
forefronts the question of writing and rhetorics. For him, the “representativity” of 
contemporary experience is not so much connected to the promise of a new 
world but to a promise that is mediated rhetorically, by way of the power of 
poetic words. With Emerson, the doctrine of representative words is turned upside 
down and what is now in question is the very representativity of our experience, 
and how it can be put into words. It is words that establish the contemporariness 
of our experience, and it is only the poet’s words that manage to translate what 
we experience into representativity, that is, into an experience that stands in 
relation to the “spirit of the age”, that, itself, is a result of a linguistic construction. 
Emerson consequently makes obvious something already implied by the doctrine 
of representative words but normalized and contained by its advocates because 
they place the precedent on things and not on words. In Emerson’s critical 
reversal, however, it is words themselves that become part of experience. And it 
is the malleability of words in poetry that sustains an experience of freedom and, 
thus, of democracy.  
Poetic words challenge hegemonic articulations of what we are and open the 
field for a rearticulation or resignification that changes us because it establishes 
another history, one that is irreducible to or discontinuous with the history we had 
before.10 Poetry’s power to overcome and to make us forget earlier articulations, 
enables it to create history anew in every instant. As a consequence, it lets us 
 
 10 On the logic of the “hegemonic articulation,” see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy (2001: 137).  
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redefine what we are by our acts of signification and resignification in a continual 
process of self-constitution that is always already a self-reflection. This is not a 
naive kind of presentism: Emerson is aware that in our desire to create the world 
anew with words – the poetic figuration of the “present knot of affairs” (W, VIII, 
19)–, we cannot but pay tribute to our immense debt to the past. Even in our most 
original creations, this debt will be echoed to a certain measure. But Emerson also 
argues that art, “[b]ecause the soul is progressive […] never quite repeats itself, but 
in every act attempts the production of a new and fairer whole,” the aim of art is 
“not imitation but creation” (W, II, 351).  
But how is it, given the immensity of our debt to the past, that we can at least 
to a certain degree evade the deadlock of tradition and create something new? 
Only by confronting the past, that is, by recirculating its terms in order to bring 
them into new differential relationships in which they will mean something 
radically different. Consequently we see in Emerson’s writing an early imprint of 
what Paul Bové with regards to modern American poetry has called a “poetics of 
destruction” (Bové 1980). Emerson’s poetics is “destructive” insofar as it breaks 
apart or loosens the hold of tradition by reappropriating its terms, by unsettling its 
sedimented forms, and by recirculating its words into new and unprecedented 
contexts. Emerson thus envisions a kind of writing that by engaging the tradition 
that goes before it both implicates itself in and potentially detaches itself from 
tradition. Overcoming the tradition in Emerson is thus a constant task and one that 
is never fulfilled. Rather, it is accomplished by way of an original quotation, that is, 
by way of an unsettling (or destruction) of the terms of tradition and their 
simultaneous rearrangement in the act of poetic figuration.  
Because a poetics framed thus self-consciously will always itself be implied by 
its writing, it forms “a radically human and temporal, that is changing, event“ 
(Bové 1980: 128). The poetic unsettling of words and sedimented forms is itself 
eventful, because it is not something that can be contained in a text once and for 
all. This unsettling can only be grasped in reading a text, that is, in the actual 
Vollzug of the text’s rhetorical procedures and its potential for plurisignation. For 
Emerson, this propensity for self-implication as well as for the performance of an 
untapped poetic potential are, more generally, the meaning of the term ‘America’. 
In other words: the definition of the reference of the signifier ‘America’ and the 
constant contestation of this reference in non-standard, unconventional, 
unrepresentative, or poetic reformulations is the event and reality of ‘America’. The 
search for an American poetics, for an expression of America in a specifically 
American literature, is thus not merely engrafted on top of a more fundamental 
concern with the nature of the American experience. On the contrary: for 
Emerson, ‘America’ is, first and foremost, an investigation and experience of words. 
‘America’ is grounded upon words and not upon a new found ‘land,’ ‘ground,’ or 
‘soil’.  
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It was Heidegger who, in the wake of Dilthey’s hermeneutics and Nietzsche’s 
experimental poetics of philosophy, first gave an elaborate account of this structure 
of the self-implication of understanding. In his pre-‘Kehre’ work on a Hermeneutik 
der Faktizität (GA 63), Heidegger carefully attempts to conceive of a process of 
understanding that generates its own ground or, rather, a method of understanding 
that, by virtue of being continually fed back into itself, produces its own facticity, a 
process that while it is being performed changes continually because 
understanding and its ground continually inflect each other. Just as Heidegger’s 
radicalization of German philosophy’s historicist and hermeneutic practices does no 
longer aspire for understanding to reach transcendence – the instalment of a 
master interpretation – so does Emerson’s radicalization of American linguistic and 
rhetoric practices, in the sense of what he calls a “destructive liberalism,” bring 
about a politics that ultimately has “no ulterior and divine ends” (W, III, 210).  
Jacques Derrida, in his re-evaluation of Heidegger’s hermeneutics, has been 
able to show that such a structure of self-implication means that we must always 
start exactly from “where we are”.11 Similarly, Emerson’s ‘hermeneutics’ avant la 
lettre wants us to begin by asking: “Where do we find ourselves?” As a 
consequence, we realize, as Emerson remarks, that we “find ourselves on a stair,” 
with “stairs below us, which we seem to have ascended,” and “stairs above us, 
many a one, which go upward and out of sight” (W, III, 45). In other words: we 
begin by acknowledging what Heidegger has called the ‘factical’ situation, or, to 
use somewhat simpler terms, the ‘fix’ or ‘embarrassment’ of our present situation. 
This fix of our present moment is irreducible to the continuum of history. Even if 
we may see the stairs below and above us, any given present moment comes as 
an interruption of history. As Reinhart Koselleck has argued, such an experience of 
the discontinuity of the present moment is a general sign of modernity. It signals 
that the self-legitimizing function of history has been dissolved and that modernity 
has been “broken loose from an earlier form of time” (see Koselleck 1989: 46).  
The self-reflection that Emerson’s hermeneutics engenders, by cancelling the 
authority of an exemplary past, produces a moment “in the present, above time” 
(W, II, 67), a moment that with its conflicting temporalities signals America’s 
modernity. America is always, as Emerson phrases it in “Circles,” on the “verge of 
to-day” (W, II, 315), expecting the new while knowing that it comes as a risky 
cancellation of the past. This “verge,” as a result of America’s self-implication, is 
always both a promise and a threat. A promise, because it potentially enables a 
different future. A threat, because it means that we risk to lose the ‘America’ that 
we have grown accustomed to. Emerson’s definition of America as being on the 
“verge“ thus corresponds to what Heidegger has called a “Denken aus dem Ab-
Grund”: for Heidegger, the kind of thought produced by the Kehre or self-
 
 11 On beginning “where we are,“ see Jacques Derrida’s conversation with John D. Caputo in (Derrida et al. 1997: 
160).  
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implication is abgründig, that is, both on the verge as well as producing its own 
ground (Grund). Such a self-reflexive move thus presents us with a double 
implication: it comes as an interruption of meaning, of sense, but at the same time, 
as the insistence that sense continues, that new sense is produced (see GA 66, 
322).12  
This may also explain why for Emerson, America’s modernity does not 
necessarily have to be the source of a great national despair. Rather, like his 
successor Nietzsche, he joyously affirms this complication and debasement of 
tradition and locates in it the origin of a poetic “power” or “force” (W, III, 113) 
that returns the world to us, albeit in a different, necessarily unprecedented shape. 
This is also why Bové is correct to point out that the stance of a destructive 
poetics, as he argues with regards to Whitman, is never one of a radical 
ahistoricism or even nihilism: rather, it calls for a turning of tradition against itself, 
for a turning of the tropes that make up that tradition in order to tap into a (poetic, 
political, etc.) potential the tradition has concealed so far. Emerson consequently 
does not envision a naïve return to the Adamic theory of ‘America’: he believes 
that it is only by way of a careful investigation of the words of the tradition that 
we can disclose a different meaning of ‘America’. Such a destructive poetics can, 
however, never be ‘programmatic,’ since such a turning of the tropes of tradition 
always happens in a present moment that is, historically speaking, contingent or 
irreversible. In “Quotation and Originality,” Emerson uses the metaphor of the 
snowflake to illustrate this irreducibility of history:  
“Old and new put their stamp to everything in Nature. The snowflake that is now falling 
is marked by both. The present moment gives the motion and the color of the flake, 
Antiquity its form and properties. All things wear a lustre which is the gift of the present, 
and a tarnish of time” (W, VIII, 175). 
By way of quoting the textual origins of America, Emerson consequently proposes 
a reflexivization, a turning and troping of the tradition so that the quotation will 
produce yet another ‘original’ refiguration (new linguistic arrangements, new 
meanings, etc.).  
Emerson here echoes the conceptual revolution that was brought about by the 
Romantics – for example by Schlegel, to name just one important exponent. 
Schlegel and other romantics speculated about how the work of art could serve as 
a medium to present that which ineffable or unrepresentable. Reflexion, the 
romantics’ term for this kind of self-implication (see Götze 2001: 218ff.) leads to a 
“poetics of a poetics” (Schlegel, KA II, 204; Nr. 238) because the formation of its 
theory does not happen, as in philosophy, externally, but rather in poetic 
representation or poetic Darstellung itself. Similarly, the way in which America 
linguistically expresses itself is not simply an external means of depicting a 
 
 12 On Heidegger’s double definition of the Kehre as both as a rupture (“Bruch”) as well as an overcoming 
(“Verwindung”), see (Jahraus 2004: 170).  
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specifically American experience, rather, it is the text of America itself (its 
conflicting discourses, its poetic uses of words) that generates an experience that is 
specifically American. Lacking an external support, lacking something that is 
unquestioningly American, it has to repeat its self-description over and over again 
because it is in fact nothing but this self-description. ‘America’ is thus continually 
invented or re-invented by way of both a quoting as well as a troping of its terms.  
Interim / instead of … : the first map of america 
Let me provide an example for this complexity of American origins and how they 
self-reflexively bend back upon themselves. ‘America’ is itself a cryptic figure: it is 
a country discovered instead of another continent: India; its people are given the 
name of another people; when America got its name in 1507 years ago, it was 
one who came after another, Amerigo Vespucci, and not the ‘original’ discoverer 
that gave America its name. And yet more significantly, this name was bestowed 
upon the new continent by the very literary institution of the old one: it was in 
the Lorraine Abbey of St. Dié-des-Vosges that cartographers under the direction of 
Martin Waldseemüller and in the on behalf of Duke René II copied and revised 
the maps compiled by Ptolemy. What is sometimes referred to as America’s “birth 
certificate”, then, the map that first named America, is itself a rewriting of an 
earlier text. Drawing upon Amerigo Vespucci’s account of his expeditions to the 
“Mundus Novus” (and mistaking him to be the discoverer of the New Continent) 
they first labelled what they considered to be – unlike Columbus – a huge island 
and fourth continent as ‘America’. ‘America,’ then, essentially is a misnomer.13  
The name ‘America,’ then, inscribed on old maps and given the name of 
someone who came after another, the naming ‘sent’ from an old place, France, 
epitomizes both the notion of belatedness as well as that of an originary revision 
central to ‘America’. ‘America’ is a palimpsest, a new name and shape drawn on an 
old map with the shape of the old cosmography still not entirely erased. The name 
‘America’ is thus a text that was never originally written. Consequently, there is no 
originary text for ‘America,’ it is itself always a correction and amendment of 
earlier texts. The very naming of the New Continent as ‘America’ is itself the 
originary (and not original) scene of such a rewriting.14 Furthermore: the 
cartographer, Waldseemüller, intended to give a male name to the continent since 
a female goddess had been the namesake of the old continent, but he conceded to 
 
 13 For a history of the Waldseemüller map, see John R. Hébert’s “The Map that Named America: Martin 
Waldseemüller’s 1507 World Map” (Hébert 2005).  
 14 This is also why I have preferred to talk of America’s eccentricity rather than of its exceptionality. While the 
notion of an “American exceptionality” stresses America’s place as different from that of old Europe, the West, 
etc., the notion of eccentricity addresses the way in which ‘America’ in Emerson’s writing always necessarily 
stands beside itself.  
 HISTORY , QUOTATION , HERMENEUTI CS  144 
 
a female ending. The result of which is a strange mixture of a male name with a 
female ending. The change of gender from Amerigo to America – the new 
Continent often being portrayed as a native woman submissively awaiting the 
European laying of the land – further suggests how the new Continent was 
considered to be something that was, essentially, other. Furthermore, because the 
mapmakers did not yet know the outlines of the new continent, they had to invent 
both the west as well as the pacific, the assumption being that if America is a 
continent it would also have to look like one and would have to be separate from 
a piece of land. Therefore, the scholars had to invent the Pacific Ocean before it 
was actually discovered. 
Again, we see here at work again the peculiar kind of revision that, 
simultaneously, turns out to be an invention: While the naming of the new 
Continent followed certain old traditions (female ending for Continents, etc.), it 
nevertheless invents the meaning of ‘America’ as something qualitatively different 
from what has come before. The word ‘America’ is therefore not in fact a neologism, 
a new coinage, but rather a paleonym, a word that has been in use but is now recast in 
different terms. 
It seems that Emerson was well aware of the kind of originary revision implied 
by the name ‘America’. He complains that  
“broad America must wear the name of a thief […] Amerigo Vespucci, the pickle-dealer at 
Seville, who went out, in 1499, a subaltern with Hojeda, and whose highest naval rank 
was boatswain’s amte in an expedition that never sailed.” (W, V, 152)  
In comparison with the nations of Europe, he says, “[w]e are equally badly off in 
our founders, and the false pickle-dealer is an offset to the false bacon-seller” (W, 
V, 152) – alluding to the legend according to which England’s national saint, 
George of England, by dubious means acquired the contract to supply the Roman 
army with bacon. America’s “fall,” as Emerson conceives of it in “Experience,” is 
thus one caused by its failure to fully live up to its poetic or creative potential.  
 “Ghostlike we glide through nature, and should not know our place again. Did our 
birth fall in some fit of indigence and frugality in nature, that she was so sparing of her 
fire and so liberal of her earth that it appears to us that we lack the affirmative principle, 
and though we have health and reason, yet we have no superfluity of spirit for new 
creation?” (W, III, 45) 
American poetry is thus necessarily still a specter, but when it reaches its full 
potential, it is precisely not the expression of some ground, of “nature” and “earth.” 
Rather, it will be a spontaneous poetic impulse that compensates for the 
unfortunate “fit” of America’s birth. Simultaneously, it will change the meaning of 
‘America’ to signify something new. That America’s is yet only “ghostlike,” a 
specter not living up to the brilliant (democratic) promise connected to its name, is 
thus the condition of the possibility of a coming “superfluity of spirit,” of the 
sustained relevance of a poetic impulse that for Emerson is also synonymous with 
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‘America’. The passage quoted above also shows how carefully Emerson tries to 
avoid to make this a myth of auto-insemination – which would be, again, a myth 
of origins. Emerson here again allows for a minimal but necessary “incalculable” 
moment, a minimal influx of genius that is less a question of talent, knowledge, 
etc., but rather one of willingness, of being ready to engage with our 
surroundings. There is a place for the human in this poetics of America, even if 
this does not mean that one could simply use this poetics as an instrument. This is 
because America is invented by way of words, and not merely by way of words 
describing things. In other words: America itself is a poetic creation, an original 
quotation that, by realizing itself poetically changes and adds to what it was. The 
poetic nature of ‘America’ thus presents itself as a kind of double gesture, similar to 
the one that Joseph Riddel has described with reference to Poe’s poetics: it is a 
“sending that crosses, a reflexive doubling that detours the letter from its 
destination” (Riddel 1995: 13).  
The two essays that most fully embrace such a complex hermeneutics or 
poetological programme are “Circles” and the essay on “Quotation and Originality”. 
In the latter, Emerson, who in his journals amasses the gains of forty years of 
excerpting the literary and philosophical writing of his time, argues that any writer 
must come to terms with what he considers to be an irredeemable debt to the 
past. Like those Universalgelehrte, like the “representative men” he portrays in the 
essay of the same title, the writer has inevitably “absorbed the learning of his 
times” (W, IV, 42) and must thus be aware of the weight that tradition places upon 
him. Necessarily, and even in a country of “Adamic” origins, then, any writer will 
have to write his own history by rewriting or refiguring what came before him.  
Emerson insists that this phenomenon does not merely apply to intellectual 
history. He reminds us, in “Literary Ethics,” that our individual histories may be 
incommensurable, even when it comes down to ordinary or civil history: “Is it 
otherwise with civil history? Is it not the lesson of our experience that every man, 
were life long enough, would write history for himself? What else do these 
volumes of extracts and manuscript commentaries, that every scholar writes, 
indicate? Greek history is one thing to me; another to you” (W, I, 170). Emerson 
thus suggests the radical and irreducible alterity of history, of nature, of 
individuality, etc. As a consequence, history is “forever renewed to be forever 
destroyed” (W, I, 359) as he argues in “The Transcendentalist”. It is continually 
“written anew”: “no history […] is safe, but a new classifier shall give it new and 
more philosophical arrangement” (W, I, 170).  
In Quotation and Originality, Emerson explains how this incessant process of 
“writing anew” comes as both a habit of appropriation as well as misappropriation:  
“The highest statement of new philosophy complacently caps itself with some 
prophetic maxim from the oldest learning. There is something mortifying in this 
perpetual circle. This extreme economy argues a very small capital of invention. The 
stream of affection flows broad and strong; the practical activity is a river of supply; but 
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the dearth of design accuses the penury of intellect. How few thoughts! In a hundred 
years, millions of men, and not a hundred lines of poetry, not a theory of philosophy 
that offers a solution of the great problems, not an art of education that fulfils the 
conditions. In this delay and vacancy of thought we must make the best amends we 
can by seeking the wisdom of others to fill the time. If we confine ourselves to 
literature, ‘tis easy to see that the debt is immense to past thought. None escapes it. The 
originals are not original. There is imitation, model, and suggestion, to the very 
archangels, if we knew their history. The first book tyrannizes over the second.” (W, 
VIII, 179-180) 
There is thus a conspicuous and irreducible “delay” or “vacancy” to our ordinary, 
commonplace knowledge about the world. And as soon as we inspect our origins 
more closely, they are complicated. The discovery of that “perpetual cycle” (of 
quotation and repetition) thus is tantamount to exposing the differences glossed 
over by what recommends itself as an origin. However, Emerson argues in Nature 
that the absence of origins is not entirely an American phenomenon:  
“The American who has been confined, in his own country, to the sight of buildings 
designed after foreign models, is surprised on entering York Minster or St. Peter’s at 
Rome, by the feeling that these structures are imitations also, – faint copies of an 
original archetype.” (W, I, 67-68) 
For Emerson, however, this archetype in America is irretrievably lost. Therefore 
Emerson states in a passage that appears in “Representative Men” as well as in an 
epigraph to Quotation and Originality”: “Every book is a quotation; and every 
house is a quotation out of all forests and minds and stonequarries; and every man 
is a quotation from all his ancestors” (W, IV, 42; W, VIII, 176). Emerson also insists 
that “new art is always formed out of the old” (CW, II, 352). But because the old 
art itself was nothing but another mise-en-abyme of an earlier quotation, art’s 
intertextuality is unavoidable, its pure origin always already adulterated.  
Given this strong assertion of the inevitability of our always-already-quoting, 
then, it might be difficult to conceive of a place for originality, or potentiality, after 
all, “[t]here is imitation, model and suggestion, to the very archangels if we knew 
their history” (W, VIII, 180). There is, however, in Emerson something else that is 
implied by this irreducible historicity of writing (individuality, national discourse, 
etc.): Precisely because any text can only be a quotation, Emerson sees the 
possibility of something he calls the “alienated majesty” (W, II, 46) of quotation: 
misinterpretation, misappropriation, misreading. Emerson dictum that “[t]here is 
then creative reading as well as creative writing” (W, I, 93) implies that the act of 
our reading takes the text beyond being merely a compendium of quotations. To 
become creative writers or readers, however, we must be ready to commit to our 
“abandonment” (W, I, 217) to a force larger than ourselves and larger than our 
instrumentalising uses of language: “poetry,” “genius,” “power,” “God,” “love,” etc. 
Like his successor Nietzsche, who saw in philosophy’s inclination towards figurality 
the only exit from its historicist fixation, Emerson asks the writer or orator to give 
in to a kind of willed self-surrender that may have the power to loosen the laws 
of the old grammar in a joyful celebration of language. “In eloquence, the great 
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triumphs of the art are […] when consciously [the orator] makes himself the mere 
tongue of the occasion and the hour, and says what cannot but be said. Hence the 
term abandonment, to describe the self-surrender of the orator” (W, VII, 49). This 
kind of willed abandonment to the Eigensinn of language – its figurality, its 
rhetoricity, its poeticity, its literaricity –, Emerson argues in “English Traits,” is a 
cultural mark that is unique to America: “In the island [England] […] there is […] 
no abandonment or ecstasy of will or intellect” (W, V, 303). And, I would add, it is 
another indication that ‘America,’ as a cultural concept, in Emerson’s writing is 
essentially a poetic idea, one that has to do with a certain exposure to the 
potential of language.  
Against the necessary present “delay and vacancy of thought” (W, VIII, 180) 
necessitated by the groundlessness of our ways of meaning-making, then there is 
the promise of language’s rhetoricity or language’s innate potential for poiesis as 
something that makes possible other, supplementary meanings. But these meanings 
always come from the future because “[a]s yet, we have nothing but tendency and 
indication,” as Emerson argues in “Literary Ethics” (W, I, 171). Literature thus is not 
an end in itself, it cannot offer finitude or transcendence, and it is also not 
something to be used as a means or an instrument. Rather, it is a sort of crypt, a 
place within a house yet beyond it. We can find a paraphrase of this process of the 
infinite referral, of this never arriving at meaning itself, in Emerson’s metaphor of 
“the stars whose light has not yet reached us” (W, II, 147): meaning implies a 
future that is already past. Meaning comes to us from the future but once it has 
arrived, it is already past because it will then again be subject to yet another future 
meaning which cannot completely arrive at itself. For this reason, the production 
of new meanings does not function along the lines of prolepsis (by way of 
prophetic statements about the future), but rather metaleptically, that is, as a 
revisionary process in which the writer “transumes,” to use Harold Bloom’s term, 
the old figures in order to produce a new and supplementary meaning.15  
Abandonment is just one among a number of terms that in Emerson denote the 
inevitable historicity of rhetorics and, vice versa, the inevitable rhetoricity of 
history. In his elaborations of “genius,” “nature,” and “reading” Emerson argues that 
philosophy and literature are mere postscripts if they do not engage in an 
exploration of and experimentation of the rhetoricity of language. These terms 
consequently all designate a revisionary process in which, even tough the 
meanings of the past cannot be escaped, the writer may still produce different 
 
 15 On the supplementary structure of writing, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (1976: 281). On the legacy 
of the figure of “metalepsis” in American poetry (Whitman, Tate, Williams, Crane Frost), see John Hollander, 
The Figure of the Echo (1981: 117-132). On “transumption”, see Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading (Bloom 
2003). Bloom is especially strong on the mechanisms of metalepsis or transumption. He overrates, however, 
Emerson’s “gnostic” rejection of history. As I have shown, the production of supplementary meaning in Emerson 
is precisely not tantamount to a rejection of history, rather, it necessitates first and foremost exactly a turning 
and recombination of the tropes of tradition.  
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meanings that will both be supplemental (going beyond the meaning supplied by 
the past) as well as spectral (echoing the past meanings). Much like Nietzsche, 
Emerson stresses that this process of giving over to the Eigensinn of language is, in 
the last instance, incalculable or, to use Nietzschean terminology, bordering on 
madness, that is, it cannot be instrumentalised as the ground for a national 
literature, poetry, etc. Other than those adhering to the doctrine of “representative 
words,” Emerson imagines a vision of the promise of words that is at once radically 
reduced a well as substantially reconceptualised: words can no longer assert their 
representativity because they always already undergo a process of figuration, 
rhetoricity, etc. But it is exactly this experience of the malleability of words that 
for Emerson is ‘representative’ of America. Emerson’s vision consequently shows 
that the quintessential American experience is not one of its soil but one of its 
language.  
The unoccupied American Parnassus 
It seems unlikely that Emerson’s notion of an America ‘reflexivized’ and his interest 
in the perils of history and writing as expressing a theory of ‘America’ should have 
gone unnoticed. But Emerson’s description of ‘America’ as a second-order structure 
of (hermeneutic) self-implication has not deserved any attention, not even in the 
last few decades of theoretically-minded research on Emerson’s writing. Where, I 
thus want to ask, did Emerson discover his theme of criticism, of America’s 
introversion or turning back upon itself? And: Is it not far-fetched to attest a 
complex theorization of the vice versa implication of history and writing to an 
author writing in the first half of the nineteenth century? If not, how did Emerson 
discover his hermeneutic theme? Having laid out the implications of Emerson’s 
reconceptualization of America as a form of criticism, as critical sending that 
poetically detours its own letter from its destination, I want to briefly suggest in 
the following how Emerson came about his theme.  
I have already shown before how Emerson describes America’s epoch in “The 
American Scholar” as one of “introversion,” and he uses Hamlet’s predicament of 
being “‘Sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought’” to characterize America’s early 
modernity. Returning to this description some forty years later, in his “Historic 
Notes of Life and Letters of New England” (W, X, 324-370), Emerson himself 
compiles a rough outline of how the concept of criticism was introduced to 
America. Emerson remarks that the age, “say in 1820 and the twenty years 
following” (W, X, 325), was “the age of severance, of dissociation, of freedom, of 
analysis, of detachment” (W, X, 326). He here also repeats his assessment of the 
time as an “age of arithmetic and of criticism” (W, X, 327) characterized by a 
strong “tendency to introversion” (W, X, 329). More importantly, however, “Life 
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and Letters of New England,” provides important information about how a critical 
methodology till then foreign to America was introduced to New England’s 
intellectual life, and how it allowed for a conceptualization of ‘America’s’ criticism, 
inversion, or, simply, modernity.  
Listing a number of formative influences – from the “backsliders from 
Calvinism,” “Hartley and Priestley and Belsham, the followers of Locke,” and 
“Swedenborg” to “the powerful influence of the genius and character of Dr. 
Channing” (W, X, 330) – Emerson here also suggests that it was Edward Everett’s 
visit to Germany that changed the course of America’s intellectual adolescence. As 
he boldly declares, it was “the genius of Everett which was almost comparable to 
that of Pericles in Athens” (W, X, 331). Emerson argues that Everett’s import of 
German ideas came as a revolution to American philosophical thought that had 
previously ignored the revolutionary impact of German idealism:  
“Germany had created criticism in vain for us until 1820, when Edward Everett returned 
from his five years in Europe, and brought to Cambridge his rich results, which no one 
was so fitted by natural grace and the splendor of his rhetoric to introduce and 
recommend. He made us for the first time acquainted with Wolff's theory of the Homeric 
writings, with the criticism of Heyne. The novelty of the learning lost nothing in the 
skill and genius of his relation, and the rudest undergraduate found a new morning 
opened to him in the lecture-room of Harvard Hall.” (W, X, 330)  
The advent of modernity in Emerson’s writing is consequently not only a result of 
my own application of a deconstructive language, rather, it comes as a 
consequence of Emerson’s inheritance of certain problems in German philosophy 
and, more precisely, hermeneutics. In “Historic Notes of Life and Letters in New 
England,” Emerson himself suggests that the import of German ideas strongly 
helped to shape the contours of a “Higher Criticism” in New England.16 The same 
essay also suggests that this theory of criticism is not merely an addition to his 
extensive reading on poetics and rhetorics in his years at Harvard – Hugh Blair’s 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), Archibald Allison’s Essays on the 
Nature and Principles of Taste (1790), or Thomas Campbell’s “Lectures on Poetry” 
(1821) – but that his familiarity with hermeneutics, with the “exegetical discourses 
in the style of Voss and Wolff and Ruhnken” (W, X, 332) effectively prepares the 
ground for his own formulation of a complex theory of poetics. As Emerson points 
out, Everett’s transfer of cutting edge German thought to America seemed to fall 
on an especially fruitful ground: “this learning instantly took the highest place to 
our imagination in our unoccupied American Parnassus” (W, X, 332).  
Emerson, trained in Unitarian doctrines, would have been well aware of some 
of the hermeneutic problems associated with Unitarian theology. And biblical 
critics would obviously have been interested in the theory of interpretation that 
 
 16 On Emerson’s implication in the “Higher Criticism” and its reception of a complex theory of hermeneutics in 
Germany, see Richard Grusin’s Transcendentalist Hermeneutics (1991: 9–79). 
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early hermeneutics proposed. In her essay on “Emerson and the Higher Criticism,” 
Barbara Packer provides a useful starting point: “Throughout the eighteenth 
century biblical critics showed an increasing willingness to turn on the biblical 
texts the same principles of critical analysis that had been employed in the study of 
classical authors” (Packer 1986). An attention to internal evidence, to secular 
history, to linguistics and editorial interventions would have profoundly changed 
the way in which biblical critics read the bible. Emerson would certainly have 
come across the revisionary scriptural analyses of Herder, Eichhorn, and Michaelis, 
but it was the aftermath of his older brother William’s sojourn to Göttingen to study 
theology in 1824 that was decisive: Like Waldo, William was planning to become 
a minister but after studying the new theology in Germany, he found his faith 
troubled by the critical questions that he was taught to ask. When William returned 
from Germany – he had already decided not to pursue his career with the ministry 
– it was not long before brother Waldo was to end his clerical ambitions telling his 
congregation that he was no longer willing to administer the Holy Communion. 
It has widely gone unnoticed how important this influx of German theory of 
interpretation or criticism was to become for Emerson and his followers at Harvard 
University. It happens in a moment when Unitarian dogma is quickly loosing its 
explanatory power and it occurs together with the late admission of British 
Romanticism in America. The figures involved in this exchange with German 
thought do not only include such known figures as Everett, Channing, Coleridge, 
Carlyle, and Emerson. It is in fact a whole generation of American intellectuals 
whose “transcendentalism” responds to a late reception of German philosophy and 
British Romanticism: George Ripley, Elizabeth Peabody, Theodor Parker, and 
Orestes Brownson are among those that combined a characteristically 
transcendentalist attitude with an interests in the Higher Criticism. Other 
theologicians and philosophers in fact decided to travel to Germany and to attend 
courses at German universities, among them Frederic Henry Hedge, George 
Ticknor, Andrews Norton, and Nathaniel L. Frothingham. The result of this 
complex trans-atlantic exchange in Emerson is a peculiar combination or, rather, 
amalgamation of the twin influences of British Romanticism and a German theory 
of hermeneutics. So far, only the former half of this equation has been properly 
investigated in American studies.17  
I want to argue that there is a specific reason why the influence of a “Higher 
Criticism” was strong even outside of the theological faculty in Harvard. “Higher 
Criticism” combines the problematics of “spirit of the age” with the question of 
understanding itself. It comes as the discovery of the historic conditions for 
understanding or, to put it the other way round, the discovery of the hermeneutic 
 
 17 For a documentation of Emerson’s exposure to German biblical criticism, see Julie Ellison, Emerson’s Romantic 
Style (1994) and Barbara Packer, “Origin and Authority: Emerson and the Higher Criticism” (1986) and Wesley 
T. Mott, ‘The Strains of Eloquence’: Emerson and His Sermons (1989: esp. 56–78). 
 HISTORY , QUOTATION , HERMENEUTI CS  151 
 
problems inherent in every historicism. “Higher Criticism” thus amounts to a radical 
perspectivism that insists that history can only be viewed from the vanishing 
moment of the present, of contemporary experience, and thus its meaning cannot 
be fixed or guaranteed. For a nation, however, that needs to build upon its textual 
tradition, this necessitates critical methodologies with which to assert the present 
meaning of the texts of the tradition. But in order to do that, it would have to 
disassociate itself from its cultural present in order to establish a fixed point of 
view. As we have seen before, Emerson believes that this must come at the price 
of a symptomatic cultural stagnation: the fixation of America’s founding history once 
and for all for him necessarily means the annulment of its cultural promise. The 
German theory of interpretation and hermeneutics would have been relevant in 
the American context because it allowed for a theorization of the complex 
processes of textual transmission. Just as the contemporary philosophy of Germany 
struggled with what they saw as the superiority of a “griechischer Geist” (see 
Szondi 1975: 139), so American writers had to explain why the “American 
Parnassus” was filled with European rather than American thought. Furthermore, 
the German theory of hermeneutics also offered an explanation of where America 
stood apropos the legacy of its own founding texts. German theory had discovered 
that writing is necessarily historic, that it always has a historical place and 
specificity, and that this insight applies both to the works that are being studied as 
well as to those studying them. The inheritance of British historicism, outlined in 
Chapter One, in Emerson thus comes together with the then already advanced 
theory of writing and reading in German philology. Emerson himself repeatedly 
pays tribute to this influence, for example when he speaks of the school of 
“biblical criticism,” or when he mentions figures such as Eichhorn, Michaelis, 
Gieseler, the secular critics Niebuhr, Ruhnken, Ast and Wolff, as well as 
Schleiermacher, Schelling, and, obviously, Hegel.  
For Emerson, it is precisely this German hermeneutics that lets him 
conceptualize America’s characteristic turning-upon-itself. It allows for the 
discovery and theorization of a second order observer (‘America,’ the ‘scholar’), 
constantly assessing the grounds on which he stands. As Michel Foucault has shown 
in The Order of Things, this discovery of a second order observer culminates, in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, in a veritable crisis of representation. This 
is not merely interesting in terms of a history of philosophy, or as a step in the 
history of Western thought: Emerson conceives of ‘America’ as a structure that 
comes into being precisely as a second order observer. America needs to 
continually assess itself, needs to sort out its (textual) legacy and, thus, needs to 
account for the ways in which it ‘means’. Its foundation as a nation is always 
already complicated by what Emerson terms “reflexivity,” “inversion,” or 
“criticism.” While Emerson’s writing repeatedly documents the influence of such a 
hermeneutics – see, for example the chapter “Books” in Society and Solitude (W, 
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VIII, 187-221) which reads like a compendium of contemporary philological 
science – it wants to go beyond its criticism of interpretation to conceive of a 
moment (in writing, in reading) that goes beyond interpretation, beyond what is 
more properly the technique of hermeneutics. Because the discipline of 
hermeneutics also allows for a conceptualization of the relation of history and 
writing, it helps Emerson to discover one of his main themes: the eccentricity of 
the contemporary moment and how it can be represented in writing. Surprisingly, 
and although Emerson’s religious roots have been documented in great detail, the 
connection between his problematization of reading or history and his training in 
the hermeneutical techniques has not been made programmatically. If it has been 
made, it has always been restricted to Emerson’s theological thought (see Grusin 
1991). Also, it seems that Emerson’s successors did not make this connection, 
otherwise it would have been more difficult to transform a writer, who had seen 
himself as a philosopher in the tradition of hermeneutic criticism, into the founding 
father of a specifically American pragmatism.  
The critical movement of “inversion,” “reflexivity,” or “criticism” that 
hermeneutics effects – an investigation of the place of understanding, something 
that later came to be known as the hermeneutic circle – forms the basis of 
Emerson’s philosophical undertaking because it lets him conceive America’s place 
in history as eccentric. Here, America is no longer simply an exception, a nation 
that has completely severed its ties to the thought of the Old Continent. Rather, 
America figures as an excess beyond Europe and, more importantly, beyond itself. 
It comes into being as a sort of second order observer that constantly re-evaluates 
and re-founds its cultural foundations.  
Maybe it is no wonder that this predicament of ‘America’ as an eccentric place 
has found its echo in European writing that, too, is eccentric with regards to its 
own tradition. Sigmund Freud’s insinuation of an American “Kulturschaden” and his 
confession of not wishing to use “amerikanische Methoden” in Das Unbehagen in 
der Kultur (1969: IX, 244; Freud 1953: XXI, 145), Martin Heidegger’s anxiety 
about a specifically American “Ruinanz” and “Weltverdüsterung” – that he thinks is 
responsible for the “technological catastrophe” that had befallen German thought 
(see Thomä 2000) –, Friedrich Nietzsche’s denigration of America’s “allgemeine 
Wohlfahrt” as “Brechmittel” (KSA, V, 165), or also Jacques Derrida’s writing on 
Lacan writing on Poe: America is here figured as an echo, an uncanny place, that 
is not the end but a curious complication or excess of history.18 When, for instance, 
Derrida discovers in his reading of “The Purloined Letter” that “a letter can always 
never arrive at its destination” (Derrida 1987: 148-152), then this becomes a more 
 
 18 For an interesting account of “America’s” place in the philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger, see Heinz 
Dieter Kittsteiner’s “Heideggers Amerika als Ursprungsort der Weltverdüsterung” (1997). For an overview of the 
concept of ‘America’ in European philosophy see Dieter Thomä, “Wie Europa versucht, Amerika auf den 
Begriff zu bringen. Über Condorcet, Tocqueville, Weber, Heidegger und andere” (2002) as well as Thomä’s 
Unter Amerikanern. Eine Lebensart wird besichtigt (2000).  
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general philosophical conundrum in its own right. But it is also an echo of how, in 
‘America,’ the foundation is always complicated by yet another detour, yet another 
turn. America’s tradition is necessarily fragile, because it comprises concepts sent 
across time, but also – as I have argued with respect to the notion of “democracy” 
– beyond time. Emerson already sees this complication that pertains to the 
foundation of America and he believes that Americans must never stop re-
discovering their country. For him, America’s arrival is infinitely deferred and 
Americans need to continually “be born again into this new yet unapproachable 
America” (W, III, 72).  
As a cultural entity that has no ground of its own but is brought into being as an 
effect of an enlightenment dream – Derrida provocatively calls it “the new 
Europe” (Derrida 1994: 40) –, America is, always already, itself a text, but a text 
without origin, a refiguration of an earlier (enlightenment) text, a “translation of a 
translation,” as Riddel puts it: “America is not discovered, but invented, and by 
‘reading’; that is, by translation” (Riddel 1984: 904). As the excess not only beyond 
European history, but beyond itself, as a vague promise of a future yet to come, 
unachieved, “a point of arrival infinitely deferred by the act of searching for it” 
(Riddel 1984: 904). As we have seen before, as a cultural concept that somewhat 
misnomically was named after one who was sent to discover it but then 
nevertheless came second, it functions precisely as a crypt, as a mise-en-abyme of 
earlier designations (see Kronick 1984: 14).  
Emerson’s use of the concept of “criticism” is meant to suggest precisely the 
groundlessness of American ways of making meaning: As the self-reflexive 
procedure of turning something upon itself, criticism is itself not made up of its 
own discrete signs but of those it circulates, remobilizes, and refigures form earlier 
texts. But Emerson and his contemporaries knew well that the new scholarship 
was both a promise as well as a danger, as it included the danger of a profound 
skepticism that would expose everything that was once thought to be original as 
the translation of an unlocatable earlier text. And indeed, as Douglas Anderson has 
shown in his analysis of the textual complexity of America’s founding texts 
(Anderson 2003), already early American literature is implied in this complex 
textual exchange. Even the diverse compacts written aboard the pilgrim ships are 
not simply original, spontaneous declarations of a new community, but meant to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the homeland now left behind for the new world. At 
the same time, such a self-implication engenders another risk: namely that once 
we arrive at an idea of ‘America,’ it will be so unique that it can hardly be 
‘representative’. Similarly, ‘America’ could stand for a production of an idea of ‘self’ 
that is so extreme in its isolation or so unique in its signature, that it will bear its 
country’s name as ‘representative’ peculiarity. We are thus also confronted here 
with the paradox of a democratic self that needs to be unique and representative 
at the same time. 
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Emerson is fully aware that the discovery of such a structure of criticism for 
America means that it must reflexively appropriate the preconditions of its 
Selbstverständnis. In other words, it must present us with an interpretation that 
feeds back into the conditions that our historical situation places on our 
understanding. In this characteristically hermeneutic move or circle, however, 
Emerson conceives of the potential for literature or poetry to effect a rupture, to 
bracket all known designations. Literature, as the place of such a characteristic 
‘return within itself,’ enables a defection of prior designations from themselves, it 
enables a mistranslation that, itself, is creative. As Emerson states in the essay “Art,” 
“new art is always formed out of the old” (W, II, 351). But like a mise-en-abyme 
of earlier texts or quotations, it is not quite reducible to these: “The Genius of the 
Hour sets his ineffaceable seal on the work and gives it an inexpressible charm for 
the imagination” (W, II, 352). If such an “inexpressible charm,” as Emerson argues, 
“overpowers the artist and finds expression in his work” (W, II, 352), then art 
establishes a minimal distance to both the past as well as its contemporary moment 
and, thus, may make a different future possible. Consequently, all art also needs to 
include a moment of “detachment,” that he considers to be characteristic of 
“rhetoric”: “The power to detach and to magnify by detaching is the essence of 
rhetoric in the hands of the orator or poet” (W, II, 354-5). If we “alight upon” a 
certain word, it can itself become “the deputy of the world” (W, II, 354). Art thus 
possesses an “aboriginal power” (W, II, 358) that is similar to “nature’s eclecticism” 
(W, II, 352): it can convert and refigure our world, while not serving as yet 
another supposed origin. This is why Emerson speaks of art’s “privilege” (W, II, 
349) as that of a repetition that is fundamentally deflected from its origin: it must 
be formed out of the “symbols in use in [its] day and nation,” but being exposed to 
processes of “rhetoric” and “power,” “it never quite repeats itself” because not 
“imitation but creation is the aim” (W, II, 351).  
American literature must therefore always introduce a minimal rupture within 
the texture of its tradition. And it is precisely by introducing this moment of 
detachment or rupture that America’s literature becomes the place or medium of 
“criticism”. As Emerson states in his Journals: “Literature is now critical” (J, V, 327). 
But because he knows that this “criticism” comes about by way of an exposure to a 
process of poiesis he also concludes: “Well, analysis may be poetic” (J, V, 327). 
Each function – that of criticism or analysis and that of creation or poiesis – in 
Emerson consequently always remains entangled with each other. Emerson does 
not propose an Adamic theory of art in which the American artist can simply build 
upon a kind of tabula rasa. Rather, he suggests that to clear the ground for 
something new in America always means that the artist exposes his creation to a 
moment of figuration. The resulting literature or art is obviously more a gesture 
than a literature, a canon, or a tradition. That is, it is a kind or mode of writing 
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rather than something that could be solidified into a literary thematics, canon, or 
tradition.  
Emerson thus combines his interest in the German school of “criticism” – with its 
attention to a hermeneutic circle as constitutive of our ways of making meaning of 
the world – with an investigation of how poetry or literature can go beyond this 
circle to provide supplemental meanings. “Literature,” of course is already a 
concept of the West, and one that includes precisely this “characteristic” return 
within itself. “Literature,” as Hegel already pointed out, is synonymous with this 
kind of self-production as self-reflection.19 America’s poetic self-implication and the 
production of its literature are thus tantamount to a situation or crisis that we now 
generally term ‘modernity’. And American literature understands itself as a modern 
literature or, at least, as a pretext to a thoroughly modern literature – because “[a]s 
yet, we have nothing but tendency and indication” (W, I, 171). America, in 
Emerson’s vision, needs to understand itself as resulting from its own literary or 
poetic description, it needs to understand itself as a nation, consequently, that has 
always already been modern.  
The “weighty sense” of the times and the invention of America  
Because America comes about as a result of its literary invention, the American 
writer needs to continually search the present for constellations of meaning that 
have not yet been actualized. He must think of the present moment as a 
depository of meanings that, when they undergo a process of refiguration, may 
signify a qualitatively different future and so potentially enable the advent of the 
age of ‘America’. As Emerson argues in his “Lecture on the Times”:  
“The Times are the masquerades of the eternities; trivial to the dull, tokens of noble and 
majestic agents to the wise; the receptacle in which the Past leaves its history; the 
quarry out of which the genius of today is building up the Future. The Times – the 
nations, manners, institutions, opinions, votes, are to be studied as omens, as sacred 
leaves, whereon a weighty sense is inscribed […] .” (W, I, 259)  
Because the future sense of America is only inscribed but not present in the things 
at hand, the only exit from the circle of understanding, the circular structure of 
criticism is invention. The American writer must therefore do the impossible, he 
must remove all intentionality from understanding and abandon himself to the 
rhetoricity or figurality of things themselves, so that his writing opens up to 
potential meanings to come, to an understanding without ground. For Emerson and 
later American authors, the future invention of America is thus a matter of risking 
 
 19 For a lucid elaboration on the connection of literature and modernity in Hegel, see Maurice Blanchot’s 
“Literature and the original experience” in his The Space of Literature (1982). 
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America’s history, here and now, in favour of a projection of its history in the 
future.20  
It is important to maintain here that this American obsession with the future is 
not merely proleptic or visionary – as Richard Poirier would have it in A World 
Elsewhere (Poirier 1985). American literature is not always the obsessive discourse 
about a utopian “world elsewhere,” in the future, it is not simply the anticipated 
question about the nature of America in the future. Rather, as Charles Olson has 
phrased it when talking of Melville’s writerly project, American writing is 
“projective”, a “figure of forward” (Olson 1997: 92) that by re-writing or even 
mistranslating the past, breaks with the past and looks beyond the present to the 
future, but in a manner so that this future itself is fed back into the experience of a 
lived present. For American writers, the future thus holds a special place, but it 
holds this special place because they see a potentially different but yet unknown 
future, a “weighty sense” not yet actualized but “inscribed” in the “omens” and 
“sacred leaves” of the present. Herman Melville famously classifies America’s 
orientation towards the future in the following passage from White-Jacket:  
“The Past is dead, and has no resurrection; but the Future is endowed with such a life, 
that it lives to us even in anticipation. The Past is, in many things, the foe of mankind; 
the Future is, in all things, our friend. In the Past is no hope; The Future is both hope 
and fruition. The Past is the text-book of tyrants; the Future is the Bible of the Free. […] 
We should, if possible, prove a teacher to posterity, instead of being the pupil of by-
gone generations. More shall come after us than have gone before; the world is not yet 
middle-aged. […] And we Americans are the peculiar, chosen people – the Israel of our 
time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world. […] We are the pioneers of the world; 
the advance-guard, sent on through the wilderness of untried things, to break a new 
path in the New World that is ours. […] At a period when other nations have but lisped, 
our deep voice is heard afar. Long enough, have we been skeptics with regard to 
ourselves, and doubted whether, indeed, the political Messiah had come. But he has 
come in us, if we would but give utterance to his promptings.” (Melville 1983: 505-6)  
There is obviously a strong echo of a discourse of providence in this central 
passage from White-Jacket. But we should also be careful to notice a different tone 
that very often underwrites Melville’s boisterous optimism: Melville’s being “sent 
on through the wilderness of untried tings” does not only carry a quasi-religious 
significance, it always also comes as a risky linguistic challenge. Not only because 
the past is a “text-book” and the future a kind of “Bible” that yet needs to be 
written, but rather because this “peculiar, chosen people” need to speak a 
“peculiar” language, as Melville’s novels show so programmatically. Already, 
Melville argues, America’s voice can be heard loud and clear, but the coming of 
America’s political Messiah is dependant upon yet another “utterance” whose terms 
have not yet been figured. Therefore, even the most optimistic American discourse 
 
 20 I am thinking here of William Carlos Williams’ comments in The American Grain who imagines the American 
writer producing the history from which America springs from (see Williams 1971: esp. 221-223).  
 HISTORY , QUOTATION , HERMENEUTI CS  157 
 
– in Melville or in Whitman, for example – needs to proceed by way of reading 
or misreading the tradition, by way of a quotation that transforms what it quotes. 
Emerson himself conceives of this kind of originary quotation as an atomizing of 
old discourses, as their recirculation in new fields of association. And it is only 
when such a quotation returns the terms of the tradition to us with an “alienated 
majesty” (W, II, 46), as Emerson argues in “Self-Reliance,” that we may begin to 
grasp a qualitatively different future. American history thus comes as a build-up of 
figurations, as, more specifically, the patina of misinterpretations that steadily 
accumulates around the notion, or, rather, the metonymy that is ‘America’.  
For Emerson, this is clearly not meant to suggest that America lacks, more 
‘properly,’ a reality. It is precisely because it comes about as a structure of 
criticism, as a refiguration or turn in language that it can effectively assert itself in 
language. And it is precisely because it is ‘merely’ an articulation in language that 
it can avoid the cultural and political stagnation that had become so prevalent in 
Europe. America’s exposure to a certain potential in language is thus not so much a 
degeneration of a more proper, more solid reality – as Heidegger and other 
European commentators would later have it in their denunciation of America’s 
(technological) ruinancy (Ruinanz) –, it is the realization of a freedom that is only 
possible in language and that comes as the assertion of a specific kind of freedom 
that can only be actualized, be “realized” if we are willing to risk what we are in 
favour of the “loud, ill-pitch’d,” potentially meaningless articulation of what we 
may be in the future.  
Consequently, and to return to the theme of hermeneutics in Emerson, we find 
a more complex hermeneutic circle at the heart of America’s cultural constitution: 
America’s reality (the reality of its democratic promise, the reality of the American 
epoch) depends on its articulation in a language that is yet to be found. But 
America’s ‘embarrassed’ language experiments with the coming language of 
democracy itself is always fed back into what America is, here and now. That is: 
the advent or expectation of America’s next age, of its future democratic 
significance is effective – culturally and politically – precisely in the present 
because it continually changes our account of what and who we are.  
Emerson calls this complex figure of a reciprocity or Wechselverhältnis of the 
world and its articulation in writing simply “relation,” and he insists that it can 
never be “betrayed” or dissolved. Rather, this “relation” is synonymous with what 
he calls “Fate”:  
 “Thus we trace Fate, in matter, mind, and morals, – in race, in retardations of strata, 
and in thought and character as well. It is everywhere bound or limitation. But Fate has 
its lord; limitation its limits; is different seen from above and from below; from within 
and from without. For, though Fate is immense, so is power, which is the other fact in 
the dual world, immense. If Fate follows and limits power, power attends and 
antagonizes Fate. We must respect Fate as natural history, but there is more than natural 
history. For who and what is this criticism that pries into the matter? Man is not order of 
nature, sack and sack, belly and members, link in a chain, nor any ignominious 
baggage, but a stupendous antagonism, a dragging together of the poles of the 
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Universe. He betrays his relation to what is below him, – thick- skulled, small-brained, 
fishy, quadrumanous, – quadruped ill-disguised, hardly escaped into biped, and has 
paid for the new powers by loss of some of the old ones. But the lightning which 
explodes and fashions planets, maker of planet and suns, is in him. On one side, 
elemental order, sandstone and granite, rock-ledges, peat-bog, forest, sea and shore; 
and, on the other part, thought, the spirit which composes and decomposes nature, - 
here they are, side by side, god and devil, mind and matter, king and conspirator, belt 
and spasm, riding peacefully together in the eye and brain of every man.” (W, VI, 21-22) 
Emerson argues that “Fate” does not only show in the ordinary but unpredictable 
facts of our lives, as a more commonsensical definition would have it. Rather, 
“Fate” becomes equally factitious in language, or in what Emerson calls “thought” 
or “character.” Consequently, the eventfulness of nature is paralleled by the 
eventfulness of the human mind as a “stupendous antagonism.” It is itself a power 
that can bring the incommensurable together and form a new world or, even, 
“compose nature” itself. Therefore, as Emerson declares emphatically, the 
unrestrainable power that “fashions planets” is in man himself, by virtue of his 
“thought,” “character,” and “criticism.” Emerson thinks that something of this 
peculiar American openness to a potential in language can characteristically be 
found in the solitary voices of the few American thinkers that America’s short 
history has produced. And it is precisely because their “speech” abandons itself to a 
potential in language that it may effectively “reorganize” and “renew” our reality, 
as he argues in “The Transcendentalist”:  
“Soon these improvements and mechanical inventions will be superseded; these modes 
of living lost out of memory; these cities rotted, ruined by war, by new inventions, by 
new seats of trade, or the geologic changes: – all gone, like the shells which sprinkle 
the sea-beach with a white colony to-day, forever renewed to be forever destroyed. But 
the thoughts which these few hermits strove to proclaim by silence as well as by 
speech, not only by what they did, but by what they forbore to do, shall abide in 
beauty and strength, to reorganize themselves in nature, to invest themselves anew in 
other, perhaps higher endowed and happier mixed clay than ours.” (W, I, 359)  
Being the result of its own rearticulation, America cannot escape the linguistic 
system by which it is produced. Rather: this is the condition sine qua non of 
America as the place of a democratic politics. We will return to this idea in 
Chapter Five.  
This structure of a hermeneutics or criticism, I want to argue, is also discernible 
in Emerson’s writing: it cannot achieve transcendence, it can never entirely free 
itself from the past or from its present situation. To achieve transcendence would 
mean that it circumscribed, in its entirety, a philosophical system, with no 
allowance for the effects of figuration or troping anymore. But its openness to the 
‘esoteric’ effects of signification and troping, its lack of a more ‘properly’ 
philosophical systematicity leaves it an allegory of philosophy that exposes 
figuration or tropes as the material, ‘real’ condition of any philosophy and writing. 
These effects are, as De Man has shown with regards to the philosophical writing 
of Kant and Hegel, themselves the condition of the possibility of the conceptual 
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system that is philosophy (De Man 1996: 89). And just as a text can never escape 
the linguistic system by which it is produced, so a reading of a text can never 
itself completely account for this text since it is itself a real event that is inevitably 
caught up in the event it reads.  
Emerson, himself speaking from an eccentric cultural perspective, may be one 
of the first to realize the untapped potential of these effects both poetically as well 
as politically. He conceives of America itself as a form of a poetic Vollzug, as the 
event of a structure in language that acquires and produces its very own facticity. 
When Emerson writes about America and when America, eventually, expresses 
itself poetically, then it will already be writing after the fact, that is, writing will 
always already have established the America that it describes. But as the result of a 
poetic Vollzug, as the turning of the tropes that signify ‘America,’ America will 
never entirely coincide with its description. In the structure of reciprocity or 
“relation” that I have outlined above, the figurative excess of writing spills over 
into the ordinary lives of Americans just as the unthinkable variety of American 
moods and manners continually asks for yet another poetic description. It is this 
peculiar, chiastic commingling of text and world, of poetry and America that, as 
Emerson will later argue, make America a “poem in our eyes” (W, III, 38). But 
this poem, because it is “yet unsung” (W, III, 38) is never an end in itself. 
“Dazzl[ing] the imagination” (W, III, 38), it must itself become the source of yet 
another refiguration.  
It is important to maintain here that Emerson thinks that this process of poetic 
Vollzug cannot be instrumentalised politically. Just as the power of “Fate,” it 
overrides what Emerson calls the “kingdom of cause and effect” (W, III, 67). It 
includes a moment of a radical suspension of prior designations in which the 
refiguration changes what it describes. The multiplicity of life in the present 
moment of culture – what Emerson calls the “irreducibleness of the elements of 
human life to calculation” (W, III, 70) – functions as an antagonism that needs to 
be continually translated into poetry, writing, or literature. But it is precisely with 
this translation that we may effect a real change, an incalculable refiguration of 
what and who we are. The structure of the hermeneutic circle, of America’s self-
implication as a poetic concepts is thus tantamount to the possibility of America as 
the place of another politics to come. This democratic politics would require a 
political horizon that recedes in the instant that a political programme is articulated. 
And America’s promise – as a cultural concept, as a nation – is to be found 
precisely in the gap between two figurations, in the “verge of to-day” that comes 
as a moment of Kehre, transition, or poetic refiguration in which previous political 
or cultural designations lose their significance and new ones are invented.  
But this also means that the position from which we understand is, at the same 
time, the object of our understanding. America is a description of a political state 
that is the result of that very description. An analysis of how America is understood 
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consequently discloses or, at least in a certain sense, produces the hermeneutic 
situation that is America. In other words: An analysis of America’s interpretation of 
the world discloses the hermeneutical situation from which ‘America’ occurs. And 
because Emerson finds himself in this curious hermeneutic circle, he does not 
merely want to describe America’s epoch, but rather America’s epoché, that is, how 
America is constantly implied in a transition or Zeitenwende that continually 
refigures what America is – as a concept and as a nation.  
We have to be careful not to dismiss this procedure in Emerson as one of his 
many mysticisms. This procedure, because it exposes the potentially irreducible 
contingency and singularity of America’s situation in the present, also exposes its 
radical historicity. Emerson’s focus on the event of America’s present is therefore 
not a mystical move intended to get rid of the vicissitudes of history or to 
transcend history in the suggestion of an America that is beyond history. Rather, his 
procedure leads us back to history exactly by exposing a moment of transition in 
which history is no longer self-evident and, thus, the possibility of another ‘history’ 
is signalled. When Emerson talks of the “power” inherent in the moment of “to-
day,” he means to alert us to a kind of Nullpunkt, a point zero, that itself opens up 
incalculable (historical) possibilities. But as Hans Blumenberg points out, the 
function of this point zero can only “be ascertained as something either not yet 
arrived at or already crossed” (Blumenberg 1983: 469). As Blumenberg argues, 
this transition must necessarily happen in a minimal or vanishing moment, but it 
nevertheless guarantees the refiguration or “reversal” that brings about the next 
epoch:  
“As regards its linguistic derivation, ‘epoch’ is better suited to designate a punctiform 
event whose importance is being stressed than the period of time that is, say, 
introduced by this event and is to be characterized in terms of it. The Greek word 
‘epoché’ signifies a pause [Innehalten] of a movement, and then also the point at which 
a halt is made [angehalten wird] or a reversal of direction takes place.” (Blumenberg 
1983: 459)  
Emerson’s focus on the moments of America’s transition consequently comes as 
both a move towards the present and as a break with actuality in a bracketing of 
the hold of everything that is ordinary, common, etc. In his attempts at finding a 
poetic expression adequate to the potential of such an “interval” (W, XII, 44), 
“gulf” (W, II, 69), or “verge” (W, II, 315) that is both “no longer” and “not yet”, 
Emerson’s writing enters, as Stephen Erickson has expressed it, a “region of 
maximal vulnerability” (1999, 103): It must risk destroying everything that is 
known in order to prepare for what is yet to come. Emerson here strongly echoes 
Coleridge’s dictum about a “willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which 
constitutes poetic faith” (Coleridge 1983: II, 6). Coleridge, who had strongly 
influenced Emerson especially in his pre-Nature years, argued that it is only such a 
momentary, poetic suspension of prior designations that is able  
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“to give the charm of novelty to things of every day, and to excite a feeling analogous 
to the supernatural, by awakening the mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom, and 
directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible 
treasure, but for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude 
we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor 
understand.” (Coleridge, Engell, and Bate 1983: II, 6) 
Similarly, Emerson suggests that it is a writing that is open to language’s poeticity 
or rhetoricity that can effect the radical suspension of significance “for the 
moment”, as Coleridge calls it. This suspension of common diction or, as Emerson 
prefers to call it, this “abandonment” to the poetic potential in language, prepares 
the ground for a refiguration even of what we think is most ordinary, customary, 
or common.  
Emerson therefore combines the conundrum of America’s hermeneutic circle – 
in which only the (historical) specification of America’s age can guarantee the 
existence of the concept ‘America’ – with an attention to those transitional 
moments that are not themselves reducible to the process of history but that 
themselves make historical change possible. Such moments of a deflection from the 
safe course of history result out of an “influx” (W, I, 329) of “power,” of “nature,” 
of “experience,” or, simply, of “life”. Such moments, Emerson argues, are the 
forces by which the ordinary becomes estranged while we begin to see the 
incalculable emergence or “becoming” (W, VII, 38) of something new, something 
that our history cannot yet account for. If America is going to prove to be the 
culmination of nations, then it will be precisely because it does not cease to be 
ready to give in to such a process of estrangement or deviation from itself. As he 
argues in “Self-Reliance”:  
“This which I think and feel underlay every former state of life and circumstances, as it 
does underlie my present, and what is called life and what is called death. Life only 
avails, not the having lived. Power ceases in the instant of repose; it resides in the 
moment of transition from a past to a new state, in the shooting of the gulf, in the 
darting to an aim. This one fact the world hates; that the soul becomes […] . ” (W, II, 69) 
America’s characteristic inquiétude – how it always “darts to an aim” – thus 
necessarily comes part and parcel with its promise: precisely because it is a 
cultural construct that is oriented not towards its current ontology but towards what 
it ought to be in the future, it at all times needs to be ready to receive an influx of 
power that will challenge what this culture is, ordinarily, but that will make its 
future state possible. Emerson, as a cultural analyst, is less interested in attempting 
to specify America’s age than he is in accounting for that “moment of transition 
from a past to a new state” that secures the potential advent of a future ‘America’. 
His careful descriptions of the America of “to-day” are consequently not historical 
descriptions aimed at categorizing and cataloguing American life in the present 
moment. Rather, they are intended to provide a strong sense of the irreducible 
multiplicity of American life in the contemporary moment. And it is precisely in 
this multiplicity that Emerson locates a potential for an America that does not yet 
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exist, that is yet unarticulated. Hence, in “The American Scholar” he urges the 
writer to concentrate on the heterogeneity of his own contemporary moment and 
calls on him to “work[] up all that is wasted to-day into to-morrow’s creation” (W, 
I, 373).  
It is because of this attention for a disruption of historical continuity in a 
vanishing moment that itself makes all historical change possible that I am not 
entirely convinced of the project of a “de-transcendentalization of the Emerson 
image” first proposed by Lawrence Buell (Buell 1984: 123) and then elaborated by 
Michael Lopez (Lopez 1988; 1994: 165-189) and others. I think, rather, that (new) 
historicist readings stress the meaningful evolution of Emerson’s thought in his time 
at the cost of an attempt to conceptualize the radical timeliness of Emerson’s 
thought in the sense that it has to be discovered anew as a reading over and over 
again. Instead of a thoroughly “de-transcendentalized” Emerson, I would like to 
propose an Emerson that is immersed in the present state of his culture while 
simultaneously exploring the field of contemporary culture for a potential that is 
yet unactualized, “unachieved”. Emerson’s present, then, would be one that is not 
self-present with itself, it is a present that Emerson cannot in the last instance 
specify because its description would require a point of view that is itself 
exempted from the process of history. But Emerson repeatedly alerts us to the fact 
that writing, in the present, is itself radically contingent and can itself only make 
sense of the present for a limited period of time. Thus, Emerson’s anecdotal (and 
unattributed) concession of “I do not believe this anymore,” or his comment in a 
letter to Henry Ware Jr. that “[I] could not but feel pain in saying some things in 
that place and presence” (Ware 1846: 395-396). Emerson here stresses the radical 
(historical) contingency of all speech acts, suggesting that what he expresses as a 
speaker is both unrepeatable and irreversible. “These things look thus to me! To 
you, otherwise” (Ware 1846: 396), he insists in the same letter, anticipating not 
only how he will contradict his contemporaries and potentially also himself, but 
how his writing will have to be read and misread by future generations of readers.  
„Faith and love are apt to be spasmodic in the best minds. Men live on the 
brink of mysteries and harmonies into which they never enter, and with their 
hand on the door-latch they die outside” (CEC, 120). What Emerson describes as 
the hermeneutic circle of man and history, is thus also apt to describe the 
interminability (Unabschliessbarkeit) of writing and reading in the present 
moment.21 As Buell points out, Emerson’s writing is therefore 
„very likely to provoke present-minded responses that seem powerful at the time but 
give way to others as the intellectual climate changes. Emerson vis-à-vis Kierkegaard 
yields to Emerson vis-à-vis social radicalism which yields to Emerson vis-à-vis Nietzsche 
and Derrida and so on through the succession of dominant isms.” (Buell, „Emerson 
Industry,“ 135) 
 
 21 Unabschliessbarkeit is Gadamer’s term, see Gadamer et al. 2001: 53.  
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The next chapter will attempt to make obvious just how much this is true not only 
of our critical responses to Emerson, but even more so of the way in which he 
himself re-reads and re-writes his own work.  
 

  
Four 
Towards a “Radical Correspondence”  
“The world is enigmatical, – everything said, and everything known or done, – 
and must not be taken literally, but genially. We must be at the top of our 
condition to understand anything rightly. You must hear the bird’s song without 
attempting to render it into nouns and verbs” (W, VII, 180), Emerson argues in 
Society and Solitude. To take something “genially,” to use Emerson’s term, means to 
resist the desire to “interrogate,” to “anatomize” (W, VII, 180) and to engage in a 
process that, rhetorically or poetically, gives form to the eventfulness of the 
present. Similar to the “hermeneutics of facticity” that a rhetorically-minded Martin 
Heidegger develops in his early work (see GA 63) – a hermeneutics that, by 
engaging in a process of understanding, would always also produce its own, 
precarious ground –, Emerson’s ‘theory’ of writing and poetics is interested not so 
much in results (the ‘work,’ the ‘poem,’ etc.), but rather in the actuality of 
rhetorical or poetical processes of figuration, that is, in how figuration is both an 
expression of literature’s implication in the world as well as in how figuration 
guarantees the contemporariness of writing.  
For Emerson, it is precisely not the poet’s will to perfection, his attempt to 
create a work that will last, that guarantees the ‘geniality’ of his writing. In “works 
of genius,” Emerson argues, “[t]here is no painful effort, but it is the spontaneous 
flowing of the thought. Shakspeare made his Hamlet as a bird weaves its nest. 
Poems have been written between sleeping and waking, irresponsibly” (W, VII, 
182). Emerson continues to say that “[f]ancy defines herself” (W, VII, 182), 
drawing attention to the inevitable or necessary (hermeneutic) circle that all 
writing is liable to. While this means that reading, interpretation, history, and, 
especially, writing, cannot escape their temporal particularity, the facticity of their 
historical situation, this correspondence and contemporaneity of literature 
conversely allows for poetry or writing to actually form its historical moment. This 
is then precisely the conundrum of the American writer’s hermeneutic self: he 
needs to enact in writing the very ‘scene’ out of which his performance results. 
Every writing, if it wants to be ‘American,’ necessarily includes such a self-
reflexive circle, it is never merely the representation of an external reality but, 
rather, contributes to the construction of that reality by its own acts of figuration 
and refiguration. In terms of what I have been arguing about the con-temporaneity 
of Emerson’s writing, this means that American writing rhetorically enacts the very 
present it purports to describe. Emerson’s rhetoric of correspondence, by drawing 
attention to this aspect of a more generally defined poiesis, makes it possible for 
writing to come close to the fleetingness of the present moment and at the same 
time models and gives form to the present’s eventfulness in a process of figuration.  
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As a consequence, this “circle” of history and our writing can never merely be a 
question of representation or Darstellung. It is, in Emerson’s term, a “riddle” that 
cannot be solved and that cannot be made transparent. This is why Emerson 
prefers to call the correspondence between human thought or writing and the 
world a “radical correspondence” (W, I, 29): the event of history spills over into 
writing and writing, vice versa, by virtue of its eventfulness or poeticity, itself forms 
and brings about events in history. Emerson’s theory of the power of language and 
rhetoric consequently can therefore also be read as an early criticism of a kind of 
naïve representationalism and a historicism that thinks of the world as something 
that can be represented, more or less adequately, in the text of the author or 
historian. Rather, he conceives of the world itself as a text, a text that by way of a 
constant recourse to itself continually rewrites itself.  
Emerson repeatedly uses the figure of the Sphinx to talk about this quandary of 
the necessary self-reflexiveness and mutual implication of writing and history: 
“There sits the Sphinx at the road-side, and from age to age, as each prophet 
comes by, he tries his fortune at reading her riddle” (W, I, 34). The Sphinx, that 
strange creature, sits at the roadside and oversees our coming and going. Emerson 
understands that the riddle that the Sphinx presents us with also concerns the risk 
that is involved in the epochal threshold, in the transition from one age to the 
next. The Sphinx presents every new age with a new riddle, with something that 
is completely unprecedented. And as a cultural artefact whose accompanying 
language has been lost, it alerts us to the fact that we may not be able, in the last 
instance, to specify our own situation in history. Emerson revises the myth of the 
Sphinx, that “standing problem which has exercised the wonder and the study of 
every fine genius since the world began” (W, I, 34), as a problem of poetics: it is 
a reading that is at stake here, a reading both of history or tradition as well as of 
our progress “on the way,” as Stanley Cavell has phrased it (Cavell 1992: 137). 
The solution of the riddle of the Sphinx would then be a text, or rather, an 
interpretation of the tradition that would reflect our own age, our progress on the 
road of history. But this would mean, in Emerson terms, that we read history 
“genially” so that by reading the text of history we create another text that in turn 
constitutes the ways in which we perceive our world. The deciphering of a world 
consequently is not merely the discovery of a writing that is hidden among the 
text of history, rather, our reading of the text of history provides an insight into 
the hermeneutic fix in which we inevitably create a new history when we start to 
read it.  
How crucial this riddle of the Sphinx is to both Emerson’s poetological as well 
as historical thought becomes obvious if we look at some of the various references 
to it in his writing. For example, in a passage in Emerson’s journal when he 
attempts to define what happens when “nations culminate” (J, VIII, 345). This 
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culmination, Emerson argues, would mean nothing less than the solution of the 
riddle of the sphinx in poetry:  
“Sphinx. ‘T is said that the age ends with the poet or successful man who knots up into 
himself the genius or idea of his nation; and that when the Jews have at last flowered 
perfectly into Jesus, there is the end of the nation. When Greece is complete in Plato, 
Phidias, Pericles, the race is spent and rapidly takes itself away. When Rome has arrived 
at Caesar and Cicero, it has no more that it can do, and retreats. When Italy has got out 
Dante, all the rest will be rubbish. So that we ought rather to be thankful that our hero 
or poet does not hasten to be born in America, but still allows us others to live a little 
and warm ourselves at the fire of the sun, for, when he comes, we others must pack our 
petty trunks and be gone.” (J, VIII, 345)  
In 1873, travelling to Egypt with his family while their house was being repaired 
after it had been badly damaged by a fire, Emerson records in his journal:  
“All this journey is a perpetual humiliation, satirizing and whipping our ignorance. The 
people despise us because we are helpless babies who cannot speak or understand a 
word they say; the sphinxes scorn dunces; the obelisks, the temple walls, defy us with 
their histories which we cannot spell.” (J, X, 407-408)1  
In these passages on the problem of the Sphinx, a blueprint for Emerson’s 
poetological programme can be discerned: if we solve her riddle poetically, then 
we establish an exchange between the world (as it is mediated or changed 
through language) and language (as it is mediated or inflected by the world). But 
the image of the Sphinx also suggests that this exchange is, essentially, both 
interminable and incalculable. It is a riddle whose solution is both necessary as 
well as impossible. This chapter will attempt to reconstruct this poetological 
programme of a more “radical correspondence” by outlining Emerson’s rhetorical 
‘programme’ in Nature and other essays – ‘programme’ here in inverted commas 
because, as we have seen before, Emerson’s programmaticity consists very often in 
precisely refuting any aspirations to programmatic or argumentative consistency.  
The “endless catalogue” of nature 
Two rhetorical questions at the beginning of the introduction to Nature bring us 
back to the problem of America’s Zeitenwende: “Why should not we also enjoy an 
original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy 
of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the 
history of theirs?” (W, I, 3), Emerson asks and thus alludes to a more general 
problem of poetic expression. He implies that an originary relation to the world is 
impossible precisely because, in poetry, the correspondence of text and world 
 
 1 There are a couple of other corroborative passages in the Journals, for example when he argues that “There 
sits the Sphinx from age to age, in the road, Charles says, and every wise man that comes by has a crack with 
her” (J, III, 525). Or earlier, quoting from De Stael: “The aenigma of ourselves swallows up, like the Sphinx, 
thousands of systems which pretend to the glory of having guessed its meaning” (J, II, 121).  
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comes as a “relation.” Poetry cannot effect the “original” or transparent 
communication between worlds and things, as close as it may get to such an ideal 
communication. Therefore, we can never quite recuperate an ‘Adamic’ situation in 
which the world and the text fall together to form a single ontological reality. In 
Emerson’s concept of poetics, there is thus necessarily an aspect of relation that 
alerts us to the fact that our poetry can only be made to resonate with the world it 
describes. Emerson’s “original relation” is thus not what he elsewhere calls a “First 
philosophy” (W, V, 244). It is not some kind of originary representation, but an act 
that is always already turned upon itself, a transformational moment and a moment 
of crossing. The poetic power of tropes, Emerson argues, lies precisely in how 
they always turn on something or turn from themselves. As he argues in “Art”: 
“The power to detach and to magnify by detaching is the essence of rhetoric in 
the hands of the orator or poet” (W, II, 354-355). That is, poetry’s “essence” is one 
of detachment or magnification, it cannot help but refigure the thing it represents 
in the act of representation.  
Emerson’s call for an “original relation” should thus not simply be read as 
another take on an “Adamic” theory of language in America.2 While Adamic 
language theory proposes the rediscovery or re-founding of an original unison 
between world and language, Emerson in Nature significantly revises this 
argument to suggest that any poetic use of language puts us into a “relation” with 
the world. This relation may be “original,” but it becomes so not because it 
uncovers a more direct intercourse of words and things but rather because it may 
figure something that is radically “detached” from all our previous significations of 
the world. Furthermore, Emerson sees a danger specific to an Adamic theory of 
language: because it posits an original, direct or transparent intercourse between 
things and their representation in language, it may fasten words too much to things 
and thereby lead to an ossification of language that would make it unresponsive to 
the change of our circumstances. Governed by such an authoritarian rule of 
correspondence, language would become, as Emerson expresses it with a phrase 
he takes from Goethe’s Faust, a “paper currency” (W, I, 30), a structure that only 
supports itself but is no longer open to the effects of troping.  
“Nature,” in Emerson’s long essay of the same name, is reevaluated as an entity 
that precisely serves as a repository of such tropings or supplemental meanings. It 
is an unbound and eventful principle of flux, that can counter language’s tendency 
towards the ossification or sedimentation of its forms. Nature, then, in Emerson 
does not simply stand for the realm of the natural, it needs to be understood as 
that field out of which we produce change, that, as a field that has not yet been 
made to conform to the narrow paths of our ordinary lifes, challenges us to 
discover our “entitle[ment] to the world”:  
 
 2 On Emerson’s complex reinterpretation of an Adamic theory of language, see also James Perrin Warren, 
Culture of Eloquence: Oratory and Reform in Antebellum America (Warren 1999: esp. 29-51).  
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“Every rational creature has all nature for his dowry and estate. It is his, if he will. He 
may divest himself of it; he may creep into a corner, and abdicate his kingdom, as most 
men do, but he is entitled to the world by his constitution. In proportion to the energy 
of his thought and will, he takes up the world into himself.” (W, I, 20)  
There is, then, a fundamental indivisibility and mutual responsivity between nature 
and man. This obviously goes beyond conventional descriptions of nature and the 
natural because it suggests that nature itself is not merely a materiality, but itself 
already possesses significance. In a later essay that revisits some of the statements 
made in Nature, Emerson will therefore argue that “[n]ature represents the best 
meaning of the wisest man” (W, I, 214). Because of this mutual interaction, our 
entitlement to the world, our dependence on it cannot be dissolved. Later in 
Emerson’s work, this entitlement is more often than not characterized as a risk, as 
the possibility of skepticism and the implied possibility of the loss of the world, as 
Stanley Cavell has shown in his careful elaboration of Emerson’s writing. As Cavell 
argues, both the “repudiation of the world” and a “revelation of the world” (Cavell 
1984: 34) lie closely together in Emerson. The multiplicity of nature consequently 
is not only a promise, it can also turn into the “abyss of skepticism” (W, II, 305) in 
which what we ordinarily experience as our world is lost and where we are 
offered the intimation of a wholly different world. As Cavell points out in In Quest 
of the Ordinary (Cavell 1988: 27-49), Emerson here implicitly refers to his allies in 
European Romanticism, where the extension of experience that nature authorizes 
is always also accompanied by the risk of skepticism. Cavell argues in an 
imaginative discussion of Coleridge’s “Rime of the Ancient Mariner” that the 
promise of transcendence in or through nature in Romanticism is always already 
exposed to the risk of encountering the “frozen” world through which the mariner 
travels and which Cavell aligns with the position of skepticism (Cavell 1988:48). 
Emerson seems to be aware, that even when we most radically distance ourselves 
from the world – when we repudiate the world, “creep into a corner” and 
“abdicate our kingdom” (W, I, 20) –, and even if we reach out to embrace the 
world, there is yet always a reminder of the potential slipperiness of the world 
that Emerson describes so memorably in “Experience”: “I take this evanescence 
and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers then when we 
clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition” (W, III, 49).  
But even if this conundrum of our “unhandsome” Wechselverhältnis with the 
world cannot be dissolved in language, it can, to use Cavell’s term, be 
“acknowledged” in a discourse, that is no longer philosophy, but rather, poetry or 
literature. Even if Emerson’s essays – and, especially, Nature – sometimes follow 
typological templates, they will more often aim at what he calls “indirection,” that 
is, at a kind of writing that is open to the effects of troping. Ideally, as Emerson 
argues in Society and Solitude, this “abandonment” (W, VII, 181) to language’s 
ungovernable rhetoricity then itself forms our inevitable responsivity to an 
incalculable nature:  
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“Everything in the universe goes by indirection. There are no straight lines. I remember 
well the foreign scholar who made a week of my youth happy by his visit. ‘The savages 
in the islands,’ he said, ‘delight to play with the surf, coming in on the top of the 
rollers, then swimming out again, and repeat the delicious manoeuvre for hours.’ Well, 
human life is made up of such transits. There can be no greatness without 
abandonment.” (W, VII, 181) 
This kind of spontaneity and indirection is the specific sign of genius in Emerson. 
In other words: if the writer is willing to give in to and abandon himself to the 
effects of figuration and troping, then his art or literature will precisely give form 
to the mutual implication of man and world: “Thus in art, does nature work 
through the will of a man filled with the beauty of her first works” (W, I, 24). 
Nature, consequently, is the name for a troping. And writing, for Emerson, is a 
mise-en-scène of this troping. However, it is important to note here, that Emerson 
conceives of nature’s “working through the will of man” not as a process that can 
be instrumentally or intentionally controlled: Both the world (“nature”) and man’s 
take on it in “art” are dependant upon each other, this is why Emerson, in “Art,” 
argues that man is “but nature’s finer success in self-explication” and that he speaks 
of “nature’s eclecticism” (W, II, 352). The process of nature, consequently, is 
contained within that of man and vice versa, and their exchange is irreducible. This 
is why Emerson rates “living man” among the finer pieces of art, as he explains in 
“Art”:  
“There is no statue like this living man, with his infinite advantage over all ideal 
sculpture, of perpetual variety. What a gallery of art have I here! No mannerist made 
these varied groups and diverse original single figures. Here is the artist himself 
improvising, grim and glad, at his block. Now one thought strikes him, now another, 
and with each moment he alters the whole air, attitude and expression of his clay. 
Away with your nonsense of oil and easels, of marble and chisels; except to open your 
eyes to the masteries of eternal art, they are hypocritical rubbish.” (W, II, 357-358)  
Contrary to the eternalizing, unificatory tendency of mannerisms, Emerson’s notion 
of “art” debunks any kind of “hypocritical rubbish” in favour of an “aboriginal 
power” (W, II, 358) that fragments and separates rather than assembles. Art is not 
the medium in which the consonance of world and man is asserted, rather, it gives 
form to the fleetingness or contingency of our interaction with the world. As a 
consequence, as Emerson argues elsewhere, “[t]he intellectual and the active 
powers […] succeed each other, and the exclusive activity of the one, generates 
the exclusive activity of the other” (W, I, 22). This complicity of the intellect and 
the material world is true even if “there is something unfriendly in each to the 
other” (W, I, 22). In fact, it is central to Emerson’s notion of art: as a fundamental 
antagonism, it is responsible for the production of new meaning. If it were to 
stabilize, the creation of new meaning, and thus, the production of art, literature, 
etc., would cease. Because Emerson qualifies this relation as an antagonism, he 
also removes the “aboriginal power” of art and literature from an ideology of 
individual will or intentionality: “[B]eauty […] comes unsought, and comes because 
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it is unsought,” and therefore “[t]he beauty of nature re-forms itself in the mind, 
and not for barren contemplation, but for new creation” (W, I, 23). Because of this 
mutual exchange, I take Emerson to say, nature is always a power, and power, on 
the other hand, is nature.  
Emerson thus defines the work of art in Nature as an “abstract,” an “epitome,” or 
a “miniature” (W, I, 23) of nature. But he insists that it is not the beauty of the 
work of art that expresses nature but rather, that it is the beauty of nature that 
expresses itself in the work of art. Emerson thus significantly inverts the traditional 
relation of art and nature to suggest that “the standard of beauty is the entire circuit 
of natural forms” (W, I, 23). Here, it is no longer the work of art that gives form, 
rather, nature itself “is a sea of forms” (W, I, 23). Therefore, individual creative 
acts function only as an “alembic” (W, I, 24) through which nature passes: “Thus in 
art, does nature work through the will of a man filled with the beauty of her first 
works” (W, I, 24). These “first works,” consequently, are to be found in the 
“endless catalogue” (W, I, 14) of nature, in its “totality” (W, I, 24). In a lecture in 
1843, Emerson gives an even more radical account of this irreducibility of the 
relation between art and the writer, between the world and nature:  
“The sense of nature is inexhaustible. You think you know the meaning of these tropes 
of nature, and today you come into a new thought, and so all nature converts itself 
instantly into a symbol of that; and you see it has been chanting that song like a cricket 
ever since the creation. Nature is a tablet on which any sense may be inscribed, only 
not anything cunning and consciously vicious. Draw the moral of the river, the rock, 
and the ocean. The river, the rock, and the ocean say, ‘Guess again.’” (LL, I, 69) 
Nature, then, is not simply the unmovable, stable ground upon which we build 
our artistic creations. It is itself a store of tropes. It is itself a symbol and any 
account of nature in artistic creation will be provisional, since there is no closure 
to nature. It is, to use Emerson’s word, “inexhaustible” and our artistic 
correspondence with it is thus potentially interminable. Consequently, this coming 
forth, this passing through, of something from nature to art is what Emerson terms 
“beauty,” and for him, it is the “ultimate end” (W, I, 24) of the universe: “Beauty, 
in its largest sense and profoundest sense, is one expression of the universe” (W, I, 
24). For Emerson, beauty, in “its largest and profoundest sense,” means that the 
forms of nature always already overtake the formations and figurations devised by 
intellect, intention and will. Therefore, the work of art, in its characteristic going 
beyond of authorial intention and formation, corresponds to the world in its 
infinitude. This also implies a radical de-individualisation of the work of art that is 
now no longer dependant upon the individual whose “operations taken together 
are so insignificant, a little chipping, baking, patching, and washing, that in an 
impression so grand as that of the world on the human mind, they do not vary the 
result” (W, I, 5).  
If Emerson, in Chapter II of Nature, sets out to define the “uses” of nature 
according to the conventions of typology, then it is precisely his genius to deny 
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any kind of naturalistic utilitarianism by precisely refuting the notion of nature’s 
usefulness. If the Chapter on “Beauty” starts out with the standard typological 
argument that nature is a reservoir of beauty only to be transcended, brought to 
visibility by the author, then it closes on a surprising note to argue that nature is its 
own use, so to speak, that it is an end in itself, and, therefore, a realm radically 
removed from human intervention. Nature is its own “final cause” and thus we 
arrive here again at the same deconstruction of origins that we have met before, 
because nature is conceived as an original displacement, as the realm of original 
differance. Beauty too, consequently, is nothing but one of the names for nature. 
But this beauty is an end in itself (not reducible to an author, an individual 
creation, etc.), in other words, it is equally contingent. This contingence, if we 
follow Emerson’s reinterpretation of correspondence, also applies to our desire for 
beauty: “No reason can be asked or given why the soul seeks beauty” (W, I, 24). 
Emerson’s complex argument thus turns upon itself: nature is an idealist origin that 
brings about thought, but it becomes its own end, because the processuality of 
thought itself is an expression of nature and itself functions as a form-giving of the 
‘unformed’ flux of nature.  
Nature and the Bemühung of correspondence  
As we have seen already in the last chapter, this turning upon itself is the 
signature movement of Emerson’s thought. Here, this movement underwrites his 
argument about art and nature and forms the basis of his discussion of philosopher 
Emanuel Swedenborg’s notion “correspondence”. In Chapter I of Nature (“Nature”), 
he starts his presentation of a theory of correspondence by way of a pronounced 
revision of the customary language of naturalists:  
“[F]or every hour and change corresponds to and authorizes a different state of the 
mind, from breathless noon to grimmest midnight. Nature is a setting that fits equally 
well a comic or a mourning piece. In good health, the air is a cordial of incredible 
virtue. Crossing a bare common, in snow-puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, 
without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed 
a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear. In the woods, too, a man casts off 
his years, as the snake his slough, and at what period soever of life, is always a child. In 
the woods, is perpetual youth. Within these plantations of God, a decorum and sanctity 
reign, a perennial festival is dressed, and the guest sees not how he should tire of them 
in a thousand years. In the woods, we return to reason and faith. There I feel that 
nothing can befall me in life, – no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which 
nature cannot repair. Standing on the bare ground, – my head bathed by the blithe air, 
and uplifted into infinite space, – all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent 
eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; 
I am part or particle of God. The name of the nearest friend sounds then foreign and 
accidental: to be brothers, to be acquaintances, - master or servant, is then a trifle and a 
disturbance. I am the lover of uncontained and immortal beauty. In the wilderness, I 
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find something more dear and connate than in streets or villages. In the tranquil 
landscape, and especially in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat as 
beautiful as his own nature. The greatest delight which the fields and woods minister, 
is the suggestion of an occult relation between man and the vegetable.” (W, I, 9-10)  
I am quoting this passage at full length because it contains, in nuce, both 
Emerson’s criticism of standard naturalist terminology as well as his own 
elaboration of a theory of a more “radical correspondence”. Revising the central 
idealist topos that says that nature is an extension of man, Emerson here 
reconceives of the relation of man and nature as an increasingly complex 
exchange. On the one hand, nature simply corresponds to the human because its 
flux is similar to the fluidity or malleability of our ordinary lives. On the other, 
however, nature may produce in us an experience that is extraordinary, that 
challenges everything we know. Emerson thus revises naturalist correspondence 
by enlarging the power of nature to disrupt and challenge, so that nature now 
becomes the “hieroglyphic of something in us” (CS, I, 299), as Emerson expresses 
it in a sermon of 1829.3 In other words: Nature itself is a language, but one that 
expresses itself in hieroglyphs and consequently cannot be a stable ground upon 
which to establish our interpretations. Nature’s language cannot be read, it has to 
be deciphered just like an unknown language. Emerson’s later assertion that 
“[n]ature is only a mirror in which man is reflected colossally” (W, XII, 165) 
consequently identifies a riddle or a contingency (“the occult relation”) at the heart 
of this correspondence. And it is this reconception of correspondence as a 
contingent relation, as something that cannot be contained by the two elements 
that go into it, that is at the heart of both Nature and Emerson’s poetics in general. 
Just how powerful Emerson thinks this kind of correspondence can be is made 
explicit in the passage quoted above, when he insists that possesses the power to 
disrupt our acquired, ordinary emotional states so that it becomes possible to feel 
the paradox feeling of “being glad on the brink of fear.”  
When Emerson calls for an “original relation” at the outset of Nature, this is not 
the ‘Adamic,’ direct access to a world, it is, rather, a certain double crossing which 
perceives language as performing what is sought. An “original relation” would 
consequently mean that we give into both to nature’s as well as language’s 
eventfulness in order to make both new ways of life as well as a new life of 
tropes possible. The self-reflexive circle that necessarily develops along with our 
willingness to confront language’s potential for meaning (and not simply its power 
to represent) is, I think, similar to what Stanley Cavell has said about Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on philosophy’s “Bemühung” (Wittgenstein 1989: vol. V, 39):  
“For what Wittgenstein means when he says that philosophy really is descriptive is that 
it is descriptive of ‘our grammar’, of ‘the criteria we have’ in understanding one another, 
 
 3 On Emerson’s use of the symbol of hieroglyphics and its relation to Swedenborg’s theory of the fall of man, see 
Lieselotte Dieckmann’s Hieroglyphics: The History of a Literary Symbol (Dieckmann 1970: 150-159) 
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knowing the world, and possessing ourselves. Grammar is what language games are 
meant to reveal; it is because of this that they provide new ways of investigating 
concepts, and of criticizing traditional philosophy.” (Cavell 2002: 56)  
This kind of Bemühung produces an awareness that the exchange between 
ourselves and the world, between language and the world, runs in two ways: that 
on the one hand, our correspondence with the world is continually or necessarily 
dependant upon how the world requires us to come up with new meanings. On 
the other hand, however, these new meanings in turn create a changed world.  
A great number of passages from Emerson’s journals, notebooks, lectures, 
sermons, and addresses suggests that the problem of language and its use in 
philosophy is at the very heart of Emerson’s thought. The indexes that Emerson 
himself compiled to his Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks offer long entries 
under headings such as “Language,” “Eloquence,” and “Rhetoric.” The Journals offer 
lengthy entries on linguistic topics and the “Topical Notebooks” collect the standard 
nineteenth-century arguments about language under titles such as “Philosophy,” 
“Theory of Poetry,” and “Rhetoric.” Nature, however, only collects these linguistic 
topics to finally reject the standard nineteenth-century view of language in the 
central Chapter IV, “Language,” one of the crucial passages in Emerson’s work. 
Emerson here takes up the standard linguistic argument about the origin of 
language from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century in which Adam figures as 
the original namer. His theological training at Harvard would certainly have made 
Emerson familiar with this doctrine in which Adam’s naming of the creatures in 
Genesis (2:19-20) figures as a situation in which the word and the thing are yet in 
a perfect correspondence. As Hans Aarsleff has argued, the “Adamic doctrine” 
(Aarsleff 1983: esp. 25-26, 42-83), popular in New England philosophy early in 
the nineteenth century, repeatedly returns to this Urszene. As Aarsleff points out, 
early philology not just in America imagines Adam as the first philosopher and 
Aarsleff quotes from John Locke’s contemporaries John Webster and Robert South, 
the latter of which characterizes Adam as “a philosopher, which sufficiently 
appeared by his writing the nature of things upon their names; he could view 
essences in themselves, and read forms without the comment of their respective 
properties” (Aarsleff 1983: 59). Emerson, as passages in his journal suggeset, was 
also familiar with Jakob Böhme’s elucidation of the doctrine in his Mysterium 
Magnum in which Adam functions as the originator of a perfect language that 
establishes a transparent connection between words and things (Boehme 1623).  
The influence that this doctrine and, more generally, early American linguistics 
had on Emerson, can here not be documented in its entirety. It suffices to say that 
Emerson was heavily influenced in both the vocabulary and the framework of 
Nature by late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century linguistic thought and its 
positing of a correspondence between the external material world and the world 
of thought and spirit. What Böhme and other thinkers of correspondence theory 
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such as Guillaume Oegger and Emanuel Swedenborg – we find their books 
thoroughly annotated in Emerson’s library –, what these thinkers called the 
“language of nature,” suggested that language was a transparent medium, a vehicle 
effectively able establish a connection between the world and thought.4 In Nature, 
in the chapter entitled “Language,” Emerson challenges this conventional view of 
language as a transparent medium by way of positing three simple propositions to 
suggest that it is in fact “nature [that] is the vehicle of thought” (W, I, 25):  
“1. Words are signs of natural facts.  
2. Particular natural facts are symbols of particular spiritual facts.  
3. Nature is the symbol of spirit.” (W, I, 25)  
All of these propositions are in violation of nineteenth century linguistic theory that 
aims to clearly delimit spirit from nature with language as the human, quasi-
transparent vehicle that connects the two. Emerson, on the other hand, refutes 
such a delimitation and effectively identifies a fundamental interaction between 
signs and natural facts. This interaction, however, can no longer be controlled by 
and in language, because what language is and what it means is itself contingent 
on this exchange. If the third proposition then identifies nature as the symbol of 
spirit, then spirit will obviously no longer be a stable place, but itself a process. 
This is further elaborated in chapter VII of Nature (“ Spirit”), where Emerson 
argues  
“that spirit creates; that behind nature, throughout nature, spirit is present; one and not 
compound, [nature] does not act upon us from without, that is, in space and time, but 
spiritually, or through ourselves: therefore, that spirit, that is, the Supreme Being, does 
not build up nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as the life of the tree puts 
forth new branches and leaves through the pores of the old.” (W, I, 63-64)  
Spirit is thus no longer the “supreme being” that governs how we approach nature. 
Rather, it is merely “supreme,” because it is the place where nature’s latency – or 
“unconscious,” as Emerson phrases it – is transferred into a thought, figuration, or 
narrative. But because nature itself is “spiritual,” because it is “putting forth through 
us,” we are always already implied in nature and nature implied in us. Emerson’s 
notion of correspondence consequently troubles any simple interaction of nature 
and spirit to suggest that there is a fundamental, but productive “discord” (W, I, 65) 
between the two. Somewhat esoterically revising the philosophical dictum of his 
time, he suggests that this relation precisely cannot be described from within a 
philosophical discourse. Rather, because the place of nature’s “putting forth through 
us” is language, this mutual implication expresses itself poetically, as a figuration in 
 
 4 On Boehme and the “language of nature,” see Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language (1995: 182-
185), and David Van Leer, Emerson’s Epistemology. The Argument of the Essays (1986: 19-58); On 
Swedenborg’s theory of correspondence and how it influenced the Transcendentalists, see, respectively, 
Alexander Kern, “The Rise of Transcendentalism” (1953) and Perry Miller, The Transcendentalisist: An 
Anthology (1950: 53). For a more general overview of the influence of correspondence theory on American 
literature, see Philip F. Gura’s “Language and Meaning: An American Tradition” (1981).  
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language: “The world is emblematic. Parts of speech are metaphors, because the 
whole of nature is a metaphor of the human mind” (W, I, 32). But emblems and 
metaphors do not establish transparent correspondences, rather, they imply a 
fundamental transference. The medium of this transference is language. Emerson 
thus reformulates a notion of correspondence to suggest that the relation between 
the world and the human mind is not transparent: it is a relation that is always 
already bound up with the figurality of language. One could therefore argue that 
for Emerson Adam’s fall is always already not just a fall from paradise but, rather, a 
fall into the metaphoricity or rhetoricity of language.  
In Nature, Emerson’s argument is not yet quite decisive. But it is obvious even 
here, how important the doctrine of correspondence was to him. Before we can 
more fully assess Emerson’s reception and revision of Swedenborg’s notion of 
correspondence in Nature, we need to take a brief detour to Emerson’s most 
elaborate evaluation of Swedenborg in his lectures on Representative Men. This 
will help us to make sense of his rather condensed reinterpretation of 
Swedenborgian correspondence in Nature. In “Representative Men,” after a 
number of exceptionally obscure passages about Abul Khain, Abu Ali Seena, and 
Bramins – mysticists that serve as a highly ironic pretext for Emerson’s analysis of 
Swedenborg – and a condensed tour de force through historical formulations of 
mystic experience – “called […] ecstasy or absence,” “a getting out of their bodies 
to think” (W, IV, 97) – and a short presentation of Swedenborg as the prime 
example of an “introverted mind” (W, IV, 98), Emerson presents Swedenborg’s 
philosophy as nothing less than “a new religion in the world” (W, IV, 101). In fact, 
Emerson’s praise of Swedenborg is enthusiastic: Swedenborg is described as “[o]ne 
of the missouriums and mastodons of literature” (W, IV, 103), “whose presence 
would flutter the gowns of an university” (W, IV, 103). He dismisses his own as 
well as the books of his contemporaries as “fragmentary,” as mere “bonmots” while 
Swedenborg is praised as being “systematic”: “all means are orderly given; his 
faculties work with astronomic punctuality […]” (W, IV, 103). Emerson quotes at 
length from Swedenborg’s Animal Kingdom (Swedenborg 1843) and finally 
presents what he perceives to be Swedenborg’s attempt to “attain the science of all 
sciences, to unlock the meaning of the world” (W, IV, 115). And it is precisely 
here, Emerson argues, that the phenomenon of correspondence comes into play:  
“In our doctrine of Representations and Correspondences we shall treat of both these 
symbolical and typical resemblances, and of the astonishing things which occur, I will 
not say in the living body only, but throughout nature, and which correspond so 
entirely to supreme and spiritual things that one would swear that the physical world 
was purely symbolical of the spiritual world; insomuch that if we choose to express any 
natural truth in physical and definite vocal terms, and to convert these terms only into 
the corresponding and spiritual terms, we shall by this means elicit a spiritual truth or 
theological dogma, in place of the physical truth or precept: although no mortal would 
have predicted that any thing of the kind could possibly arise by bare literal 
transposition; […] This symbolism pervades the living body.” (W, IV, 115-6)  
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The passage from Representative Men makes explicit just how much Emerson takes 
from Swedenborg. But it has been overlooked that Emerson immediately sets 
about challenging the doctrine or idealism of Swedenborgian correspondence by 
adding that “[t]he fact thus explicitly stated is implied in all poetry, in allegory, in 
fable, in the use of emblems and in the structure of language” (W, IV, 116). This 
may seem like a minor addition when in fact it is a significant revision or even an 
outright dismissal of Swedenborg’s notion of correspondence. “The fact thus 
explicitely stated” is what David Van Leer has called “Swedenborg’s primitive 
notion of a parallelism between the two worlds of matter and spirit” (Van Leer 
1986: 28). Van Leer is certainly right about the ‘primitivism’ of Swedenborg’s 
notion of correspondence, but he himself misses the radical import of Emerson’s 
addition when he maintains that Swedenborg’s shortcoming in turn came to be a 
sort of founding stone for Emerson’s philosophical thought. Obviously, van Leer is 
not interested in the linguistic dimension of Emerson’s critique, because what the 
second half of Emerson’s qualification effectively introduces into the parallelism of 
correspondence is precisely language, and it is by this introduction that Emerson 
dissolves the parallelism. It is only when we pay attention to this linguistic 
dimension of Emerson’s rebuttal of Swedenborg’s “bare literal transposition” (W, IV, 
116) that we can ascertain how correspondence is now no longer guaranteed by 
an objective standard which would enable us to judge the representational value of 
our sensations. Rather, it is implied by our uses of language, as Emerson points out 
when he criticizes Swedenborg for limiting his insight to a theological problem: 
“This design of exhibiting such correspondences, which, if adequately executed, 
would be the poem of the world, […] was narrowed and defeated by the 
exclusively theologic direction which his inquiries took” (W, IV, 120). Emerson 
consequently calls Swedenborg’s notion of correspondence “mystic” (W, IV, 121) 
and contends that “[t]he slippery Proteus [of nature] is not so easily caught” (W, IV, 
121). He also insists that nature “is no literalist” and that the “dictionary of symbols” 
that would correspond to the totality of nature “is yet to be written” (W, IV, 121). 
Even tough heavily influenced by Swedenborg’s writing, Emerson thus sees there 
a mysticism that is diametrally opposed to his insistence on flexibility, flux, and 
spontaneity. Thus he argues that “[t]hese books should be used with caution. It is 
dangerous to sculpture these evanescing images of thought” (W, IV, 132):  
“Swedenborg’s system of the world wants central spontaneity […] and lacks power to 
generate life. There is no individual in it. The universe is a gigantic crystal, all whose 
atoms and laminæ lie in uninterrupted order, and with unbroken unity, but cold and 
still. […] There is an immense chain of intermediation, extending from centre to 
extremes, which bereaves every agency of all freedom and character. […] All his figures 
speak one speech. All his interlocutors Swedenborgise. […] The thousand-fold relation 
of men is not there. The interest that attaches in nature to each man, because he is right 
by his wrong, and wrong by his right, because he defies all dogmatising and 
classification, so many allowances, and contingences, and futurities, are to be taken 
into account, strong by his vices, often paralysed by his virtues, - sinks into entire 
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sympathy with his society. This want reacts to the centre of the system. […] There is no 
lustre in that eye which gazes from the centre, and which should vivify the immense 
dependency of beings. (W, IV, 133-4) 
Emerson apropos Swedenborg consequently imagines a philosophy that by 
investing too much in its systematics brings the world itself to a halt, a philosophy 
that by trying to establish an encompassing perspective on the world occasions a 
massive standstill both in the philosopher’s text – so that “[a]ll his interlocutors 
Swedenborgise” – as well as in the world – that now lacks all “allowances, and 
contingences, and futurities.” Swedenborg, Emerson argues, wants to establish a 
correspondence that steadfastedly interlocks the world and the philosopher’s text 
so as to halt all exchange between the world and the text. Emerson therefore 
dismisses him as a “literalist” and maintains that we should look for a (more 
“radical”) correspondence precisely in the way in which both the world and the 
text undergo a constant refiguration or reformulation. Emerson’s insistence on the 
spontaneity of both the world and the philosopher’s text is consequently not just a 
criticism of Swedenborg, it is much more than that, namely a task that Emerson 
sets before him. Before nature, Emerson argues, “[t]he human mind stands ever in 
perplexity” and he maintains that “[t]he reconciler has not yet appeared” (W, IV, 
94), upholding the promise for a future meaning of the world.  
Emerson’s revision of Swedenborg’s doctrine of correspondences insists on the 
ambiguity of any verbal access to the world. Earlier, in his journals, Emerson still 
thought that in exemplary cases an ideal, Swedenborgian correspondence was 
possible. Hence, he characterizes Goethe as “as person who hated words that did 
not stand for things” (J, III, 314). In other places too, Goethe is defined as the gold 
standard of an author that “put[s] ever a thing for a word” (W, IV, 274). Later, 
however, Emerson dispenses with this standard when he allows for a fundamental 
“remoteness” between words and things: “There is every degree of remoteness 
form the line of things in the line of words,” he remarks in a journal entry from 
1835. As a consequence, we can only “approximate” truth in so “many words, 
hoping that one, if not another, will bring you as near to the fact as he is” (J, III, 
492). The seeming maturity of language, its ability to “cover a thing” (W, IV, 276), 
is here replaced by an insight into its “young & unformed” state, so that “there are 
many things that refuse to be recorded” (J, III, 492). And in an entry in 1837, 
alluding to the atomic theory of eighteenth century physicist and astronomer Roger 
Joseph Boscovich, he records his skepticism in even stronger terms: “As Boscovich 
taught hat two particles of matter never touch, so it seems true that nothing can be 
described as it is. The most accurate picture is only symbols & suggestions of the 
thing but from the nature of language all remote” (J, IV, 266). Swedenborg, at 
least in Emerson’s account, holds a literal transposition possible and therefore posits 
language as a transparent medium. Emerson, however, views “remoteness” itself as 
a quality of the “nature of language” itself.  
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A more “radical” correspondence  
It is important to note that Emerson significantly revises this notion of a 
correspondence in spirit or ideality. Here, the correspondence is one that is 
established precisely via the process of figuration essential to language. Judith 
Butler has pointed out in a different context that this “performative moment” is the 
central discovery of philosophy early in the nineteenth century and that it is 
essential to the philosophy of Hegel. Her description of Hegel’s complication of 
philosophy’s procedure by language in his Logic is, I think, also applicable to 
Emerson:  
“In his Logic, Hegel argued that the dialectic consisted in the unity of apparent 
opposites – more precisely, in the logical and ontological relation of mutual 
implication that persists between ostensibly oppositional terms. When the dialectic no 
longer denotes the ontological unity of opposites or the logical principle of dialectical 
reversal, it no longer maintains its conventional meanings. The invocation of the 
dialectic becomes instead a performative moment in a language, an occasion in which 
the loss of metaphysical moorings clears the way for a poetic affirmation of what is.” 
(Butler 1991: 269) 
When he rephrases Swedenborg’s notion of correspondence as a “radical” 
correspondence, Emerson introduces a similar moment of mediation or 
performance in and through language. Swedenborg’s romantic or, with Emerson’s 
term, “mystic” way of thinking, attempting to bring together apparent opposites 
(matter and mind, the thing and the word) in unity or continuity, that is, in 
correspondence, in Emerson becomes a moment of linguistic generation, a 
moment of figuration and ‘metaphorisation.’ This also implies an amendment of the 
procedure of dialectics in which progress is no longer merely the successful effort 
to subordinate and domesticate the negative: here negativity or that which is as 
yet unspecified enables advancement. Emerson could thus be said to open that 
famed backdoor of Hegelian semiology, even if he does it unawares and without 
the intention to explicitely criticize Hegel’s system.  
This introduction of what one could variously call simply language, or figurality, 
or semiology, in Emerson’s critique of Swedenborg then explicitly turns on the 
matter of presentation: “When he mounts into the heaven, I do not hear its 
language. A man should not tell me that he has walked among the angels; his 
proof is, that his eloquence makes me one” (W, IV, 141-2). Emerson here draws 
attention to what is central to his notion of a more “radical correspondence”: that 
poetic language, but also literature and philosophy, can, by way of a mobilization 
of figurality, by investing in the Vollzug of a tropology, itself produce an 
eventfulness that “invites us onward”: “It is the best sign of a great nature, that it 
opens a foreground, and, like the breath of morning landscapes, invites us onward. 
Swedenborg is retrospective” (W, IV, 143).  
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The meanest word in Emerson’s dictionary (“retrospective”) then has its 
contrapunctual movement in the fluidity of the processes of writing and reading. 
And we as readers, in filling in, constructing the text, take part in an event, the 
event of the text, an activity that for Emerson stands in a “radical correspondence” 
to the way in which we interact or make sense of nature or our exterior reality. If 
writing “invites us onward” it does so by being invested in a process of “onward 
thinking” (Cavell 1972: 136), of Verfertigung or Vollzug that does not merely 
represent but present the experience of fluidity that for Emerson is characteristic of 
the “spontaneity” of nature. While he attests this kind of spontaneity to some 
writers – he mentions Jacob “Behmen” (Böhme) as the specimen of a writer 
whose style is “tremulous with emotion” (W, IV, 142) – Emerson clearly finds it 
lacking in Swedenborg, where “the entire want of poetry […] betokens the 
disease, and, […] is a kind of warning” (W, IV, 144). As Emerson argues:  
“It is remarkable that this man, who, by his perception of symbols, saw the poetic 
construction of things, and the primary relation of mind to matter, remained entirely 
devoid of the whole apparatus of poetic expression, which that perception creates” (W, 
IV, 143).  
Maybe it is in difficult passages such as these that we find the imprint of Emerson’s 
philosophy. Often ignored or simply overread, it functions as a kind of neuralgic 
point for his reformulation of Swedenborgian correspondence: Swedenborg, who 
had discovered the problem of the representational power of sensation – that 
subsequently became the central assumption and problem of pre-Kantian 
philosophy –, and who had concluded that our mind is symbolic of nature and 
external reality and vice versa, that is, that mind and matter are in a primary 
relation, discovers a principle of flux or change at work in both mind and matter. 
But Emerson then makes Swedenborg’s (metaphysical) game null and void: by 
drawing attention to “the apparatus of poetic expression” Emerson turns away from 
the question of the phenomenality of nature and insists that the perception of our 
indebtedness to an outside reality is not a ‘properly’ ontological one but rather one 
that is established in our uses of language and, hence, poetic. Emerson further 
enforces this point when he concludes his dismissal of Swedenborg by the verdict 
that his “books have become a monument” (W, IV, 144): in its putting forward of a 
stable relation between word and thing, by giving an account, basically, of the 
orderliness of the universe, the philosophy itself is dead, “cold and still” (W, IV, 
133). In Emerson, then, the impetus to find or develop a mode of writing that 
would guarantee the freedom of meaning, that would be irreducible to history, is 
not merely a philosophical problem but also an ethical concern.  
Returning to the chapter “Language” in Nature, we find a similar deflation of 
Swedenborg’s metaphysical or ontological argument. To start with, already the 
argumentative structure that Emerson comes up with makes explicit his departure 
form Swedenborgian correspondence. “Language” here is a subsection of nature, 
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that is, it is presented as an essential part of nature and not its opposite. For 
someone as deeply steeped in typology as Emerson, this certainly is not a mere 
negligence. Emerson then argues that because we are unable to give an objective 
standard which establishes a stable relation between our sensations and nature, we 
cannot “know whether the impressions they make on me correspond to outlying 
objects” (W, I, 47): the terminology of correspondence is thus made irrelevant. As 
Emerson states a few paragraphs later: “Whether nature enjoy a substantial 
existence without, or is only in the apocalypse of the mind, it is alike useful and 
alike venerable to me” (W, I, 48). The signature of Emerson’s ‘theory’ of 
correspondence consequently is to be found in the way in which language (or 
poetry) ceases to conform to John Locke’s definition of language as mere “great 
Conduit” (Locke 1990: III, xi, 5). Language here is no longer an instrument or a 
medium enabling the transparent, facile exchange between the world of nature 
and that of spirit. Rather, he makes an all-encompassing figurality or poiesis the 
feature of a Naturzustand before its division into nature and spirit. The definition 
of a more “radical correspondence” precisely hinges on this figurality, on this 
poiesis. Thus he takes us on a journey back in history:  
“Because of this radical correspondence between visible things and human thoughts, 
savages, who have only what is necessary, converse in figures. As we go back in history, 
language becomes more picturesque, until its infancy, when it is all poetry; or all 
spiritual facts are represented by natural symbols. The same symbols are found to make 
the original elements of all languages. It has moreover been observed, that the idioms of 
all languages approach each other in passages of the greatest eloquence and power.” 
(W, I, 29) 
We consequently find in Emerson a Rousseauvian moment in which “the first 
language had to be figural” (“Que le premier langage dut être figuré”) – an assertion 
that Rousseau’s elaborates in the third chapter of his Essai sur l’origine des langues 
(Rousseau 1976: 381).5 Man’s fall, Emerson argues in a significant revision or 
reversal of Locke’s argument about language as a corruption of “the Fountains of 
Knowledge, which are in Things themselves,” is precisely his fall from language’s 
figurality. When Emerson states that “[t]he corruption of man is followed by the 
corruption of language” (W, I, 29), he does precisely not mean to say that this 
corruption has to be conceived of as the becoming more figural of language. 
Rather, man’s fall is his fall from figurality, and very much like what Nietzsche in 
Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne termed the “Vergessen jener 
primitiven Metapherwelt” of language (KSA, I, 883.), his forgetting of the figurality 
of both language and nature:  
“The corruption of man is followed by the corruption of language. When simplicity of 
character and the sovereignty of ideas is broken up by the prevalence of secondary 
 
 5 On this Rousseauvian moment of figuration, see Paul de Man’s Blindness and insight (1983: esp. 116-142); on 
the “first language” as “figural,” see especially 133.  
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desires […] and duplicity and falsehood take place of simplicity and truth, the power 
over nature as an interpreter of the will is in a degree lost; new imagery ceases to be 
created, and old words are perverted to stand for things which are not; a paper currency 
is employed, when there is no bullion in the vaults. In due time the fraud is manifest, 
and words lose all power to stimulate the understanding or the affections.” (W, I, 29-30)  
The “fraud” of a “paper currency” is thus not caused by the disturbance of a stable 
relation of world and thing. Rather, it is the result of an overstabilization of 
precisely that relation so that, on the one hand, there is no more room for the 
creation of “new imagery” and, on the other, “old words” have not been affected 
by a change in the world. The result is a world in which the phenomenon of 
meaning has been exorcised. But this world, as we have seen, is “frozen,” “cold 
and still”.  
Other than the doctrine of “representative words” that wanted to fasten words to 
things and thus establish a direct, unmediated correspondence that presented itself 
as the coincidence of spirit and matter, Emerson insists on a more “radical 
correspondence” (W, I, 29) that is brought about especially by language’s 
figurality, by the way in which our access to reality is fundamentally and 
inevitably mediated by language. This insight into what one could call a 
hermeneutics – especially because it is not expressed as a systematics, because it is 
not the foundation of a philosophical system – for Emerson is what philosophy and 
literature are all about in the first place. Also, I want to maintain that Emerson’s 
insight goes well beyond the linguistics and language philosophy of Emerson’s 
time. It speaks of a fundamental mediation at work in our perception of the world 
but does not give in completely, as Stanley Cavell has shown, to the ‘temptation’ 
or ‘risk’ of scepticism. Rather, in Emerson it is exactly the Unverbürgtheit of our 
relation to the world, the fragility of our grip on the world that makes possible 
“newness” and “the way onward” (W, II, 319). For Emerson, any perception or 
‘reading’ of the world is implicated in the precariousness of such a hermeneutic 
moment, it presents itself as our implication in a conversion or transition of figures. 
This kind of ‘figuring’ out the world, if I may say so, is a never-ending task, 
because we are continually both reading as well as misreading the world, that is, 
interpreting and perceiving the world. This kind of ‘figuring’ out, as Paul De Man 
has shown in Allegories of Reading (De Man 1979), is the form in which we 
participate in the world, and language’s figurality is the necessary, unavoidable 
form that this participation takes.  
Because our experience of the world is continually endangered, there can be 
no end to this conversation with the world, to this task of reading the world. As 
Emerson argues in “Experience”: “The secret of the illusoriness [of life] is in the 
necessity of a succession of moods or objects. Gladly we would anchor, but the 
anchorage is quicksand. This onward trick of nature is too strong for us: Pero si 
muove” (W, III, 55). Thus language, the event of its shift of moods, registers, etc., 
enters into a “radical correspondence” with the event of the world, incalculable 
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and unforeseeable. Our use of language, our “convers[ion] in figures” (W, I, 29) 
consequently is not a medium, it is one of the principal ways in which we are in 
the world, it is, as Heidegger will argue, the primary form of our being-in-the-
world. Emerson’s “radical correspondence” expresses itself in the fact that language 
is not merely an image or representation of nature. Rather, it is an addition, a 
“second nature, grown out of the first, as a leaf out of a tree” (W, III, 22), it itself 
presents itself as a material event, whose unfolding produces precisely the excess 
of metaphoricity or figurality that turns nature from itself, that changes nature itself. 
Just as in Heidegger’s early Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 63), then, every 
understanding or reading of the world produces its own event, it produces its own 
ground, is its own “facticity,” as Heidegger expresses it. Emerson similarly accounts 
for the facticity of our uses of words in his journals: “Nature is a language & every 
new fact that we learn is a new word” (J, IV, 95). We must consequently 
understand that this correspondence can never remain a purely theoretical or 
systematical undertaking: it has to be itself performed continually in writing or 
reading. If Emerson conceives of nature itself as a text, then this performs again 
the kind of self-reflexive circle that we have already seen in previous chapters. 
Nature’s self-reflexivity also functions as a debasement of origins because she 
“baptizes herself; and this through the metamorphosis again” (W, III, 22). But it is 
precisely in this disparagement of the importance of origins and in its commission 
to “metamorphosis” that nature enables change and progress both in the world as 
well as in the ways in which we read or understand the world. “We need change 
of objects” (W, III, 55), Emerson argues, so that nature may reintroduce precisely 
that poetic “spark” (W, III, 3) that the project of Western metaphysics had tried to 
systematically control and contain.  
Emerson’s “radical correspondence” leads to a sort of double crossing in which 
he conceives of language as coming forth from nature, but of nature itself as 
becoming language. This is what Emerson means when he speaks of nature as a 
“dictionary” (W, I, 32). The term “correspondence” in Emerson does therefore not 
merely signal a certain inheritance (namely that of Swedenborg’s philosophy), it 
also presents a radical reformulation of what philosophy terms ontology, because it 
attempts to conceive of a way in which the material itself is inscribed as a trope. 
This is most explicitly elaborated in some of the descriptive passages in Nature.  
“I see the spectacle of morning from the hill- top over against my house, from daybreak 
to sunrise, with emotions which an angel might share. The long slender bars of cloud 
float like fishes in the sea of crimson light. From the earth, as a shore, I look out into 
that silent sea. I seem to partake its rapid transformations: the active enchantment 
reaches my dust, and I dilate and conspire with the morning wind. How does Nature 
deify us with a few and cheap elements! Give me health and a day, and I will make the 
pomp of emperors ridiculous. The dawn is my Assyria; the sunset and moonrise my 
Paphos, and unimaginable realms of faerie; broad noon shall be my England of the 
senses and the understanding; the night shall be my Germany of mystic philosophy and 
dreams.” (W, I, 17) 
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This is how this double crossing takes place: nature’s “spectacle” (the advent of 
daybreak, the rising of the sun, etc.) becomes a spectacle of the text (the transition 
of images, the ways in which one trope occasions the next). As Emerson’s fluid 
language proceeds from one image to the next, it reproduces nature’s eventfulness 
so that “I seem to partake its rapid transformations.” But in a next step, the text 
produces its own material event, as the succession of images occasions an event of 
the text itself. Eventually, this (textual) eventfulness feeds back again into the 
world or nature, now itself transfigured (nature’s dawn is now “Assyria,” its night 
“Germany,” etc.). As Emerson argues in “The Poet”: “[Man] filled nature with his 
overflowing currents” (W, I, 75). In nuce, the sentence contains Emerson’s 
complex poetological programme of a radical “correspondence” between nature 
and poetry: A figural description of nature, that of the overflowing stream, comes 
to denote human thought but is then fed back into nature. Nature thus calls upon 
us to abandon ourselves to a “convers[ion] in figures” (W, I, 29) but 
simultaneously, our conversion by way of figures changes nature itself since it 
itself forms a material event that possesses its very own facticity.  
If we again look at the passage quoted above, we can try to give a more 
detailed account of Emerson’s rhetorical procedure in order to see how he 
conceives of this event of the text. In this passage from Nature, taken from the 
subsection on ‘Language,’ Emerson conceives of the rhetor as undergoing three 
separate stages: First, the speaker is overwhelmed by the sublime moment of 
nature’s spectacle. Second, this spectacle is then translated into a succession of 
figures, a succession that also induces a sublime moment in the reader, urging him 
to enter into a process of interpretation similar to that of the speaker. Emerson 
consequently takes the rhetor’s habitual relation to the world to be overwhelmed 
by nature’s spectacle; only by coming up with a series of tropes can he again give 
an account of the world. Third, because our abandonment to a process of figuration 
is incalculable (see, for example, the transition from “cloud” to “fishes” to “silent 
sea”), it produces its own evidence, the text’s event feeds back into the world 
because it allows for a new relation to the world, because it changes the way in 
which we interact with the world.  
In the continuation of the passage – after drawing attention to danger of 
language’s becoming a “paper currency” (W, I, 30), that is, meaningless abstraction 
– Emerson argues that it is “wise men” who can “pierce this rotten diction and 
fasten words again to visible things; so that picturesque language is at once a 
commanding certificate that he who employs it is a man in alliance with truth and 
God” (W, I, 30). But this correspondence is again not simply a result of some kind 
of simple analogy. Rather it is re-established precisely in “[t]he moment our 
discourse rises above the ground line of familiar facts, and is inflamed with passion 
or exalted by thought, it clothes itself in images” (W, I, 30-31). This then for 
Emerson is the sign of “good writing” or “brilliant discourse”:  
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“A man conversing in earnest, if he watch his intellectual processes, will find that 
always a material image, more or less luminous, arises in his mind, contemporaneous 
with every thought, which furnishes the vestment of the thought. Hence, good writing 
and brilliant discourse are perpetual allegories. This imagery is spontaneous. It is the 
blending of experience with the present action of the mind. It is proper creation. It is 
the working of the Original Cause through the instruments he has already made.” (W, I, 
30)  
Emerson thus conceives of the disruption of our ordinary relation to the world as a 
moment of the sublime, but he maintains that this happens in or through the 
medium of language, namely when “our discourse rises above the ground line.” 
Thus invested with passion and thought, language immediately undergoes a 
process of refiguration, the speaker “clothes his thought in images”, in other words, 
his passion expresses itself precisely by way of a transmutation in which the 
inflammation of passion becomes image or trope. And again, the passage here 
performs what it describes: the associative sequence of images that Emerson 
provides functions as a Vollzug of the inflamed passion of the orator and transfers it 
onto the reader, who, by following some of the sudden twists of the argument, 
himself experiences a rapid change of moods. And it is precisely when language 
overtakes us, when our discourse becomes “exalted” or “inflamed,” that is, when 
we are exposed to the process of figuration and when we rise above the common 
ground of our existence, that we may assert what it means to be a poet and, for 
that matter, human. 
We can find another example of this crossing or correspondence in the third 
Chapter of Nature (“Beauty”) where Emerson writes about the unpredictability of 
the weather to himself engage in a rhetorical procedure that produces its very 
own unpredictable materiality. Here, Emerson again performs rhetorically what he 
describes when his description of a succession of different weather phenomena is 
enhanced by a succession of images that are themselves only loosely connected:  
“Not less excellent, except for our less susceptibility in the afternoon, was the charm, 
last evening, of a January sunset. The western clouds divided and subdivided 
themselves into pink flakes modulated with tints of unspeakable softness; and the air 
had so much life and sweetness, that it was a pain to come within doors. What was it 
that nature would say? Was there no meaning in the live repose of the valley behind the 
mill, and which Homer or Shakspeare could not re-form for me in words? The leafless 
trees become spires of flame in the sunset, with the blue east for their background, and 
the stars of the dead calices of flowers, and every withered stem and stubble rimed with 
frost, contribute something to the mute music.” (W, I, 17-8)  
The notion of a “mute music” is here to be applied both to the phenomena that 
Emerson describes as well as to the images that he uses to render them in the 
text. Both, the real phenomena and the textual images, can only figure that which 
“nature would say“. As in other places the idea or notion of a representational flux 
here coincides with an insight into the failure of language to entirely re-present 
what it describes. The abruptness of many of Emerson’s transitions instigates the 
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event of the text precisely because it is discontinuous, full of gaps, etc. The 
eventfulness of Emerson’s text is consequently not just the recirculation of “odds 
and ends borrowed from a bizarre assortment of poets, scientists, philosophers, and 
visionaries,” as Packer has phrased it (Packer 1982: 25). The passages quoted 
above make explicit how Emerson’s procedure builds not only upon the 
recirculation of texts he quotes, rather, the decontextualization of sentences from 
the journal and from earlier lectures allows Emerson to “shock [us] out of patience” 
(J, V, 83), to defamiliarize our professionalized ways of reading. Emerson styles 
himself to be “a rocket manufacturer” (J, VII, 247) and he understands that “[w]ho 
can make a good sentence can make a good book” (J, V, 79). As Enrico Cadava 
points out with regards to the importance of the sentence in Emerson, his language 
does work “not by the accumulation of multiple associations around a strongly held 
center, but through the mobilization of terms from one shifting context to another. 
This mobilization names an engagement with changing historical and political 
relations” (Cadava 1997: 21).6  
Stanley Cavell, too, has shown an interst in the weight that Emerson’s writing 
places on the single sentence:  
“I have taken the familiar experience of Emerson’s writing as leaving the individual 
sentences to shuffle for themselves to suggest that each sentence of a paragraph of his 
can be taken to be its topic sentence. I welcome the consequent suggestion that his 
essays are collections of equals rather than hierarchies of dependants” (Cavell 2005, 
244)  
Cavell argues that by juxtaposing seemingly contradictory or even unconnected 
sentences, Emerson effectively challenges philosophy’s obsession with 
argumentative consistency in favour of an attention to how meaning is produced as 
a result of a process of figuration (and not a systematics). Cavell argues that 
Emerson’s “words become specimens of a totality of significance arrived at 
otherwise than by a system (philosophical or scientific or narrative) of which 
Emerson felt incapable” (Cavell 2005, 270). Cavell sees his sentences as 
“fashionings of discontinuity”, and he likens Emerson’s writing to that of 
Wittgenstein, because he shares with Wittgenstein an interest in “the medium of 
philosophy as fragment, in counterpoise to its medium as system” (Cavell 2005, 
270). Emerson’s stylistic choices are consequently not mere eccentricities: by 
taking recourse to what Barbara Packer has called a “more disruptive” (Packer, 
Emerson’s Fall, 27) editorial technique, he effectively manages to make obvious or 
even to challenge philosophy’s natural tendency for systematicity. Instead of the 
build-up of systematic meaning, I want to argue, Emerson elaborates the power of 
 
 6 For an account of Emerson’s struggle with the tradition of American rhetoric in Nature, see Alan D. Hodder’s 
Emerson’s Rhetoric of Revelation. Nature, the Reader, and the Apocalypse Within (1989: esp. Chapter 4, 
“Rhetoric of Revelation,” 103-155), for an overview of the Transcendentalists’ interest in rhetorics, see 
Matthiessen, American Renaissance. Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (1968: esp. 14-
70).  
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the sentence as a kind of Gestalt, as the expression of a significance that is not yet 
controlled or governed by an overarching system. “[T]he energy of Emerson’s 
characteristic sentence is centripetal” (Hodder, Emerson’s Rhetoric of Revelation, 
121) as Hodder puts it. Cavell suggests that because they lack the support of a 
system that would guarantee their meaning, Emerson’s sentences need to say 
everything at once, while every sentence needs to start out from scratch: 
“[I]mplicitly everything about Emerson’s practice as a writer bespeaks this sense of 
aggregation and juxtaposition – from his culling from his journals for individual 
essays, to the sense of his sentences as desiring to stand apart from one another, 
each saying everything, each starting over” (Cavell 2005, 270-271).  
More often than not, the significance of a sentence in Emerson’s essays is in 
excess of the argumentative structure that the essay develops. But in Emerson’s 
essay, this is never just a stylistic shortcoming or inadequacy: when Emerson 
transfers paragraphs from his journal or from earlier lectures, he sometimes leaves 
them intact, and sometimes he breaks them down and redistributes their sentences 
to different paragraphs, sometimes to different essays altogether. As Packer argues, 
“this process never entirely effaces the original style of the sentences, their 
juxtaposition with other similarly decontextualised sentences produces a perpetual 
series of small shocks or jolts” (Packer, Emerson’s Fall, 27). This procedure is 
intimately connected to Emerson’s interest in philosophy, that is, it is precisely how 
an element of what I have called rhetoricity or poeticity is introduced into the 
systematic language of philosophy. As Cavell points out in an imaginative passage 
in Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow, this procedure is later adopted also by 
Thoreau, who similarly insists on the power of sentences to “turn us around”:  
“Thoreau learned from Emerson to make sentences that may attract us by their beauty or 
their curiosity, and at the same time seem to play with our desire for some 
transformative understanding. He sometimes depicts this process as turning us around 
(both alluding to what has to happen to the prisoners in Plato’s cave if they are to find 
the way out, and invoking the idea of turning found in the concept of conversion); 
sometimes he says we need to see that we are lost (that is, to recognize perdition in 
order to be moved to find ourselves); sometimes he shows us how to turn the world 
upside down in order to reorient ourselves.” (Cavell 2005: 220-21) 
I also take Cavell to imply here that Emerson’s procedure also puts special weight 
not only on the single sentence, but more generally on processes of figuration that 
are in excess of the system of references and cross-references that a text 
establishes. Cavell also mentions “the power that Emerson precisely directs against 
fixated form, namely the power of turning our words against our words, to make 
them ours” and argues, that what Emerson “calls his essays accomplishes this task” 
(Cavell 2005: 8).  
Contemporary critics of Emerson’s writing were well aware of his essays’ special 
attention to that which was not reducible to standard forms of the typological 
arguments. Francis Bowen, in a 1837 review of Nature, wrote:  
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“We find beautiful writing an sound philosophy in this little work; but the effect is 
injured by occasional vagueness of expression, and by a vein of mysticism, that 
pervades the writer’s whole course of thought. The highest praise that can be accorded 
to it, is, that it is a suggestive book, for no one can read it without tasking his faculties 
to the utmost, and relapsing into fits of severe meditation. […] The reader feels as in a 
disturbed dream, in which shows of surpassing beauty are around him, and he is 
conversant with disembodied spirits, yet all the time he is harassed by an uneasy sort of 
consciousness, that the whole combination of phenomena is fantastic and unreal.” 
(Miller 1950: 174)  
Most probably, Emerson would have liked the review. In any event, the mood 
which Bowen describes as being set up in Nature, foreshadows that of 
“Experience”, where, likewise, “sleep lingers […] about our eyes” and “ghost-like 
we glide through nature” (W, III, 45). Emerson was obviously well aware that his 
essays focus their strength in the aphoristic, in the apostrophic, descriptive, or 
rhetorical sentence, that is, in the “fragmentary” effect of sentences”. In a journal 
entry from 1834, he already thinks about the central importance of the sentence: 
“Mr. Coleridge has written well on this matter of Theory in his Friend […] A true 
method has no more need of firstly, secondly, etc., than a perfect sentence has of 
punctuation. I tells its own story, makes its own feet, creates its own form. It is its 
own apology” (J, III, 295-96). And in a letter to Carlyle, shortly before the 
publication of his first series of essays in 1841, he acknowledges a certain lack of 
structure in his planned publication: “In a fortnight or three weeks my little raft 
will be afloat. Expect nothing more of my powers of construction, - no ship-
building, no clipper, smack, nor skiff even, only boards and logs tied together” 
(CEC, 291). And, in another, earlier letter to Carlyle, he summarizes his editorial 
technique and method of composition as follows: “Here I sit and read and write 
with very little system and as far as regards composition with the most fragmentary 
result: paragraphs incompressible each sentence an infinitely repellent article” 
(CEC, 185).  
Because of its peculiar stylistic procedures, Emerson’s rhetorics involves the 
reader to the point where it threatens his security. And while it may not have 
been Emerson’s intention in Nature to place his reader “in a disturbed dream” as 
Bowen calls it, he certainly goes a long way to unsettle the reader’s security. For 
Emerson it was crucial, to forego the worn-out terms of tradition (of typology, of 
Unitarian doctrine, etc.) and to replace it with some sort of “uneasy sort of 
consciousness”, as his early reviewer Bowen experiences it. As he later expresses 
it in “Circles,” in one of his typically apodictic sentences: “People wish to be 
settled; only as far as they are unsettled, is there any hope for them” (W, II, 320). 
Incompleteness or “suggestiveness,” as Bowen terms it, is thus not a mark of a 
stylistic failure in Emerson’s essays. Rather, it is a sign of the essays’ effectivity in 
engaging the reader in a process of actively co-producing the meaning of the text. 
This is why the inconsistency and, partly, redundancy of Emerson’s essays is not 
simply an eccentricity. It is a conscious choice that means to expose the illusion of 
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an extratextual reality as well as to displace the philosophical categories and 
traditional determinants that normally guarantee our facile communication with a 
text. As he explains in a passage of “Self-Reliance”:  
“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and 
philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He 
may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now 
in hard words and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though 
it contradict everything you said to-day.” (W, II, 57) 
Emerson’s declaration of nonconformity here in “Self-Reliance” obviously also forms 
part of the larger project of antinomianism in American culture. But what I want to 
draw attention to here, is how Emerson delegates the responsibility for his texts’ 
production and significance to his reader. It is the reader who will finally have to 
decide whether his texts are to be read as philosophical tracts, as polemics, as 
sermons, as literary exercises, etc. And, as Emerson argues, every text speaks 
differently to different readers:  
“‘Tis the good reader that makes the good book; a good head cannot read amiss: in 
every book he finds passages which seem confidences or asides hidden from all else 
and unmistakably meant for his ear; the profit of books is according to the sensibility of 
the reader; the profoundest thought or passion sleeps as in a mine, until it is discovered 
by an equal mind and heart” (W, VII, 296).  
A similar comment can be found in “Representative Men” where Emerson argues 
that the role of the reader is generally underrated: “We have few readers, many 
spectators and hearers” (W, IV, 193). The reader effectively fills in the blanks in 
Emerson’s essays. As Hodder points out, his essays are meant to provoke in the 
root sense of calling forth: “to stimulate in others what was productive in oneself. 
Indeed, for Emerson, to provoke meant to procreate” (Hodder 1989: 106). But the 
writer does not mobilize language merely in order to entertain but rather in order 
to stimulate the movement of the mind. As Emerson phrases it in “The American 
Scholar”: “Books are the best of things, well used; abused, among the worst. What 
is the right use? What is the one end which all means go to effect? They are for 
nothing but to inspire” (W, I, 89).  
Emerson thus envisions the reader’s responsivity to or, again, correspondence 
with the rhetoric processes that a text unfolds. Other than the textual system in 
which Emerson had been trained – typology, that attempted to establish a stable 
system of exchange between the stories of the Old Testament and their allegorical 
return in contemporary American scripture –, we find in his essays a mobilization 
of rhetoric procedures that combine to effect a radically new poetics of immediacy 
or, to use Emerson’s terms, of “surprise,” “shock,” and “revelation.” Emerson 
himself states that one of the aims of his essays is to inspire “new activity”: “A wise 
writer will feel that the ends of study and composition are best answered by 
announcing undiscovered regions of thought, and so communicating, through 
hope, new activity to the torpid spirit” (W, I, 70). As a consequence, Emerson 
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always places his emphasis on what he terms “power” or “energy” and not so 
much on the structure of the final product. This is also why I think Hodder is right 
when he suggests that Emerson’s texts are “virtual” (Hodder 1989: 107): They call 
upon the reader to go along with the movement and surprising turns of the text. 
Emerson knows, however, that his essays cannot entirely plan this participation of 
the reader. But clearly Emerson’s peculiar use of the sentence as an “infinitely 
repellent particle” (CEC, 185) is meant to precipitate this participation insofar as it 
asks the reader to cooperate in the production of the text.  
The incoherence or incongruity of Emerson’s writing, its ‘unsystematicity’ in 
philosophical terms, is thus – being consciously planned as a movement of 
rhetorics – both an intended result as well as – being delegated to the reader – an 
incalculable process. As a wilful abandonment to processes of figuration and 
rhetorics it makes correspondence possible. But this correspondence remains a 
matter of words and, thus, by changing language, Emerson attempts to change also 
what is beyond language. And because language conditions the way in which we 
make sense of the world, correspondence suggests that we can also change the 
ways in which we make sense of the world. On the other hand, however, 
because this wilful abandonment through language confronts language’s full 
potential for rhetoricity, it remains, in the last instance, uncontrollable or 
ungovernable by the poet or writer. But in Emerson, as we have seen before, it is 
precisely this unforeseeability that makes yet another meaning (of the world, of 
nature, etc.) possible. Emerson’s injuction in the “Prospects” chapter of Nature, 
“build therefore your own world” (W, I, 76), is consequently not so much a matter 
of origination, it is a matter of an engagement in and with language.  
Significantly, then, Emerson’s project for a reformulation of ‘America’ is again 
invested in the (hermeneutic) problem of coming to account for prior uses of 
language. By way bringing old sayings into new contexts and by recirculating 
sentences from his own writing he attempts to effect unprecedented combinations 
in which these sayings and sentences will make another, different, or new sense. 
This also means that he departs form an ideal of (hermeneutic) intelligibility 
because the abandonment to rhetorical processes means a debasement of 
Verständlichkeit, that remains, essentially, a model of instrumentality or 
intentionality. As Emerson points out in “Method of Nature”:  
“The universal nature, too strong for the petty nature of the bard, sits on his neck and 
writes through his hand; so that when he seems to vent a mere caprice and wild 
romance, the issue is an exact allegory. Hence Plato said that ‘poets utter great and wise 
things which they do not themselves understand’.” (W, II, 34) 
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The “method” of nature 
But again, it is important to maintain here that this does not mean that Emerson’s 
writing cannot or does not want to be historical. Nature as a repository of an 
unorganized force, of the undecidable, is precisely necessary to make history and 
the writing of history possible. What happens between “build therefore your own 
world” and a much more cautionary note in the journal dating from January 10, 
1832 and explaining that “the difficulty is that we do not make a world of our own 
but fall into institutions already made and have to accommodate ourselves to them 
to be useful at all” (J, III, 318), has to be understood precisely in rhetorical terms: 
writing, in Emerson, is always already connected to the problem of history, 
because it alone holds the potential to refigure the ways in which we view or 
write our history. But because we can never completely loosen the grip of the 
received language, the rewriting of our history will always be both: a quotation 
and a refiguration. And it is by entering into a “radical correspondence” with the 
flux of nature that we are most likely to come up with new figurations of or for 
history. As a consequence, Emerson at times dismisses the ‘written’ history of his 
times and calls upon Americans to see their implication in “another history,” in “the 
external world” and in “nature,” as he argues in “History”:  
“But along with the civil and metaphysical history of man, another history goes daily 
forward, – that of the external world, – in which he is not less strictly implicated. He is 
the compend of time; he is also the correlative of nature. His power consists in the 
multitude of his affinities, in the fact that his life is intertwined with the whole chain of 
organic and inorganic being.” (W, II, 35-6)  
To enter into a “radical correspondence” thus means to see that “man is a bundle 
of relations, a knot of roots, whose flower and fruitage is the world” (W, II, 36). 
This attention does not mean that we can give a total account of our situation or 
position in the world, but it implies that what had hitherto not been paid attention 
to can effectively become the nucleus of a new figuration of our history. It is in 
writing that we can disturb the sedimentations of history and, potentially, refigure 
it. But again, this process is not something that we can predetermine: “No man can 
antedate his experience, or guess what faculty or feeling a new object shall 
unlock, any more than he can draw to-day the face of a person whom he shall see 
to-morrow for the first time” (W, II, 38).  
Entering into a more “radical correspondence” therefore opens the possibility 
that our history is not simply there, but the result of “creative” reading and writing:  
“I will not now go behind the general statement to explore the reason of this 
correspondency. Let it suffice that in the light of these two facts, namely, that the mind 
is One, and that nature is its correlative, history is to be read and written. Thus in all 
ways does the soul concentrate and reproduce its treasures for each pupil. He, too, 
shall pass through the whole cycle of experience. He shall collect into a focus the rays 
of nature. History no longer shall be a dull book. It shall walk incarnate in every just 
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and wise man. You shall not tell me by languages and titles a catalogue of the volumes 
you have read. You shall make me feel what periods you have lived.” (W, II, 38) 
In yet another challenge of the doctrine of representative words, Emerson thus 
argues that he is ashamed at “what a shallow village tale our so-called History is” 
(W, II, 40) and he proposes: 
“Broader and deeper we must write our annals, – from an ethical reformation, from an influx of 
the ever new, ever sanative conscience, – if we would truly express our central and wide-
related nature, instead of this old chronology of selfishness and pride to which we have too 
long lent our eyes. Already that day exists for us, shines in on us at unawares, but the path of 
science and of letters is not the way into nature. The idiot, the Indian, the child, and 
unschooled farmer’s boy stand nearer to the light by which nature is to be read, than the 
dissector or the antiquary.” (W, II, 40)  
Correspondence, consequently, in Emerson means the abandonment to the 
variable, unformed forces of nature, to something that has not yet been poured 
into the cast of history and therefore holds the potential for change, holds the 
power to even rewrite that “old chronology.” The contingency or undecidability of 
nature, the fact that it is “unaware” of our doings is then precisely the condition of 
the possibility of change and, thus, history. And herein also lies the central 
significance of the work of art, of its more “radical” correspondence with nature: it 
can offer such an experience of the undecidable, too. In the third chapter of 
Society and Solitude, “Art,” Emerson spells out this correspondence as “active 
operation”:  
“There is but one Reason. The mind that made the world is not one mind, but the 
mind. Every man is an inlet to the same, and to all of the same. And every work of art is 
a more or less pure manifestation of the same. Therefore we arrive at this conclusion, 
which I offer as a confirmation of the whole view, that the delight which a work of art 
affords, seems to arise from our recognizing in it the mind that formed Nature, again in 
active operation. It differs from the works of Nature in this, that they are organically 
reproductive. This is not; but spiritually it is prolific by its powerful action on the 
intellects of men. Hence it follows that a study of admirable works of art sharpens our 
perceptions of the beauty of Nature; that a certain analogy reigns throughout the 
wonders of both […]” (W, VII, 50)  
What Emerson terms “active operation” is thus the power (attested to both nature 
and the work of art) to suggest a certain eventfulness, to suggest, again and again, 
that something is still in progress, im Vollzug. The central term with which 
Emerson chooses to illustrate this correspondence between art and nature is 
“analogy”: It makes obvious that Emerson thinks of this correspondence always 
already in aesthetic terms. Significantly enough, both the processes of nature and 
art, as extensions of each other, and if described in aesthetic terms, form “one 
Reason” or “one mind” that is all about a potential to instigate change while itself 
not becoming a sedimented form. This also goes to show why Emerson sees art at 
work in fields that we would not normally subsume to it:  
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“Herein is the explanation of the analogies which exist in all the arts. They are the 
reappearance of one mind, working in many materials to many temporary ends. Raphael 
paints wisdom; Handel sings it, Phidias carves it, Shakspeare writes it, Wren builds it, 
Columbus sails it, Luther preaches it, Washington arms it, Watt mechanizes it. Painting 
was called ‘silent poetry’; and poetry, ‘speaking painting.’ The laws of each art are 
convertible into the laws of every other.” (W, VII, 52)  
We begin to see how Emerson’s repeated references to this kind of radicalized 
correspondence take him a long way from the idealism and naivety of 
Swedenborgian correspondence and form the framework for his careful elaboration 
of the respective quandaries of writing and historical understanding. Here, the 
focus lies not so much on seeing, establishing or documenting this correspondence, 
rather, it lies on uncovering a potential that will make it feasible to conceive of 
history as something that is read and written “actively and not passively” (W, II, 8). 
In other words: the condition of the possibility of history and writing needs to be 
sought in language’s potential for poiesis, because history itself is in Emerson, as 
Cadava has argued, nothing but a “palimpsest of several shifting figures” (Cadava 
1997: 94). In Emerson, as Cadava continues, “writing forms an essential part of the 
motion that names nature and that nature names” (Cadava 1997: 94). Nature thus is 
not simply an origin that occasions writing, it is itself inherently coupled with 
writing so that the process of writing can only be described by way of a recourse 
to nature and that of nature, on the other hand, must be conceived of as an 
extension of writing. This is why the natural world, as Emerson conceives of it, is 
itself suffused by the signs of writing. See for example this passage in “Goethe, or, 
The Writer”:  
“Nature will be reported. All things as engaged in writing their history. The planet, the 
pebble, goes attended by its shadow. The rolling rock leaves its scratches on the 
mountain; the river its channel in the soil […] The falling drop makes its sculpture in the 
sand or the stone. Not a foot steps into the snow or along the ground, but prints, in 
characters more or less lasting, a map of its march. Every act of the man inscribes itself 
in the memories of his fellows and in his own manners and face. The air is full of 
sounds; the sky, of tokens; the round is all memoranda and signatures, and every object 
covered over with hints which speak to the intelligent.” (W, II, 261) 
This kind of poetic correspondence is also fleshed out in “The Poet”, where 
Emerson explains that “[l]anguage is fossil poetry” and argues that “[a]s the 
limestone of the continent consists of infinite masses of the shells of animalcules, so 
language is made up of images, or tropes, which now, in their secondary use, 
have long ceased to remind us of their poetic origin” (W, III, 22). And just as the 
“etymologist finds the deadest word to have been once a brilliant picture” (W, III, 
22) we need to remember the poetic origins of our words so that our tropes and 
fables will not become sedimented forms, “immortal sign[s]” (W, II, 9) that loose 
the power to engender change:  
“For poetry was all written before time was, and whenever we are so finely organized 
that we can penetrate into that region where the air is music, we hear those primal 
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warblings and attempt to write them down, but we lose ever and anon a word or a 
verse and substitute something of our own, and thus miswrite the poem.” (W, III, 9) 
This conception of language consequently negates all aspirations for historical truth 
in writing. It conceives of history itself as a “vanishing allegory” (J, II, 435) and 
wants to preserve an attention to how it is poetically produced, i.e. as a result of a 
process of figuration that continually erodes itself.  
“Images, tropes, […] which have long ceased to remind us of their poetic origin”: 
to effect the defamiliarization of history’s “allegory,” one would have to expose 
history as being figural itself or revert the kind of “Vergessen jener primitiven 
Metapherwelt” of language (KSA, I, 883.) that Nietzsche holds to be philosophy’s 
fundamental (positivist and historicist) mistake. It comes as no surprise, then, that 
Nietzsche would take up Emerson’s point and elaborate it in more detail in Über 
Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne:  
“Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropo-
morphismen kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch 
gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem Gebrauche einem Volke fest, 
canonisch und verbindlich dünken: die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen 
hat, dass sie welche sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, 
Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen in Betracht 
kommen.” (KSA, I, 881-2) 
As Enrico Cadava has shown, both Emerson and Nietzsche are interested in the 
process of writing because it can be a place in which the sedimentations of history 
are disturbed.  
“Nietzsche and Emerson suggest that a genealogy of historical truth would reveal its 
origins not only in metaphor but in the progressive erosion of metaphor. In their terms, 
a history founded on facts would correspond to the process whereby, in the face of the 
metaphorical sedimentation of historical concepts and truths, a fact is asserted 
nevertheless through the erasure of the metaphor in which it was born. History would 
be a name for this obliteration of figures or tropes.” (Cadava 1997: 9)  
More strongly than Nietzsche, however, Emerson insists that once we engage in a 
process of writing, once we abandon ourselves to language, we necessarily also 
encounter its metaphoricity, its Eigensinn. Emerson’s poetological programme can 
never become instrumental (in securing America’s change, language’s 
representativity, etc.). What Emerson concretizes as his methodological principle, 
the “method of nature” (W, I, 197), thus is not a method at all, because it describes 
precisely how philosophy must give up on its claim for originality and 
transparency and itself engage in a process of figuration. This is why the 
presentation of his “method” in “The Method of Nature” includes an elaboration of 
how language’s use of figures and tropes necessarily torpedoes his own attempt at 
methodological consistency. As he argues in “The Method of Nature”:  
“There is an intrinsic defect in the organ. Language overstates. Statements of the infinite 
are usually felt to be unjust to the finite, and blasphemous. Empedocles undoubtedly 
spoke a truth of thought, when he said, ‘I am God;’ but the moment it was out of his 
 TOWARDS A “RADICAL CORRESPONDENCE”  195 
 
mouth, it became a lie to the ear; and the world revenged itself for the seeming 
arrogance, by the good story about his shoe.” (W, I, 198-9)  
The fable of Empedocles’ ill-fated apotheosis speaks of the eventfulness of 
language itself, because his assertion (“I am God”) is refigured in the moment in 
which he utters it. No writer or orator can attain control of this “defect” of 
language, as one utterance or trope is necessarily refigured by the one that comes 
after it. Consequently, and if we follow Emerson, language and its processes of 
figuration are adequate to a nature that is primeval and “aboriginal.” But this also 
means that nature and language can no longer serve, as in Western metaphysics, as 
origins. The language that nature produces is unpredictable and “defective” – in 
the sense that it always ‘defects’ or strays from the meaning intended for it by the 
speaker. It can thus never produce truth or the ideal poem but, rather, only 
another mistranslation of some ideal poem that was never and will never be 
written: “we lose ever and anon a word or a verse and substitute something of our 
own, and thus miswrite the poem”. But it is precisely by way of this “defection” or 
mistranslation that language corresponds to nature, to its plasticity, malleability and 
spontaneity.  
“The method of nature: who could ever analyze it? That rushing stream will not stop to 
be observed. We can never surprise nature in a corner; never find the end of a thread; 
never tell where to set the first stone. […] The wholeness that we admire in the order of 
the world, is the result of infinite distribution. Its smoothness is the smoothness of the 
pitch of the cataract. Its permanence is a perpetual inchoation. Every natural fact is an 
emanation, and that from which it emanates is an emanation also, and from every 
emanation is a new emanation.” (W, I, 199)  
For Emerson, nature’s eventfulness, its perpetual but unpredictable renewal, is a 
“metaphysical and eternal spring that no chemistry, no mechanics, can account for” 
(W, II, 200). And he argues that “a mysterious principle of life must be assumed, 
which not only inhabits the organ, but makes the organ” (W, II, 200). This kind of 
“incessant self-registration” (W, IV, 262), as Emerson calls it in “Goethe, or, The 
Writer,” therefore constitutes both nature as well as writing as processes that are 
inherently self-reflexive, that is, producing the very ground from which they 
spring. Both describe and simultaneously perform a constant beginning or a 
continual metamorphosis: In nature, “[a]ll is nascent, infant. […] [A]ll seems just 
begun; remote aims are in active accomplishment. […] [T]endency appears on all 
hands […] [T]otal nature […] is becoming somewhat else; is in rapid 
metamorphosis” (W, II, 203).  
Emerson’s “method of nature” is consequently not so much concerned with a 
‘method’ stricto sensu, because his definition of nature hinges precisely upon the 
observation that there is no discernible pattern, course of action, etc. implied by 
nature. Rather, it hopes to find a language or, rather, an écriture and a rhetorics 
that will respond to nature’s “redundancy or excess of life” (W, II, 204). But each 
of these écritures can, inevitably, merely be a contingent or supplementary 
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response to the world’s excess: “Each individual soul is such, in virtue of its being 
a power to translate the world into some particular language of its own” (W, II, 
206).7 The impression that nature makes on us necessarily remains a “peculiarity” 
(W, II, 204) because this “particular language” always necessitates yet another 
instance of miswriting and the final “conversation with nature is still unsung” (W, I, 
170). We then find here a confirmation of the ‘supplementary’ character of all 
American writing that I have already hinted at in a previous Chapter: If America 
“is a poem in our eyes” (W, III, 38), this is because it continually miswrites and 
supplements itself precisely by virtue of being a poem, that is, a kind of writing 
and reading.  
Contrary to definitions of art that stress its permanence, Emerson is interested in 
the ways in which art responds to the spontaneous, the unforeseeable, etc. Thus 
he argues, again in “The Method of Nature”:  
“What is best in any work of art, but that part which the work itself seems to require and 
do; that which the man cannot do again, that which flows from the hour and the 
occasion, like the eloquence of men in a tumultuous debate? It was always the theory 
of literature, that the word of a poet was authoritative and final. He was supposed to be 
the mouth of a divine wisdom.” (W, I, 210)  
For Emerson, the sign of genius is to be found in that “which the work itself seems 
to require,” that is, again not in some kind of artistic control by the author over his 
text, but rather in the ways in which he “abandons” the creation of his work to the 
eventfulness of the occasion (the “tumultuous debate”) and to the radical 
contingency inherent to the process of literary figuration (“that which the man 
cannot do again”). While every man or writer may be “articulate,” it is “genius” 
that fulfils nature’s potential, that mediates or translates its “mute music” (W, I, 18) 
by refiguring it in the process of literary creation. Again, however, this process of 
figuration is radically removed from the writer’s control: “Nature is a mute, and 
man, her articulate speaking brother […] Yet when Genius arrives, its speech is 
like a river; it has no straining to describe, more than there is straining in nature to 
exist” (W, II, 218).  
In his reformulation of his own earlier poetic theory (in Nature), Emerson draws 
attention to the fact that the American translation, conversion or displacement of 
past translations or writings happens on the margin, at the horizon of a future yet 
to come, of a projected meaning that has never been or, rather, will never have 
been realized. This is why “[e]loquence shows the power and possibility of man” 
(W, VIII, 112) as Emerson argues in “Eloquence”. The orator “can paint what has 
occurred and what must occur, with such clearness to a company, as if they saw it 
 
 7 I am using the term supplementary here according to Jacques Derrida’s definition who argues in Of 
Grammatology that “if supplementarity is a necessarily indefinite process, writing is the supplement par 
excellence since it proposes itself as the supplement of the supplement, sign of a sign, taking the place of a 
speech already significant” (1976: 281).  
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done before their eyes” (W, VIII, 112-3). “Then recall the delight that sudden 
eloquence give, – the surprise that the moment is so rich.” (W, VIII, 113). Genial 
creation requires the unforeseeable suddenness of the poetic or rhetorical moment, 
something that occurs unexpectedly “before our eyes.” And it is important to 
remember that Emerson, as we have seen in Chapter Three, defines both nature as 
well as America in exactly these terms, as “fluxational symbol[s]” (W, III, 34), that 
is: tropes, continually being refigured “before our eyes”, so that we cannot fix our 
perspective on them. The (American) language that expresses this conundrum is 
not so much original or genetic, rather, it is transformational and tropic, in other 
words: poetic. We consequently also see that we need to read Emerson’s 
qualification that “America is a poem in our eyes” as a chiastic statement: America 
is poetry and poetry is America, that is, the possibility of America is bound up with 
the possibility of poetry. The difficulty of Emerson rhetorical programme 
consequently lies in the fact that it presents us with a double inscription: it transfers 
images of nature onto the process of writing, so that writing itself comes to express 
the malleability or transitionality that Emerson identifies as characteristic of nature. 
Emerson’s poetics thus describes a kind of hermeneutic circle in which genius “is 
itself a mutation of the thing it describes” (W, II 219), so that genius itself writes 
the very stage on which its performance takes place. ‘Genial’ poetic or artistic 
creation can consequently only happen when the production of text (of the work 
of art, etc.) establishes a correspondence, becomes contemporaneous with the 
event of the present’s unfolding. Emerson again uses the analogy of the 
Daguerreotype to stress the fragility and volatility of this moment of artistic 
creation: “In writing the casting moment is of greatest importance, just as it avails 
not in Daguerre portraits that you have the very man before you, if the expression 
has escaped” (J, VI, 94).  
In Emerson’s revision of nineteenth century symbolism and the idealist 
assertions associated with it, language goes beyond itself to suggest a peculiar kind 
of self-engendering or, as Emerson terms it, “self-registration”. Emerson’s writing is 
a joyous, exuberant celebration of poetic language. Yet at the same time, the 
enthusiasm of that writing is often stopped cold by a certain obstinacy of language 
– the linguistic equivalent of what he describes as the aesthetic experience of 
being “glad to the brink of fear” (W, I, 9). In Emerson’s writing, the succession of 
images often gets out of hand in a frantic process of multiplication and 
reformulation. When the orator speaks “like a river” (W, II, 218) the series of 
images he uses conveys more of a disruption than a poetic succession or harmony. 
And maybe we find here another way of getting to grips with what Emerson calls 
“radical” correspondence: Language itself, in its fizzling, flaring series of images, 
presents a kind of phenomenal being that suggests an experience not unlike the 
idealist experience of nature or reality in which sublimation, the sublime 
experience and the emanation of spontaneous feeling lead to a dissolution of the 
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individual that is then recovered via the affirmation of the individual by a 
“Selbstbewußtwerdung als intelligibles Vernunft-Subjekt,” as Harmut Boehme has 
argued (Böhme 1989). But, and this is why this correspondence is “radical” in 
Emerson, his vision of correspondence is not about a final relation in harmony. 
More strongly than Kant, Emerson insists on the irreducibility of this relation but 
suggest that it is precisely because language (art, poetry, aesthetic contemplation) 
and nature can never be brought up to a par that this relation remains relevant, 
“unsettles” and asks for its figuration. The relation then is precisely not mimetic, on 
the contrary, it presents its very own explosion into the phenomenal being of 
language. It itself is, as Emerson argues in “Eloquence,” “power” (W, VIII, 115) or 
an “emanation” (W, VIII, 114) and the orator’s “speech is not to be distinguished 
from action. It is the electricity of action” (W, VIII, 115). The implicit connection 
between reality and language, as suggested by Emerson’s revision of 
Swedenborgian correspondence, is not that language can mime reality, but rather, 
that in its presentation of an event of meaning and figuration, in its production of 
fragments, of irreconcilable pictures, it itself is phenomenal being, material and 
real. Language, therefore, does not merely represent the disorder and eventfulness 
of a world, it de facto presents disorder and eventfulness as a succession of images 
and as a planned and unplanned integration and disintegration of metaphoric 
structures and analogies. Emerson style, the way in which it often presents a series 
of only loosely connected images, metaphors, symbols, etc., consequently presents 
a universe in linguistic fragments, like a collection of daguerreotypes documenting 
discrete and unconnected moments.  
This vision of a world fragmented in its presentation in the text is by no means 
Emerson’s particular philosophical and poetic crisis: Edgar Allen Poe, Emily 
Dickinson, and other early nineteenth-century writers have been puzzled by the 
kind of phenomenalist argument about perception – famously articulated by Hume 
in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume 1999) –, stating that our 
perceptual faculties provide only fragmentary, discrete and discontinuous data of 
the world, and that we therefore can only know the world in bits and pieces. This 
crisis was widely discussed in America in the early eighteenth century. Emerson 
himself makes a reference to it that, in its intimation of an accelerated life of the 
senses, already anticipates the discussions about a specifically modern 
“nervousness” around 1900:  
“It is very unhappy, but too late to be helped, the discovery we have made that we 
exist. That discovery is called the Fall of Man. Ever afterwards we suspect our 
instruments. We have learned that we do not see directly, but mediately, and that we 
have no means of correcting these colored and distorting lenses which we are, or of 
computing the amount of their errors. Perhaps these subject-lenses have a creative 
power; perhaps there are no objects. Once we lived in what we saw; now, the 
rapaciousness of this new power, which threatens to absorb all things, engages us.” (W, 
III, 75-76) 
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In the writing of Emerson, of Dickinson, and also of Poe, this crisis of perception is 
very often transformed into a problem of symbolism. To these authors, single 
verbal elements represented self-sufficient and independent units that functioned 
almost like exaggerations of perceptual moments. These symbolist elements of 
language would render a world particularly graspable but, at the same time, the 
irreducibility of these individual moments would also invite a certain skepticism as 
to whether they could all be composed to actually depict a world. In fact, 
arguments about the fragmentary nature of the universe have often been 
associated, historically, with the philosophical problems of symbolism and 
representation. Traditional symbolism presupposes, a philosophy, or rather, a 
worldview, in which the material and its representation in language constitute both 
mirrors of yet another, ideal reality (from which they “emanated”). In Kenneth 
Burke’s terminology, the symbol is “a terministic bridge whereby one realm is 
transcended by being viewed in terms of a realm beyond it” (Burke 1966: 5).8 
Symbolism consequently is an attempt to relate one thing to another, to establish a 
correspondence and, in Swedenborg, even transcendence. In Emerson’s peculiar, 
‘inconsistent’ mode of writing, the symbol is thus precisely introduced as a 
philosophical issue. It is meant to problematize the ways in which we perceive the 
world. In Emerson’s poetological practice – as well as, say, in Dickinson’s – 
symbols do not hold this promise of transcendence. In the progression of a text, 
they remain particular, “infinitely repellent particles” that cannot be integrated into 
the broader argument of the text.  
Consequently, Emerson’s take on symbolism is not so much a matter of building 
“bridges,” but rather of drawing attention to the gaps between analogies, 
parallelisms, etc., of investigating some abyss at the heart of representation and 
reality. This is why there is a tendency for the metonymic rather than the symbolic 
in Emerson’s writing. And it is exactly this being metonymical that underwrites a 
kind of “realism” in Emerson’s writing: the metonymic, with its sudden shifts 
functions as an attempt at producing an eventfulness in language that will 
somehow remind us of the eventfulness of our world. But again, it can always 
only be a reminiscence, a “mistranslation”. This is the paradox, hence, of the 
symbol: it asserts its individuality when it effectively gains its value from the 
“fluxional” process that grants the symbol’s meaning in the first place:  
“Here is the difference betwixt the poet and the mystic, that the last nails a symbol to 
one sense, which was a true sense for a moment, but soon becomes old and false. For 
all symbols are fluxional; all language is vehicular and transitive, and is good, as ferries 
and horses are, for conveyance, not as farms and houses are, for homestead. Mysticism 
consists in the mistake of an accidental and individual symbol for an universal one.” 
(W, III, 34) 
 
 8 See also Charles Feidelson, Symbolism and American Literature (1953: esp. 50). 
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As soon as the symbol becomes a self-sufficient unit, a “bridge” rather than a 
“ferry” or a “horse,” it is inevitably also a dead fragment.  
We may ask ourselves what this reduction of the world to fragments, what the 
disunity of the universe means to Emerson? Does he believe that, in the last 
instance, there is a set of overarching explanatory structures for the universe? Yes, 
I think he does, but these principles can only be phrased optatively and they are 
generated precisely out of the disunity, flux of the nature. Emerson is not a 
postmodernist, we find in his writing a strong echo of philosophical and theological 
thought where the perception of chaos and the world’s disintegration will 
ultimately illuminate a different, harmonized structure of the universe. “By or 
beyond each thought frankly,” Emerson argues in “Fate,” “by harping, or, if you 
will, pounding on each string, we learn at last its power. By the same obedience 
to other thoughts we learn theirs, and then comes some reasonable hope of 
harmonizing them” (W, VI, 4). It is the achievement of Stanley Cavell to have 
shown that this hope, this optimism, in Emerson is always already coupled with a 
profound (if sometimes hidden) skepticism.9 What used to be the prevalent 
understanding of Emerson, namely that he was great writer merely because of his 
personality and that the consistency of his American character somehow rescued 
him from the inconsistencies or even obvious faults of his writing, can be 
dismissed precisely if we accept that his symbolist procedures, as laid out above, 
are not a mere accident of his writing but, rather, their very ‘programme’. This is 
why, for instance, Nature’s inconsistency is ‘programmatic,’ it functions as the 
introduction of a mode of writing, a kind of philosophical reasoning that cannot be 
addressed correctly without paying attention to the concrete linguistic forms and 
processes of figuration in which it is expressed. Its reinsertion of ‘metaphoricity’ 
into the highly structured discourse of typology functions itself as a philosophical 
critique or critique of philosophy since it presents itself, to use a phrase coined by 
Jacques Derrida, as “a flower of rhetoric without properties, with no proper 
meaning, a repeated self-quotation” (in Bloom 2004: 125), and thus challenges the 
totalizing tendency of philosophical discourse by an attention to the rhetoric or the 
poetic. And as we have seen earlier, this possibility of speaking differently, of 
speaking poetically, for Emerson is the condition of the possibility of new 
meaning, and, therefore, the promise that ‘makes’ America.  
While for Emerson “the power of picture or expression […]. implies … a certain 
control over the spontaneous states, without which no production is possible” (W, 
II, 336), it is important to point out that he sees a dimension of rhetoricity or 
figuration at work in any individual occurrence of language or speech. Poetry or 
art are “a conversion of all nature into the rhetoric of thought” (W, II, 336). As a 
consequence, Emerson’s poetics constantly manages to refute the totalizing gesture 
 
 9 Cavell has written at length about this combination of optimism with a profound scepticism in his “Thinking of 
Emerson” and “An Emerson Mood,” both appended to his The Senses of Walden (1981: 123–38, 141–60). 
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usually associated with a poetological programme: Every reading, every 
conversation, every use of language is necessarily a translation, that is, it is lost in 
a kind of rhetorization that, to use a term that Emerson adopts from 
Schleiermacher, can only be an “approximation”: “Every time we converse,” 
Emerson argues, “we seek to translate it into speech, but whether we hit, or 
whether we miss, we have the fact. Every discourse is an approximate answer: but 
it is of small consequence, that we do not get it into verbs and nouns, whilst it 
abides for contemplation for ever” (W, III, 282).10 As we have seen before, 
Emerson’s method of composition further enhances approximative quality of his 
writing by offering a conflagration of styles so that its intention remains indecisive, 
vague.  
Clearly enough, then, Emerson essays do not amount to a poetics, to a 
consistent voice, but rather show what it means, to use Paul de Man’s description,  
„to start out from the bafflement that such singular turns of tone, phrase, and figure [are] 
bound to produce in readers attentive enough to notice them and honest enough not 
to hide their non-understanding behind the screen of received ideas that often passes, 
in literary instruction, for humanistic knowledge.” (De Man 1986: 23)  
Emerson’s essays refuse to totalize their own assertions exactly by the ways in 
which they bring terms, voiced styles, ambiguities, etc. into play, all used 
previously (in earlier essays, by other writers, etc.) but now placed into a new 
rhetoric constellation and thus acquiring a new meaning. The totalisation of a 
poetics is consequently refused by a consistent interest into how terms can be 
brought into play again, how they can be shown in a new light by placing them 
within a new poetic or rhetoric configuration. And clearly enough, this is a process 
that does not aim for a stable infrastructure for writing or the institutionalization of 
a poetics. Emerson’s lifelong writing, his constant recycling and rewriting of 
passages from his journals as well as from earlier essays may, in the case of 
individual essays, seem to provide a particular conclusion that in its given, 
particular rhetorical context may be said, to use De Man’s term, “irrefutable” (De 
Man 1986: 19). But if we compare particular uses of a concept, a phrase, a style 
etc. to other uses – in the essays, in the lectures, in the journals –, it becomes 
obvious that these divergent uses do not amount to a systematic presentation of the 
deeper laws and infrastructures that could be used to control and govern a next 
reading or analysis. As a result, one can identify two different uses of rhetorics in 
Emerson’s essays: On the one hand, it administers a study of tropes – Emerson’s 
tropology, his investigation of how the meaning of tropes changes according to 
their particular rhetorical context–, on the other, it provides a discourse of and on 
persuasion – that is, an examination of the power of affective or performative 
 
 10 On the influence of Schleiermacher’s notion of “approximation” on early language and interpretation theory, see 
Joseph Margolis, “Schleichermacher and Theorists of Language and Interpretation” (1987).  
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language and how it produces a presence that will inevitably again be caught up 
by the rhetorical movement of tropes.  
Furthermore, as I have argued before, Emerson’s refusal to be systematic or 
programmatic also coincides with his particular thematic interests. Because the 
historical value of ordinary life has not yet been asserted, Emerson believes, it 
cannot be narrated in an authoritative account. The irreducible heterogeneity and 
fluidity of American life in the contemporary moment asks for an equally flexible 
poetic style, able to transform the “rapid intrinsic energy” (W, I, 122) of the 
present moment into a kind of writing that is itself eventful. This is why Emerson 
insists that “[t]he literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of 
the street, the meaning of household life, are the topics of the time” (W, I, 111). 
When Emerson asserts that he “ask[s] not for the great, the remote, the romantic” 
(W, I, 111) and instead pledges to focus on the “common,” the “familiar,” and the 
“low” (W, I, 111) then this also comes as a disengagement from the 
“programmatic” aspirations of a poetics and as a call for a kind of attention that is 
specific to literature or poetry. As he argues in “The American Scholar,” American 
literature, because it yet lacks a long history or a canon of “classical” works, is in a 
privileged position to refocus literature’s attention to the materialities of the 
contemporary moment: “That which had been negligently trodden under foot by 
those who were harnessing and provisioning themselves for long journeys into far 
countries, is suddenly found to be richer than all foreign parts” (W, I, 110-111). 
Even if Emerson in his journals excerpts the writing of two thousand years, he 
consistently replaces the vanishing points of Western culture – “Homer or 
Shakespeare” (W, I, 17) – by an attention to the heterogeneity of culture in the 
present moment:  
“Give me health and a day, and I will make the pomp of emperors ridiculous. The dawn 
is my Assyria; the sunset and moonrise my Paphos, and unimaginable realms of faerie; 
broad noon shall be my England of the senses and the understanding; the night shall 
be my Germany of mystic philosophy and dreams.” (W, I, 17)  
The resulting rhetorics in Emerson is one that attempts to be responsive to the flux 
of the present moment of culture and of nature, to the eventfulness of a present 
unfolding, emerging, or, as Emerson terms it, “becoming” (W, II, 45). But because 
the passage through this heterogeneous field of nature is incalculable, an American 
poetics must itself remain hazy and impermanent. It can itself only figure as a 
momentary expression of a momentary situation and cannot be instrumentalised or 
founded as a national literature or rhetorics. Because a literary history, a canon is 
absent, American literature and rhetorics must build up from nature, from the 
contemporary moment, where “the anchorage is quicksand” (W, III, 45). For 
Emerson, this situation is more generally the situation of American culture as a 
whole, as he points out in a late address (“Moral Forces: Read on a Fast Day 
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Appointed by the President of the United States, 13 April 1862”), mentioning the 
“groundless ground” upon which American culture necessarily needs to be built:  
“And see how we are planted with our antiquities, and everlasting laws of nature, and 
long immoveable conservatisms, and our old religions: We are all set-down on a 
spinning ball rushing with inconceivable velocity in a whirl of similar balls, that make 
the mind giddy to think of, – never a resting place, never a port – never so much as a 
pillow of air under us, but a hollow, immense gulf below and above our solidity is our 
foundation. Will you make your bed on a chain of lightning? Well, all this groundless 
ground and gay foundation wherefrom to build up, is the precise symbol of our whole 
position in the universe, our whole social and moral status. On such tottering basis of 
thoughts, of sentiments, of perceptions is our power and well-being built.” (LL, II, 279-
280) 
“Cripples and monsters”  
Speaking of the impermanence of America’s poetic words and of the 
‘programmatic’ inconsistency of Emerson’s essays, we should also remember that 
contemporary commentators on America’s art of public speech had always been 
baffled by the American orator’s tendency towards rhetorical exuberance. One of 
the most decisive critiques is Alexis de Tocqueville’s, who in Chapter XVIII of 
Democracy in America (“Why American Writers and Orators Are often Bombastic”) 
reproaches American rhetoricians for their “unreasonably inflated” style and their 
“pomposity” (DiA, 561). Elsewhere, he criticizes Americans for their use of “so 
many improper terms and inadequate expressions” (DiA, 178), which he believes 
expresses the “violent and precipitous process” (DiA, 173) that prepared the 
founding of the American republic. He is especially disturbed by the power of 
American oratory to produce what he calls “monsters”:  
“We have seen, moreover, that in democratic peoples the sources of poetry are beautiful 
but relatively rare. They are soon exhausted. Finding no more material for the ideal in 
what is real and true, poets give up on truth and reality altogether and create monsters. I 
have no fear that the poetry of democratic peoples will prove timid and quite mundane. 
I worry, rather, that it will constantly be losing itself in the clouds and end up depicting 
worlds that exist only in the imagination. I fear that the works of democratic poets will 
often be replete with immense and incoherent images, exaggerated portraits, and bizarre 
composites, and that the fantastic creatures that spring from such poets’ minds may at 
times make one long for the real world.” (DiA, 562) 
Instinctively, Tocqueville connects the problem of American words to the lack of a 
“supreme authority” (DiA, 178) in America. He believes that the Americans’ 
penchant for stylistic incoherence is not only due to the their immaturity with a 
veritable poetic style, rather, he thinks that it is a consequence of a lack of sources 
for real poetry. Lacking a definite shape and history, so Tocqueville implies, the 
American culture does not lend itself easily to literature or poetry. Consequently, 
when Tocqueville speaks of Americans’ “democratic instincts” (DiA, 174), he does 
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so in a derogatory manner, suggesting that it is precisely the capricious form of 
democracy that is responsible also for the impermanence of American words. But 
what makes Tocqueville so anxious about the impermanence of words in America 
– namely that it cannot yet be controlled by an ‘official’ political discourse – in 
Emerson is precisely the linguistic nucleus that makes its democratic promise 
possible. For Emerson, as we have seen before, such an impermanence of words 
is the condition of the possibility of a different articulation of ‘America’ and, hence, 
the essence of America’s democratic promise.  
Tocqueville’s observations do not only concern the nature of American public 
discourse. He also comments on American forms of writing or, rather, the non-
existence of a veritable “American literature”.11 There is a passage in Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America that has not received much attention, but it frames a 
problem that is relevant to our concerns here. Tocqueville here critically reports 
on the “poetic style” of Americans:  
“I have often noted that Americans, who generally conduct business in clear, incisive 
language devoid of all ornament and often vulgar in its extreme simplicity, are likely to 
go in for bombast when they attempt a poetic style. In speeches their pomposity is 
apparent from beginning to end, and, seeing how lavish they are with images at every 
turn, one might think they never said anything simply. […] The reason for this can be 
stated without much difficulty. In democratic societies, each citizen is usually 
preoccupied with something quite insignificant: himself. If he lifts up his eyes, he sees 
only one immense image, that of society, or the even larger figure of the human race. He 
has either very particular and very clear ideas or very general and very vague notions; 
there is nothing in between. Once drawn out of himself, therefore, he invariably 
expects that someone is going to set before him some prodigious thing to behold. […] 
This, I think, explains fairly well why men in democracies, whose affairs are generally 
so slight, ask their poets for works conceived on such a vast scale and portraits so 
extravagant in their proportions.” (DiA, 561) 
Other than in Tocqueville’s worried account, Emerson sees the impermanence of 
“vulgar” words as a potential corrective against the tendency of political speech to 
sediment within authoritarian forms. To him, the promise of words in America is 
precisely not linked to an American adoption of traditional literary forms – “the 
great” or “the romantic” (W, I, 111) –, but rather, to its literature’s openness to the 
vulgarity of “[t]he meal in the firkin; the milk in the pan; the ballad in the street; 
the news of the boat” (W, I, 111). And Emerson insists that it is precisely such an 
attention to that which is vulgar or ordinary that will make the American epoch: 
“Give me insight into to-day, and you may have the antique and future worlds” 
(W, I, 111), as he famously phrases it in Nature. And Emerson also confesses a 
penchant for what Tocqueville terms “vulgarities” when he notes, in his journal, 
that he wants to “shock” his readers by his improper “taunts and cries of hatred and 
 
 11  See also Cushing Strout’s “Tocqueville and the Idea of an American Literature” (1986) for an account of 
Tocqueville’s interest in America’s literature.  
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anger” (J, V, 83). Here, the American disposition towards “uncouth words,” to use 
Jefferson’s phrase cited in Chapter Three, is an expression of America’s flexible 
democratic promise. For Tocqueville, on the other hand, such a stylistic inaptitude 
is merely the expression of the Americans’ lack of “a sure enough taste”:  
“Writers, for their part, are hardly likely to resist these instincts, which they share. They 
are always pumping up their imaginations until they become so unreasonably inflated 
that they forsake the great for the gigantesque. They hope in this way to attract the 
immediate attention of the crowd and focus it on themselves, and in this they are often 
successful. For the crowd, which looks to poetry only for very vast subjects, lacks the 
time to take the precise measure of all that are laid before it and lacks as well a sure 
enough taste to discern readily in what respects those subjects are disproportionate. 
Author and public mutually corrupt each other.” (DiA, 561-562) 
The possibility of a “mutual corruption,” in Tocqueville the source of a profound 
anxiety, in Emerson forms the basis of the linguistic freedom of America. Because 
the “disproportionate” domains of private and public speech in America continually 
inflect and corrupt each other, and because they never quite overlap, they 
safeguard American discourse from the danger of sedimentation. For Emerson, it is 
precisely rhetoric’s power to produce “monsters,” to be able to figure that which 
hitherto was unsayable in what may be “immense and incoherent imagery” and 
“exaggerated portraits,” that is the strength of the American dialect. Because “losing 
itself in the clouds” (DiA, 562) is precisely the way in which this poetry taps into 
what has not yet become part of our ordinary language games. To be able to 
come up with “worlds that exist only in the imagination” (DiA, 562), for Emerson 
and other writers of the time precisely holds the promise of a language invented 
anew, and, thus, of defining or creating a different America.  
In his essay on “Art,” Emerson draws attention to this revolutionary potential of 
language: “Art is the need to create; but in its essence, immense and universal, it 
is impatient of working with lame or tied hands, and of making cripples and 
monsters, such as all pictures and statues are. Nothing less than the creation of man 
and nature is its end” (W, II, 363). Emerson recognizes that even if the “essence” 
and “end” of art is the “creation of man and nature,” this creation must remain an 
ideal end that can only be approximated by language’s implication in the poetic 
and rhetoric. These “cripples and monsters” consequently function as the 
simultaneously necessary and inevitable detour or defection of language from its 
ideal ends. But it is precisely when language is able to produce the worlds that 
only exist in the imagination that its ends become “immense and universal”. 
Consequently, one could argue with Emerson that a dimension of rhetorical 
decorum is never merely a collateral nuisance. It is necessary if literary discourse 
is to achieve its “immense and universal” end, namely the production of a 
qualitatively different future. That literature or art are open to this dimension of 
decorum, that they are ready to receive such an incalculable rhetoricity, this, for 
Emerson, is how they safeguard themselves against the ossification of tradition.  
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In “Circles,” Emerson takes this argument a step further by suggesting that 
works of art are also epoch-making: because art and literature give form to the 
fluidity and volatility of “nature,” they can generate “new thought,” that potentially 
builds a “new continent”:  
 “There are no fixtures in nature. The universe is fluid and volatile. Permanence is but a 
word of degrees. […] The Greek sculpture is all melted away, as if it had been statues of 
ice; here and there a solitary figure or fragment remaining, as we see flecks and scraps of 
snow left in cold dells and mountain clefts, in June and July. […] The Greek letters last a 
little longer, but are already passing under the same sentence, and tumbling into the 
inevitable pit which the creation of new thought opens for all that is old. The new 
continents are built out of the ruins of an old planet; the new races fed out of the 
decomposition of the foregoing. New arts destroy the old. See the investment of capital 
in aqueducts made useless by hydraulics; fortifications, by gunpowder; roads and 
canals, by railways; sails, by steam; steam, by electricity.” (W, II, 302)  
But again, Emerson’s does not envision the epochal turn as a smooth transition. 
Rather, resulting out of a confrontation with “incalculable” nature, it comes as a 
“shock or leap” (W, III, 179) that itself cannot be calculated. Emerson here 
conceives of this turn as a “destruction” that only leaves “figures” or “fragments” of 
what went before. In other words: American poetics, as a ‘destructive poetics’ (see 
also Chapter Three), figures as an excess of itself, its language continually 
overtaking the speech acts that bring it into being. There is then a curious form of 
self-engendering or “self-registration” that is the result of this excessive nature of 
America’s thought and poetry: it is precisely because it has the power to be in 
excess of the narrative that it tells about itself, that it can be “above time” (W, II, 
67), in a “radical correspondence” with the eventfulness of the present or nature 
into which it feeds itself back into.  
As we will see in more detail in Chapter Five, Emerson’s poetics of nature is 
also the vantage point from which he develops his theory of a democratic politics. 
In accordance to his belief in the “incalculability” of nature, he continues to insist 
that nature is not a “cause,” but always a “novel effect” or an “emanation” whose 
law “no chemistry” and “no mechanics” (W, I, 199-200) can account for. While this 
prevents nature’s quick integration or instrumentalisation as the origin of a political 
programme, Emerson is also careful to warn against an over-interpretation of 
nature. It would be wrong, he argues in “The Method of Nature,” to assume that in 
nature “everything refers” (W, I, 200). As he explains:  
“Nature can only be conceived as existing to a universal and not to a particular end, to 
a universe of ends, and not to one, – a work of ecstasy, to be represented by a circular 
movement, as intention might be signified by a straight line of definite length.” (W, I, 
201)  
If we were to instrumentalise nature as field of a political programmatics, then “the 
tools run away with the workmen” (W, I, 209) as Emerson phrases it. He insists 
that “a man’s wisdom is to know that all ends are momentary, that the best end 
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must be superseded by a better” (W, I, 209). In parts, this refusal to 
instrumentalise a “method of nature” also explains his disengagement from social 
reform:  
“He who aims at progress, should aim at an infinite, not at a special benefit. The 
reforms whose fame now fill the land with Temperance, Anti-Slavery, Non-Resistance, 
No Government, Equal Labor, fair and generous as each appears, are poor bitter things 
when prosecuted for themselves as an end.” (W, I, 214)  
If the “method of nature” envisions a political goal, then it is only that “[y]our end 
should be one inapprehensible to the senses: then will it be a god always 
approached, – never touched” (W, I, 216). If the object that the political reformer 
sets before him is too specific, “he presently exhausts it” (W, I, 217).  
Refusing to translate the “method of nature” into a political programme, Emerson 
maintains that it finds its application only in the unorganized multiplicity of 
experience in the present. The consequence for Emerson’s theory of political 
reform is that it is not in a method but, rather, in the particularities of ordinary 
experience that we find the “germ” (W, XI, 143) for the advent of the epochal 
turn. As he argues in the lecture on “The Times”:  
“[I]n the wild hope of a mountain boy, […] in the love-glance of a girl; in the hair-
splitting conscientiousness of some eccentric person […] is to be found that which shall 
constitute the times to come, more than in the now organized and accredited oracles. 
For whatever is affirmative and now advancing, contains it.” (W, I, 264)  
The consequence of Emerson’s poetics or “method” of nature is thus a literature 
that attests to language a certain spontaneity, contemporaneity, and eventfulness so 
that the event of the text goes beyond merely representing what it describes. But 
because it exceeds itself as a rhetorical structure, it itself becomes factitious, 
welthaltig. This characteristic spilling over of the text into the world, the self-
referral and self-registration of Emerson’s poetics, is also the point of departure 
from which I will develop the political implications of Emerson’s poetics for 
‘America’ in the next Chapter.  
 
 

  

  
This World is not Conclusion. 
A Species stands beyond – 
Invisible, as Music – 
But positive, as Sound –  
It beckons, and it baffles –  
Philosophy – don’t know –  
And through a Riddle, at the last –  
Sagacity, must go –  
To guess it puzzles scholars;  
To gain it, men have shown  
Contempt of generations,  
And crucifixion known.  
– Emily Dickinson 
 
 
 

  
Five  
 
The Aporia of Passage and the Future of American 
Democracy 
Starting in “Self-reliance,” where he insists on the individual’s capacity for 
contingency and argues against the totalizing assumptions of individualism, 
Emerson tries to envision an individual that strongly resembles Foucault’s 
description of the modern individual as that which “resists all secret codes, who 
has no identity, who is not reducible to one or another of the hermeneutic 
techniques of pastoral power, who is marked by the ‘right to be different’” 
(Foucault 1983: 211). This individual, Emerson argues, in its epoché of acquired 
ways of interpreting the world or in its complete suspension of the belief in the 
world before us, necessarily attracts the contempt of all those who want to assert 
the legacy of tradition and history: “The new statement is always hated by the old, 
and, to those dwelling in the old, comes like an abyss of skepticism” (W, II, 305). 
But it is precisely by way of a suspension of common sense and by way of a 
radical questioning of the world before us that the individual (the “genius,” the 
“poet,” the “representative man”) in Emerson’s writing entertains the promise or 
possibility of another world. And it is such a stepping out of the continuum of 
history and the subsequent acquisition of a different perspective on the world that 
also establishes a new, unprecedented meaning of the world. For Emerson, the 
potential of ‘American’ individualism is simultaneously always also the possibility of 
progress, that is, the possibility of the advent of a new era, age, or epoch.  
Hans Blumenberg has shown that the epochal threshold is always a kind of 
impossible Nullpunkt at which, simultaneously, a system comes to its close while 
another begins. But the epochal threshold – as a moment without expansion – is 
impossible to explicate, Blumenberg argues, since the boundaries it declares 
become manifest only after it has been crossed. The epochal turn is thus a frontier 
that is imperceptible and in Blumenberg’s account not necessarily tied to an event 
or a date (Blumenberg 1983: 469). Because the recognition of the epochal turn 
asks us to abandon old doctrines and initiate a new system of elementary 
presuppositions, because we cannot establish the logos of the transition, the 
epochal threshold necessarily remains an aporia, not just in the sense of an 
epistemological undecidability, but rather in the sense of a quandary that is lacking 
a “poros,” a way, or a passage. Maybe it is useful to recall here that in Greek, 
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“poros” also denotes the dangerous or risky passage across the sea, and as I have 
argued in Chapter Three, it is precisely in such moments of a risky passage that 
Emerson sees the experience of ‘America’ both institutet and challenged.1  
Jacques Maritain, in his Reflections an America, has argued for a continued 
significance of this passage for Americans and identified a paradox in the fact that 
Americans, in spite of having settled in the New World, are still not a settled 
people:  
“We are confronted in this country with a curious paradoxical contrast. Nobody seems 
less indifferent to the world and to the goods of this world, more eager to work on it, to 
transform it (not so much in order to enjoy it, but in order to make it better) than the 
American people. But at the same time one feels in them a kind of strange, insuperable 
detachment. Americans seem to be in their own land as pilgrims, prodded by a dream. 
They are always on the move – available for new tasks, prepared for the possible loss of 
what they have. They are not settled, installed (I would say in French, “installés” – a 
word which carries a strong moral connotation) though a trend toward an ideal of 
security has been developing since the war. Yet they are still far from being a settled 
people.” (Maritain 1964: 93)  
If we can identify the experience of passage (across the chaotic sea, across the 
epochal threshold, across the boundaries of old histories and doctrines, etc.) as an 
experience that is ‘representatively’ American, then this representativity is 
consequently not to be found in the ways in which it is (conventionally) 
expressed. Rather, it is precisely the suspension of conventional ways of narrating 
the passage and a deferral of the commonsensical meaning of this passage that is 
‘representative’: the experience of ‘America’ can thus be expressed precisely as a 
constant delay and suspension of the meaning of a passage to ‘America’.  
The experience of ‘America’ thus comes to be synonymous with a prolonged 
experience of liminality as described in Victor Turner’s classic anthropological 
study On the Edge of the Bush. As Turner argues: “[F]or me the essence of 
liminality is to be found in its release from normal constraints, making possible the 
deconstruction of the ‘uninteresting’ constructions of common sense […] into 
cultural units which may then be reconstructed in novel ways.” For Turner, 
liminality is thus exactly the “domain […] of ‘uncommon sense’” (Turner 1985: 
159-60), and, as we have seen in previous chapters, Emerson locates the 
‘American’ promise in a similar potential openness to such an ‘uncommon sense’: 
America for him is all about continually breaking down the linguistic and 
ideological boundaries established by common sense, by the doctrine of an 
equivalence of words and things, or by Adamic language theory, etc.  
In Emerson, this need to be “unsettled” (W, II, 320) is meant both literally as 
well as figuratively, although it is commonly expressed in linguistic or poetic 
terms. And this “unsettling” is also the very challenge that Emerson’s essays in their 
 
 1 For an extensive account of the epistemology of “aporia,” see Sarah Kofman’s “Beyond Aporia?” (1988).  
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focus on processes of poetic revision and refiguration both envision as well as 
respond to. One could argue that Emerson insists on the continuing significance of 
a specifically American experience of passage, but he does not conceive of it as a 
part of a teleology of manifest destiny in order to suggest that history is always in 
the making, that we need to interact “poetically” with our present in order to be 
aware of the choices it presents us with. What is at stake then, in the “unsettling” 
moment of the present, is the vanishing moment of the epochal turn or Kehre as a 
moment of decision that would establish the (temporal, cultural, ideological) 
boundaries of the next epoch.  
In the American context and, especially, for what Sacvan Bercovitch has called 
“the symbolic construction of America” (Bercovitch 1993), the recognition of such 
an epochal turn is of vital importance. After all, the foundation of ‘America’ and the 
existence of a culture specifically ‘American’ hinges precisely on the identification 
of America’s “crossing” or “leaping” from European culture, as Stanley Cavell has 
argued in The Senses of Walden (Cavell 1992: 136). As a result, American literature 
has been obsessed with the vanishing moments of such an epochal turn, with the 
moments of a passage away from the old and into a world that is brilliantly new. 
Emerson, as I have pointed out before, recognizes the radical or risky potential 
that such an epochal turn presents. He conceives of it as a moment of aporia not 
easily decidable but alerting us to the decisions we have made and letting us 
rethink the roads not taken.  
For many of Emerson’s contemporaries, the historiographical conundrum of 
America’s epochal turn remained a preoccupation that pertained simply to the 
nation’s political or socio-economic improvement. Emerson, however, turns the 
historiographical problem of the epochal threshold into a more general argument 
about the cognition or perception of the world. For my purposes here, the 
vanishing moment of the epochal turn and the kind of epoché it brings about, may 
serve to loosen the profound hold on our thought by common sense and by our 
ordinary ways of being. In other words, the epochal threshold brings about a 
moment in which old fundaments are precariously suspended and America is 
thrown into the vacuum of an unknown future that may be both a brilliant promise 
of manifest destiny as well as the abyss of a horror vacuui, of a vacated world in 
which my perceptions and beliefs do not account for anything anymore. It thus 
opens a minimal and precarious space for a new form of politics, of justice or 
responsibility, but at the same time, it speaks of the dangers of a certain scepticism, 
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as it may radically suspend our ordinary perception of the world.2 In fact, the 
radical possibility of a world vacated of common sense, is tantamount to the 
potential arrival of a new form of politics, of justice, of responsibility, as Jacques 
Derrida has pointed out (Derrida 1992). 
Emerson mentions several instances of such a suspension of judgment and how 
it may give way to a new way of thinking the world. In his essays, the very 
phenomenon of genius is repeatedly connected to precisely such a suspension of 
our ordinary ways of perceiving the world. Because the new world that the 
genius brings about always implies a rejection of common sense, the genius, 
radically refiguring the world in an unprecedented idiom, is bound to be 
misunderstood:  
“With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern 
himself with his shadow on the wall. Out upon your guarded lips! Sew them up with 
pack-thread, do! else, if you would be a man, speak what you think to-day in words as 
hard as cannon-balls, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, 
though it contradict everything you said to-day. Ah, then, exclaim the aged ladies, you 
shall be sure to be misunderstood! Misunderstood! It is a right fool's words. Is it so bad 
then to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and 
Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that 
ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.” (W, II, 391) 
Emerson thus fuses the historiographical problem of a present moment continually 
adjourned with a problem of its expression or representation: We cannot give a 
comprehensive account of the present, but it is only by writing about it that we 
can unearth its potential to offer a qualitatively different future. The radical 
contingency and thus the irreducible historicity of thought and writing, in the 
present cannot be avoided: but it is only by speaking today what we think today 
that we can we can bring about the transition to the future. In Emerson, this 
transition is never described in terms of a millennialism, because it can itself not 
be anticipated. It can only be phrased tentatively: “[T]he time will come when we 
too […] shall eagerly convert more than we now possess into means and powers” 
(W, I, 256). The very terms of the “conversion” that Emerson imagines, rest in its 
incalculability: it cannot and must not be predetermined. And like in Nietzsche, to 
confront the contradicting and radically irreducible possibilities of the present, also 
means to confront another temporality “above time” (W, II, 67), signifies a 
stepping out of historical time into a moment that has yet to be integrated into the 
historical continuum. Again, we can grasp here the full meaning of what I want to 
 
 2 On the legacy of such a skepticism in American culture, see Cavell’s Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: 
The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism (1990), his comments in Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, 
Emerson, Austin, Derrida (1995), and the Chapter “The Philosopher in American Life (Toward Thoreau and 
Emerson)” in Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (1988). On Cavell’s interest in 
skepticism, see also Michael Fischer, Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism (1989) and Espen Hammer, 
Stanley Cavell skepticism, subjectivity, and the ordinary (2002). For a comprehensive study of Emersonian 
skepticism, see John Michael’s Emerson and Skepticism (1988). 
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call America’s epoché: the determination of America’s epoch, its place in history, 
literally hinges on a pause, on the opening of a “cleft”, to use a term that Emerson 
adopts from Carlyle (CEC, 459), by means of which the American writer steps out 
of preconceived notions of ‘America’ and engages, self-reflexively, in a process of 
revision and refiguration. This stepping out of common sense cultural 
denominations will then have established, always already, a radically different 
meaning of ‘America’.3  
The Kehre or “conversion” that Emerson envisions implies a risk: its “results […] 
are uncalculated and uncalculable” (W, III, 69), as Emerson remarks in 
“Experience”. Like in Nietzsche, who similarly turns historicist thought against 
itself, to acquire or generate new meaning out of old terms potentially means to 
encounter madness. Emerson is aware of this risk implied by putting one’s horizon 
of understanding at disposal:  
“A certain tendency to insanity has always attended the opening of the religious sense 
in men, as if they had been ‘blasted with excess of light.’ The trances of Socrates, the 
‘union’ of Plotinus, the vision of Porphyry, the conversion of Paul, the aurora of 
Behmen, the convulsions of George Fox and his Quakers, the illumination of 
Swedenborg, are of this kind” (W, II, 281f.).  
Emerson elaborates the notion of conversion in religious terms here, but we have 
already established that the religious in Emerson is, more often than not, a more 
general instance of the human and the symbol of something that is already deeply 
invested in the problems of hermeneutics. But I want to draw attention here to 
Emerson’s reference to Thomas Gray’s Progress of Poesy: “’blasted with excess of 
light’” (Gray 1862: 35, l.101) precisely denotes the way in which our acquiring of 
new meaning can be something risky and dangerous, potentially even traumatic in 
the sense that it can reconfigure our habitual perception of the world.4 Emerson’s 
poetics here paradoxically holds both a threat as well as a promise: a threat, 
because it implies the hazard of a world vacated of meaning (“insanity”), a 
promise, because it turns something that is yet unformed into figures and meaning. 
Just how strong this promise is, Emerson suggests in the concluding sentences of 
the Chapter on “Culture” in The Conduct of Life: “The time will come when the 
evil forms we have known can no more be organized,” Emerson argues, but it is 
the poet who will “overcome and convert” this “chaos and gehenna. [The poet] 
will convert the Furies into Muses” (W, VI, 166).  
There are other passages in Emerson’s essays that suggest how he reconceives 
of the notion of (religious) conversion in poetic terms. For example in “Poetry and 
Imagination” where he argues that “[t]he […] measure of poetic genius is the 
power […] to convert those [superstitions] of the nineteenth century and of the 
 
 3 On America’s special inclination towards the temporality of an “always already,” see Jacques Derrida’s Rogues: 
Two Essays on Reason (2005: esp. 14) 
 4 Gray’s reference itself is to John Milton’s Paradise Lost, III, 380.  
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existing nations into universal symbols” (W, VIII, 34). Or in Natural History of the 
Intellect, where he locates in poetry’s power of figuration the power to transform 
the unformed experience of the “to-day” into a more general significance:  
“The highest measure of poetic power is such insight and faculty to fuse the 
circumstances of to-day as shall make transparent the whole web of circumstance and 
opinion in which the man finds himself, so that he […] sees so truly the omnipresence 
of eternal cause that he can convert the daily and hourly event of New York, of Boston, 
into universal symbols.” (W, XII, 42) 
However, it is important to remember here that the conversion of the unformed 
material of “to-day” into poetic significance is not a process that can be calculated 
or pre-contained. The poetic principle of converting the particular into the 
universal has no law. Lacking a telos, this transition therefore is not easily 
answerable in the words of tradition, but only in poetry’s turning of tropes, that is, 
in the incalculable mode of a rhetorical performance or Vollzug. The figure of the 
poet and that of the genius in Emerson represent this principle of a sustained 
commitment to the Eigensinn of language. The suspension of America’s traditions 
consequently always has to be complemented with a more radical suspension or 
epoché: namely that of an “unsettling” of the naming of ‘America’ itself. And 
“unsettling,” as we have already seen in Chapter Three, is not just a casual use of 
words, it implies a strategy that shakes up the sedimented forms of culture just as it 
suspends even America’s most persistent cultural myth, namely that it is a country 
that was settled by pioneers.  
When Emerson asks “Where do we find ourselves?” in the opening passage of 
“Experience,” then this is to be read precisely as the instigation of a movement of 
self-implication that is meant to suspend the normalized, conventionalized 
meanings of ‘America’ and its underlying ideological tenets of providence, 
individualism, etc. These, not only for Emerson, had become empty ciphers. And 
Emerson’s question, as he insists, cannot be answered simply by recourse to 
tradition or history. Those referring to the established authority of American 
scripture (Unitarian dogma, New England Typology, etc.), will precisely not be 
able to answer his question, because it refuses to be answered in the old 
terminology, as he points out in “The Over-Soul”: “They do not answer the 
questions which the understanding asks. The soul answers never by words, but by 
the thing itself that is inquired after” (W, II, 282). Emerson implies again that in 
order to answer the question, we need to necessarily confront the inevitable self-
referentiality of understanding. We need to engage in a process of self-implication 
or “criticism,” and this process will itself be the answer. In other words: The 
confrontation with the contingent potential of the present moment (“Where do we 
find ourselves?”) refuses to be expressed in the words of tradition or as a 
genealogical narrative. Rather, it must be answered by way of a radical sublation 
of acquired meanings and by their poetic refiguration: “People wish to be settled; 
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only as far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them” (W, II, 320). And this 
unsettling of prior designations is precisely how the hope for a better future, 
democracy, ‘America,’ etc., is entertained.  
While this feature of self-referentiality is central to Emerson’s rethinking of a 
culture of American individualism (in the sense of what Stanley Cavell has 
described as Emerson’s discipline of “moral perfectionism”), it is, more generally, 
also a feature of America’s modernity, of the “groundless ground” (LL, II, 280) on 
which it is founded. And it is precisely, Emerson argues, because of this 
“groundlessness” of understanding in America that we cannot predict its future:  
“No inspired man ever asks this question or condescends to these evidences. For the 
soul is true to itself, and the man in whom it is shed abroad cannot wander from the 
present, which is infinite, to a future which would be finite. These questions which we 
lust to ask about the future are a confession of sin. God has no answer for them. No 
answer in words can reply to a question of things. It is not in an arbitrary ‘decree of 
God,’ but in the nature of man, that a veil shuts down on the facts of to-morrow; for the 
soul will not have us read any other cipher than that of cause and effect. By this veil 
which curtains events it instructs the children of men to live in to-day. The only mode 
of obtaining an answer to these questions of the senses is to forego all low curiosity, 
and, accepting the tide of being which floats us into the secret of nature, work and live, 
work and live, and all unawares the advancing soul has built and forged for itself a new 
condition, and the question and the answer are one.” (W, II, 284-85)  
Because understanding must necessarily follow a certain logic – that of “cause and 
effect,” for example –, it cannot answer “a question of things,” that is, it cannot 
represent the contingency of our ordinary lifes and, thus, it cannot calculate our 
futures. There is an impenetrable “veil,” however thin, that hinders our 
‘unmediated vista’ on the “facts of tomorrow”. These necessarily remain 
unintelligible in language. This is why Emerson’s argument stresses the importance 
of an acknowledgement of the ordinary and the present moment as well as of an 
abandonment to its “tide of being”: We must precisely resist an attempt to 
predetermine our future if we want it to be qualitatively different from what we 
are now. And this future happens, is “forged” as a “new condition,” precisely if we 
abstain from anticipating it as a programmatic (political, systematic, philosophical) 
aim or intention. Emerson, in his radical reduction of the problem of understanding 
(‘America,’ the future, etc.), thus finds himself in a curious hermeneutic circle (“the 
question and the answer are one”) that is strongly reminiscent of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics of facticity in which the act of understanding is itself part of Da-Sein, 
in which Da-Sein is nothing but the Selbstauslegung of Dasein (see GA 63, esp. 9-
16).  
And again, Emerson’s notion of the “groundless ground” here exposes, avant la 
lettre, a problem that will later be described by Nietzsche as the characteristic 
“Grundlosigkeit” (KAS, III, 106) of philosophy or, by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, 
as the necessary and unavoidable “Bodenlosigkeit” (GA, V, 8) of his own and 
philosophy’s undertaking. Emerson’s question (“Where do we find ourselves?”) 
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does consequently not lead to a representative formulation of our contemporary 
experience. Also, it does also not provide an answer that would reconcile the 
present moment with past and future history. Rather, the question initiates a 
hermeneutic maneuver that precisely resists the accumulation of the present 
moment into a series of (historical) moments and accentuates the eccentricity of 
the present moment with regards to history. This procedure of directing our 
understanding to or against what we are today induces, as Emerson argues in a 
passage in Experience, a certain bewilderment:  
“Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and 
believe that it has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below 
us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go 
upward and out of sight.” (W, III, 45) 
Emerson phrases this conundrum of the present moment’s eccentricity with regards 
to historical time in similar terms in “Over-Soul,” where he states that  
“man will come to see that the world is the perennial miracle which the soul worketh, 
and be less astonished at particular wonders; he will learn that there is no profane 
history; that all history is sacred; that the universe is represented in an atom, in a 
moment of time” (W, II, 297). 
The repetition of “will” here alerts us to the fact that the attainment of meaning (of 
the “sacred” history, of the “atom” or the “moment” with regards to the “universe”) 
is characteristically deferred, just as the “stairs above us” necessarily “go upward 
and out of sight”.  
These examples suggest that the characteristic figure of Emerson’s writing or 
poetics is how it imagines a ‘coming back to itself,’ a “reflection,” “inversion,” 
“criticism,” or “conversion”. Emerson is interested in such a figure of self-referral 
because it comes as a mode of poetic discourse that allows for an examination of 
the boundaries of our ways of making meaning. And he insists that Americans, as a 
liminal people, need to be especially open to such a poetic refiguration of what 
they are, if they want to live up to the promise named by ‘America’. Victor Turner 
has drawn attention to a similar figure of self-referral when he has argued, in his 
classic treatise of liminality in On the Edge of the Bush, that it is by going near or 
beyond the boundaries of meaning that “a community of human beings may bend 
existentially back upon itself and survey its extant condition not solely in cognitive 
terms but also by means of tropes, metaphors, metonyms, and symbolic 
configurations […]” (Turner 1985: 124). Similarly, the feasibility of ‘America’ as a 
community of liminars has to be reaffirmed constantly by way of such a poetic 
turning of the “tropes” and “symbolic configurations” that have brought about 
‘America’ in the first place: “This human mind wrote history, and this must read it. 
The Sphinx must solve her own riddle” (W, II, 4), Emerson states in “History” and 
phrases precisely the way in which we cannot escape our own ways of making 
meaning. Emerson’s writing accepts this “double bind”. It knows that this 
 THE APORI A OF PASSAGE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY  221  
 
hermeneutic circle is not dissolved by an attempt to establish a transcendental 
system of meanings or a more ‘representative’ account of our world, rather, it 
wants to precisely invest in this circle in order to enable its next turn, troping, etc.  
But this turn or Kehre, if we conceive of it in epochal terms, as Emerson often 
does, also comes as a risky sublation of prior meanings. The kind of epoché that I 
am interested here thus creates a “cleft” or a “verge,” at times even an “abyss,” to 
use Emerson’s terms, in which our habitual ways of making meaning are 
challenged from its margins or even, in extremis, from without the conventions 
they delimit. Emerson therefore locates the “measure of poetic power” (W, 12, 42) 
precisely in its ability to bracket the present world by way of a suspension of 
conventions and traditions. This suspension is brought about by a refiguration, that 
is, by a ‘poetic’ and, thus, incalculable turning of the tropes, that will itself result in 
a new account of the world not pre-contained in present discourses. This poetic 
bracketing of the world, as an interruption of our normalized ways of seeing it or 
giving account of it, corresponds to what Jean-François Lyotard has described, in 
The Differend, as the ethic possibility of the coming of the other, of l’invention de 
l’autre. And the situation of the American present – the way in which it presents 
itself as a hermeneutic conundrum, indicating a future that cannot be named – 
must be understood as what Lyotard calls the differend, that “unstable state and 
instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases 
cannot yet be” (Lyotard 1988: 13). In Lyotard, and I would argue that Emerson 
makes a similar point, this “unstable […] instant of language” is the promise of 
freedom and justice because it holds the promise of a different politics continually 
changed by its exposure to a potential in language. Emerson in his essays radically 
challenges contemporary definitions of freedom and redefines it as that which is 
irreducible to our historical framings and narratives. He thus envisions, to use 
Jacques Derrida’s phrase in The Other Heading, an “entitlement to a word” that is 
otherwise and other than the present. Derrida argues that this freedom stems from 
a posture that insists on “not to be identical to itself. Not to not have an identity, 
but not to be able to identify itself, to be able to say “I” or “we”; to be able to 
take the form of a subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only 
in the difference with itself (avec soi)” (Derrida 1992: 9).  
America’s epoché, its critical turning upon itself as well as the beginning of its 
age of criticism – America’s “age of reflection” (W, II, 327) as Emerson calls it in 
his lecture on “Intellect” – consequently speaks of America’s discovery of its 
inevitable self-implication or Selbstverhältnis. And Emerson’s redirection of focus to 
the present or the ordinary happens precisely in order for this self-reflexivity to 
occur. The discovery of this self-implication is tantamount, as Emerson argues, to 
America’s coming “out of darkness […] into the light of today (W, II, 327). The 
present thus for Emerson is the medium in which both our relation to the world as 
well as our reflection upon it undergo a complex process of criticism. And the 
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question “Where do we find ourselves?” is at once Emerson’s most basic as well as 
most sophisticated expression of this critical self-implication. The advent of 
America’s age is thus precisely not signalled by the achievement of the nation’s 
promise but, rather, by a becoming critical or self-reflexive. Again then, if I stress 
here Emerson’s attention to the moment of the present, then this is not meant to 
locate this present as the new origin of American culture. Rather, it is meant to 
suggest that Emerson’s present necessarily remains eccentric towards itself because 
in giving account of it, we must refigure it. Emerson’s question, instead of 
providing a point of origin for future and more authoritative articulations of 
‘America,’ thus points us to an originary complication, an origin that is already 
double, because it is always already related to itself. And it is precisely in this 
sense that Emerson’s vision of the foundation of a specifically ‘American’ culture is 
indeed radical and unprecedented: it sees ‘America’s’ cultural subjectivity, its 
‘identity’ in a critical process of rhetorics rather than in the individual destinies of 
the subjects that found this culture. If we consider contemporary attempts of 
confirming America’s identity via the re-establishment of a genealogy of founding 
fathers, we may begin to understand how radical Emerson’s vision was at the time.  
Democracy’s ouverture  
In the following, I will establish a connection between Emerson’s obsession with 
the eccentric temporality of the present with Jacques Derrida’s elaboration of a 
notion of “politics” or “democracy”. Although the terminology of the present 
(presentation, presence, etc.) has become off-limits and is now a forbidden 
language in cultural studies, it has been overlooked that Jacques Derrida’s turn to 
politics is nothing but a re-evaluation of the temporality of such an eccentric 
present. Not the present as presence, as something that is present to itself, but as 
the moment in which politics is oriented towards the future, that is, the moment of 
Entscheidung and Ereignis. Derrida is not the ‘philosopher of the future’ – clearly 
he knew Nietzsche well enough to avoid some of the more sinister implications of 
this label – and I do not think that he is the ‘philosopher of the messianic,’ as 
current critical language has it – even tough he has of course been deeply 
influenced by a Judaic tradition of thought. Derrida, as I will show, is well aware 
that an ‘ethics of the future’ is a dangerous kind of transcendentalism if it is not 
connected to the contingencies of a (lived and experienced) present. Derrida’s 
writing, especially that after his political Kehre, comes predominantly as a criticism 
of philosophy’s metaphysical implications, but it also imagines forms of a 
participation in the present – that, for Derrida, are potentially, forms of justice or 
freedom.  
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For Derrida, if this present is to potentially open up a different future, it 
precisely needs to lack a horizon of expectation. In other words: It cannot have a 
telos or teleology, it must come as an opening, as an unconditioned and 
unconditional beginning: “History depends on such an excessive beginning 
[ouverture]” (Derrida and Wills 1995: 6). Derrida argues that in the moment “of 
waiting without horizon of expectation” (Derrida 1994: 168), potentially the 
advent of something different or new can happen. This moment thus cannot be 
inscribed within the calendars of a nation, and, in our context, it cannot be 
textually produced in a constative statement such as the Declaration of 
Independence. The attempt to lock the performative statement into a programme, 
as Derrida insists, “is quite simply to erect a barricade against the future” (Derrida 
1983: 19). Confronting this moment of decision in an ambivalent present therefore 
means to “always risk the worst” (Derrida, Porter, and Morris 1983: 19). 
It is important to insist here that this is not a moral or ethical reductionism or 
the lack of a more concrete political project: the moment of decision will be, there 
is no doubt about that in Derrida’s writing, violent and “monstrous” (Derrida 2005: 
144). For Derrida, the moment of decision – although its cancellation of 
ambivalences is never free of judgment and never without violence – is already 
ethical. The opening up of justice, the political system, etc. is in itself already the 
direction of a new and more ‘just’ justice or political system. And it is precisely in 
this excess of meaning, in the precipitancy or excessivity that is realized by the 
decision that Derrida finds the promise of justice or democracy (see Derrida 1992). 
The only (but indeed radical) assumption of Derrida’s politics is thus that in every 
moment of decision, there is a “kind of essential disproportion that must inscribe 
excess and inadequation in itself” (Derrida 1992: 248). This disproportion itself 
raises the stakes in the demand for justice” (Derrida 1992: 248), that is, the 
inscription of an excess in the moment of the decision guarantees that the decision 
itself cannot be instrumentalised, cannot be calculated and therefore will have to 
be taken time and time again.  
I want to understand what I have described as epoché in terms of a similar 
irreducible excessivity, a procedure that makes ordinary meaning go beyond itself, 
leading to a ‘de-totalization’ of the hold of ordinary language and common sense. It 
is by way of a refiguration, recirculation, and remobilization of the terms of 
common diction in “poetry” – Emerson’s term for all kinds of literary writing – that 
this excessive meaning is produced. While the “demand for justice” in Derrida’s 
philosophy is always bound up with language’s potential for difference – its 
potential to always provide another meaning –, deconstruction’s movement is one 
of constant “deferral,” “delay,” or “postponement” as well as simultaneous 
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“urgency,” or “imminence” (Derrida 1994: 31)5: It urgently wants to bring about 
the new meaning while knowing at the same time, that it has not yet arrived.  
As we have already seen in Chapter One, this is precisely the way in which 
Emerson conceives of the moment of the present as comprising different 
temporalities or temporal movements: On the one hand, the “American” present 
makes us aware that we are always and inevitably too late – “It is a mischievous 
notion that we are come late into nature; that the world was finished a long time 
ago” (W, I, 105) – yet also always too early – “I read with some joy of the 
auspicious signs of the coming days, as they glimmer already through poetry and 
art, through philosophy and science” (W, I, 110). There is, then, in Emerson an 
elaboration of a kind of Derridean originary posteriority (simultaneous urgency and 
deferment) that is the very sign of his politics: it voices the unconditioned or 
unconditional desire for change and another politics while it knows about our 
inescapable debt to and involvement in the past. Emerson’s “embrace of the 
common” (W, I, 111), the way in which his writing focuses on the “matter” of our 
ordinary lives – “The meal in the firkin; the milk in the pan; the ballad in the 
street; the news of the boat; the glance of the eye; the form and the gait of the 
body” (W, I, 111) – directs our attention precisely to the way in which the present 
moment of American culture is at stake, is about to be decided, that is, become 
history. And thus, even if or precisely because it does not put forward a political 
agenda, it lays out a politics. As Derrida points out: “There is an avenir for justice 
and there is no justice except to the degree that some event is possible which, as 
event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations and so forth” (Derrida 
1992: 27).  
Emerson’s repeated criticism of the notion of “calculation” shows that he was 
intimately aware that America’s future was not a matter of a political programmatics 
or one of simple calculation. Living in a time that saw the rapid evolution of the 
means of “statistics” and its implementation in all branches of society and 
government, he forcefully suggests that we cannot calculate our progress. 
Decisions (and with them a qualitatively different future) can only happen in a 
moment of “precipitate urgency,” of “thoughtlessness and unconsciousness” 
(Derrida 1992: 26). In order to occur, they must be “made outside of knowledge 
or given norms” (Derrida 1994: 355). Only if our present is at stake – only if we 
are willing to again confront a kind of Nietzschean moment of madness in which 
the hold of our common diction is potentially lost – will there be an opening out 
 
 5 See also the following passage in Specters of Marx: “[D]ifferance, if it remains irreducible, irreducibly required 
by the spacing of any promise and by the future-to-come that comes to open it, does not mean only deferral, 
lateness, delay, postponement. In the incoercible differance the here-now unfurls. Without lateness, without 
delay, but without presence, it is the preciptiation of an absolut singularity, … binding itself necessarily to the 
form of the instant, in imminence and in urgency: even if it moves toward what remains to come there is the 
pledge … The pledge is given here and now, even before, perhaps, a decision confirms it. It thus responds 
without delay to the demand of justice. The latter by definition is impatient, uncompromising, and unconditional“ 
(Derrida 1994: 31).  
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of which history might proceed otherwise (as ‘democracy,’ as ‘America,’ etc.). It is 
precisely the unsorted disorder of the present – what Emerson calls its 
“mountainous miscellany” (W, VI, 289) – that holds the promise of more than one 
plausible course of history. Our inability to give a representative account of our 
present moment, the dichotomy of what we know (about ourselves) and what we 
do (to ourselves?) then, as in Derrida’s account, “will be the condition of practical 
freedom” (Derrida 1994: 355). And, as Derrida argues, it is the “non-
contemporaneity of present time with itself” (Derrida 1994: 25) that is then 
designated as the condition of the possibility of the event, and, with that, as the 
condition of the possibility of freedom and justice.  
Therefore, the notions of a democracy a-venir (Derrida 1994; 1992: esp. 76-78) 
and that of a justice a-venir (Derrida 1992: 256-257) are associated with the 
structure of difference itself. This association of différance and a certain notion of 
democracy has been a persistent theme in Derrida’s late work (see Derrida 1994: 
64-65), and Derrida, in his explication of the “structure of the promise” of 
democracy (Derrida 1992: 78), repeatedly points out that this promise necessarily 
needs to be postponed, that this promise is never to be fulfilled, i.e. never to be 
turned into a utopian, messianic fulfilment. Otherwise it would be presence, and 
therefore, no longer a claim or an opening in historical time. Obviously its slow 
congealment into forms of private and public life cannot be prevented, and the 
unconditioned promise of one generation will always revert into or concretize into 
the life-world of the next – characteristically shaped by ennui, boredom, and 
nostalgia. The promise of one generation then is the unmarked, everyday life-
world of the next. This is why the present has to be searched for its ambivalences, 
the way in which it contradicts itself, the ways in which its ideals are not in accord 
with the condition of its people. Democracy and differance consequently coincide 
in the “cleft” or “verge” (Emerson’s terms) implied by the different temporalities of 
the contemporary moment. This opening differentiates the present from itself and 
presents us with a decision, that is, with the minimal space of another politics.  
Even if Emerson consequently talks of the future, the future is at stake only 
insofar as the present is at stake, i.e. awaiting a decision or in the process of 
performing the decision. Simon Critchley has stressed that the mode of difference 
combines both postponement and urgency (the very signature of Emerson’s 
political stance, as we have already seen in Chapter One). In his essay “The 
Other’s Decision in Me,” Critchley argues that Derrida’s concept of politics is only 
plausible if we manage to think the here and now of its claim without taking it to 
be realized yet:  
“It is a question here of linking la démocratie à venir to différance understood […] as l’ici 
maintenant sans présence, as an experience of the impossible without which justice 
would be meaningless. In this sense, la démocratie à venir does not mean that 
tomorrow (and tomorrow and tomorrow) democracy will be realized, but rather that the 
experience of justice as the maintaining-now of the relation to an absolute singularity is 
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the à venir of democracy, the temporality of democracy is advent, it is arrival happening 
now. […] [D]emocracy is the future of deconstruction, but this future is happening 
now.”(Critchley 1999: 154)  
Critchley furthermore states – I think correctly – that Derrida’s conception of a 
democracy to come is reminiscent of Benjamin’s conception of the messianic as it 
blasts through the continuum of the present (Critchley 1999: 154), establishing the 
present’s difference with itself (ici maitenant sans presence). Derrida’s concept of a 
“messianism without content, of the “messianic without messianism” (Derrida 1994: 
65), that is: of a messianism that is willing to give up its central norm or pledge 
(that salvation will happen in the future) in order to mobilize a (political, ethical, 
etc.) potential for self-differentiation in the here and now. For Derrida, it is 
precisely this self-differentiation bound back into our lived present that forms the 
promise of an emancipation that is not already pre-contained in ethical norms. This 
is why his messianism needs to be one without a messiah and why his invocation 
of Marxism in The Specters of Marx is less concerned with the ethical norms put 
forward by it but rather with the structure and form of the utterance or invocation 
in Marx’s writing (see Derrida 1994: 162-176). Again then, we encounter here the 
attempt to think the potential of a Jetzt, that is, the potential of a present moment 
to bring about contingent historical responses. In Emerson, this is connected to a 
questioning of our particular circumstances and our relation to them in language. 
Consequently, the procedures of his writings point to a more radical hermeneutics 
that does not want to discover some lost meaning of ‘America,’ but rather 
conceives of ‘America’ as nothing else than the continual departure from itself, a 
process of self-differentiation put in motion by the kind of self-implication indicated 
by Emerson’s question “Where do we find ourselves?” America, because of this 
self-differentiation, is a social body that always stands beside itself, or, as Joseph 
Vogl has phrased it, it is “stets verschoben, aufgehoben und vertagt […]. Die 
Heterogenität der sich selbst stiftenden Gemeinschaft verlangt, dass sie ihre 
Gründung stets ein weiteres Mal wiederholt, sie wird demokratisch nur im 
fortwährenden Rekurs auf ihre innere Kluft.”6 ‘America,’ then, is this sideways shift, 
the continual slipperiness of its foundations. And we have seen how this Kluft or 
“verge” never fails to attract Emerson’s attention. He in fact makes a point that is 
very similar to Vogl’s when he argues that it is precisely the American desire to 
define the specificity of its culture and history that produces what Emerson calls – 
in Heideggerian diction avant la lettre – the “unhandsome part of our condition,” 
the unavailability of the meaning of ‘America’:  
“I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our 
fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition. 
Nature does not like to be observed, and likes that we should be her fools and 
 
 6 Joseph Vogl, “Einleitung,” in Gemeinschaften. Positionen zu einer Philosophie des Politischen (Vogl 1994: 20) 
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playmates. We may have the sphere for our cricket-ball, but not a berry for our 
philosophy.” (W, III, 49) 
The hermeneutic impulse in Emerson consequently questions the nature of our 
experience in a kind of radical perspectivism in which the arrival of the full 
significance of ‘America’ is continually deferred. It shows that our experiences 
connect only as in “a string of beads” and that the moments of our lifes “prove to 
be many-coloured lenses which paint the world their own hue, and each shows 
only what lies in its focus” (W, III, 50). But it is precisely by virtue of being 
contingent with regards to our assessment of the world, by virtue of never quite 
being in harmony with the world, that these experiences also function as the seeds 
of change. Faced with the paralysis of American culture in Jacksonian democracy, 
Emerson locates in our contingent, momentary experiences the “force” or “chance” 
of risking what we are. His writing therefore references something like a coming 
together of deconstruction and hermeneutics in a “more radical hermeneutics,” to 
use a term coined by John D. Caputo (Caputo 2000). Hans Georg Gadamer has 
argued that hermeneutics requires us to put our own horizon of understanding 
“into play” (ins Spiel bringen) and thereby putting it “at risk” (aufs Spiel setzen) 
(Gadamer 1960: 366). But while for Gadamer’s hermeneutics the aim is always to 
appropriate another (or the other’s) horizon as one’s own (in the sense of an 
Aneignung) in what his hermeneutics conceives of as a “fusion of horizons” 
(Horizontverschmelzung), deconstruction has shown that to ‘risk’ this risk (of 
approaching the other’s horizon of understanding, or, more generally, of what 
deconstruction calls the coming of the other) implies to put one’s own meaning 
and self at risk, to put one’s own home at risk. Again, Emerson of course uses very 
different terminology, but the gist of his argument in the essays is similar. Here, 
the final Horizontverschmelzung – the attainment of America’s providential place 
in history, or, quite simply, the attainment of the meaning of America – cannot 
take place: because there can be no (complete) re-actualisation of the texts of 
tradition as there is no stable meaning to the founding texts in the first place; 
because America’s historical moment is irreducible; and, last but not least, because 
the moment of experience and, especially, of reading and writing in Emerson is 
irreversible and cannot be brought into coordination with our ordinary experience 
of temporality. Another passage from “Experience” may illustrate that for Emerson 
the undertaking of putting one’s horizon of understanding into play implies a risk 
that is very real indeed:  
“I had fancied that the value of life lay in its inscrutable possibilities; in the fact that I 
never know, in addressing myself to a new individual, what may befall me. I carry the 
keys of my castle in my hand, ready to throw them at the feet of my lord, whenever and 
in what disguise soever he shall appear. I know he is in the neighborhood, hidden 
among vagabonds. Shall I preclude my future by taking a high seat and kindly adapting 
my conversation to the shape of heads? When I come to that, the doctors shall buy me 
for a cent.” (W, III, 53f.)  
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On the one hand, “unsettling”, that radical questioning of our horizon(s) of 
understanding, Emerson says, has the power to put our homes in jeopardy so that 
“I never know […] what may befall me.” On the other, it is only by taking this 
risk that we can guarantee the coming of the other (the “new individual”), the 
advent of a different future. This conundrum for Emerson is never a simple or 
easily manageable one, certainly not among the misery depicted in “Experience.” 
It confronts us with an existential decision of which we cannot know the outcome. 
“Gladly we would anchor, but the anchorage is quicksand. This onward trick of 
nature is too strong for us: Pero si muove” (W, III, 55). The “quicksand” of 
“Experience” implies that to put our horizon of understanding at risk can also mean 
that we lose what we thought was a ‘representative’ experience as well as a 
‘representative’ depiction thereof. The common is no longer simply the stable 
ground from which we can start to answer the question “Where do we find 
ourselves?” This ordinariness has itself become uncanny, to use Cavell’s phrase, by 
way of our self-implication and therefore our everyday life, our customs and 
traditions themselves are, as Emerson argues elsewhere, a “tottering basis” (LL, II, 
280), a “groundless ground” (LL, II, 280). And this for Emerson “is the precise 
symbol of our whole position in the universe, our whole social and moral status” 
(LL, II, 280).  
The test of war  
America, as an idea, in Emerson’s writing thus emerges as a criticism of historicity, 
as a construct that prevents and precludes its own historic specificity and whose 
historical situation must always remain “in flux”, “transient,” and ambivalent, that is: 
haunted by the contradictory ghosts of its past and its future.  
“So our life, which had its beginning a few summers ago from a sorry succession of 
some dull material causes, walks with God on the other side through time and chance, 
through the fall of suns and systems, through unbounded ages, unhurt and immortal. ‘T 
is the rich treasure in earthen vessels. Such being the character of our life, such must 
also be the character of its descriptions. If a man carefully examine his thoughts he will 
be surprised to find how much he lives in the future. His well being is always ahead.“ 
(J, II, 168)  
Emerson’s conception of America’s present is then a kind of Derridean khora, 
something irreducible to truth, impossible to identify, something written in sand, 
blown away by the next (historical) storm.  
In “On the Name,” Derrida reads and conceptualizes the slipperiness of the term 
khora in Plato’s Timaeus (Derrida and Dutoit 1995). In Plato, khora carries the 
meanings of place or location, but Derrida points out that any definition of the 
term would have to acknowledge the very “textual drift” (Derrida and Dutoit 
1995: 123) that seems to be “essential” to the khora and conceives of it as a 
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“necessity that is neither generative nor engendered” (Derrida and Dutoit 1995: 
126). The khora is a non-name then for something that refuses to be named, for 
what philosophy cannot name. Derrida’s comments on the chora are relevant to 
our concerns here because the khora identifies a certain ‘not knowing’ in (the 
being of) every identity. This is relevant not only for our discussion of Emerson’s 
problematization of America’s identity, it also suggests a model with which to 
describe the import of Emerson’s writing or écriture. I have shown how Emerson 
interacts with contemporary historicist discourses only to renounce them in favour 
of a more complex historicism that includes both an understanding of how history 
is made in writing as well as the possibility of the failure of that writing of history. 
For Emerson, literature is a historical mode. But it is also the discourse of literature 
or poetry that can exhibit the failures of history, that can show how once a 
historical account has been established, all other “histories” will be lost. While 
literature may consequently stand as an example of history, even as a 
representative discourse of history, it extends beyond this relation to include 
something of what Emerson calls a more “radical correspondence” (W, I, 29) 
which is itself not reducible to history. Rather, here the representativity of 
historical discourse, its ability to establish a correspondence between text and 
event is challenged insofar as Emerson draws attention to that which is eventful in 
the text itself, to that which is the event of the text. That is, we need to pay 
attention to the ways in which the effects of semiology, the effects of signification, 
and the material effects of the text form a dimension of rhetorics that both is and is 
not an effect of history. In other words: History and writing subsist precisely 
because of these more “radical correspondences”.  
There is, however, as I will show in the following, in Emerson a certain 
hesitation as to whether an unbounded, chaotic present or, for that matter, it 
description in literature or poetry can be in a sense instrumental in bringing about 
the next epoch of American civilization. That is, Emerson’s estimation of the 
potential “plannability” or “programmability” of the epochal threshold changes over 
time and he gradually comes to see the role of the scholar or poet as the 
harbinger or even herald of a new epoch in a rather bleak light. Emerson’s 
comments on the notion and the fact of “war” in his essay of the same title will 
here serve as a kind of litmus test to gauge how he assesses the potential of a 
contingent, unorganized, and unprecedented present. After all, the brilliant hope 
that Emerson had placed in the American scholar for a reformation of American 
Culture will be utterly devastated by the horrors of the Civil War.  
In the lecture “War” (W, XI, 149-176), delivered in the spring of 1838, 
Emerson starts by way of presenting war as a kind of Schmittean state of 
exception, as the aporia of an interregnum, that by means of its violence brings 
about the next epoch in human history. Even tough, Emerson argues, war may 
seem “to sane men at the present day […] to look like an epidemic insanity, 
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breaking out here and there like the cholera or influenza, infecting men’s brains 
instead of their bowels” (W, XI, 151), he nevertheless sees the “copious 
bloodshed” (W, XI, 152) of war as “necessary” (W, XI, 151). On the one hand 
then, “[o]n its own scale, on the virtues it loves, [war] endures no counterfeit, but 
shakes the whole society until every atom falls into the place its specific gravity 
assigns it” (W, XI, 152). War, I take Emerson to say, is instrumental in bringing 
about the new era. On the other hand, however, war is a phenomenon that is 
itself historical, a nuisance that, given time, will no longer exist. Emerson, whose 
reception of a Hegelian philosophy of history I have outlined before, sees war as a 
mere stage in the progressive development of thought: Commenting on the human 
race’s penchant for the “brutish form” (W, XI, 160) of war, Emerson is convinced 
that the “eternal germination of the better has unfolded new powers, new instincts, 
which were really concealed under this rough and base rind” (W, XI, 160). There 
is, then, a twist in Emerson’s argument that has gone unnoticed: the events of war 
are themselves only a “form” expressing a certain stage in the progressive history 
of ideas. Emerson here gives precedence to ideas rather than events and, thus, the 
priority is not to avoid war, but rather to avoid the ideas that are expressed by the 
“form” of war: “[I]f the rising generation can be provoked to think it unworthy to 
nestle into every abomination of the past, and shall feel the generous darings of 
austerity and virtue; then war has a short day, and human blood will cease to 
flow” (W, XI, 175). We need to be able to conceive of the possibility of peace, 
we need to be able to “think” peace in order to avoid war. Thus he asks what 
may, at first sight, seem like a rather naïve question: “Cannot peace be, as well as 
war?” (W, XI, 160). But the question challenges his readers to think first the 
attainability and implications of the idea of peace before calling for this or that 
political programme to secure it.  
Emerson’s complex argument again turns historicist dogma on its head when he 
argues that it is not events (in the sense of a Realgeschichte) but rather ideas that 
define the age. Although war still “break[s] out here and there” (W, XI, 151) it is 
precisely the way in which his age has begun to think the idea of peace that for 
him indicates that America is entering a new era:  
“The idea itself is the epoch; the fact that it has become so distinct to any small number 
of persons as to become a subject of prayer and hope, of concert and discussion, – that 
is the commanding fact. This having come, much more will follow. Revolutions go not 
backward. The star once risen, though only one man in the hemisphere has yet seen its 
upper limb in the horizon, will mount and mount, until it becomes visible to other 
men, to multitudes, and climbs the zenith of all eyes. And so, it is not a great matter 
how long men refuse to believe the advent of peace: war is on its last legs; and a 
universal peace is as sure as is the prevalence of civilization over barbarism, of liberal 
governments over feudal forms. The question for us is only, How soon?” (W, XI, 161)  
Of course we can always argue in hindsight that Emerson was, plainly and simply, 
wrong in his assessment of the times, after all, the “rising star” of peace he had 
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envisioned was thrown out of its orbit by a brutal Civil War twenty years later. But 
what is at stake for Emerson in his contemporaries’ refusal “to belief the advent of 
peace” (W, XI, 161; my emphasis) is the power of ideas to form a new era. If only 
they were to invest in this new and yet untried idea of peace, Emerson hopes, the 
whole system of beliefs and values would change as the sedimented forms that we 
use to express these beliefs and values would themselves be recirculated and thus 
make new ideas sayable, thinkable: “This having come, much more will follow” 
(W, XI, 161). Again, then, we find here the already familiar gesture of Emerson’s 
criticism of historicism that combines a call for the urgency of the problem now 
with the inevitable insight that the coming of the new idea will necessarily be 
deferred – “The question for us is only, How soon?” (W, XI, 161).  
Emerson is of course fully aware “[t]hat the project of peace should appear 
visionary to great numbers of sensible men” and that it “should appear […] to be 
embarrassed with extreme practical difficulties” (W, XI, 161). But the phrase “the 
idea itself is the epoch” in a nutshell contains his redefinition of historicism in 
terms not of specificity, of what is, but, rather, in terms of what might be, had we 
only the (linguistic, rhetorical, poetic, philosophical) means to conceive of it. As so 
often in Emerson, it is not events themselves that bring about change. Rather, our 
use of language opens up a horizon of possibility that makes not only new things 
sayable, but has the power to itself give rise to events. As we have seen in 
Chapter Four, this is what Emerson terms “correspondence,” the overflowing of 
language, poetry and literature into life so that the movement of language (the 
way in which it refigures, recirculates, etc.) itself galvanizes into the movement of 
our lifes. The avoidance of war and the advent of peace, then, is dependant not 
upon a political program (e.g. an American paradigm of non-intervention) but 
rather on a process of (poetic) figuration that lets us think new ideas and thereby 
lets old ideas “melt away”:  
“It is really a thought that built this portentous war-establishment, and a thought shall 
also melt it away. Every nation and every man instantly surround themselves with a 
material apparatus which exactly corresponds to their moral state, or their state of 
thought. Observe how every truth and every error, each a thought of some man’s mind, 
clothes itself with societies, houses, cities, language, ceremonies, newspapers. Observe 
the ideas of the present day, – orthodoxy, skepticism, missions, popular education, 
temperance, anti-masonry, anti-slavery; see how each of these abstractions has 
embodied itself in an imposing apparatus in the community; and how timber, brick, 
lime and stone have flown into convenient shape, obedient to the master-idea reigning 
in the minds of many persons.” (W, XI, 163) 
What Emerson terms the “imposing apparatus” is the sedimentation of a political 
process into institutionalized forms, and the passage makes explicit that he thinks 
this “embodiment” of thought is unavoidable. There is a danger however, Emerson 
reminds us, because as soon as these forms have become an “imposing apparatus” 
they are no longer perceived to be momentary expressions of the present state of 
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society but become mere unmarked circumstances. Emerson then argues that the 
sights of America’s military apparatus all around the country are precisely such 
expressions of what was once a momentary expression of society’s situation but has 
now become an unmarked (“eternal”) circumstance: “We have all grown up in the 
sight of frigates and navy yards, of armed forts and islands, of arsenals and militia” 
(W, XI, 163). The military apparatus produces its own necessities, but Emerson 
wants “to put trust in ideas, and not in circumstances” (W, XI, 163). Again, the 
potential for change is here located not in events but rather in the contingencies of 
what Emerson variously terms thought, language, spirit: “The least change in the 
man will change his circumstances” (W, XI, 165f.). But to embrace this potential 
for change again means to accept a certain eccentricism or exotism, because ideas 
that bring about new epochs will not be pre-contained in the discourses that we 
use at any given moment: “There is no good now enjoyed by society, that was not 
once as problematical and visionary as this” (W, XI, 163).  
How can such a politics – one that cannot and must not be instrumentalised as a 
political programmatics – be instigated? In Emerson’s words: “How is this new 
aspiration of the human mind to be made visible and real? How is it to pass out of 
thoughts into things?” (W, XI, 170), he asks, carefully choosing the tentative 
“aspirations” to indicate how precarious this process of the progression of the 
human mind and culture is. And he continues:  
“Not, certainly, in the first place, in the way of routine and mere forms, – the universal 
specific of modern politics; not by organizing a society, and going through a course of 
resolutions and public manifestoes, and being thus accredited to the public […] . We 
have played this game to tediousness. […] This is not to be carried by public opinion, 
but by private opinion, by private conviction, by private, dear, and earnest love” (W, 
XI, 170f–71)  
And returning to the question of “Cannot peace be, as well as war?”, Emerson 
argues that  
“if, for example, [man] could be inspired with a tender kindness to the souls of men, 
and should come to feel that every man was another self with whom he might come to 
join, as left hand works with right. Every degree of the ascendency of this feeling would 
cause the most striking changes of external things: the tents would be struck; the men-
of-war would rot ashore; the arms rust; the cannon would become street-posts; the 
pikes, a fisher’s harpoon; the marching regiment would be a caravan of emigrants, 
peaceful pioneers at the fountains of the Wabash and the Missouri. (W, XI, 166) 
Emerson utopian vision of a peaceful and thus changed America does not rely on 
its established institutions (its military apparatus, etc.) or known authorities (the 
genealogy of founding fathers). Rather, it builds upon the contingent potential of 
human interaction and requires an unconditional openness to the other that 
Emerson expresses as “private, dear, and earnest love”. This “politics” then is 
similar to what Jacques Derrida has called a “politics of Friendship” that 
commences “in the friendship of an alliance without institution” (Derrida 1994: 86). 
 THE APORI A OF PASSAGE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY  233  
 
Derrida argues such a politics of friendship always presents itself as “a 
deconstruction of the genealogical schema,” so that it becomes possible “to think 
and live a politics, a friendship, a justice which begin by breaking with their 
naturalness or their homogeneity, with their alleged place of origin” (Derrida 
1997: 105). I think that Derrida’s comments on friendship can be applied to 
Emerson’s investigation of the possibility of peace, since it envisions a similarly 
radical reduction of a general political scenario to the field of private interaction. 
While Emerson’s contemporaries call for America’s rise to world power, he 
exceptionally restages American politics on the level of human interaction and 
transfers the progress of the nation into man, “because in himself reside infinite 
resources” (W, XI, 172). This is not merely a reinforced, extreme version of the 
doctrine of American individualism, rather, I want to read it as a relocation of the 
progress of culture to what is, essentially, not proper to it. Because for Emerson, 
these “infinite resources” are a kind of original heterogeneity in man that is not 
and will not entirely be made commensurate with culture. These “infinite 
resources” consequently stand for nothing more and nothing less than the principle 
of hope that the epigram to the essay “War” establishes: “The archangel Hope / 
Looks to the azure cope, / Waits through dark ages for the morn, / Defeated day 
by day, but unto Victory born” (W, XI, 149).  
Given this radical reformulation of American politics as a means to ensure a 
potential for change, it comes as no surprise that Emerson does not want to 
anticipate or predetermine America’s future politics. When he argues that the 
“present fabric of our society and the present course of events” (W, XI, 175) points 
to the “[t]he proposition of the Congress of Nations” (W, XI, 175), this is obviously 
only a very general vision of the future. He does, however, not give up on the 
idea that it is in America (and not in the nations of the old continent) that this 
change will happen. Therefore he argues that in America  
“[t]here is the highest fitness in the place and time in which this enterprise is begun. Not 
in an obscure corner, not in a feudal Europe, not in an antiquated appanage where no 
onward step can be taken without rebellion, is this seed of benevolence laid in the 
furrow, with tears of hope; but in this broad America of God and man, where the forest 
is only now falling, or yet to fall, and the green earth opened to the inundation of 
emigrant men from all quarters of oppression and guilt; here, where not a family, not a 
few men, but mankind, shall say what shall be; here, we ask, Shall it be War, or shall it 
be Peace?” (W, XI, 175f.)  
The passage makes clear that Emerson thinks of America’s future as yet to be 
decided and, as we have already seen in Chapter One, his assessment of the 
likelihood of change for America changes over time. While his early essays sing 
America’s praise as a nation in which change is continually happening, Emerson is 
much more skeptical about the chances for change in his later essays. However, 
with the advent of the Civil War, Emerson sees America’s prospects radically 
challenged or even annihilated. He is no longer certain whether change will 
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happen all by itself and in view of the “conspiracy of slavery” (W, XI, 297) he is at 
a loss to explain how America’s change could go so completely wrong. “[T]hey call 
it an institution, I call it a destitution, – this stealing of men and setting them to 
work” (W, XI, 297), Emerson says, expressing his perplexity, and asks: “Why 
cannot the best civilization be extended over the whole country, since the 
disorder of the less-civilized portion menaces the existence of the country?” (W, 
XI, 299). And it is precisely or notably in this conundrum of being presented with 
America’s two minds – its thinking of peace or equality yet also its refusal to 
abolish slavery – that Emerson returns to historicist thought and to the question of 
whether a war may be instrumental in bringing about America’s new epoch.  
In April in 1861, the situation has fundamentally changed, and so is Emerson’s 
mood when he delivers a lecture in Boston on “Civilization at a Pinch”. On 
January 31, 1862, at the Smithsonian institute in Washington, Emerson delivers a 
revised version of the lecture, entitled “American Civilization,” in which he revisits 
some of his earlier comments on war, now all inflected by the current crisis:  
“‘There are periods,’ said Niebuhr, ‘when something much better than happiness and 
security of life is attainable.’ We live in a new and exceptionable age. America is 
another word for Opportunity. Our whole history appears like a last effort of the Divine 
Providence in behalf of the human race; and a literal slavish following of precedents, as 
by a justice of the peace, is not for those who at this hour lead the destinies of this 
people. The evil you contend with has taken alarming proportions, and you still 
content yourself with parrying the blow it aims, but, as if enchanted, abstain from 
striking at the cause.” (W, XI, 299f.)  
Emerson here juxtaposes the earlier essays theme of America’s opportunity – its 
promise of a better or at least changed world, its promise of “peace” – to the 
greatest evil, “the alarming proportions” of the institution of slavery that had led 
America into its civil war. That he is taking his cue from Barthold Georg Niebuhr 
here is significant insofar as it stresses his epochal concerns: Niebuhr had 
formulated a trailblazing study of history in his Vorlesungen über Römische 
Geschichte and his work focused on the question of the Zeitalter as well as on the 
modalities of the Zeitenwende. For Emerson, the question of war’s legitimacy is 
connected to the question of a decision of the age. That is: Emerson is not sure 
whether a call for war will be a legitimate response to the present conundrum of 
America’s division over the issue of slavery or whether to live up to its 
“opportunity” would mean something along the lines of a more radical laissez-faire 
acquiescence. What does one do if, even in the face of the evil of slavery, one 
cannot see how Americans “could be inspired with a tender kindness to the souls 
of men” (W, XI, 166)? In other words: What does one do if all the signs of the 
times show that America has taken the wrong path? What are the options for 
political intervention now that all hope has been lost?  
“If the American people hesitate, it is not for want of warning or advices. The telegraph 
has been swift enough to announce our disasters. The journals have not suppressed the 
 THE APORI A OF PASSAGE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY  235  
 
extent of the calamity. Neither was there any want of argument or of experience. Neither 
was anything concealed of the theory or practice of slavery.” (W, XI, 300)  
Confronted with the evil of slavery – and Emerson never wavered in his call for 
abolition – and an increasing national divide, Emerson hesitates as to the 
legitimacy of war as a last measure. While Emerson knows that the American 
republic needs a violent shake-up to wrest itself free of the evil of slavery, he 
fears that to use war as a means of bringing about America’s next age would 
inevitably mean the precontainment of a politics. This is why the civil war and 
slavery come as the great tests for Emerson’s ‘theory’ of the advent of America’s 
age of democracy. Reading the signs of the times (the “warning and advices”), 
Emerson’s response is somewhat unrevealing, if not to say misplaced, if we assess 
it in terms of the politics it suggests for solving the crisis of the Civil War. Again, 
his solution to this dilemma works according to the principles I have outlined in 
previous chapters: the promise of change does not come in the form of changed 
circumstances, it is a matter of language and of expression. Here in “American 
Civilization,” change again comes in the guise of a refigurative move: Emerson 
explains that the war is a consequence of ideas becoming ends in themselves and, 
therefore, to bring about change, these ideas (and the tropes that describe them) 
need to be refigured or, even, substituted by new ones. In a decisive and 
characteristic move at the end of “American Civilization,” Emerson thus renounces 
all the terms that have become standard designators of America’s freedom and 
instead introduces a new one, “morality”: “It is not free institutions, it is not a 
republic, it is not a democracy, that is the end, - no, but only the means. Morality 
is the object of government” (W, XI, 309). Morality thus stands here for the 
principle of change itself, for what, just twenty-five years later, Nietzsche’s Zur 
Genealogie der Moral will describe as the possibility of an “Umwerthung aller 
Werthe” (KSA, V, 269). In late Emerson, this possibility of a revaluation of the 
tropes of our discourse as well as the unpredictability or contingency of individual 
speech defines the possibility of freedom itself, as the concluding passages of 
“American Civilization” on Lincoln suggest:  
“This is the consolation on which we rest in the darkness of the future and the 
afflictions of to-day, that the government of the world is moral, and does forever destroy 
what is not. […] Since the above pages were written, President Lincoln has proposed to 
Congress that the government shall cooperate with any state that shall enact a gradual 
abolishment of slavery. In the recent series of national successes, this message is the 
best. It marks the happiest day in the political year. The American Executive ranges itself 
for the first time on the side of freedom. […] He speaks his own thought in his own 
style. All thanks and honor to the Head of the State! […] If Congress accords with the 
President, it is not yet too late to begin the emancipation; but we think it will always 
be too late to make it gradual. (W, XI, 309-11) 
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Understanding and Abandonment  
Emerson never lost his interest in the question of how to secure America’s political 
progress and the advent of its new age. However, unlike some of his 
contemporaries he was not a social reformer in the sense that he proposed new 
social experiments, associations, legislations, etc. His credentials as a social 
reformer are questionable and his comments on the political agenda of his day 
more often than not remain strangely inconclusive (see also Chapter One). The 
historicist re-evaluation of Emerson’s writing under the auspices of a “de-
transcendentalizing” in recent criticism, its assumption that his writing is reducible 
to the social and political concerns of his time has ignored that the restaging of 
Emerson’s “transcendentalism” as something that is to be explained with recourse 
to the concrete materialities of his contemporary world (race, class, gender, etc.), 
cannot explain Emerson’s silence on much of the social concerns of his era – the 
issue of slavery being the most obvious exception. Also, the historicist’s bias 
towards bringing Emerson’s eccentricism back into accord with contemporary 
realities necessarily had to ignore the ways in which his writing imagines a politics 
or, rather, a potential for politics in what precisely cannot be brought to accord 
with contemporary political concerns, in what Emerson conceives of as an 
irresolvable dualism between the world of thought and that of action, or the world 
of politics and that of nature, for that matter. It comes as no surprise then that the 
historicist reduction of Emerson’s transcendental writing as something that is 
continuous with much of nineteenth century American social history had to 
blatantly ignore Emerson’s interest in “nature” or in a “method of nature,” that is, in 
processes or “worlds of life” not already contained in the world of contemporary 
politics. “Hear the rats in the wall, see the lizard on the fence, the fungus under 
foot, the lichen on the log. What do I know sympathetically, morally, of either of 
these worlds of life?” (W, II, 39). “Nature” is therefore that which goes beyond 
what we imagine as our world, our politics, our ordinariness, and it is a disruptive 
force both within Emerson’s writing as well as within his re-evaluation of historicist 
and political discourses.  
Henry David Thoreau says in “Walking” that “[p]olitics is but a narrow field and 
that still narrower highway yonder leads to it” (Thoreau 1993: 53). Other than 
Emerson, Thoreau will choose to leave the narrowness of political institutions, of 
what Emerson calls “church and state and school” (W, IX, 202) and what Thoreau 
calls “Church and State and People” (Thoreau 1993: 50). Thoreau moves out of a 
life guaranteed by the institutions of our lifes into nature where he starts his radical 
experiment of a ‘community of one’ at Walden pond, accepting the necessities of 
daily life as his only ‘institutions’. Emerson’s experiment is less ‘literal’ as it 
conceives of “nature” as a general principle countering the anthropocentric urges 
of individualism so that the ‘good’ may “take the way from man, not to man” (W, 
II, 68-9). For my formulation of Emerson’s political interest and of what I have 
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termed the danger of instrumentalisation, the notion of “nature” is important 
because it offers a vision of processes where “[w]e can point nowhere to anything 
final,” where only “tendency appears on all hands” (W, I, 203). Nature comes to 
function as the antagonist of politics or policies, as it always relates not “to any 
number of particular ends, but to numberless and endless benefit” (W, I, 204). 
There is then the generative movement of “total nature” (W, I, 203), which goes 
against the anthropomorphic tendencies of American individualism, against a 
“private will” (W, I, 204) that Emerson sees at work elsewhere in American 
politics, a will that it dissolves in a “redundancy or excess of life” (W, I, 204). This 
does not mean that Emerson renounces the ‘human’ per se, but he endeavours to 
initiate a politics that is open also to what is yet beyond our current definitions of 
the ‘human’. “Nature” here holds the promise of another politics because it 
necessitates “the equal serving of innumerable ends without the least emphasis or 
preference to any […] [It] can only be conceived as existing to a universal and not 
to a particular end, to a universe of ends, and not to one” (W, I, 200-1).  
Emerson’s insistence on “nature” as something that goes beyond our political 
intentions is meant to provide a counterpoint to the danger of political 
instrumentation:  
“At present, man applies to nature but half his force. He works on the world with his 
understanding alone. He lives in it and masters it by a penny-wisdom; and he that 
works most in it is but a half-man, and whilst his arms are strong and his digestion 
good, his mind is imbruted, and he is a selfish savage. His relation to nature, his power 
over it, is through the understanding, as by manure […] .” (W, I, 72)  
To apply his whole force to nature would mean to accept its irreducibility to the 
understanding – or to “intellection” (W, II, 308), as Emerson sometimes prefers to 
call it. Our relation to nature is consequently governed by nature’s irreducibility to 
our social, political and philosophical concerns; “nature,” as Emerson states with 
regards to the philosopher’s quest to “dispose of nature,” “will not be disposed of” 
(W, IV, 78). Nature consequently comes to function as a resistant field within our 
ordinary social and political practices. As Martin Seel has argued in his Ästhetik der 
Natur, nature must be conceived “als ein Stück abweichender Gestaltung dieser 
Praxis, als eine beharrliche Erinnerung an ihre nicht zweckgerichteten Vollzüge 
und Formen” (Seel 1991: 106). Thus nature comes as a corrective of an 
instrumental, intentional conception of politics, but it can only be initiated, as Seel 
argues, in our „korrespondierenden Interaktion mit der Natur“ (Seel: 106).  
Emerson in “The Method of Nature” (1841) describes this interaction as a form 
of „behold[ing]“ nature as a whole “in a spirit as grand as that by which it exists” 
(W, I, 200). In nature we therefore see what George Kateb has called Emerson’s 
“happy responsiveness to contrasting or antagonistic thoughts and phenomena” 
(Kateb 1995: 8), a strategy that counters the goal-orientedness of any political 
pragmatics. His essays show, as Kateb argues, “that meaning or beauty or truth can 
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be found in conflicting or incompatible ideas, principles, forces and practices” 
(Kateb 1995: 9). They suspend institutionalized or conventionalized philosophical 
or political perspectives in favour of a “radical correspondence” with the process of 
nature as something that holds “innumerable ends”. What Kateb terms Emerson’s 
“democratic individualism” – as a redefinition of a democratic politics conceived 
not in a priori political terms but rather as a mode of “infinite responsiveness” 
(Kateb 1992: 91) – consequently can only be described once we are willing to 
forego precisely the historicist impulse that aims to bring into accord Emerson’s 
philosophy and his politics: it requires us to accept Emerson’s dictum that when 
“speculating on the future in politics” we need to accept a “fluxional protean 
incalculable element” (J, 15, 286). Consequently, I would argue, both philosophy 
and politics are staged as encompassing and going beyond the other. The “de-
transcendentalizing” of Emerson (Buell 1984: 123; Lopez 1988) forgets that it is 
precisely in the way in which Emerson’s politics goes beyond a political 
programmatics and his philosophy goes beyond the systematic impulse of 
philosophy that its political and philosophical import is to be found. Against the 
historicist intention to bring his “transcendentalism” back into the concrete 
materialities of life (race, gender, etc.), we should recognize how it imagines a 
fundamental ‘otherness’, ‘trans-humanness,’ ‘trans-politicalness’ in nature that is not 
reducible to human affairs, not created for or by man. The “narrow field” 
(Thoreau) of culture and politics is thus opposed in Emerson to a nature that forces 
us into a “facility of adaptation and of transition through many related points, to 
wide contrasts and extremes” (W, VI, 137). Directionless as a matter of policy, 
nature suggests processes of emergence, of evolution or of movement that are not 
governed by the sedimentation and institutions characteristic of the political. This 
also explains why we need to insist that Emerson the philosopher necessarily must 
contradict Emerson the reformer: it is precisely by way of being philosophical that 
Emerson attempts to reform. “Nature” necessarily expresses an otherness that 
contradicts any specific reformist programme.  
“Nature” and his formulation of a “method of nature” also function as essential 
addendums to Emerson’s theory of “genius” and the collection of epoch-making 
“representative men” that he assembles in his essays. The genius and the 
representative man are epoch-makers precisely not by furthering the 
understanding or by proposing a new political programmatics. Rather, they find 
new meaning by “abandoning” themselves to a kind of Nietzschean Vergessenheit 
in the ungovernable processes of nature. As Emerson argues in “Literary Ethics”: 
“The vision of genius comes by renouncing the too officious activity of the 
understanding, and giving leave and amplest privilege to the spontaneous 
sentiment” (W, I, 165). By giving space to this “power” or “force”, man moves 
from the “centre of things” (W, II, 60) and becomes an “aboriginal self” (W, II, 63) 
that becomes the conduit of powers that are greater than himself. Even in the 
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early texts – in “The American Scholar,” for example – where Emerson still insists 
on the centrality of the scholar, man is not an unproblematic centre: “The world, – 
this shadow of the soul, or other me, – lies wide around,” but it is in fact the 
“attractions” of the world that can alone “unlock my thoughts and make me 
acquainted with myself” (W, I, 95). The “unsearched might of man” (W, I, 114) 
can thus only be made accessible via a detour to that which is other, by a passage 
through the world. In later essays, this becomes more pronounced, as he now 
conceives of man as being on the margin or, to use a phrase in “Circles,” at the 
“verge of the today” (W, II, 315), always “rushing from the center to the verge of 
our orbit” (W, II, 315), merely a witness to forces more powerful than he is. 
Therefore, the individual is not the harbinger of new worlds, rather, these have to 
be delegated to processes radically incommensurable to humanism or 
individualism.  
The focal point of this radical refutation of a certain humanism, as put forward 
by American individualism, is again the term “nature,” but Emerson sometimes also 
uses different names for it (“God,” “love,” “influence,” “power,” “force,” etc.). 
“Nature never became a toy to a wise spirit” (W, I, 8), he argues and states that its 
“catalogue is endless” (W, I, 14). Emerson here comes very close to other 
important challengers of historicist and political dogma in the nineteenth century, 
especially Karl Marx: indeed, it would be interesting to compare Emerson’s 
insistence on the ‘force’ of nature with Marx’s recognition of the irreducibility of 
praxis as a new form of political transformation. Both Emerson and Marx are 
interested, I think, in what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have described as 
“the promise implicit in an originary opening to the ‘other,’ to the unforeseeable, 
to the pure event, which cannot be mastered by any aprioristic discourse” (Laclau 
2002: 90). And just like for Marx and other theorists of cultural and historical 
progress in the nineteenth century, Emerson thinks that an opening to an 
incalculable other is the condition of the possibility of any cultural evolution. As he 
argues in “Progress of Culture”:  
“Nature is brute but as this soul quickens it; Nature always the effect, mind the flowing 
cause. Nature, we find, is ever as is our sensibility; it is hostile to ignorance; – plastic, 
transparent, delightful, to knowledge. Mind carries the law; history is the slow and 
atomic unfolding. All things admit of this extended sense, and the universe at last is 
only prophetic, or, shall we say, symptomatic, of vaster interpretation and results. 
Nature an enormous system, but in mass and in particle curiously available to the 
humblest need of the little creature that walks on the earth! The immeasurableness of 
Nature is not more astounding than his power to gather all her omnipotence into a 
manageable rod or wedge, bringing it to a hair-point for the eye and hand of the 
philosopher.” (W, VIII, 223-224)  
Emerson’s reconception of progress, his revision of the dogma of providence, and 
his formulation of America’s political exigency, are all related to this notion of 
nature as something that is irreducible to the world as we know it. Nature is 
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“prophetic,” it is “symptomatic of vaster interpretation and results,” even if we 
cannot say what these interpretations and results are. And, paradoxically enough, 
its “immeasurableness” complements the mind’s very own omnipotence. But it is 
precisely by virtue of being irreducible to human aims that it holds the promise of 
another social organization, another politics, another ‘America’. Nature thus holds 
for Emerson something that is similar to what Jacques Derrida has called “the 
undeconstructibility of a certain idea of justice” (Derrida 1994: 90), that for Derrida 
is also the promise specific to the political ‘form’ of democracy. This 
“irreducibleness” or “undeconstructibility” of something that cannot be factored into 
a humanly governed evolution of our life-worlds, or, in our case, of something 
that cannot be made instrumental in bringing about America’s new era, for 
Emerson (as well as for Derrida) is the condition of possibility of any politics, of 
meaning, and of change. In “Progress of Culture,” the essay I have been quoting 
from, he states in the poem provided as an epigraph: “Nature spoke / To each 
apart […] / Not clearly voiced, but waking a new sense / Inviting to new 
knowledge“ (W, VIII, 205). This “new sense” or “new knowledge” in Emerson’s 
‘theory’ of the ages is nothing less than the advent of a new era. And because 
‘America,’ in Emerson’s writing, is a figure for the possibility of a new era, 
“nature,” as its condition of possibility, deserves his repeated attention.  
This has important implications also for Emerson’s revision of the theory of the 
“spirit of the age“: While the confrontation with nature opens up a “cleft” in history 
that opens the possibility of a history signified differently, this does not mean that 
Emerson sees this as a guarantee for America’s future. “Nature“ may “wake a new 
sense“ in us, however, it also has the power to “unsettle“ us insofar as it can 
suspend our ordinary ways of signifying our history, of making meaning. Together 
with the utopian vision of a different meaning of and era for ‘America,’ there is a 
danger that progress may be altogether lost or that the meaning of history might 
be completely hidden from us. In “Progress of Culture,” Emerson is careful to also 
alert us to this potential of “nature”: “Here stretches out of sight, out of conception 
even, this vast Nature, daunting, bewildering” (W, VIII, 224). Again then with 
regards to the notion of “nature,” we see a kind of “postponing” or “deferral” at 
work here: while Emerson insists on our “responsiveness” (Kateb’s term) or 
commitment to nature, its meaning is “out of sight”, in the future, à-venir. Nature is 
thus linked closely to Emerson’s conception of progress as developed in the essay 
“Progress of Culture.” All stages in history, he argues, are subject to this kind of 
“postponing” as their interpretation will only fully be given in an uncertain, as of 
yet unspecified future. “[H]istory is the slow and atomic unfolding. All things admit 
of this extended sense, and the universe at last is only prophetic, or, shall we say, 
symptomatic, of vaster interpretation and results” (W, VIII, 223).  
This theory of America’s age as a postponed one is most compellingly 
formulated in Emerson’s essays “Circle,” “Quotation and Originality,” and 
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“Representative Men”. All identify the aspect of postponement, a kind of Derridean 
à-venir that complicates the succession of ages. This puts Emerson at a certain 
remove from other contemporary attempts to historicize America’s epoch and 
makes discernible a strong Hegelian influence. While contemporary historians of 
America content themselves with a documentation of ‘what is,’ that is, with 
specifying America’s place in history, Emerson complements this documentation 
with an investigation of ‘what may be,’ with the question of how the transition to 
the next ‘American’ epoch may be conceived. This process of transition is, like in 
Hegel, synonymous with the notions of ‘meaning,’ of ‘history,’ of the ‘concept’: that 
is, it is always both a description as well as a theory of the epoch and of history. 
Given the obvious Hegelian influence in Emerson, however, I also want to 
mention an important difference: Unlike Hegel’s weltgeschichtliche Individuen 
Emerson’s writer or scholar is not instrumental in bringing about the next epoch. 
His texts do not merely depict, ‘representatively,’ the contemporary world. Rather, 
the community of representative men that Emerson portrays in his essays 
characteristically go beyond their ‘representativity’. That is, they depict a moment 
in which their contemporary experience is no longer ‘representative’ but turns into 
the experience of a new era; and they approach a moment in which texts are no 
longer mere ‘representativeness’ or an expression of ‘contemporariness’ anymore, 
but rather go beyond what, contemporarily, had been imaginable. Emerson then 
relies on both man as the centre of things as well as on something he calls 
“conversion,” a profound change in man that comes as an “influx […] of power,” 
“inspiration” or “ecstasy” (W, I, 335). He does thus not conceive of a realization of 
Geist striving towards its self-realization. The heroes in “Representative Men” all 
‘representatively’ stand for such a going beyond rather than merely being the 
sources of a kind of ‘representative’ expression of Zeitgeist. Goethe, Shakespeare, 
and Napoleon, Fox, Milton or Luther: they are the age in a potentiality that goes 
beyond the characteristics that go into its description. And thus they stand for a 
conversion or refiguration of the thought of their time that they are not wholly 
responsible for because it is a result of their intimacy with or abandonment to the 
process of language. Emerson therefore locates in all his “representative men” a 
certain willingness to commit to the Eigensinn of language, and it is precisely this 
delegation of Geist, thought, etc. to language that turns these men – unwillingly 
and unwittingly – into epoch-makers. Writing on Homer, Shakespeare and Milton, 
Emerson argues that these writers, “[l]ike prophets, seem but imperfectly aware of 
the import of their own utterances” (W, XII, 276), so that “the man and the poet 
show like a double consciousness” (W, XII, 276). Their language characteristically 
overtakes them and their writing about the contemporary world undergoes a 
poetic refiguration in which tropes and topoi are recirculated to depict a 
previously unimaginable world. This is why these “representative men” for 
Emerson are always the age’s “unattained but attainable self” (W, II, 7): they 
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represent their age not in what is, but in what could, should, and might be. But 
this “attainable self,” it is important to note here, cannot be calculated, it can only 
be aimed at by way of a radical giving over to language’s potential for poetry. 
‘America,’ very much in the sense of Cavell’s moral perfectionism, is thus a striving 
towards a goal that may be, in the last instance, unrealizable (Cavell 1990). 
‘America’ is thus the name for something that may well be impossible, but 
something that nevertheless has to be sought by a kind of “crossing, or leaping,” as 
Cavell argues (Cavell 1992: 136).  
Anselm Haverkamp has suggested, that it is precisely for this reason that the 
issue of “Deconstruction in/as America” may be relevant:  
“I see nobody to whom we owe as much as we owe to Jacques Derrida for his unfailing 
dedication to America. Take the gift, for example. ‘For finally, if the gift is another name 
of the impossible, we still think it, we name it, we desire it. We intend it.’ America is by 
now the age-old name for the thought, the desire, and the intention towards the 
impossible, like the gift (not given, but to be given). Like that ‘other cape,’ Cape 
Europe, […] America has become a paleonym, the recitation of an old name for some 
hope not altogether lost.” (Haverkamp 1995: 9)7  
Haverkamp also argues convincingly that although American philosophers – 
Emerson, Thoreau, Cavell – do not hesitate to call America their home, they do 
not share the kind of nostalgic, Heideggerian vision of being at home. “The 
substantive disagreement with Heidegger,” Haverkamp quotes Cavell, is “that the 
achievement of the human requires not the inhabitation and settlement but 
abandonment, leaving” (Haverkamp 1995: 9; Cavell 1992: 138). To use the 
Emersonian phrase: “People wish to be settled: only as far as they are unsettled, is 
there any hope for them” (W, II, 320). The hope connected to ‘America’ is one 
that is thus underwritten by the risk of unsettling. But “unsettling,” in Emerson, is 
not so much a matter of abandoning our houses but rather of our willingness to 
confront a potential in language. This becomes obvious in the following passage 
from “Circles,” where Emerson talks about what it means to be a writer: “I unsettle 
all things. No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an 
endless seeker with no Past at my back” (W, II, 318). Even if this “unsettling” may 
never quite pay off our debt to the past, Emerson nevertheless envisions a 
confrontation with language that by recirculating tropes and figures “unsettles” the 
sedimented forms that we are ordinarily using and takes them beyond the 
conventions of our discourses to provide new meanings.  
“Unsettling” could thus be described as the hope for a synthesis (the future of 
another meaning) that goes beyond what went into its making, something that is 
qualitatively different and not deducible from the past or present state of language 
and culture. In the terms of Emerson’s comments on “representative men,” this 
 
 7 Jacques Derrida has repeatedly argued that democracy, as the “political experience of opening to the other,” is 
precisely an “experience of the impossible,” see Derrida et al. 2002: 194.  
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“unsettling” comes as an extension of the subject to what is beyond itself: towards 
“nature”, towards “life”, etc. “Shakspeare,” for example, is a “new and larger 
subject than had ever existed” (W, IV, 218). As we have already seen, Emerson 
uses various terms for this process of extension: “passion,” “enthusiasm,” 
“abandonment,” “detachment,” “poetry,” and “ecstasy” are among the most 
frequently used. Here is Emerson commenting on the process of “passion” in 
Conduct of Life:  
“Passion, though a bad regulator, is a powerful spring. Any absorbing passion has the 
effect to deliver from the little coils and cares of every day: ‘tis the heat which sets our 
human atoms spinning, overcomes the friction of crossing thresholds, and first 
addresses in society, and gives us a good start and speed, easy to continue, when once 
it is begun. In short, there is no man who is not at some time indebted to his vices“ (W, 
VI, 259).  
Passion denotes a process that allows for the “crossing of thresholds” as it overrides 
the frictional resistance associated with cultural and subjective identities. Its “ever-
proceeding detachment” (W, IV, 30) allows for a rite de passage in which the 
accustomed ways of our culture are sent “spinning” from their sedimentary bed. 
This is why for Emerson “enthusiasm” and “abandonment” are merely the flipsides 
of the same coin: they both describe a process in which we challenge the hold of 
our conventionalized ways in language, culture, politics. As Cavell argues:  
“The idea of abandonment contains what the preacher in Emerson calls enthusiasm, or 
the New Englander in him calls forgetting ourselves, together with what he calls leaving 
or relief or quitting or release or shunning or allowing of deliverance, […] together 
further with something he means by trusting or suffering […]. “ (Cavell 2003: 18)  
On the one hand, Emerson argues in “Circles,” that “nothing great was ever 
achieved without enthusiasm” (W, II, 321) but he also insists that “there can be no 
greatness without abandonment” (W, II, 181). Enthusiasm as well as abandonment 
are thus forces which are never under the complete control of the individual. 
They are, as in the essay “The Over-Soul,” “something incalculable,” the “alien 
energy” that goes beyond “the will I call mine” (W, II, 268): a force that always 
overwhelms private will. This is why Emerson also states in the same essay that 
we “do not yet possess ourselves, […] and we know at the same time that we are 
much more” (W, II, 278). To possess ourselves, however, would mean precisely 
to know about “impersonality,” about that which goes beyond ourselves, which 
would mean that we became indifferent to the fate “I call mine”, a point that 
Emerson will finally make in Fate, as Sharon Cameron has pointed out (Cameron 
1998: 3). The themes of “abandonment” and “enthusiasm” thus return us to the 
theme of the “two minds” that I have dealt with in Chapter One: the crux of 
Emerson’s genius on “the verge of to-day” (W, II, 315) – in its abandonment as 
well as in its enthusiasm – is that the two modes can never entirely be separated. 
This is why Emerson’s genius necessarily resembles that other important figure 
standing ‘between the times’: just like Hamlet who observes a “time out of joint,” 
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Emerson’s genius both in its commitment (to political change, to meaning, etc.) as 
well as in its detachment (from ordinary life, from common sense) is at the mercy 
of forces more powerful than himself.  
It is important to add here that Emerson’s investigation of “abandonment” and 
“enthusiasm” also challenge philosophy’s self-description as an all-inclusive system 
of thought. It is precisely in these processes that philosophy’s place as the ‘first 
science’ is challenged: philosophy, given its tendency towards typology, rationality, 
and systematization, cannot account for them. This becomes obvious, for example, 
when Emerson talks about Plato’s writings in “Representative Men” and argues that 
they “have not, – what is no doubt incident to this regnancy of intellect in his 
work, – the vital authority which the screams of prophets and the sermons of 
unlettered Arabs and Jews possess” (W, IV, 76).  
If Emerson values intuition, then, this is not merely the standard Romantic 
valuation of the primitive or the naïve. Here, the “unlettered Arabs and Jews” 
embody a more “vital authority,” a force that challenges or stands in a conflictual 
nature with the “regnancy of intellect”. In Plato, Emerson sees the philosopher just 
barely managing to forgo the danger of philosophy’s inclination towards rigid 
systematization, and how he avoids this danger is by way of his implication in 
something that philosophy would like to ostracize: the literary:  
“He is intellectual in his aim; and therefore, in expression, literary. Mounting into 
heaven, diving into the pit, expounding the laws of the state, the passion of love, the 
remorse of crime, the hope of the parting soul, – he is literary, and never otherwise” (W, 
IV, 57).  
“Being literary” means to hand over authority from the “regnancy of the intellect” 
to the material processes of a literary mode of writing with its shift of topics, 
themes, metaphors, etc., that will counter philosophy’s intention to find a 
transparent language. It is precisely this willing delegation of intellect to language 
that Emerson calls “abandonment.” This “abandonment,” this kind of 
Überantwortung (the German term here holds the double connotation of 
“commitment” as well as “delegation”) to semiology for Emerson is a function of 
writing, or, rather, of poetry, and the poet becomes a poet-genius by a willing 
commitment to such an Überantwortung to language and writing. Emerson’s 
interest could consequently be described precisely in terms of what his 
contemporary Hegel, in the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften and 
with a different aim, has called the “Abfall der Idee von sich selbst,” (TWA, IX, 
28), or, equally, what Hegel calls the “Metamorphose” (TWA, IX, 31) of concepts 
themselves, namely a kind of defection from or abandonment to the idea in 
writing. Emerson, not unlike Hegel, conceives of this process as incalculable, as 
something that can never be instrumentalised (as a philosophical technique or 
topology) but that nevertheless yields change. In Hegel’s system, this change is 
also synonymous with philosophy. Emerson’s take, however, seems to be even 
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more radical and precludes the formulation and critical hermeneutics of a dialectic 
(in the sense of a process that is goal-oriented) as he insists that it is only in 
literary writing that we can truly abandon ourselves to the effects of semiology. 
His comments on abandonment and on writing radically question the value of the 
individual’s role in coming up with new meaning and underline a point that Paul 
De Man has made about the nature of literary language in general: “[I]t follows 
from the rhetorical nature of literary language that the cognitive function resides in 
the language and not the subject” (De Man 1983: 137). 
Talking about Hegel’s Abfall, one cannot but remember Heidegger’s denigration 
of America as “Abfall” as well as his observations on America’s “Ruinanz” 
(ruinancy). While Ruinanz in early Heidegger is synonymous with the term 
“modernity,” it later comes to be replaced by Heidegger’s depreciatory term 
“Amerikanismus,” by which Heidegger means to denote a general “Trübung” of 
Dasein (see Ermath 2000).8 This American obfuscation (Trübung) of being, for 
Heidegger, is the origin of a lasting darkening of the world as we know it 
(Weltverdüsterung). For Emerson, however, it is precisely in such an obfuscation, 
in such a semiological Abfall that he finds America’s potential for renewal, for 
hope, etc. Other than Heidegger, who is obsessed with the authentic and the fact 
of its loss, Emerson is willing to accept the loss of ‘America’s’ authenticity, if there 
ever was such a thing, and is even prepared to lose ‘America’ itself, if it potentially 
enables the advent of another ‘America’. An America, I would argue, in which the 
democratic community is precisely conceived of as an aesthetic project or 
tropological work.  
Emerson quest is therefore not an attempt to re-establish a certain mysticism or 
to somehow pretend that modernity has never happened. Emerson already knows 
about the dangers of reason monomaniacally posited that Melville will give its 
great literary testament to in Moby-Dick. Ahab’s total interpretation of the world 
(“All are Ahab”), that he utters with reference to the doubloon that is nailed to the 
mast, is the vision of the other extreme of a world in which everything means, 
where “significance lurks” in all things, and where there is no influx of chance or 
contingency:  
“But one morning, turning to pass the doubloon, he seemed to be newly attracted by 
the strange figures and inscriptions stamped on it, as though now for the first time 
beginning to interpret for himself in some monomaniac way whatever significance 
lurked in them. And some certain significance lurks in all things, else all things are little 
worth, and the round world itself but an empty cipher, except to sell by the cartload, as 
 
 8 This denigration of America as “Abfall,” as a form of inauthentic life is of course not exclusive to Heidegger and 
has a long history in European philosophy: it starts with Rilke’s description of America’s inauthentic life, of 
America as “Lebensattrappe” in a letter to Witold Hulewicz on November, 13 1925 (Rilke et al. 1991: II, 376-
77), and then is taken up in Oswald Spengler, Hans Zehrer, the Jüngers, Max Weber, Alexandre Kojève, Arnold 
Gehlen, and others. For an overview, see Lutz Niethammer, Posthistoire: Has History Come to an End? (1992). 
For Martin Heidegger’s account of America’s degeneracy, see James W. Ceaser’s “Katastrophenhaft: Martin 
Heidegger’s America“ (1997).  
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they do hills about Boston, to fill up some morass in the Milky Way.” (Melville and 
Tanselle 1983: 1253) 
Emerson shows that aesthetic or poetic thought is always in a relation of 
correspondence with our realities: it cannot be founded by recourse to a language 
that was previously established as transparent. Rather, it has to confront the 
contingencies of our ways of creating the world. And it is this opacity of being, of 
nature that opens up the future but at the same time reminds us that there can be 
no ‘pure’ break from what we are for the future: our implication in history, in our 
generation, in what we are is irreducible, there is no such thing as a clean break 
with the past or the present. But if this is true, it also means, that we can only see 
the other, the future, etc. when we divert or defect (abfallen) at least minimally 
from the safe course of history. In Emerson, ‘individualism’ and ‘America’ are two 
names for this kind of self-differentiation of culture and the individual from 
themselves. They are an Abfall that may itself be the productive source of 
something else. And this paradox movement of Abfall also characterizes the 
Emersonian present insofar as it is always a waning as well as an emergence. In 
the sense of a Heideggerian Inzwischen (GA 65, 371-392), the present moment 
presents a radical difference that cannot be integrated into a dialectics because it 
comes as an eccentricity that both is and is not (yet).  
We find this paradox potential of a radical ‘nihilism,’ in which something is “on 
its way” (W, III, 185) but cannot yet be calculated because it does not yet know 
what it will be, also in Emerson’s successors Nietzsche and Heidegger. In Emerson, 
this necessarily unacknowledged potential of abandonment or of unsettling is often 
labelled “forgetting” (see W, XII, 77, 101). Heidegger calls it “Vergessenheit.” For 
both Emerson and Heidegger, forgetting indirectly speaks of a radical difference, 
that – because it cannot be known as a radical difference – can only be 
encountered intermittently, inconsistently and as a surprise. This is why forgetting 
can be the spring of a thinking out of the open, in the open, but not in the sense 
of something that can be planned or calculated (GA XI, 55). Forgetting is only an 
“instrumental” process insofar as it may help to activate an untapped potential in 
our cultural present and thus may serve to enable the advent of a qualitatively 
different future. As Emerson states in “Quotation and Originality”: “The profound 
apprehension of the Present is Genius, which makes the Past forgotten” (W, VIII, 
201). And in a sentence that could be taken straight from Nietzsche: “The one 
thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, to be surprised 
out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory” (W, II, 321). Again, then, 
this anticipates the Nietzsche in Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen 
Sinne who argues that philosophy has forgotten the “metaphoricity” of language. I 
have quoted the passage before, but I reproduce it here for convenience’s sake:  
“Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, 
Anthropomorphismen kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch 
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und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem 
Gebrauche einem Volke fest, canonisch und verbindlich dünken: die Wahrheiten sind 
Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind, Metaphern, die 
abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind […].” (KSA, I, 881-2) 
Nietzsche argues that in our ordinary uses of words, we tend to forget the 
figurative dimension of any utterance. Himself at the receiving end of a certain 
kind of historicism, he also argues that history, by positing what seems to be a 
transparent, straightforward narrative, lets us forget the conflicting potentials of the 
present moment. Against the historian’s impulse to recollect the past, Nietzsche’s 
new philosopher is the conduit of a creative force (“schöpferische Kraft”) that 
makes the past and the present discontinuous with each other and thus enables the 
advent of the new. And just as Emerson criticizes a “love of repose” (W, II, 22) 
and calls for reinvigoration of America’s “optative mood” (W, I, 341), Nietzsche, in 
Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben, attacks an “objektiv sich 
gebärdende Gleichgültigkeit” (KSA, I, 293) to reinstate “das Recht dessen, was jetzt 
werden soll” (KSA, I, 254). In Nietzsche too, this “plastische Kraft” (KSA, I, 252) 
needs to remain incalculable if it is to potentially bring about the future:  
“Die historische Bildung ist vielmehr nur im Gefolge einer mächtigen neuen 
Lebensströmung, einer werdenden Kultur zum Beispiel, etwas Heilsames und Zukunft-
Verheissendes, also nur dann, wenn sie von einer höheren Kraft beherrscht und geführt 
wird und nicht selber herrscht und führt.” (KSA, I, 258) 
In his reformulation of historicism, Nietzsche takes his cue from Emerson and gives 
life priority over history and emerging forces priority over recorded facts, to argue 
that an overemphasis on history turns the historian into a „Totengräber des 
Gegenwärtigen“ (KSA, I, 252). Finally, in a revision of Emerson’s remarks on the 
riddle of the Sphinx, Nietzsche remarks that “[d]er Spruch der Vergangenheit ist 
immer ein Orakelspruch: nur als Baumeister der Zukunft, als Wissende der 
Gegenwart werdet ihr ihn verstehen” (KSA, I, 295). Thus the present comes as an 
antagon of history, and even tough it acquires its form through and as a result of 
history, it also holds the potential of overcoming that form. The “Dunstschicht des 
Unhistorischen” (KSA, I, 254) that the contemporary moment presents, establishes a 
discontinuity that allows for a horizon of possibility, for what Nietzsche calls a 
“lebendige Zukunft” (KSA, I, 297).9  
As we have seen, in Emerson it is precisely the “to-day,” as the ahistorical 
moment “in the present, above time,” that guarantees such a future. And this also 
explains why genius is never to be found simply in an individual or a 
 
 9 This is why Nietzsche argues that the unhistorical alone can guarantee an evolution of the human: “Es ist wahr: 
erst dadurch, dass der Mensch denkend, überdenkend, vergleichend, trennend, zusammenschließend jenes 
unhistorische Element einschränkt, erst dadurch dass innerhalb jener umschließenden Dunstwolke ein heller, 
blitzender Lichtschein entsteht, also erst durch die Kraft, das Vergangene zum Leben zu gebrauchen und aus 
dem Geschehenen wieder Geschichte zu machen, wird der Mensch zum Menschen: aber in einem Uebermasse 
von Historie hört der Mensch wieder auf, und ohne jene Hülle des Unhistorischen würde er nie angefangen 
haben und anzufangen wagen.“ (KSA, I, 254) 
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“representative man” but rather in an “original force” (W, IV, 34). It is precisely 
such an “original force” or “passion,” as Emerson argues in “Memory” that may give 
us the future:  
“With every broader generalization which the mind makes, with every deeper insight, – 
its retrospect also is wider; with every new insight into the duty or fact of today, we 
come into new possession of the past. When we live by principles instead of traditions, 
– by obedience to the law of the mind, instead of by passion, the great mind will enter 
into us, – not as now in fragments and detached thoughts, and the light of today will 
shine backward and forward. Memory is a presumption of a possession of the Future. 
Now, we are halves. We see the past, but not the future. But in that day, will the 
hemisphere complete itself, and foresight be as perfect as aftersight.” (W, XII, 110)  
Emerson knows that this does not in any way cancel our debt to the past, but he 
suggests a pattern of historical evolution in which exactly what is not yet 
commensurable to history ensures the progress of history:  
“You cannot overstate our debt to the Past, but has the Present no claim? The 
wonderful fact is quite another, ourselves. […] The divine gift is not the old, but the 
new. The divine is the instant life that receives and uses; the life that creates; and can 
well bury the old in the omnipotency with which it makes all things new.” (W, XII, 109) 
Harold Bloom has conceptualized this movement as one of “transumption” or of 
“metalepsis” (Bloom 2003: 73-74), but because he locates the responsibility for this 
movement firmly within the individual writer, it remains a decidedly humanist 
stance with him. Emerson’s “divine gift” is, however, precisely not to be located in 
an individual. Its source is a self-sufficient “instant life that receives and uses,” a 
“creative life” that is “unhandsome,” to use Emerson’s terminology, radically 
removed from an instrumentalizing notion of human agency. For Emerson, even 
tough this reinscription or refiguration of history may be effected by an individual 
writer, it necessarily goes beyond the calculation of an individual writer because it 
comes as an exposure to the rhetoricity of language. As Emerson phrases it in one 
of his characteristically chiastic definitions: genius, as an original force, creates and 
by creating, man becomes genius.  
“The one thing in the world, of value, is the active soul. This every man is entitled to; 
this every man contains within him, although in almost all men obstructed and as yet 
unborn. The soul active sees absolute truth and utters truth, or creates. In this action it 
is genius; not the privilege of here and there a favorite, but the sound estate of every 
man. In its essence it is progressive. The book, the college, the school of art, the 
institution of any kind, stop with some past utterance of genius. This is good, say they, 
– let us hold by this. They pin me down. They look backward and not forward. But 
genius looks forward: the eyes of man are set in his forehead, not in his hindhead: man 
hopes: genius creates.” (W, I, 90)  
America’s future poetry / poetic future 
The process that Emerson calls “broader generalization” is not a finite one. For 
him, this “wonderful” process is synonymous with ‘America’. Lacking a 
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“representative” form, the name ‘America’ thus designates the “instant life that 
receives and uses; the life that creates” (W, XII, 108). The lack of America’s 
representative forms, its (rhetoric, political, philosophical) eventfulness, however, 
is its strength as a democracy. In other words, it is precisely because America 
incessantly has to come up with “new statements” that it may be a democracy. 
Again, then, I find Emerson’s description of America to be overlapping with 
Derrida’s remarks on a democracy à-venir, or, more generally, on the impossibility 
of the presence of democracy. Derrida talks of a general incapacity of democracy 
to present itself (imprésentabilité) and argues that  
“[t]he absence of a proper form, of an eidos, of an appropriate paradigm, of a definitive 
turn, of a proper meaning or essence and, at the same time, the obligation to have only 
turns, rounds tropes, strophes of itself: that is what makes democracy unpresentable in 
existence. But this unpresentability responds and corresponds to the force of this 
democratic weakness.” (Derrida 2005: 74)  
To have nothing but “turns, rounds, tropes, strophes of itself,” this is of course 
precisely what we have identified as Emerson’s poetic performance and Vollzug of 
‘America’ all along. And just like Derrida, Emerson identifies democracy’s 
eventfulness as being ‘instrumental’ in preventing it from arriving at itself, which 
would mean the foreclosure of all its political aspiration in a totalitarian deadlock. 
If Emerson argues in “Politics” that “[e]very actual State is corrupt” (W, III, 208), 
then corruption denotes the ways in which any given form of government, 
necessarily is at a certain remove from fulfilling the wishes of its citizens. But it is 
exactly this corruption of any “actual State,” the impresentabilité (Derrida 2005: 74) 
of any given instalment of a democratic politics, that is, for both Emerson and 
Derrida, the condition of the possibility of freedom.  
Emerson’s remarks on the “wonderful” process of American life – its volatility 
and eventfulness – show him at a decisive remove from Tocqueville’s earlier 
anxiety about the eccentricity of American democracy. But Emerson is well aware 
of the dangers of America’s unbounded freedom. In “Politics” he argues that “the 
older and more cautious among ourselves are learning from Europeans to look 
with some terror at our turbulent freedom. It is said that in our license of 
construing the Constitution, and in the despotism of public opinion, we have no 
anchor” (W, III, 211). At the same time, however, he knows that this turbulence is 
nothing but the condition of the possibility of freedom. “[M]onarchy,” Emerson 
quotes Fisher Ames, “is a merchantman, which sails well, but will sometimes strike 
on a rock and go to the bottom” (W, III, 211). The “republic,” on the other hand, 
“is a raft, which would never sink, but then your feet are always in water” (W, III, 
211). But even if Emerson’s stance vis-à-vis the advent of democracy is a cautious 
one, he clearly sees its potential as something that will be epoch-making. Other 
politically inclined authors of the time did not share Emerson’s progressive 
position. They saw the disruption of history as a danger rather than as a condition 
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of the possibility of change. For Matthew Arnold, for example, the advent of 
democracy’s “turbulent freedom” is a fait accompli, and, in the defeatist terms of 
conservatism, the death of a world: “Wandering between two worlds, one dead, / 
The other powerless to be born” (Arnold 1926: 272).  
For Emerson, however, it is not the politicians, that, by thoughtfully weighing 
their politics, guarantee this freedom. It is the poet that can offer a potential exit 
from a situation that has become stalled because he challenges the “rotten diction,” 
the “paper currency” (W, I, 30) by creating “new and spontaneous word[s]” (W, II, 
54). The poet thus “repairs the decay of things” and installs us as the “creators of 
our age” (W, I, 160). Emerson’s famous statement that “America is a poem in our 
eyes” consequently has to be read in its double sense: on the one hand, it says 
that America is something that – before our eyes, our under observation – turns 
every so often, so that we continually have to adjust our perception and 
perspective. On the other hand, America is constituted as a poem, by way of a 
turning of its tropes and figures. The writer who in the succession of Emerson most 
radically put this poetic theory and program into poetic practice was, of course, 
Walt Whitman. Just like Emerson’s, Whitman’s America is one that remains, 
essentially, “unsettled,” the poet symptomatically “contradicting himself” and 
“containing multitudes” (see Whitman 2002: 77) – contradictions and multitudes 
that are supposed to continually enable the (poetic) making of ‘America.’ And just 
like Emerson, Whitman conceives of America’s poetic making as happening in 
futurity, in literatures written by what he calls the “author to come,” and he also 
speaks of his poetry as something that is still in a state of nascency, as something 
that, prospectively, “will be.” Like Emerson, Whitman tries to come up with a kind 
of writing that opens a future. And this writing comes as a challenge to accustomed 
ways of writing and speaking: the “Poetry of the Future,” as Whitman calls it, will 
consist of “future poets . . . referring not to a special class, but to the entire 
people,” the people of “the great radical Republic with its . . . loud, ill-pitch’d 
voice, utterly regardless whether the verb agrees with the nominative” (Whitman 
1963: II, 486, 478). Proper language – spoken by the English, Whitman implies –, 
is a sign of injustice, whereas the ‘improper,’ poetic language of democracy 
continually subverts its own (linguistic, syntactic, etc.) rules so that it responds to a 
people continually changing. For Whitman and for Emerson, justice is thus 
signalled by poetry, by the Americans’ improper use of language, the formlessness 
or malleability of their national rhetoric. The American practice of using words 
improperly or poetically thus forms the basis of an “autochthonous national poetry,” 
“a national poetry which was not English but American” (Whitman 1963: II, 478, 
484, 481), as Whitman insists.  
Even tough Whitman saw multiple openings for such a future poetry, he saw his 
own application of free verse as a potential future poetry for America. “My form,” 
he writes, “has strictly grown from my purports and facts, and is the analogy of 
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them.” In other words: Whitman considers his use of free verse to be the 
“analogy” of “a revolutionary age” (Whitman, Moon, and Bradley 2002: 755). 
Whitman insists on a kind of Emersonian correspondence in which the form of 
poetic expression is made to resonate with the experience of the contemporary 
and, vice versa, the form of poetic expression itself constitutes a specific experience 
of the world. For Whitman – just as Emerson deeply invested in the philology and 
poetics of his time – it was then not the specialized discourses of government and 
politics, not the standardized collection of Americanisms prepared by the 
philologists of his time, that would bring about a new language of democracy: For 
Whitman, just as for Emerson, the poet is the maker, the inventor of words and of 
language, so much even that he is no longer bound by its very history. English, 
according to Whitman, “is not a polished fossil-language,” he argues against other 
philologists who do not believe that there will be a uniquely American idiom. For 
him, it is “but a broad fluid language of democracy” (see Hollis 1957: 419). 
Consequently, for Whitman too, the poet is the epoch-maker, he, by means of his 
words, connects the past to the present and “realizes” the future:  
“Past and present and future are not disjoined but joined. The greatest poet forms the 
consistence of what is to be from what has been and is. He drags the dead out of their 
coffins and stands them again on their feet […] he says to the past, Rise and walk before 
me that I may realize you. He learns the lesson […] he places himself where the future 
becomes present. The greatest poet does not only dazzle his rays over character and 
scenes and passions […] he finally ascends and finishes all […] he exhibits the pinnacles 
that no man can tell what they are for or what is beyond […] he glows a moment on the 
extremest verge.” (Whitman, Moon, and Bradley 2002: 623) 
Not unlike Emerson, Whitman insists on a strong connection between America’s 
language and its polity. And he also connects the problem of America’s epoch to 
that of its language. Whitman thinks that it is the poet’s responsibility to “keep 
language open, flexible, and responsive to the changing contours of American 
democratic experience”, as Betsy Erkkila has argued (Erkkila 1989: 84). And just as 
Whitman is still waiting for the American era to begin, he also sees the language 
of American democracy as something that has yet to be realized. 
The poets will bring this American idiom or language about not by an act of 
discovery (as etymologists of the time argued), but by an act of invention. The 
poet-genius, both for Emerson and his follower Whitman, invents the new 
language. But because the true poet, especially for Whitman, is the American 
people, this poetry has to be multivocal so as to be able to picture the language 
games of a new America. This for Whitman also means the inclusion of “hundreds 
of outré words” (Whitman and Traubel 1904: 2) used by slaves. He thinks that 
what he calls “nigger dialect” (Whitman and Traubel 1904: 24) will be of greatest 
significance to the future of American English. The accents of African-Americans for 
Whitman have “hints of the future theory of the modification of all words of the 
English language, for musical purposes, for a native grand opera in America” 
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(Whitman 1904: II, 24). The future that Whitman imagines, is more than Emerson’s, 
one that leaves the genealogy of the founding fathers: In order for the future to 
take place, Whitman argues, the language of women, slaves and opera needs to 
replace an instrumentalised political liturgy that, even in America, has become a 
pale cast. Whitman even envisions a differently gendered future: “Sometimes I 
have fancied that only from superior, hardy women can rise the future 
superiorities of These States” (Whitman 1904: 13). But for Whitman, the future of 
the United States is not a new nationalism, but rather, as he argues, a “language 
experiment” that will be investigating “new potentialities of speech” (Whitman 
1978: III, 729n.).  
This is why for Whitman the advent of true art and poetry is inevitably coupled 
with the advent of a republican or democratic politics. In the American Primer, 
which he originally addressed to “American Young, Men, and Women, for Literats, 
Orators, Teachers, Musicians, Judges, Presidents, &c.,” Whitman wants Americans to 
“throw off” the sovereign rule of standard English in favour of a language that is 
created to correspond to the “new occasions, new facts, new politics, new 
combinations” (Whitman 1978: III, 734) of contemporary America. And in another 
passage in his notebooks, Whitman expresses a strong belief that America can be 
founded again, only that this time around, the foundation will be achieved in 
language:  
“I have heard it said that when the spirit arises that does not brook submission and 
imitation, it will throw off the ultramarine names. – That spirit already walks the streets 
of the cities of These States – I, and others, illustrate it. I say America too shall be 
commemorated – and shall stand rooted in the ground in names – […].“ (Whitman 1978: 
III, 755)  
But the advent of the unprecedented form of polity in republicanism, Whitman 
argues, has not yet been complemented by similarly unprecedented linguistic 
forms. But he insists that they will be created, even if he argues in “In “Poetry To-
Day in America – Shakespeare – The Future” that not even the greatest poets 
(Shakespeare, Milton) can prepare us for the poets and the poetry of democracy:  
“Republicanism advances over the whole world. Liberty, with Law by her side, will one day be 
paramount – will at any rate be the central idea. Then only – for all the splendor and beauty of 
what has been, or the polish of what is – then only will the true poets appear, and the true 
poems. Not the satin and patchouly of to-day, not the glorification of the butcheries and wars 
of the past, nor any fight between Diety on one side and somebody else on the other – not 
Milton, not even Shakspere’s plays, grand as they are. Entirely different and hitherto unknown 
classes of men, being authoritatively called for in imaginative literature, will certainly appear. 
What is hitherto most lacking, perhaps most absolutely indicates the future. Democracy has 
been hurried on through time by measureless tides and winds, resistless as the revolution of 
the globe, and as far-reaching and rapid. But in the highest walks of art it has not yet had a 
single representative worthy of it anywhere upon the earth.” (Whitman 1963: II, 483) 
The “measureless tides and winds” characteristic of democratic politics still await 
their adequate poetic expression, and, consequently, a specifically “American” 
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literature still needs to be written in the future. Rephrasing Emerson’s “America is a 
poem in our eyes,” Whitman insists that “[t]he Americans of all nations at any time 
upon the earth have probably the fullest poetical nature. The United States is 
essentially the greatest poem” (Whitman 2002: 616). But Whitman, too, is careful 
not to see his poetry as the fulfilment of what he proposes as a poetic programme 
for America. In the poem “Poets to Come”, he states that “I myself but write one 
or two words for the future, / I but advance a moment only to wheel and hurry 
back in the darkness” and concludes that he is “[e]xpecting the main things from 
you,” that is, the “poets to come” (Whitman 1961: VII, 14).  
 It is important to note here that both Emerson and Whitman do not conceive of 
a democratic literature as a mere addendum to the republicanised politics of the 
United States. Art and poetry for them are not a simply an external means 
expressing the inherent qualities of democracy: The advent of democracy and the 
advent of a democratic literature are interdependent, one cannot happen without 
the other, linguistic change results in political change and vice versa. Their 
insistence on the urgency of the advent of a specifically “American” or democratic 
literature thus means that they both conceive of America’s democracy as yet 
unfinished, postponed to the future. The mutual implication of poetry and politics 
expressed in the phrases “America is a poem in our eyes” (Emerson) and “The 
United States is essentially the greatest poem” (Whitman) are consequently not 
casual remarks: they locate a matter of poetics right at the very heart of America’s 
political constitution. Therefore we find here, avant la lettre, a formulation of 
Derrida’s consideration that democracy is nothing but its transition of tropes and 
figures. If Emerson and Whitman seem to praise a kind of heroic poet, singing 
himself, then we always need to remember that the poet is precisely the figure 
that is most attuned to or has abandoned himself to language’s poetic processes of 
transition and of troping. The poet is thus a central figure not by virtue of merely 
expressing ‘representatively’ the experience of democracy, but rather by virtue of 
being a conduit for the contingency of both language’s and democracy’s 
transitionality and figurality.  
As we have seen in previous chapters, this kind of incalculable transition can 
also be found in what Emerson terms “nature”. As he states in a late lecture 
delivered at Harvard University in 1870:  
“The moment there is fixation, putrifaction and death come. The very word Nature 
makes us to know this. “Natura” – becoming, about to be born. We are immortal by the 
force of transits. The law of the world is transition and our power lies in that.” (LL, II, 
43)  
In an earlier but similar passage, Emerson identifies “nature” with the “becoming” 
of the world in general. This becoming, as he remarks in an aside, pertains to 
futurity, as already the Latin root of the word suggests: 
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“It is singular that our rich English language should have no word to denote the face of 
the world. Kinde was the old English term, which, however, filled only half the range 
of our fine Latin word, with its delicate future tense, - natura, about to be born, or what 
German philosophy denotes as a becoming. (W, VII, 171) 
But for the Emerson of “The Poet”, nature is just one term denoting the 
contingency principle at work not only in nature, but also in poetry, thought, etc. 
In a long paragraph he explains this analogy or, rather, identity of nature and 
poetry:  
“Genius is the activity which repairs the decays of things, whether wholly or partly of a 
material and finite kind. Nature, through all her kingdoms, insures herself. Nobody cares 
for planting the poor fungus: so she shakes down from the gills of one agaric countless 
spores, any one of which, being preserved, transmits new billions of spores tomorrow 
or next day. The new agaric of this hour has a chance which the old one had not. This 
atom of seed is thrown into a new place, not subject to the accidents which destroyed 
its parent two rods off. She makes a man; and having brought him to ripe age, she will 
no longer run the risk of losing this wonder at a blow, but she detaches from him a new 
self, that the kind may be safe from accidents to which the individual is exposed. So 
when the soul of the poet has come to ripeness of thought, she detaches and sends 
away from it its poems or songs, – a fearless, sleepless, deathless progeny, which is not 
exposed to the accidents of the weary kingdom of time; a fearless, vivacious offspring, 
clad with wings (such was the virtue of the soul out of which they came), which carry 
them fast and far, and infix them irrecoverably into the hearts of men. These wings are 
the beauty of the poet’s soul. The songs, thus flying immortal from their mortal parent, 
are pursued by clamorous flights of censures, which swarm in far greater numbers, and 
threaten to devour them; but these last are not winged. At the end of a very short leap 
they fall plump down, and rot, having received from the souls out of which they came 
no beautiful wings. But the melodies of the poet ascend, and leap, and pierce into the 
deeps of infinite time.” (W, III, 22-3) 
I am quoting the passage from “The Poet” in its full length here because I want to 
draw attention to Emerson’s characteristic procedure, that is, how the passage 
performs what it describes. On the one hand, Emerson describes the cycle of 
nature as one of simultaneous germination and decay. This cycle is unpredictable, 
that is, it includes a moment of “chance” that fundamentally and irretrievably 
changes the conditions for each individual process of germination and decay. On 
the other hand, Emerson defines the process of thought in analogous terms: the 
production of new thoughts includes a moment of poetry, a minimal but 
irreversible “sending,” “detachment,” or “leap” from the known configuration of 
thought, a sending that both crosses as well as subverts that which it springs from. 
But it is only on a third level of rhetoric performance, or Vollzug that we find the 
imprint of Emerson’s characteristic procedure: The processes of nature and thought 
are not only analogous in terms of the argumentative structure of the passage. 
Rather, Emerson transfers elements of the description of the process of nature 
metaphorically onto his description of poetry, so that the writing of poems is the 
“ripening of thought,” and so that the censures, embodying the hold of tradition, 
“fall plump down, and rot.” In the rhetoric transition from nature to poetry, nature 
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comes to describe the process of poetry and the other way round; the transmission 
of new billions of spores” is like the “fearless, vivacious offspring” of the soul in 
poetry. In other words: Rhetoric presentation with its metaphorical shifts here is 
not simply a matter of expression, it is itself part of the definition of nature and 
poetry.  
Following up this chiastic description of nature and poetry or thought, the essay 
“The poet” goes on to postulate the poetic principle of “metamorphosis” as the 
general process characteristic of both nature and poetry:  
“But the poet names the thing because he sees it, or comes one step nearer to it than 
any other. This expression, or naming, is not art, but a second nature, grown out of the 
first, as a leaf out of a tree. What we call nature, is a certain self-regulated motion, or 
change; and Nature does all things by her own hands, and does not leave another to 
baptize her, but baptizes herself; and this through the metamorphosis again.” (W, III, 
22) 
Nature and our acts of poetic naming are consequently both characterized by a 
poetic kind of contingency, by a “self-regulated motion,” “change,” or 
“metamorphosis,” that in Emerson’s terms are synonymous with the eventful and 
unforeseeable process of transition. And Emerson argues that this poetic power of 
language does not merely apply to the poets. Its metamorphosis is also our 
metamorphosis, since Emerson suggests that the poetic text makes possible an 
experience that is not merely textual but real.  
 “If the imagination intoxicates the poet, it is not inactive in other men. The 
metamorphosis excites in the beholder an emotion of joy. The use of symbols has a 
certain power of emancipation and exhilaration for all men. We seem to be touched by 
a wand, which makes us dance and run about happily, like children. We are like 
persons who come out of a cave or cellar into the open air. This is the effect on us of 
tropes, fables, oracles, and all poetic forms. Poets are thus liberating gods. Men have 
really got a new sense, and found within their world another world, or nest of worlds; 
for, the metamorphosis once seen, we divine that it does not stop.” (W, III, 30) 
Poetry is thus reconceived as a merit not merely restricted to linguistic modes of 
expression: “tropes, fables, oracles, and all poetic forms” have an “effect” on us. 
And if Emerson argues that “[t]he poets are thus liberating gods”, then this is not 
simply the affirmation of a radical kind of individualism because the poets 
paradoxically liberate by wilfully abandoning themselves to language. It is 
precisely this abandonment to the rhetoricity of language that, for Emerson, 
licences a kind of freedom, a “stimulation” by and through tropes that is 
“transcendental” and “extraordinary” because it allows us to be “carried away” from 
known configurations of thought.  
“The ancient British bards had for the title of their order, ‘Those who are free 
throughout the world.’ They are free, and they make free. An imaginative book renders 
us much more service at first, by stimulating us through its tropes, than afterward when 
we arrive at the precise sense of the author. I think nothing is of any value in books 
excepting the transcendental and extraordinary. If a man is inflamed and carried away 
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by his thought, to that degree that he forgets the authors and the public, and heeds 
only this one dream, which holds him like an insanity, let me read his paper, and you 
may have all the arguments and histories and criticism.” (W, III, 32) 
And again, this “departure from routine” (W, III, 23) made possible by the 
rhetoricity of language in Emerson is always more than a praise of poetic forms: it 
is realitätshaltig, material, because it “puts the world like a ball in our hands” (W, 
III, 32) and “nations, times, systems, enter and disappear like threads in tapestry of 
large figure and many colors” (W, III, 33). If poetry sometimes borders on 
“insanity”, the “emancipation” (W, III, 33) it suggests can also be epoch-making: 
“Therefore we love the poet, the inventor […] . He unlocks our chains and admits 
us to a new scene” (W, III, 33). For someone deeply steeped in the political 
liturgy and oratory of his time, this is a radical departure: It is no longer the 
eloquent politician so formidably epitomized by America’s founding fathers, but 
America’s poets that make possible the advent of the new epoch, that by their 
implication in the rhetoricity of language bring about a more fundamental epoché 
that is not a matter of political speech, doctrine or planning.  
It is important to maintain here that Emerson’s focus on transition and rhetorics is 
not a mysticism, as he himself maintains:  
 “But the quality of the imagination is to flow, and not to freeze. The poet did not stop 
at the colour, or the form, but read their meaning, neither may he rest in this meaning, 
but he makes the same objects exponents of his new thought. Here is the difference 
betwixt the poet and the mystic, that the last nails a symbol to one sense, which was a 
true sense for a moment, but soon becomes old and false. For all symbols are fluxional; 
all language is vehicular and transitive, and is good, as ferries and horses are, for 
conveyance, not as farms and houses are, for homestead. Mysticism consists in the 
mistake of an accidental and individual symbol for an universal one.” (W, II, 34) 
In other words: all symbols are necessarily “accidental and individual,” our use of 
them underlies what linguists will later call the principle of arbitrariness. Again 
then, we find here Emerson’s praise of language’s potential for “conveyance” or 
“unsettledness” and it is in this potential that Emerson locates the promise of 
America’s new epoch, of America’s change. What he calls “metamorphosis” 
consequently is not only the basis of his poetological but also of his political 
thought. It draws attention to how language’s tropological movement, its 
rhetoricity, enables a continual epoché that is tantamount to political change. 
‘America’ is thus reconceived as an aesthetic project against a dangerous “love of 
repose” (W, II, 22): by engaging in a sort of radical doubt, by suspending linguistic 
or political common sense, it opens a “cleft” or “verge” for poiesis, so that the 
transition to something new presents itself as a movement or recirculation of 
meaning. Both the poet and the orator, because of their special proclivity or 
responsiveness to language, hold the key to this production of a coming sense 
generated by “fluxional symbols”.  
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Emerson thinks that the American orator is especially sensitive to such a future, 
to such a coming of sense. As he says in “Eloquence”: “The orator must ever stand 
with forward foot, in the attitude of advancing. His speech must be just ahead of 
the assembly, ahead of the whole human race, or it is superfluous“ (W, VIII, 115). 
Elsewhere, he goes a step further to suggest that the orator must also be ahead of 
himself: “We aim above the mark to hit the mark” (W, III, 185). Emerson’s writing 
thus stands in a long tradition of an American poetics that sees itself as what 
Charles Olson has described as a “figure of forward” (Olson 1997: 96). And just as 
Whitman’s poet, Emerson’s, too, is still a messianic figure that has not appeared on 
the American scene yet, as he argues in “The Poet”:  
“I look in vain for the poet whom I describe. We do not, with sufficient plainness, or 
sufficient profoundness, address ourselves to life, nor dare we chant our own times and 
social circumstance. If we filled the day with bravery, we should not shrink from 
celebrating it. Time and nature yield us many gifts, but not yet the timely man, the new 
religion, the reconciler, whom all things await.” (W, III, 37) 
This striving towards new forms of poetic expression, towards a new role for the 
poet in American society, for Emerson is tantamount to achieving his country. 
There is, thus, a characteristic overlap in his writing between his attempts at 
defining or locating a specifically American cultural or political disposition and his 
aspiration to find new poetic means to express them: Both goals are vanishing 
points rather than concrete political or aesthetic aims and they acquire their 
significance precisely because they cannot be achieved. Emerson insists, however, 
that even if we can never finally achieve our country, it is necessary that we start, 
here and now, to “address ourselves to life” and to “chant our own times and 
social circumstance”.  
“Endowed with such a life”: expecting America’s next age 
Again, I am led back to Jacques Derrida’s interest in the form of democracy as a 
polity that can never be fully achieved. Derrida insists that because democracy 
does not have an identifiable form, it will never exist as such. But he argues that it 
is precisely because democracy can never exist that we must continue to strive 
towards it. As he declares in Rogues: Two Essays on Reason:  
“If [si] democracy does not exist and if [si] it is true that, amorphous or polymorphous, it 
never will exist, is it not necessary to continue, and with all one’s heart, to force oneself 
to achieve it? Well, yes [si], it is necessary; one must, one ought, one cannot not strive 
toward it with all one’s force.” (Derrida 2005: 74)  
And just as Emerson asks fellow Americans to address their own contemporary 
moment, Derrida believes that a striving towards democracy must happen in the 
here and now because it is precisely a mode of our being-in-the-world. In other 
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words: both Emerson and Derrida, even if they think that America or the political 
form of democracy may never be achieved, maintain a strong sense of urgency 
that asks us to attend to our “to-day,” our own contemporary moment. As Derrida 
says: “The to-come of democracy is also, although without presence, the hic et 
nunc of urgency, of the injunction as absolute urgency” (Derrida 2005: 73).  
Derrida argues that democracy always comes at the price of a loss of 
sovereignty, that is, at the same time, also a loss of tradition. The expectation of 
democracy’s freedom is necessarily linked to a loss of established genealogies, 
traditions, because it cannot be deduced from the past but must be effected by an 
orientation towards “the experience that lets itself be affected by what or who 
comes [(ce) qui vient], by what happens by or by who happens by, by the other to 
come, a certain unconditional renunciation of sovereignty is required a priori” 
(Derrida 2005: xiv). This renunciation of tradition or sovereignty in Derrida is 
comparable to what Emerson describes as “abandonment” because it implies that 
the coming refiguration of the political scene will only happen if it is approached 
unconditionally: it is not the result of our willing, but, rather, of our willingness to 
accept a certain “force” or “power” (Emerson’s terms) that is beyond our control. 
As Derrida phrases it:  
 “Such a distribution or sharing also presupposes that we think at once the 
unforeseeability of an event that is necessarily without horizon, the singular coming of 
the other, and, as a result, a weak force. This vulnerable force, this force without 
power, opens up unconditionally to what or who comes and comes to affect it.” 
(Derrida 2005: xiv) 
Derrida conceives of this “vulnerable force” as “an act of messianic faith – 
irreligious and without messianism” (Derrida 2005: xiv). In Derrida’s account, 
democracy thus finds its place in what he describes as “another place without age, 
another ‘taking-place,’ the irreplaceable place or placement of a ‘desert in the 
desert,’” that is also “a spacing from ‘before’ the world, […] from ‘before’ […] any 
anthropotheological dogmatism or historicity” (Derrida 2005: xiv). This place of 
democracy, even if it is an impossible one, would allow political change to take 
place, “without, however, providing any ground or foundation” (Derrida 2005: 
xiv). Derrida calls this impossible place or scene a khora: “Khora would make or 
give place; it would give rise – without ever giving anything – to what is called 
the coming of the event” (Derrida 2005: xiv). Derrida then continues to argue that 
such a tentatively phrased theory of democracy may not amount to a political 
programme – and he has often been attacked precisely for not providing one –, 
but that it may well enable a certain expectation for a coming political event or 
the advent of democracy:  
“No politics, no ethics, an no law can be, as it were, deduced from this thought. To be 
sure, nothing can be done [faire] with it. But should we then conclude that this thought 
leaves no trace on what is to be done – for example in the politics, the ethics, or the 
law to come. On it, perhaps, on what here receives the name khora, a call might thus 
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be taken up and take hold: the call for a thinking of the event to come, of the 
democracy to come, of the reason to come” (Derrida 2005: xiv).  
I am not simply referring to Derrida’s comments on a democratie à-venir because it 
is a fitting theoretical backdrop for my explication of some of the problems of 
Emerson’s description of an America on “the verge of to-day.” I want to suggest, 
rather, that there may be a much stronger connection between nineteenth century 
American political thought and the notion of a démocratie à-venir. Derrida himself 
states in Rogues that his study is meant to serve as an investigation of the curious 
“volt” between the concept of democracy and America: “[A]t the end of a long 
detour, right near the end, it will perhaps become clear that democracy in 
America or, more precisely, democracy and America will have been my theme” 
(Derrida 2005: 14). Derrida’s essay is in fact itself a working out of some of the 
problems of a theory of democracy that present themselves in Tocqueville’s classic 
account of Democracy in America (see Derrida 2005: 13-15). Again then, we are 
confronted with a circuitous and temporally perplexing instance of a trans-atlantic 
exchange in which a European philosopher that travels across the Atlantic to study 
the political system in America turns out to be read by a European philosopher that 
claims that his study will have been about (the future of democracy in) America. 
More importantly, however, Derrida’s study engages in a complex sending or 
circular structure that also lies at the very heart of the American cultural 
constitution. In other words: the circular structure or identification of America and 
democracy, the ways in which they serve as each other’s origin, is not only a 
theme in Tocqueville, Emerson, and Derrida, it is the very conundrum of the 
political form of democracy and of America.  
Derrida’s study aims to deconstruct “the circular identification of cause and end” 
that he sees at work in the first explication of American democracy in Tocqueville. 
He argues that Tocqueville’s account effectively identifies the form of democracy 
with popular sovereignty and thus arrests all the forces that could serve as 
democracy’s “driving cause” (Derrida 2005: 13). Tocqueville, Derrida argues, 
“presents this circularity as the effective fulfilment of a democracy that, up until 
then, had been presented only as a project, an opinion, a claim or allegation, a 
deferral to later, a utopia, indeed the fiction of a democracy to come” (Derrida 
2005: 13). Derrida quotes the following passage from Democracy in America to 
support his point:  
“In our own day, the principle of popular sovereignty has been elaborated in practice 
in every conceivable way. It has disentangled itself from the many fictions with which it 
has elsewhere been carefully been wreathed. It adapts its form to the necessities of each 
particular case.” (DiA, 64) 
I think Derrida is right in pointing out that Tocqueville’s account of democracy – 
lacking an internal division, an internal antagon that would enable democracy’s 
next trope, turn, or refiguration – forecloses democracy’s potential because it 
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prevents new articulations of democracy, of freedom, etc. And indeed, Tocqueville 
posits the sovereignty of the people as a new God, it is “the cause and end of all 
things” and “everything proceeds from them, and to them everything returns” 
(DiA, 65). As we have seen, Derrida precisely attempts to speak about a space, 
spacing, or interval that interrupts the circularity of the identification of the 
sovereignty of the people and democracy.  
However, I think that Derrida glosses over a persistent concern in Tocqueville 
that is especially relevant to what I have been saying about Emerson’s explication 
of an America on “the verge of to-day.” There is a contradictory tendency in 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America that itself deconstructs what Derrida identifies 
as a rather straightforward identification of the American people and their political 
system. For Tocqueville too, America suggests a political future that has not yet 
been achieved, that is uncertain and unsecured. This is precisely what Tocqueville 
elaborates in Chapter XVIII of his study when he talks about the “Future of the 
Three Tribes in America”:  
“It is difficult though not impossible for the human mind to circumscribe the future 
within certain broad limits, but beyond those limits chance plays havoc with all 
prediction. In our picture of the future, chance always leaves a zone of darkness, which 
the eye of intelligence cannot penetrate.” (DiA, 412-13) 
Tocqueville thus acknowledges a certain problematics inherent in his analysis of 
American democracy: his aim is to depict the current state of the American nation, 
to predict how it will evolve and thus to gauge whether it is a valuable alternative 
to the aristocracies of the old continent. And Tocqueville, the elitist aristocratic 
observer, is skeptical of the promises of democracy because he is precisely unable 
to deduce America’s future state from the present moment he witnesses. In the 
new world, the ability of the aristocratic regimes to regulate and govern change 
has been nullified. There is then, especially towards the end of the first and in the 
second book of Democracy in America, a strong anxiety that the promise of the 
new political system cannot finally be assessed because its evolution is, as yet, 
unforeseeable:  
“This is what the present reveals. What will the final result of this tendency be? What 
events may halt, slow, or hasten the movement I have described? These remain hidden 
in the future, whose veil I do not pretend to be able to lift.” (DiA, 455) 
More and more, Tocqueville amasses facts on his journey through America that do 
no longer add up to a coherent picture of American democracy. The diverse forms 
of democracy in the present moment cannot be reduced to a common 
denominator or a discernible tendency. This becomes obvious already in Chapter 
Four where Tocqueville attempts to ‘calculate’ the “Principal Causes that Tend to 
Maintain the Democratic Republic in the United States” and has to concede that 
there are “accidental” (DiA, 318) causes that he cannot factor into his estimation of 
America’s future. When confronted, for example, with the phenomenon of a 
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rapidly increasing migration to the vast lands of the West, Tocqueville is unable to 
integrate this demographic development into his documentary account and simply 
concedes: “[t]he ultimate consequences of this migration of Americans toward the 
west still lie hidden in the future” (DiA, 324). Finally, the eloquent political analyst 
– who starts out by trying to establish a plan by which to improve democracy – is 
at a loss to account for the unforeseeable, ungovernable potentiality of the future 
in democracy.  
There is then, in this early attempt to come to terms with the American 
democracy, a curious sense that Tocqueville’s project fails. But it fails precisely 
because it acknowledges a characteristic quality of democracy that precisely cannot 
be made commensurate with Tocqueville’s documentary project. There is, in 
democracy, a potential for change that results from but can never be simply 
reduced to the present “knot of affairs” (W, VIII, 31), as Emerson phrases it. And 
this is why, strictly speaking, democracy always remains yet to be achieved.  
Today, we may have lost the context of a specifically Puritan vision or cultural 
temporality that explained – even to Americans in the nineteenth century – this 
promise of a future democracy. But the connection of Puritan doctrine or ideology 
and the national political awakening would still have been very strong in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. Puritan doctrine, as Sacvan Bercovitch has shown in 
The American Jeremiad, underwrote an “ideological consensus” (Bercovitch 1978: 
176) that suggested a peculiar cultural temporality that was, simultaneously, 
“endless and self-enclosed” (Bercovitch 1978: 178): Any cultural possibility in the 
present moment of American culture invited a host of other possibilities to be 
potentially fulfilled in the future, but the possibilities actualized in the future will 
always be part of what is called ‘America’. This is why America, as a cultural entity, 
will only be revealed in the future and in contrast to the present (see Bercovitch 
1978: 176-178).  
In White-Jacket, Herman Melville exemplifies this peculiar cultural and temporal 
logic when he explains that for Americans, as the “pioneers of the world,” the 
future holds a special significance:  
“The world has arrived at a period which renders it the part of Wisdom to pay homage 
to the prospective precedents of the Future in preference to those of the Past. The Past 
is dead, and has no resurrection; but the Future is endowed with such a life, that it 
lives to us even in anticipation. The Past is, in many things, the foe of mankind; the 
Future is, in all things, our friend. In the Past is no hope; the Future is the Bible of the 
Free. […] [Thus] in many things we Americans are driven to a rejection of the maxims of 
the Past, seeing that, ere long, the van of the nations must, of right, belong to ourselves 
[…]. Escaped from the house of bondage, Israel of old did not follow after the 
Egyptians; to her were given new things under the sun. And we Americans are the 
peculiar, chosen people – the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the 
world. […] God has predestined, mankind expects, great things from our race; and great 
things we feel in our souls. […] We are the pioneers of the world; the advance-guard, 
sent on through the wilderness of untried things, to break a new path in the New World 
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that is ours. […] Long enough have we been skeptics with regard to ourselves, and 
doubted whether, indeed, the political Messiah had come. But he has come in us, if we 
would but give utterance to his promptings.” (Melville and Tanselle 1983: 505-6)  
For Americans in the nineteenth century, Melville’s amalgamation of the nation’s 
religious eschatology with its political promise would have been a familiar figure. 
Melville here uses the familiar theme of America as the “Israel of our time” to 
suggest a radically secularized version of the biblical myth in which the promise of 
the future can no longer be simply awaited, but needs to be asserted in the here 
and now, in the concrete materialities of American life in the present moment (“he 
has come in us”). “God’s predestination,” however, even in Melville’s forceful 
optimism, is still a future that is not secured and cannot simply be awaited: it is 
only if Americans aim to fulfil mankind’s expectation in the present cultural 
moment that America’s promise continues to be real.  
This curious bending back of cultural time, of cultural expectations into the 
moment of a lived present – the crucial attribute of the cultural and temporal logic 
exemplified by the jeremiad in America, as Sacvan Bercovitch has pointed out 
(Bercovitch 1978) –, is also what we deemed to be characteristic of a democratie 
à-venir. In other words, American culture seems to be especially prepared for the 
promise of a future that needs to be addressed in the “to-day”. The system of 
typology and its expression in the jeremiad as well as the ideology of manifest 
destiny are all components of this cultural logic that calls on Americans to attend to 
their cultural moment in order to keep the promise of the future alive.  
Simple and terrible laws  
Compared to Melville’s boisterous confidence in White-Jacket, Emerson seems to 
be much more careful in specifying America’s expectation or promise. This is 
because his vision of history is not that of a progressive improvement, is not that of 
a kind of Hegelian spiral that slowly progresses towards an enlightened secularism. 
For him, the very existence o man implies his fall. As he notes in “Experience”: “It 
is very unhappy, but too late to be helped, the discovery we have made, that we 
exist. That discovery is called the Fall of Man” (W, III, 75). This fall of man for 
Emerson signifies that even in our boldest beginnings, we have already again 
fallen and, thus, our expectation is postponed, deferred. We thus find in Emerson a 
curious temporal structure, a kind of original posteriority, a “postponed 
expectation” (W, I, 81), in which America’s promise is constantly postponed 
precisely when it is being addressed. Thus for Emerson, America’s democracy is 
and has to remain an emergent form, one whose arrival needs to be continually 
deferred so that its potential is not foreclosed. As we have seen already, the place 
of this original posteriority in Emerson is “nature” as that which is “about to be 
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born, or what German philosophy denotes as a becoming” (LL, II, 43). But nature, 
as a kind of genius loci, as the place of a tropic or figural originality, is always 
already interwoven with human uses of language. Both language and nature are 
texts, texts that continually inflect each other to form the reality in which we live.  
In “The Conduct of Life”, Emerson describes nature as a book. But it is yet a 
book unwritten, a “rude form” that blocks “her future statue, concealing under 
these unwieldy monsters the fine type of her coming king” (W, VI, 15). “The 
population of the world,” Emerson continues, “is a conditional population; not the 
best, but the best that could live now” (W, VI, 16). Other than some of his 
contemporaries, then, Emerson circumvents the identification or specification of 
America’s future. For him, the coming of the future still depends upon our 
acknowledgment of the present’s potential for self-difference. And this potential, 
necessarily, is risky and unforeseeable, offering both a vision of magnificence as 
well as of potential decadence. The promise of the future then always needs to 
come as an unspecified optative and not, say, in the form of the conventional 
figures of providentialism. This obviously is a decisive break from many of his 
contemporaries, who were convinced that America had reached the end of history 
and marked a point where “nations culminate” (J, VIII, 345). Emerson’s 
contemporary Orestes Brownson, to provide an example, was sure that America 
had arrived at a “vantage ground to which no people have ever ascended before,” 
and that the “cause which landed our fathers on Plymouth Rock” had been 
effectively fulfilled: “Verily it is near. […] Humanity awaits the hour of its renewal” 
(qtd. in Hochfield 1966: 93, 175-76, 252-253).  
In Emerson, the coming of the future is again implied in or displaced into a 
process of poetics. America too is a “symbol” that, as Emerson states in “The Poet”, 
is “fluxational” or “vehicular and transitive” (W, III, 34). It owes its existence and 
its “transfigurations” (W, III, 14) to nature as the original locus of figuration. 
America is thus, as Riddel argues, paradoxically “a mis-transcription of its origin,” a 
translation “of the pure poem that nevertheless cannot properly precede it” (Riddel 
1995: 51). This explains why Emerson thinks that his “country is an excessive 
pretension” (W, I, 186). In fact, in order to live up to its promise, it must be 
nothing but a series of pretensions. Hence Emerson’s advice: “Neither dogmatize, 
or accept another’s dogmatism” (W, I, 186). America’s advent as the culmination of 
nations is thus guaranteed as well as complicated by the “primal warblings” (W, III, 
8) of poetry. And it is poetry that suggests how America, as an emerging 
democracy, does no longer correspond to the standard narrative of the history of 
nations. In “Circles,” Emerson argues that the power of poetry goes beyond our 
will to form our cultures:  
“Every ultimate fact is only the first in a new series. […] There is no outside, no 
enclosing wall, no circumference to us. […] The result of to-day, which haunts the mind 
and cannot be escaped, will presently be abridged into a word, and the principle that 
seemed to explain nature, will itself be included as one example of a bolder 
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generalization. In the thought of to-morrow there is a power to upheave all thy creed, 
all the creeds, all the literatures, of the nations, and marshal thee to a Heaven which no 
epic dream has yet depicted. Every man is not so much a workman in the world, as he 
is a suggestion of that he should be. Men walk as prophecies of the next age.” (W, II, 
304-305) 
Even in America, I take Emerson to say, we are not the sovereign legitimators of 
our fate. What we think is an “ultimate fact,” is in fact only the starting point for a 
series of refigurations. This process by which we are transformed is without limits, 
without a safeguard, because we can never establish our individual and communal 
identities once and for all. These too, as Emerson argues, are “haunted” by the 
materialities of our ordinary lives in the contemporary moment that feed back into 
what we are. Potentially, the refiguration that happens in the vanishing moment of 
the today – between what we were and what we will be tomorrow – is so radical 
that we cannot account for it. We thus “walk as prophecies” because even if we 
want to form our future, we cannot predetermine it.  
Because our future potentially comes as an “upheaval,” the progress of nations is 
a mysterious one and can only be described as the emergence of a “power” and 
not in terms of a dialectic. As Emerson insists in “Experience”: “Life is not 
dialectics” and we “have had lessons enough of the futility of criticism” (W, III, 
58). In each evolutionary step, we potentially face a radical rupture or de-
basement of the narratives that we use to account for our situation:  
“Step by step we scale this mysterious ladder: the steps are actions; the new prospect is 
power. Every several result is threatened and judged by that which follows. Every one 
seems to be contradicted by the new; it is only limited by the new. The new statement 
is always hated by the old, and, to those dwelling in the old, comes like an abyss of 
scepticism.” (W, II, 305) 
I want to draw attention to how Emerson complicates the standard dialectic 
argument: the “new statement” here is not merely a sublation of the elements that 
go into it. Rather, there is a fundamental contradiction between the new and what 
went before it so that the new necessarily comes as a complete repudiation of the 
old. Everything that we may have known “pales and dwindles before the 
revelation of the new hour” (W, II, 306). While the dialectic supposes that we can 
account for historical progress, Emerson in “Circles” exhibits the moment of change 
as the moment of a singular emergence, as the moment of an event that cannot be 
integrated into a dialectic argument or narrative. And the unforeseeability of this 
event applies both to the progress of American democracy as well as to what 
Emerson calls the “perfection” of the individual: “There are no fixtures to men, if 
we appeal to consciousness,” he says in “Circles,” “[t]he last chamber, the last 
closet, he must feel was never opened; there is always a residuum unknown, 
unanalyzable. That is, every man believes that he has a greater possibility” (W, II, 
306). Or, in epochal terms, this is why “a new degree of culture would instantly 
revolutionize the entire system of human pursuits” (W, II, 309).  
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The politics of American democracy for Emerson thus has the contours of an 
ethics that asks us to acknowledge political or historical change as a singular event 
that we cannot control or instrumentalise, even tough we must be ready to 
receive it. As he phrases it in a passage in his journal: “There must be a revolution. 
Let the revolution come” (J, IV, 414). Paradoxically then, the revolution will not 
come by itself if we are not willing to accept it. But its coming itself cannot be 
predicted, because it comes as a “growth” or as a “movement” that itself is 
“incalculable” (W, II, 320). In other words: it comes as an unpredictable turning or 
refiguration of what we are. 
Emerson’s theory of historical progress, of the emergence of the age American 
democracy thus presupposes a present that is not self-identical, that is not present 
with itself. And, if we follow a remark made by Jacques Derrida in his Specters of 
Marx, the moment of democracy’s emergence is necessarily “out of joint,” because 
it presupposes the supplementary effect of a present that is “too much,” beyond 
measure (Derrida 1994: 43). Emerson obviously lacks the terminology to further 
specify such a supplementarity, but he conceives of a number of forces – “fate,” 
“nature,” “life,” “love,” etc. – that cancel our intentional acts but are nevertheless 
the condition of possibility for change. In “The Over-Soul” Emerson points out how 
change must therefore always be imminent, it can happen the very next moment 
and only if we are willing to receive may we fulfil the “extraordinary hopes of 
man” (W, II, 267):  
“The philosophy of six thousand years has not searched the chambers and magazines of 
the soul. In its experiments there has always remained, in the last analysis, a residuum it 
could not resolve. Man is a stream whose source is hidden. Our being is descending 
into us from we know not whence. The most exact calculator has no prescience that 
somewhat incalculable may not balk the very next moment. I am constrained every 
moment to acknowledge a higher origin for events than the will I call mine.” (W, II, 267-
268) 
This is obviously a far cry from the doctrine of providence, even tough some of its 
rhetorical impetus subsist here. In Emerson’s reformulation of the doctrine, 
providence does precisely not come as the slow but foreseeable fulfilment of a 
certain prediction, but as the certainty of an unforeseeable, eventful change. As he 
states it again in “Fate”: “Providence has a wild, rough, incalculable road to its end, 
and it is of no use to try to whitewash its huge, mixed instrumentalities, or to dress 
up that terrific benefactor in a clean shirt and white neckcloth of a student in 
divinity” (W, VI, 8). Emerson conceives of providence as continually rerouted by 
the irreducible materialities of the present moment, by the “cataclysms” of “every 
day” and by the “disasters which threaten mankind” (W, VI, 8). But these “shocks 
and ruins” of the today are “less destructive” than our attempts at organizing or 
instrumentalising our fate. As Emerson remarks laconically: “Every spirit makes its 
house; but afterwards, the house confines the spirit” (W, VI, 8).  
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The greatest danger for the American freedom is thus limitation, stagnation, or 
the sedimentation of cultural forms. Even tough they may be unavoidable, 
Emerson calls on Americans to live up to the promise of American freedom by 
precisely acknowledging those forces that cannot be instrumentalised and that do 
not yet suggest a pattern of cultural change. And this is also how he conceives of 
his own role as a writer when he describes his aim as one of “contagion, yeast, 
‘emptins,’ anything to convey fermentation, import fermentation, induce 
fermentation into a quiescent mass” (J, VI, 346). And it seems especially relevant 
to him in a time that he describes as the “age of tools” (W, VII, 157), that is, an 
age that conceives of society as a “machine” (W, I, 318) whose change can be 
mechanically or strategically governed. Against a political consensus in America 
that social and cultural evolution can be engineered and instrumentalised, Emerson 
proposes the antagonistic action of a principle he repeatedly calls “friction” (W, I, 
319; W, VI, 79): “friction” denotes the ways in which our attempts at structuring 
our lives are countered by a contingent moment of the unplannable. It stands for 
the unforeseeable, ungovernable interaction of thought and action, of nature and 
man. “By how much we know, so much we are,” (W, 12: 10), Emerson states in 
“Powers and Laws of Thought,” but he is well aware that the relation of 
knowledge and being forms an antagonism, a reaction in which our material being 
qualifies what we think and vice versa. Hence, the “stupendous peculiarity” (W, 
XII, 10) of our knowledge. As Michael Lopez points out in Emerson and Power: 
“Our knowledge, our identity, must be ‘corrected’ and ‘perpetually reinforced’ by a 
life and experience that are rough – that push back” (Lopez 1996: 43). John 
Dewey, in what was the first philosophical appreciation or re-evaluation of 
Emerson’s writing early in the twentieth century, describes this corrective and anti-
instrumental principle of “friction” as central to the thought of Emerson: 
“Intelligence,” as Dewey argues, “must throw its fund out again into the stress of 
life; it must venture its savings against the pressure of facts” (Dewey 1967: 152).  
Again, this is very much what Harold Bloom is after when he identifies a spirit 
of metalepsis or transumption in American poetry (Bloom 1977:13). But with 
Bloom, this remains an idealist narrative, a vision of the individual that, because he 
has a privileged access to language, is an accomplished troper and so heals the 
world. Blooms vision thus implies a dialectic, a progression of stages in which the 
poet and his abilities effect and secure the successful sublation. Blooms reading of 
Emerson’s theory of imagination – in his study on the poetry of Wallace Stevens – 
suggests that the individual may finally overcome the difficulty of the word to find 
the word as medium of self-reflection and self-grounding. Bloom points out that 
this is the specifically American “inspiration” of a figural re-centering:  
“I think Nietzsche particularly understood that Emerson had come to prophesy not a de-
centering, as Nietzsche had, […] but a peculiarly American re-centering, and with it an 
American mode of interpretation […]; a mode that is intra-textual, but that stubbornly 
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remains logocentric, and that still follows Emerson in valorizing eloquence, the 
inspired voice, over the scene of writing.” (Bloom 2003: 176).  
I want to argue however that in Emerson the dialectic that Bloom proposes 
outruns its own grammar because what Emerson calls the poet’s “abandonment” to 
language implies an elementary risk: here, the re-centering that Bloom envisions 
is thrown off course by the principle of “friction,” of a figural contingency, of 
difference, or, quite simply, poetry.  
In Emerson, things precisely “do not return into themselves” (J, VII, 20), 
because they are the result of a singular emergence that is irreversible and cannot 
be reconstructed. This moment properly of difference also makes clear that when 
Emerson talks of the “Lords of Life” in “Experience,” he conceives of them as 
merely “threads on the loom of time” (W, III, 83), “fragments” whose larger 
pattern cannot be discerned so that he “knows better than to claim any 
completeness for my picture” (W, III, 83). The “Lords of Life” consequently, 
expose the internal limit and antagonism of historicity that must be constantly 
‘approached’ or “approximated” (Emerson’s term) if history is to be continued to be 
written.10 But this confrontation with history’s other cannot be reduced to the 
workings of a dialectic, it precisely foregoes the telos of a Hegelian history. In 
Emerson’s ‘theory’ of historical progress, there is no such transumption, no quasi-
theological teleology, and indeed, as we have already seen, America comes into 
being precisely as a criticism or reversal of such a concept of history. And it is as a 
reversal of a Hegelian notion of progress that ‘America’ becomes the place of a 
new democratic politics or, as Anselm Haverkamp has phrased it, a “new sense of 
the political – of politics deconstructed not in the sense of giving up the space of 
the political, but in the sense of keeping it deconstructible. Open to revision, but 
in a radical sense” (Haverkamp 1995: 9). Emerson’s revision of American thought 
consequently does not primarily want to effect a return to history, it aims to 
reinstate the right of a differential or singular present that opens up the field of 
historical representations for a refiguration, for new articulations.  
Consequently, Emerson argues that “[t]he only sin is limitation” (W, II, 308) and 
that we need to accept that a characteristic exaggeration or going beyond is part of 
our existence. In the “Nature” essay of 1844, he conceives of nature as the place 
of this originary difference. Nature, as he argues, on the one hand is continuous 
and “always consistent,” but on the other hand “she feigns to contravene her own 
love. She keeps her laws, and seems to transcend them” (W, III, 181). Taking his 
cue from astronomy, Emerson argues that there must always be an excessive 
energy that spurs things into motion:  
 
 10 For interesting comments on Emerson’s notion of “experience” and the notion of a Lebensphilosophie in 
Heidegger and Nietzsche, see Dieter Thomä’s “Eine Philosophie des Lebens jenseits des Biologismus und 
diesseits der ‘Geschichte der Metaphysik’: Bemerkungen zu Nietzsche und Heidegger mit Seitenblicken auf 
Emerson, Musil und Cavell” (2004).  
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“The astronomers said, ‘Give us matter and a little motion and we will construct the 
universe. It is not enough that we should have matter, we must also have a single 
impulse, one shove to launch the mass and generate the harmony of the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces.’ […] ‘A very unreasonable postulate,’ said the metaphysicians, ‘and a 
plain begging of the question.’ […] Nature, meanwhile, had not waited for the 
discussion, but […] bestowed the impulse, and the balls rolled. […] That famous 
aboriginal push propagates itself through all the balls of the system, and through every 
atom of every ball; through all the races of creatures, and through the history and 
performances of every individual.” (W, III, 184) 
But the essay also suggests that such an exaggeration or excess is always also 
added to what we are ‘proper,’ and that it is precisely this impulse that is the 
spring of our existence: “Exaggeration is the course of things. Nature sends no 
creature, no man into the world without adding a small excess of his proper 
quality. Given the planet, it is still necessary to add the impulse” (W, III, 185). 
This “to add the impulse,” I think, is an apt description of the differential, diverted 
course of history in Emerson. It comes as a “little violence of direction,” as a “slight 
generosity, a drop too much” or as an “excess of direction” (W, III, 185). The 
course of history, well indeed of all things, betray this “profusion” as an 
incalculable excess that prevents things from ‘properly’ returning into themselves. 
This knowledge of our powerlessness vis-à-vis our fate may, as Emerson points out, 
“envelop us in dull, melancholy days” (W, III, 196) and it may be that “[t]he 
appearance strikes the eye everywhere of an aimless society, of aimless nations” 
(W, III, 192). On the other hand, we may realize that we at least “have some 
stake in every possibility” (W, III 196) and that, even if it reaches us unprepared, 
“[e]very moment instructs” (W, III, 196).  
It is significant that Emerson here again associates nature’s exaggeration with a 
certain mode of language in America: “Our music, our poetry, our language itself 
are not satisfactions, but suggestions” (W, III, 190). Language is the medium in 
which nature’s disseminative effects are registered, where it becomes obvious that 
“[a]ll promise outruns the performance” and that “[w]e live in a system of 
approximations” (W, III, 190). More importantly, nature’s excess here is itself a 
dissemination, it is neither continuous nor discontinuous, it is not within history and 
cannot be accounted for in a teleological narrative. It is “above time,” only 
suggestive of things to come. Because Emerson himself suggests rather than 
predicts the future course of the American nation, John Dewey has connected 
Emerson’s role as the first “Philosopher of Democracy” precisely with this spirit of 
suggestion when he argues that Emerson is the philosopher not of that particular 
democracy, ‘America,’ but of “any system which democracy may henceforth 
construct” (Dewey 1903: 412). Dewey insists that for Emerson, the age of 
democracy is “just now dawning” and presents itself as something whose 
implications are difficult to judge. Emerson, in Dewey’s judgement, must therefore 
propose a “new type of literary art” that suggests a new “method of knowledge” 
responsive to the promise or suggestion of democracy. Emerson’s enterprise then 
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comes as a path-breaking “more-than philosophy”, as a type of discourse that goes 
beyond traditional metaphysics by engaging itself in a work that precisely is “art, 
not metaphysics” (Dewey 1903: 406).  
Later commentators have characterized this move as a move away from a 
metaphysical idealism to a “cultural criticism”. Cornel West has famously described 
it as Emerson’s (and other American philosophers’) “evasion of philosophy” (West 
1989). And it is such a move that effectively defines Emerson’s modernity. Dewey 
was the first to bring out this aspect of Emerson long buried under the 
transcendentalist image. Emerson himself is clearly aware of his eccentric or 
esoteric position as American philosopher. In a late lecture series at Harvard 
(“Natural History of the Intellect”, delivered in 1871) he states: “I think philosophy 
is still rude and elementary. It will one day be taught by poets” (W, XII, 14). I 
take this not to suggest that philosophy should or will escape into the idealisms of 
poetry but, if we follow West, that it indicates the creation of a philosophical 
position that saw itself among other more “quotidian struggle” for meaning. As 
West explains when he examines Dewey’s reaction to Emerson: “Dewey 
understands Emerson’s evasion of modern philosophy […] as a situating of 
philosophical reflection and poetic creation in the midst of quotidian human 
struggles for meaning, status, power, wealth, and selfhood” (West 1989: 73). 
This more “quotidian struggle for meaning” for Emerson is also a possible 
definition of democracy. The American philosopher is here no longer the 
transcendental “man in the open air” (see Matthiessen 1968: 626-655), but man 
“related to nature and the human constitution” (W, I, 89). The philosopher in the 
American context thus comes already as a dissolution of the myth that Nietzsche 
will later describe as “reines, willenloses, schmerzloses, zeitloses Subjekt der 
Erkenntniß” (KSA, V, 365). As Stanley Cavell has argued, we are thus confronted 
with the question of “the philosopher in American life” that is, of how American 
philosophy is always “in quest of the ordinary,” and of how this ordinary is the 
locus as well as the theme of American philosophy (see Cavell 1988: 3-26). For 
Emerson, as he phrases it in “Fate”, philosophical debate turns “into a practical 
question of the conduct of life. How shall I live?” (W, VI, 3).  
Stanley Cavell has characterized both Wittgenstein and Emerson as “philosophers 
of culture”. But culture, for the nineteenth-century context, is a highly problematic 
concept, as Cavell points out: with Emerson (just as with Wittgenstein), culture is a 
force or power rather than something given, material and obvious. Culture lies 
precisely in what Cavell terms the uncanniness of the ordinary, its characteristic 
quality is to be able to be manifest and problematic at the same time. I think that 
American studies have ignored Cavell’s insight when they conceived of its aim as 
that of establishing a coherent narrative for American culture in the nineteenth 
century. It has therefore gone unnoticed how Emerson’s call for “renovat[ing] life 
and our social state” (W, II, 75) always develops both out of and against the 
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predominant cultural tendencies of his time. Cultural or social renovation for 
Emerson does not merely rely on a cultural or individual vocation. And it does 
also not exclusively depend on the individual’s self-culture or the nation’s laborious 
improvement. It relies, essentially, on the emergent processes of force and power, 
that is, it relies on energies that can precisely not be made commensurable with 
the dogma of individual or national perfectionism.  
This cultural renewal thus asks of the writer and philosopher to question his 
“conduct of life” and to adopt an attitude that is more than a plan. This attitude can 
be a devotion to the “here and now” (W, XI, 539), a “daily renovation of 
sensibility” (W, VIII, 282), or, as Richard Poirier has phrased it, a more general 
“attitude or disposition of preparedness to act” (Poirier 1987: 59). Emerson’s 
concern for concrete questions of the conduct of life has not gone unnoticed but I 
think that it has never been considered as being problematic. And it is because of 
what may seem as a pretty straightforward interest in the conduct of life that 
Americanists have easily adopted Emerson into the tradition of pragmatism. As a 
consequence, Emerson’s ‘transcendentalism’ looked like the blunder of a 
philosopher that had not yet found his bearing. Kenneth Burke for example, when 
connecting Emerson to the American tradition of pragmatism argues that “Emerson’s 
brand of transcendentalism was but a short step ahead of out-and-out pragmatism” 
(Burke 1966: 9). But I think that Burke trusts too much in the self-reflection and 
self-grounding of Emerson’s individual. Individual and national ‘perfectionism’ in 
Emerson precisely confront forces that are incommensurable with such a self-
grounding. They clash with forces that go beyond or, more precisely, ‘transcend’ 
the construction of an individual or national narrative or genealogy. As a 
consequence, Emerson’s transcendentalist extravagance is not only a stylistic 
idiosyncrasy, it marks a potential of his writing that prevents its easy integration 
into that tradition of American thought that Georges Santayana has later labelled 
“the Genteel Tradition” (see Santayana 1998: 37-64). It surfaces as Emerson’s 
modernity, that is, as the irresolvable conflict or the antagonism between 
(individual and national) self-culture) and the incalculable forces it confronts.  
Emerson’s brand of transcendentalism is thus not so much a matter of what 
Matthiessen, Hopkins, Paul, Miller, Feidelson and others heralded as Emerson’s 
transcendental “organicism or pantheism, as Puritan (or Oriental) mysticism” (Lopez 
1994: 46), as Michael Lopez has phrased it. The going beyond of its transcendental 
aesthetic involves a more troublesome exposition or acknowledgement of a 
properly Nietzschean strain in Emerson’s thought. The brilliant promise of 
individual and national self-culture in Emerson is always underwritten by “a 
recognition of the simple and terrible laws” (W, XII, 55), by a discovery of “the 
enormous elements of strength which […] make our politics unimportant” (W, VI, 
61), by an “aboriginal might,” a “hairy Pelasgic strength,” by a certain “plus or 
positive power” (W, VI, 71-73) and “beast-force” (W, VI, 252). These forces 
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always already form the dark underside of Emerson’s characteristic optimism, and, 
when they surface, they should not be simply dismissed or defused as instances of 
Emerson’s eccentricity or extravagance. These forces do not come as exceptions to 
Emerson’s “moral mildness” or as the “exception that proved the Transcendentalist 
rule”, rather, as Lopez argues, they form the other focus of Emerson’s writing, 
challenging the “temperate monistic image” (Lopez 1994: 47) with an attention to 
that which goes beyond an optimistic human pragmatism.  
The exposure of such a disturbing underside of transcendentalist optimism 
necessarily comes as an anomaly within the founding narrative of an American 
pragmatism because Emerson’s interest in “power” necessarily undermines the 
image of the American “ideal man of self-reliant energy” (Matthiessen 1968: 367), 
actively coping with his environment. As Emerson warns in his journals:  
“We must beware of the nature of the spiritual world. It has this terrible power of self-
change, self-accommodation to whatsoever we do, that Ovid’s Metamorphoses take 
place continually. […] We are not immoveably moored, as we are apt to think, to any 
bottom. And if we do wrong, and don’t succeed, we think we can come back to where 
we were. That where is gone.” (J, I, 271) 
The danger of the spiritual world is thus also the danger of skepticism. But this 
skepticism in Emerson is only the figure of a more general de-basement of human 
action and intentionality. Even in our willingness to act, even in our most self-
reliant gestures, Emerson suggests, we cannot instrumentalise our conditions 
because they have a life of their own, because they are themselves the expression 
of a power that is beyond our control. Emerson’s call for “self-reliance” or “self-
command” (W, I, 43), for “heroic acts” (W, I, 77), or for the “dominion” (W, I, 40) 
or “the kingdom of “man over nature” (W, I, 77), his assertion of “new activity” 
(W, I, 70) and “new creation” (W, I, 23) knows perfectly well about this underside 
of a transcendental optimism. More importantly, this attitude is never innocent, it 
necessarily comes as a reaction to the knowledge of the “unmooredness” or 
“bottomlessness” of our ways of coping with the world.  
As long as Emerson’s writing served as the exclusive origin of a specifically 
American literature and philosophy, this fascination for the ambivalence of power 
had to go unnoticed. It was only when it became apparent that there is an 
important connection that goes beyond the connection of Emerson and 
pragmatism’s instrumentalism by pointing out continuities between Emerson and 
Nietzsche – in Eduard Baumgarten’s elaboration of a sequence among Emerson, 
James, Dewey and Nietzsche as founders of a “Philosophie der Macht” 
(Baumgarten 1938), in Matthiessen’s comparison of Emerson’s ideal man of self-
reliance and “the hard-willed Übermensch” (Matthiessen 1968: 368), in Perry 
Miller’s remarks on the Napoleonic undercurrent in Emerson’s adoration of genius 
(Miller 1967: 171), or in Daniel Aaron’s discussion of Emerson as “the seer of 
laisser-faire capitalism and the rampant individual” (Aaron 1951: 8) – that an 
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irreconcilable conflict or ambivalence between a trademark optimism and an 
equally characteristic attitude of indecision or irresolution started to surface.11  A 
conflict that, in the last instance, is also the conflict at the heart of an American 
ideology between the brilliant promise of manifest destiny and its (technological) 
catastrophe. Again then, to a certain degree, one could argue that Emerson’s 
ambivalence can be explained with regards to his own contemporary moment (see 
Chapter One): he witnesses an age in which ‘America’ is fundamentally changed, 
an age that saw both the promise and the danger of America’s future. And in 
Emerson, this characteristic ambivalence or, rather, undecidability also extends to 
man himself. Just as the contemporary historical moment comprises conflicting and 
incalculable emerging forces and is not merely a fact of history, so is man himself 
an “arsenal of forces” (W, X, 69). This is why “[t]here is not yet any inventory of a 
man’s faculties, any more than a bible of his opinions” (W, VI, 53) and why 
Emerson sees himself “as a geometer of [man’s] forces” (J, IX, 464). 
It is not difficult to see that Emerson’s ambivalent position on the intentionality 
of human action and thought would hardly be compatible with the philosophy of 
action in the tradition of American pragmatism that it was said to establish. For the 
philosophers of American pragmatism, daily experience and everyday actions 
became their predominant field of application. But pragmatism often presupposes a 
today as the stable ground upon which the pragmatist makes his actional choices. 
William James – to provide a case in point –, on the flyleafs added to his edition 
of Emerson’s writing preserved in the collection of James’ philosophical library at 
Harvard, carefully annotates Emerson’s essays and, under the heading “to-day”, 
cross-references many passages in which he finds his own interest in the moment 
of a today as the stage for action reflected (see Carpenter 1939). But while the 
pragmatists wanted to locate the today as the (unproblematic, transparent, 
foundational) point of departure for further action, Emerson sees “the hour that 
now is” or the “earnest experience of the common day” (W, II, 290) in a much 
more ambivalent light, as a passage from his “Lecture on the Times” makes 
obvious:  
 
 11 Eduard Baumgarten, a student of Heidegger’s, is in fact the first to investigate the connection between Emerson 
and Nietzsche. Baumgarten, who from 1936 to 1938 publishes a two-volume account on Die geistigen 
Grundlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens, argues that Emerson’s connection with Nietzsche is “das 
einzige gross-greifbare Beispiel einer echten Begegnung zwischen Deutschland und Amerika” (Baumgarten 
1936: II, 396). When asked for his opinion, Heidegger later attempted to prevent Baumgarten’s employment at 
the University of Göttingen on the grounds that he, Baumgarten, had been “erheblich amerikanisiert … in 
Haltung und Denkweise” (GA 16, 774-75) during his stay in America. How strongly Heidegger was influenced 
by his own anti-Americanism in his denunciation of Baumgarten remains yet to be investigated. See also 
Hermann Hummel, who remarks in 1946 that Emerson „must be regarded as the teacher and master rather 
than as a ‘précurseur’ of Nietzsche“ (Hummel 1946: 84). Scholarship on the important connection between 
Emerson and Nietzsche has not been frequent, but interest in this trans-atlantic exchange has been steadily 
increasing since Stanley Cavell’s description of an Emerson “after Nietzsche and Heidegger”. For a good 
overview, see for example “The Anti-Emerson Tradition” in Michael Lopez’ Emerson and Power (1994: 19-52). 
For a more comprehensive study, see George J. Stack, Nietzsche and Emerson: An Elective Affinity (1992). 
Various more specialized approaches to the connection between Emerson and Nietzsche are presented in the 
special issue on “Emerson and Nietzsche” of ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance, 43/1, 1997.  
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“To-day is a king in disguise. To-day always looks mean to the thoughtless, in the face 
of an uniform experience that all good and great and happy actions are made up 
precisely of these blank to-days. Let us not be so deceived. Let us unmask the king as 
he passes. Let us not inhabit times of wonderful and various promise without divining 
their tendency. Let us not see the foundations of nations, and of a new and better order 
of things laid, with roving eyes, and an attention preoccupied with trifles.” (W, I, 267-
268) 
Emerson is happy to merely “divine” the implications of the present moment of 
culture because he knows that its tendencies cannot be inventarized. There is then 
in Emerson a profound hesitation as to whether the moment of the “to-day,” its 
tendencies and promises, can be realized or can be achieved, let alone be 
instrumentalzed. Again, we are concerned here with a present that consists of 
contradictory tendencies, temporalities, and promises. Emerson’s present is 
“factitious” in Heidegger’s sense: it stands both for our everyday experiences as 
well as for everything that is unrecognized or unthematised. It thus includes a 
moment in which the ordinary becomes uncanny (Cavell’s term), a moment in 
which the present exposes its own ruination (Heidegger’s term). As Emerson 
points out in Nature: “All promise outruns the performance. We live in a system of 
approximations. Every end is prospective of some other end, which is also 
temporary; a round and final success nowhere” (W, III, 190). As we have seen, 
this self-difference of the present moment for Emerson is a symptom or, rather, 
sign of America’s modernity. It forms America’s “groundless ground” which “is the 
precise symbol of our whole position in the universe, our whole social and moral 
status” (LL, II, 280). It is precisely this insistence on the self-difference of the 
present that Emerson points to European philosophers in the tradition of a critique 
of metaphysics, especially Nietzsche and Heidegger.  
The risk of “carrying on the world” 
It is Emerson’s life-long ambition to find a mode of writing or a rhetoric that would 
be able to express the present’s flux of forces. In a passage from his journal, he 
suggests that he has only begun to answer this task: “Our American letters are, we 
confess, in the optative mood” (J, V, 409). Two years later, the passage is 
recirculated into “The Transcendentalist”: “Our American literature and spiritual 
history are, we confess, in the optative mood” (W, I, 342). Literature thus becomes 
a medium in which America’s indecision, its location between the ages can be 
thematised. Again then, it is not the more systematized discourse of philosophy, 
but a notion of poetic or literary writing that is essential to Emerson’s project. And 
indeed, as Jacques Derrida has argued, the advent of the form that we call 
literature is related to the advent of the political form that we call democracy. 
Derrida speaks of literature as  
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“[a] historical institution with its conventions, rules, etc., but also this institution of 
fiction which gives in principle the power to say everything, to break free of the rules, to 
displace them, and thereby to Institute [sic], to invent and even to suspect the 
traditional difference between nature and institution […] The institution of literature in 
the West, in its relatively modern form, is linked to an authorization to say everything 
and doubtless too to the coming about of the modern idea of democracy. Not that it 
depends on a democracy in place, but it seems inseparable to me from what calls forth 
a democracy, in the most open (and doubtless itself to come) sense of democracy.” 
(Derrida 1992 37)  
As a discourse that is open to the incalculable effects of figurality, literature always 
already goes beyond philosophy that tries to control these effects. Because of its 
potential for polysemy and plurisignation, its potential for rhetorical difference, it 
comes into being as a privileged medium to express the singular tropes and turns 
that in democracy are a condition of the possibility of freedom. And indeed, 
nineteenth-century American writers are looking for a form of writing that can 
embody the radical politics of democracy. Emerson himself is interested in what he 
calls the poetics of “primal warblings” (W, III, 8) as “pre-cantations,” as he 
expresses it with a musical term in “The Poet,” that “pre-exist, or super-exist” (W, 
III, 25) any integration into a notion of “soul” (W, III, 21) or a “song of the nation” 
(W, III, 8). Whitman – using similar musical terminology – conceives of his “chant” 
as a “lawless music” (Whitman 1980: 663). And even Tocqueville seems to realize 
– tough anxiously – democracy’s special proclivity for what he describes as “works 
conceived on such a vast scale and portraits so extravagant in their proportions” 
(DiA, 561). It is important to maintain that Emerson – with his poetics of “infinitely 
repellent particles” (CEC, 185) – and Whitman – with his paratactical catalogues 
and his free-verse scansion – do not merely conceive of their poetic projects as 
experiments in stylistic innovation. They strongly believe that their “language 
experiment” – this is Whitman’s term in his unpublished notebooks (see Kummings 
2006: 361) – does not merely describe or talk about the democratic experience. 
They think that their poetry opens a space for a more “radical correspondence” 
(W, I, 29) in which poetry itself transforms American democracy into a construct 
that is poetic, in other words: open to change, open to future or supplementary 
meaning.  
Consequently, they conceive of the function of writing as one of giving space 
for an event of meaning before any notion of a discourse of “representativity.” 
Again, I think that Jacques Derrida’s comments on the connection between the 
forms of literature and of democracy are helpful in order to understand the kind of 
“radical correspondence” that Emerson envisions:  
“[The] experience of writing is ‘subject’ to an imperative: to give space for singular 
events, to invent something new in the form of acts of writing which no longer consist 
in a theoretical knowledge, in new constative statements, to give oneself to a poetico-
literary performativity at least analogous to that of promises, orders, or acts of 
constitution or legislation which do not only change language, or which, in changing 
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language, change more than language. […] In order for this singular performativity to be 
effective, for something new to be produced, historical competence is not 
indispensable in a certain form (that of a certain academic kind of knowledge, for 
example, on the subject of literary history), but it increases the chances.” (Derrida 1992: 
55)  
Literature is thus the space in which a singular performativity expresses itself. But 
it expresses itself precisely not as another representative historical discourse, but as 
poetry, that is, as a series of rhetorical or figural turns. It is precisely literature’s 
poetic licence, its “right to say everything,” as Derrida argues, that “ties its destiny to 
a certain non-censure, to the space of democratic freedom. No democracy without 
literature; no literature without democracy. […] [I]n no case can one dissociate on 
from the other” (Derrida 1992: 23).  
What then, one may ask, is the relationship between democracy and literature? 
That of metonymy, metaphor, mutual exchange or analogy? Democracy is 
literature? Democracy is literature is America? Yes, but only in the provisional 
sense that this “is” has any kind of meaning. In other words: it is exactly in the 
singular moments in which literature insists on its “right to say everything” – which 
includes the right to not say anything at all or say something that does not make 
much sense at all – that it is democratic, and it is exactly in these moments in 
which democracy changes into something radically different, that it becomes a 
fiction, invention and, therefore, the expression of a (political, poetic, literary) 
freedom. America’s expression and emergence as a democracy consequently 
implies a characteristically Derridean turn: it comes as a paradoxical or, rather, 
chiastic founding in which its literary description is, simultaneously, its emergence 
or advent as a democracy. And indeed, that this performativity produces that which 
it describes is true both for the discourses of literature as well as that of 
democracy. Literature is thus, as Derrida argues, not an “institution among others or 
like other”:  
“[I]t is an institution which consists in transgressing and transforming, thus in producing 
its constitutional law; or, to put it better, in producing discursive forms, “works” and 
“events” in which the very possibility of a fundamental constitution is at least 
“fictionally” contested, threatened, deconstructed, presented in its very precariousness. 
Hence, while literature shares a certain power and a certain destiny with “jurisdiction,” 
[…] at a certain point it can only exceed them, interrogate them, “fictionalize” them: 
with nothing, or almost nothing, in view, of course, and by producing events whose 
“reality” or duration is never assured, but which by that very fact are more thought-
provoking, if that still means something.” (Derrida 1992: 72) 
As we have seen, the “poetic” in Emerson is precisely the place of what Derrida 
here calls transgression or transformation. It is conceived of as an opening – or 
“abandonment,” as Emerson would term it – to the rhetoricity or figurality of 
language that produces an effect of radical correspondence or poetic Vollzug that 
cannot itself be reduced to a theme or be construed from its context. The poetic, 
as a “singular concatenations of words” (Culler 1995: 46), to use Jonathan Culler’s 
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definition of the lyric, opens up to a new sense, and this sense may also be 
political.  
As we have seen earlier, the attitude of opening up to such a new sense, of 
receiving or acknowledging the possibility of a new sense in Emerson comes as a 
demand or a responsibility in the “to-day.” It is only when the writer attends to 
the unorganized materialities of the present moment of culture – to that which 
“dwells in the hour that now is” (W, II, 290) – that he can hope to be changed, to 
be surprised “out of his propriety,” as Emerson phrases it in “Circles”:  
“The one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, to be 
surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory and to do something 
without knowing how or why; in short to draw a new circle. Nothing great was ever 
achieved without enthusiasm. The way of life is wonderful; it is by abandonment.” (W, 
II, 321) 
In “Self-Reliance” he argues that the “moment of transition from a past to a new 
state” is always imminent, “becoming” (W, II, 69). And it is only an abandonment 
to the undecided potential of the today and not an act of deliberation that will 
effect the advent of the new state (of the “perfected” individual, of American 
democracy). The American writer must thus develop an attitude – a 
characteristically Emersonian “mood”, as Stanley Cavell would say (Cavell 2003: 
20) – that is again similar to what Derrida describes as “friendship”:  
“Friendship is never a present given, it belongs to the experience of expectation, 
promise, or engagement. Its discourse is that of prayer, it inaugurates, but reports 
(constate) nothing, is not satisfied with what is, it moves out to this place where a 
responsibility opens up a future.” (Derrida 1997: 236)  
If democracy is an emergent form, then the call for such an attitude is a constant 
one and comes as a general call for cultural reorientation. As Derrida points out:  
“For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not only will 
it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging 
to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to come: 
even when there is democracy, it never exists, it is never present, it remains the theme of 
a non-presentable concept.” (Derrida 1997: 306) 
Emerson’s question of “Where do we find us today?” does therefore not ask for an 
authoritative description of American culture in the present moment. Rather, it asks 
us to acknowledge a fundamental gap or, as Emerson terms it, a “verge” between 
what we are and a potential or promise that is yet unfulfilled. It has to be 
understood as presenting or exposing, critically, two fictions: that of the “we” and 
that of the “today”. Both are questioned as to a potential in them that is not yet 
actualized. The “today” is not the (democratic) end of history, and the “we” is not 
yet the fulfilled promise of a community that is ‘American’. The question thus 
locates ‘America’ in the kind of “disjointed time” that Derrida seeks to define as the 
place of an ethos of democracy in Specters of Marx (Derrida 1994: 3).  
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Emerson’s writing has doubtlessly produced some of the genetic myths of 
American culture and it continues to produce them today. But, I want to insist, 
because of its openness to a poetic sense it necessarily also undergoes an “excess 
of direction” (W, III, 185) and thus undermines the very myths that it perpetuates. 
Consequently, Emerson issues a warning:  
“Whilst thus the energy for originating and executing work deforms itself by excess, and 
so our axe chops off our own fingers […] . All the elements whose aid man calls in will 
sometimes become his masters, especially those of most subtle force.” (W, VI, 68) 
Emerson knows that this kind of poetic “carrying on [of] the world” (W, VI, 71) is 
not without its risk: it implies a very real chance that in our confrontation with the 
unachieved forces of “what we are today” we encounter an “excess” that is 
beyond our control and that has the power to radically change us. Emerson thus 
locates an “explosive complexion” (W, VI, 68) at the heart of his theory of a poetic 
understanding of America. It implies that we need to give up our claims for a 
‘representative’ discourse about America and instead need to favour a poetic 
language that in its shifting moments leads to the unfolding or discovery of new 
sense that we may not be able calculate in the last instance. But as we have seen 
before, it is precisely in the incalculability or unforeseeability of its poetic sense 
that Emerson also locates America’s (democratic) promise. As a result, democracy 
and, for that matter, ‘America’ are no longer instituted or founded, rather, they are 
synonymous with a constant cultural production, tantamount to a process of 
“unending” cultural perfectionism that never quite reaches its end (Cavell 1990: 
138).  
Consequently, the poetry of America’s democracy is always yet to come. And 
indeed, Maurice Blanchot has suggested in The Book to Come, the presence of 
poetry is necessarily always “to come”:  
“The presence of poetry is still to come: it comes from beyond the future and does not 
stop coming when it is here. A temporal dimension different from the one of which the 
time of the world has made us masters is at play, in language when language lays bare, 
by the rhythmic scansion of being the space of its unfolding.” (Blanchot 2003: 239) 
Emerson’s theory of the advent of the American age thus presents a decisive break 
from contemporary (Hegelian) philosophy of history that sees the conflict of history 
resolved in a series of harmonized stages – and where democracy would be one 
clearly identifiable stage in the progress of a nation. For Emerson, the advent of 
the American age is first and foremost – and before the specification of America’s 
place in history – the emergence of new forms of cultural production and the 
advent of a poetic theory of democratic politics in which the advent of democracy 
is not the result of some authoritative founding act (by the founding fathers, by 
‘representative’ Americans, by the “American scholar,” etc.) but the persistent 
attention to a poetic process by way of which Americans continually open up to a 
new sense (of themselves, of America, etc.). It would be wrong to consider this as 
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a kind of nihilism or to see it as a negation of change. As Blanchot points out, 
poetry can be a “restrained action” that effectively changes the world:  
“Because there is poetry not only is something changed in the universe, but there is an 
essential change of the universe, whose meaning the realization of the Book only 
discovers or builds. Poetry always inaugurates something else. In relation to the real, 
one can call it unreal (“this country did not exist”); in relation to the time of our world, 
“the interregnum” or “the eternal”; in relation to the action that modifies nature, 
“restrained action.” (Blanchot and Mandell 2003: 238) 
Emerson’s conceptualization of the poetic emergence of America obviously takes 
some of its cultural suggestiveness from the fact that the notion of a “language of 
creation” has always been a central part of Puritan ideology. But whereas Puritans 
believed the ideology to be self-evident – and, consequently, believed that the 
realization of the American garden of Eden was quasi automatic – Emerson 
conceives of a moment of mediation as central to the advent of America’s age. This 
advent presupposes an “interregnum” (Blanchot’s term), a “slight discontinuity” or 
“indescribably small interval” (W, XII, 44), as Emerson phrases it. The moment of 
America’s Entdeckung as a democracy is thus not the moment of some “perfect 
sight” (Porte 1979: 79), as Joel Porte has argued, rather, it is a moment brought 
about by the mediation of language, a mediation in which language itself gains a 
poetic presence. Emerson knows that “we do not see directly; but mediately” (W, 
III: 75) and he constantly reminds us of what Cadava has called, with regards to 
Emerson’s Nature, an “irremediable belatedness” (Cadava 1997: 127): “If Emerson’s 
Nature […] reveals anything, it is perhaps the vision of the end of vision, the 
revelation that everything begins in a moment of mediation” (Cadava 1997: 128). 
Emerson’s oeuvre is thus not so much what Oliver Wendell Holmes has called “the 
Book of Revelation of our Saint Radulphus” (Holmes 1885: 103), but rather a 
testament to those intermediary moments of transition, conversion, or emergence 
that he deems so important. Instead of promising “revelation” and rather like that 
famous unreachable green light across the bay in Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, 
Emerson thinks of America’s promise as one that is necessarily postponed. And, as 
Lawrence Buell has correctly pointed out, this is also why we need to see 
Emerson less as the enthusiastic orphic chanter but rather as a writer who realizes 
a potential for “nonresolution in [his] prose” (Buell 1984: 136).  
But again, the acknowledgment of a moment of mediation for Emerson does not 
necessarily mean that we have to give up our hope for change. In the 
intermediary moment of language something happens, something “becomes,” as 
Emerson would say, but this something is not at once or immediately reducible to 
the process of history. History itself, Emerson would argue, is precisely this process 
of mediation. As Cadava has pointed out, history in Emerson is the possibility of 
recognizing the world as mediated, as the “result of man’s own labor within time” 
(Cadava 1997: 128). And thus this mediation necessarily comes as a rupture, as 
Emerson insists in “Circles”:  
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“Life is a series of surprises. We do not guess to-day the mood, the pleasure, the power 
of to-morrow, when we are building up our being. Of lower states, of acts of routine 
and sense, we can tell somewhat; but the masterpieces of God, the total growths and 
universal movements of the soul, he hideth; they are incalculable. […] The new 
position of the advancing man has all the powers of the old, yet has them all new. It 
carries in its bosom all the energies of the past, yet is itself an exhalation of the 
morning. I cast away in this new moment all my once hoarded knowledge, as vacant 
and vain. Now for the first time seem I to know any thing rightly. The simplest words, – 
we do not know what they mean except when we love and aspire.” (W, II, 320) 
Even history’s seemingly all-powerful process of transumption, I take Emerson to 
say, confronts the more powerful moment of a characteristic force (“surprise,” 
“growths,” “movements,” “energies,” “exhalation”) that marks the excess of its 
system. This is why, even if we consciously or strategically “build up our being,” 
inescapably, “there is always a residuum unknown, unanalyzable” (W, II, 306), as 
he suggests elsewhere in the essay. And characteristically, Emerson’s metaphysical 
theories (of correspondence, of compensation, of analogy, of genius, etc.) also 
include such an excessive moment in which the system is taken beyond its proper 
limits. Clearly, we can discern here a strong echo of Hegelian philosophy where 
the ultimate aim is the restoration of harmony. Even though how Hegel rates 
philosophy’s chances at reaching this goal has become a contented issue today, 
Emerson is aware of the achievements of a dialectic vision of history: “By going 
one step farther back in thought, discordant opinions are reconciled, by being seen 
to be two extremes of one principle” (W, II, 308). Emerson’s conclusion in the 
same essay, however, remarkably challenges Hegelian orthodoxy by suggesting 
that there can be no final harmony or synthesis, because “we can never go so far 
back as to preclude a still higher vision” (W, II, 308). But to believe in the 
possibility of that “higher vision” again signals both a promise as well as a profound 
risk: “Then all things are at risk. It is as when a conflagration has broken out in a 
great city, and no man knows what is safe, or where it will end. […] The very 
hopes of man, […] are all at the mercy of a new generalization” (W, II, 380-309).  
We thus always find in Emerson the double movement of trying to achieve the 
next step in history while knowing that the transition to the next stage – if it is a 
real transition – exposes us and what we are to a profound risk. Emerson’s writing 
therefore oscillates between the insistence on a future harmony, the promise of a 
“central Unity” (W, I, 44) – that must necessarily become a “degradation” (W, I, 
45) at the precise moment when we think we have achieved it – and a “division” 
(W, II, 269) or “some foreign force, some diversion or alterative” (W, VI, 147). 
Our attempts at planning our lifes and structuring our experiences are thus met 
with what Emerson calls “[t]hat great principle of Undulation in nature” (W, I, 98), 
or, more generally, the “law of compensation” (W, II, 96) that “balances every gift 
and every defect” (W, I, 97). The formulation of a final identity, in its mobilization 
and appropriation of an incalculable principle must thus necessarily end in 
atonement.  
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Emerson’s constant insistence on a residuum – “unknown, unanalyzable” – 
pertaining both to the origin as well as the result of progress, also lets me doubt 
Michael Lopez’s assertion of a thoroughly “de-transcentalized” Emerson. Even if a 
final transcendence (of division, of time, etc.) is precluded in Emerson’s writing, he 
still wants to conceive of moments in his writing that, in their singular impact, 
“transcend” historical time. But because these moments are themselves 
“incalculable,” Emerson must recognize that they can only be “harbingers or 
forerunners” of that promised land of a “purely spiritual life” (W, I, 338), as he 
states in “The Transcendentalist”. The prospect of Idealism is thus obscured by the 
fact that “the most aspiring genius” is “neutralized” (W, I, 345), that our 
“extravagant demands” are answered by a “strange disappointment” (W, I, 344). 
Emerson’s writing underscores this by an almost incessant movement of self-
parody, as Evan Carton has argued: “Emerson’s language incorporates affirmation 
and denial, simultaneously undercuts (but does not quite undermine) the argument 
it forges, shadows its own creative claims with critical counterclaims, places 
irreconcilable but inextricable self-images side by side” (Carton 1985: 25-26).  
Other than the exponents of an American politics of ‘improvement’ (see Chapter 
One), Emerson’s politics must thus risk the very idea and ideal of America. And his 
insistence on the name ‘America’ is therefore not to be taken as a foreseeable 
ideal, but rather as a receding horizon of perfectibility. It is the name that 
undergoes a persistent auto-deconstruction, is continually exposed to its own 
excess, but is nevertheless invoked as a promise or hope that answers to the 
urgency of a changing America here and now. American culture itself, for 
Emerson, must thus remain prospective, as he points out in “Circles”: “Our culture 
is the predominance of an idea which draws after it this train of cities and 
institutions. Let us rise into another idea; they will disappear” (W, II, 302). 
America, the nation and the concept, can thus never be achieved, because it is 
itself a name for a process of transition, for a specific attitude towards change:  
“This old age ought not to creep on a human mind. In nature every moment is new; the 
past is always swallowed and forgotten; the coming only is sacred. Nothing is secure 
but life, transition, the energizing spirit. […] People wish to be settled; only as far as 
they are unsettled is there any hope for them.” (W, II, 319-320).  
Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, was the first to be puzzled by 
this specifically American or democratic openness to future change:  
“Democratic institutions awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being 
able to satisfy it to the full. No sooner does full equality seem within the people’s reach 
than it flies from their grasp, and its flight, as Pascal said, is eternal. The people 
passionately seek a good that is all the more precious because it is close enough to be 
familiar yet far enough away that it cannot be savoured. The chance of success spurs 
them on; the uncertainty of success vexes them. (DiA, 226) 
Tocqueville considers the prospective nature of democracy’s promise a problem, a 
“passion” that prevents the instalment of a more programmatic democratic politics. 
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The deferral of democracy’s promise whenever it seems to arrive at itself, the 
postponement of the advent of an ‘authentic’ ideal of democracy, for Tocqueville, 
signals the necessary corruption of the democratic project in America. For 
Emerson, on the other hand, it signals America’s specific promise because he 
believes that it is precisely the fact that we cannot quite calculate our 
contemporary moment, that we cannot quite give a comprehensive account of 
‘what we are’ and ‘where we find ourselves,’ that upholds the promise for future 
change.  
It is in the essay “Experience” that Emerson most forcefully presents an account 
of how democracy’s elusiveness is the source of a responsibility that is specifically 
American. In the opening pages, Emerson mourns that nature never lets us directly 
experience its objects: “Direct strokes she never gave us power to make; all our 
blows glance, all our hits are accidents” (W, III, 50). Emerson locates an all-
pervading disjunction or division in the world that prevents all direct 
communication between our experiences and their apprehension in thought. 
Mourning the death of his recently deceased son, Emerson shocks the reader by 
comparing his child’s death to a piece of real estate – “In the death of my son, 
now more than two years ago, I seem to have lost a beautiful estate, – no more. I 
cannot get it nearer to me” (W, III, 48) –, underwriting a radical rupture between 
the event of a world and how we perceive and experience it. But Emerson turns 
his own experience of grief into a more programmatic and even political argument 
in “Experience” when he argues that such a division is both the agon as well as 
the driving force of a specifically American (political) desire. Emerson, too, realizes 
that democracy can never quite arrive at itself when he admits that he takes “this 
evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers 
then when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition” 
(W, III, 49). But it is precisely such an elusiveness of the presence of democracy 
that is also the inauguration of an ethos, of a responsibility specific to America. As 
he argues, again in “Experience”:  
“Since our office is with moments, let us husband them. Five minutes of to-day are 
worth as much to me as five minutes in the next millennium. Let us be poised, and 
wise, and our own, to-day. Let us treat the men and women well; treat them as if they 
were real; perhaps they are.” (W, III, 60) 
The responsibility towards the other that Emerson calls for, comes unconditionally, 
and it pertains to the here and now, to our own contemporary moment. Because 
this moment itself continually changes and is continually changing us, we cannot 
live up to this responsibility once and for all, we cannot “calculate” it, as Emerson 
says:  
“How easily, if fate would suffer it, we might keep forever these beautiful limits, and 
adjust ourselves, once for all, to the perfect calculation of the kingdom of known cause 
and effect. In the street and in the newspapers, life appears so plain a business that 
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manly resolution and adherence to the multiplication-table through all weathers will 
insure success. But ah! presently comes a day, or is it only a half-hour, with its angel-
whispering, – which discomfits the conclusions of nations and of years!” (W, III, 67) 
The conflicting, irreducible temporalities and materialities of the present moment 
of culture will thus always thwart our attempts at predicting its future course. And 
even if our everyday lives are very much ordinary, unmarked, or “plain,” as 
Emerson terms it, they have a strange way of eluding us precisely in the moment 
in which we try to “clutch” them or establish a firm grip on them. For Cavell, this 
characteristic “uncanniness” of the ordinary can be a source of a profound 
skepticism in American culture (Cavell 1988). However, for Cavell as well as for 
Emerson, there is a route of escape from this danger of skepticism that comes as a 
willingness to accept, as an “acknowledgment,” as Cavell terms it, that we cannot 
control or calculate our lifes in the last instance: 
“Power keeps quite another road than the turnpikes of choice and will; namely the 
subterranean and invisible tunnels and channels of life. It is ridiculous that we are 
diplomatists, and doctors, and considerate people; there are no dupes like these. Life is 
a series of surprises, and would not be worth taking or keeping if it were not.” (W, III, 
67)  
Every contemporary moment may thus come as an unforeseeable challenge to 
what we think is our established identity. “Nature hates calculators” (W, III, 68), 
Emerson says and argues that all progress is the consequence not of our active 
planning, not of our chosen acts, but a result of a casualty or irreducibility of our 
“casual” experience: “[T]he mind goes antagonizing on, and never prospers but by 
fits. We thrive by casualties. Our chief experiences have been casual” (W, III, 68). 
This is why Emerson, quoting Luke 17:20, insists that the new in ‘America’ is a 
“‘kingdom that cometh without observation’” (W, III, 68). As a consequence, the 
“results of life” are necessarily “uncalculated and uncalculable” (W, III, 69) and 
Emerson agrees that we may be “struck with this irreducibleness of the elements 
of human life to calculation” (W, III, 69). But it is also precisely this irreducibility 
of the elements that form our present moment of culture that ensure change, that 
opens up our contemporary moment to a general and potentially radical “newness” 
(W, III, 68). Hence, the irreducibility of “that which is coexistent” (W, III, 70), that 
is the contemporary moment that “knows not its tendency” (W, III, 70). But it is 
precisely because its event is unforeseeable that it possesses a potential for change: 
“The miracle of life which will not be expounded but will remain a miracle, 
introduces a new element” (W, III, 70). Life, as a “flux of moods” (W, III, 72), is 
thus never quite present with itself, it always reminds us of the possibility of 
something else, of a potential “passage into new worlds” (W, III, 85). Thus, “[o]ur 
life seems not present so much as prospective” (W, III, 73). Emerson thus locates a 
certain compensation for an experience of division in moments of “temperament” 
or “surprise” (W, III, 82). As he claims enthusiastically: “Onward and onward! In 
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liberated moments we know that a new picture of life and duty is already 
possible” (W, III, 75).  
Emerson’s democratic ethics consequently implies a responsibility for America’s 
here and now. But it does so not because it believes that it finds ‘America’ as a 
state more perfected than others. It is because the present – as an incalculable 
“flux” or emerging force – holds a potential for change that is located as the space 
of democracy. Emerson’s urgent call that we attend to the present moment thus 
also opens this very moment to the advent of something else. And this is precisely 
the complex temporal structure that Jacques Derrida has identified as characteristic 
of democracy: “The to-come of democracy is also, although without presence, the 
hic et nunc of urgency, of the injunction as absolute urgency” (Derrida 2005: 73). 
In Emerson’s words: “We must set up the strong present tense against all the 
rumors of wrath, past or to come” (W, III, 63). The present moment of American 
culture – as an intermediary or vanishing state – thus functions as the space of a 
communal reconciliation or “conversation” (W, III, 55) as Emerson terms it. This 
communal space between is a “narrow belt” (W, III, 62) and consists only of 
“astronomical interspaces betwixt atom and atom” (W, III, 63-64). But even as an 
“indescribably small interval” (W, XII, 44), as Emerson calls this space of an 
Inzwischen in “Powers and Laws of Thought,” it can bring about a “conversation” 
and thus potentially opens us up to a qualitatively different future: “All good 
conversation, manners and action come from a spontaneity which forgets usages 
and makes the moment great” (W, III, 68). The vanishing mediator of the present 
moment, that “middle region of our being” (W, III, 62), functions thus as a 
reconciliatory moment “between these extremes” of the past and the future, it is 
the “equator of life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry” (W, III, 62), that is, the place 
of all the forces that, if we are willing to abandon ourselves to them, may change 
us and may make a radically different future possible.  
This would also explain why for Emerson the “immensity of to-day” or the 
“passing hour” is the very “age of ages” (W, X, 194). As a necessary condition for 
the possibility of change, it is that which makes history possible. If Emerson’s “to-
day,” as a moment “in the present, above time” (W, I, 67) comes as a departure 
from history, as its excess, then it also brings us back to history by making 
historicity itself possible. In other words, it is precisely in making change possible, 
precisely in its opening up to a different future that the irreducible moment of the 
“to-day” is constitutive of any historicity. With the “to-day” being a “present in 
disguise” or in “flight” (W, IV, 273), the precise nature of the historical course of 
the American democracy can, however, not be predicted, but as a receding 
horizon of perfectibility it can nevertheless be culturally effective. As Derrida 
points out with regards to the promise of democracy: “Whether the promise 
promises this or that, whether it be fulfilled or not, or whether it be unfulfillable, 
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there is necessarily some promise and therefore some historicity as future-to-come” 
(Derrida 1994: 73).  
Towards the end of the essay “Experience,” Emerson again asserts the present’s 
potential for effecting a radical conversion or epohkè. In fact, the making of the 
democratic individual in Emerson is intimately linked to a certain willingness to 
abandon oneself to this radical potential of the present moment. As Emerson points 
out: “I am ready to die out of nature and be born again into this new yet 
unapproachable America” (W, III, 72). Democracy’s future promise – “this new yet 
unapproachable America” – has to be approached unconditionally, it is something 
given to us not by ourselves, not as a result of our rational choices, but “out of 
nature,” that is, as the result of a confrontation with the conflicting materialities of 
our contemporary moment. Given that we accept that our condition is 
“unhandsome” and that we cannot “clutch” anything once and for all, there is thus 
nevertheless the contingency for a certain enthusiasm or optimism that comes in 
the form of our identification with the promise of democracy: “And what a future it 
opens!,” Emerson exclaims and finishes with what we have to read as a utopian 
promise rather than as a programmatic imperative:  
“[I]n the solitude to which every man is always returning, he has a sanity and revelations 
which in his passage into new worlds he will carry with him. Never mind the ridicule, 
never mind the defeat; up again, old heart!—it seems to say,—there is victory yet for all 
justice; and the true romance which the world exists to realize will be the 
transformation of genius into practical power.” (W, III, 85-86) 
  
  
Bibliography  
Aaron, Daniel. Men of Good Hope: A Story of American Progressives. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1951. 
Aarsleff, Hans. From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History. 
Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
Allen, Gay Wilson, and Harry Hayden Clark. Literary Criticism. Pope to Croce. Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1962. 
Althusser, Louis. “Contradiction and Overdetermination.” In For Marx. London: Verso, 1996. 
89-128. 
Anderson, Douglas. William Bradford’s Books: Of Plimmoth Plantation and the Printed Word. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 
Arnold, Matthew, Arthur Thomas Quiller-Couch, and Guy Saint Quintin. The Poems of Matthew 
Arnold, 1849-1867. London: Oxford University Press, 1926. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981. 
Bal, Mieke. Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2002. 
Balibar, Etienne. “The Vacillation of Ideology.” In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 
ed. by C. Nelson and L. Grossberg. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 159-210.  
———. “Politics and Truth: The Vacillation of Ideology, II.” In Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies 
on Politics and Philosophy before and after Marx. New York: Routledge, 1994. 151-174. 
Baumgarten, Eduard. Die Geistigen Grundlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens. Frankfurt: V. 
Klostermann, 1936. 
———. Der Pragmatismus: Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, John Dewey. Frankfurt am 
Main,: V. Klostermann, 1938. 
Bauschinger, Sigrid. The Trumpet of Reform: German Literature in Nineteenth-Century New 
England. Columbia: Camden House, 1998. 
Bender, Thomas. Community and Social Change in America. New Brunswick.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1978. 
Bennett, Jane. Thoreau’s Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications, 1994. 
Bercovitch, S. “Emerson, Individualism and the Ambiguities of Dissent.” The South Atlantic 
quarterly 89, no. 3 (1990): 623-662. 
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The American Jeremiad. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978. 
———. The Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic Construction of America. New York: 
Routledge, 1993. 
Bercovitch, Sacvan, and Cyrus R. K. Patell. Cambridge History of American Literature. 8 vols. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. London; New York: Routledge, 1994. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 286  
 
Blanchot, Maurice. “Literature and the original experience.” In The Space of Literature. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1982. 209-247. 
———. The Book to Come. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
Blessin, Stefan. Goethes Romane. Aufbruch in die Moderne. Paderborn, Zürich: Schöningh, 
1996. 
Blix, Göran. “Charting the ‘Transitional Period’: The Emergence of Modern Time in the 
Nineteenth Century.” History and Theory 45 (2006): 51-71. 
Bloom, Harold. A Map of Misreading: Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2003. 
———. Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. 
———. Deconstruction and Criticism. London; New York: Continuum, 2004. 
Blumenberg, Hans. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. 
Boehme, Jacob. The Mysterium Magnum, or, An exposition of the First Book of Moses, Called 
Genesis. In Works. To which is prefixed, the life of the author. With figures illustrating his 
Principles, left by the Rev. W. Law. 4 vols. London, 1623. 
Böhme, Hartmut. “Das Steinerne. Anmerkungen zur Theorie des Erhabenen aus dem Blick des 
„Menschenfremdsten”. In Das Erhabene. Zwischen Grenzerfahrung und Grössenwahn, 
ed. by C. Pries. Weinheim: VCH Acta Humaniora, 1989. 119-141.  
Booth, Wayne C. A Rhetoric of Irony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. 
Bové, Paul A. Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modern American Poetry. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980. 
Bradford, William. Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647. New York: Knopf, 1959. 
Brecht, Bertolt. Werke. Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1988. 
Bronfen, Elisabeth. “Der ‘American Dream’: Versprechen und Katastrophe eines Begriffs.” In 
Antiamerikanismus. Zum europäisch-amerikanischen Verhältnis zwischen Ablehnung 
und Faszination, ed. by G. Kreis. Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2007. 83-100. 
Brown, Richard D. Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700-
1865. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Buell, Lawrence. “The Emerson Industry in the 1980s: A Survey of Trends and Achievements.” 
ESQ 30 (1984): 117–36. 
Burke, Kenneth. “I, Eye, Ay – Emerson’s Early Essay ‚Nature’: Thoughts on the Machinery of 
Transcendence.” In Transcendentalism and Its Legacy, ed. by M. Simon and T. H. 
Parsons. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. 3-24.  
Butler, Judith. “The Nothing that Is: Wallace Stevens’ Hegelian Affinities.” In Theorizing 
American Literature: Hegel, the Sign, and History, ed. by B. Cowen and J. G. Kronick. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991. 269-287.  
Cadava, Eduardo. Emerson and the Climates of History. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1997. 
Caldwell, Patricia. The Puritan Conversion Narrative: The Beginnings of American Expression. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
Cameron, Sharon. “The Way of Life by Abandonment: Emerson’s Impersonal.” Critical Inquiry 
25/1 (1998): 1-31. 
Caputo, John D. More Radical Hermeneutics. On not Knowing who We Are. Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 2000. 
Carlyle, Thomas. “Signs of the Times.” Edinburgh Review 49, no. 98 (1829): 439-59. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 287  
 
———. Chartism. Boston: Little and Brown, 1840. 
———. “Past and Present [1843].” In The Works of Thomas Carlyle, Centenary Edition, ed. by H. 
D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. 
———. Critical and Miscellaneous Essays in Five Volumes. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1904. 
Carpenter, F. I. “William James and Emerson.” American Literature 11/1 (1939): 39-57. 
Carton, Evan. The Rhetoric of American Romance: Dialectic and Identity in Emerson, and 
Dickinson, Poe, and Hawthorne. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985. 
Cavell, S. “Excerpts from Memory.” Critical Inquiry 32, no. 4 (2006): 767-811.  
Cavell, Stanley. The Senses of Walden. New York: Viking Press, 1972. 
———. Themes out of School: Effects and Causes. San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984. 
———. In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988. 
———. Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism. 
La Salle, Ill. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
———. Philosophical Passages Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. 
———. Must We Mean what We Say? A Book of Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002. 
———. Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
———. Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2005. 
Cayton, Mary Kupiec. Emerson’s Emergence: Self and Society in the Transformation of New 
England, 1800-1845. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. 
Ceaser, James W. “Katastrophenhaft: Martin Heidegger’s America.” In Reconstructing America: 
The Symbol of America in Modern Thought, ed. by J. W. Ceaser. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997. 187-213. 
Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 
Chandler, James K. England in 1819: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic 
Historicism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
Channing, William Ellery. The works of William E. Channing. Boston: American Unitarian 
Association, 1886. 
Charvat, William. The Profession of Authorship in America, 1800-1870. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992. 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, James Engell, and Walter Jackson Bate. Biographia literaria, or, 
Biographical sketches of my literary life and opinions. 2 vols. London; Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983. 
Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Cousin, Victor. Cours de l’histoire de la philosophie moderne: Ladrange: Didier, 1846. 
Crawford, Robert. Devolving English Literature: Edinburgh University Press, 2000. 
Critchley, Simon. Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Lévinas and Contemporary 
French Thought. London; New York: Verso, 1999. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 288  
 
Culler, Jonathan. “Deconstruction and the Lyric.” In Deconstruction Is/In America: A New Sense 
of the Political, ed. by A. Haverkamp. New York: New York University Press, 1995. 41-
51. 
———. Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1975. 
Curti, Merle Eugene. The Growth of American Thought. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Books, 1982. 
Daly, Robert. “William Bradford’s Vision of History.” American Literature 44, no. 4 (1973): 557-
569. 
Davidson, Cathy N. Revolution and the Word. The Rise of the Novel in America. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
De Man, Paul. Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979. 
———. Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
———. The Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 
———. Aesthetic Ideology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
Delbanco, A. William Ellery Channing: An Essay on the Liberal Spirit in America: Harvard 
University Press, 1981. 
Delbanco, Andrew. The Puritan Ordeal. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
Derrida, Jaques. “Passions: ‘An oblique offering’.” In Derrida: A critical reader, ed. by D. 
Woods. Oxford; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992. 5-35. 
———. “This Strange Institution Called Literature: An Interview with Jacques Derrida.” In Acts 
of Literature, ed. by J. Derrida and D. Attridge. London; New York: Routledge, 1992. 
33-75. 
———. Of grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
———. Dissemination. Chicago: University Press, 1981. 
———. The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987. 
———. “Canons and Metonymies: An Interview with Jacques Derrida.” In Logomachia: The 
Conflict of the Faculties, ed. by R. Rand. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992. 
195-218. 
———. “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’.” In Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice, ed. by D. G. Carlson, D. Cornell and M. Rosenfeld. London: 
Routledge, 1992. 3-67. 
———. The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992. 
———. “Den Tod geben.” In Gewalt und Gerechtigkeit Derrida - Benjamin, ed. by A. 
Haverkamp. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994. 331-445. 
———. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. 
New York: Routledge, 1994. 
———. “’The Time is out of Joint’.” In Deconstruction Is/In America: A New Sense of the 
Political, ed. A. Haverkamp. New York: New York University Press, 1995. 14-38. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 289  
 
———. On the name. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
———. The gift of death. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
———. Politics of friendship. London; New York: Verso, 1997. 
———. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
Derrida, Jacques, and John D. Caputo. Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with 
Jacques Derrida. New York: Fordham University Press, 1997. 
Derrida, Jacques, Catherine Porter, and Edward P. Morris. “The Principle of Reason: The 
University in the Eyes of Its Pupils.” Diacritics 13, no. 3 (1983): 2-20. 
Derrida, Jacques, and Elizabeth Rottenberg. Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-
2001. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002. 
Dewey, John. “Emerson-The Philosopher of Democracy.” International Journal of Ethics 13, no. 
4 (1903): 405-413. 
Dewey, John. “The Scholastic and the Speculator.” In The early works, 1882-1898. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1967. 148-154. 
Dieckmann, Liselotte. Hieroglyphics: The History of a Literary Symbol. St. Louis: Washington 
University Press, 1970. 
Diggins, John P. The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-interest, and the Foundations of 
Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. 
Driscoll, Catherine. “The Moving Ground: Locating Everyday Life.” South Atlantic Quarterly 
100, no. 2 (2001): 381-398. 
Dumm, Thomas L. A Politics of the Ordinary. New York: New York University Press, 1999. 
Eco, Umberto. The Search for the Perfect Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. 
Ellison, Julie. Emerson’s Eomantic Style. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
“Emerson and Nietzsche.” ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance 43, no. 1 (1997). 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “Fourier and the Socialists.” The Dial 3, no. July 1842 (1842). 
———. Complete works. Centenary ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903. 
———. Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson: With Annotations. Boston, Cambridge: Houghton 
Mifflin Co.; Riverside Press, 1909. 
———. The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. by S. E. Whicher and R. E. Spiller. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964. 
———. The letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. by E. M. Tilton and R. L. Rusk. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1966. 
———. The Complete Sermons of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. by A. J. Von Frank and W. T. Mott. 
4 vols. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1989. 
———. Emerson’s Antislavery Writings, ed. by L. Gougeon. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995. 
———. The later lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1843-1871, ed. By R. A. Bosco and J. 
Myerson. 2 vols. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001. 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, and Thomas Carlyle. The Correspondence of Emerson and Carlyle, ed. 
by J. Slater. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 
Ermath, Michael. “Heidegger on Americanism. Ruinanz and the End of Modernity,” 
Modernism/modernity 7 (2000): 379-400.  
Erkkila, Betsy. Whitman The Political Poet. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 290  
 
Feidelson, Charles. Symbolism and American Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1953. 
Feller, Daniel. The Jacksonian Promise: America, 1815-1840. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995. 
Fellman, Michael. The Unbounded Frame: Freedom and Community in Nineteenth Century 
American Utopianism. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973. 
Fischer, Michael. Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989. 
Fitzgerald, F. Scott. The Great Gatsby. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Fliegelman, Jay. Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language & the Culture of 
Performance. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York,: 
Vintage Books, 1973. 
———. “Afterword.” In Michel Foucault, beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, ed. by H. L. 
Dreyfus and P. Rabinow. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. 208-226. 
Fowler, William Chauncey. The English Language in its Elements and Forms: With a History of its 
Origin and Development: Designed for Use in Colleges and Schools. New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1851. 
Francis, Richard. Transcendental Utopias: Individual and Community at Brook Farm, Fruitlands, 
and Walden. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
Fresonke, Kris. West of Emerson. The Design of Manifest Destiny. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003. 
Freud, Sigmund. Studienausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1969. 
———. The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by J. 
Strachey, A. Freud, C. L. Rothgeb, A. Richards, and Scientific Literature Corporation. 
London: Hogarth Press, 1953. 
Gadamer, Hans Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. 
Tübingen: Mohr, 1960. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Carsten Dutt, and Richard E. Palmer. Gadamer in Conversation: 
Reflections and Commentary. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, and Reinhart Koselleck. Zeitschichten. Studien zur Historik. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2000. 
Garnett, Richard. The Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson. London: Walter Scott, 1888. 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. “Literarischer Sansculottismus.” In Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe, 
ed. by E. Trunz. Hamburg: Christian Wegner, 1963, 239-44.  
———. Faust. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999. 
Götze, Martin. Ironie und absolute Darstellung. Philosophie und Poetik in der Frühromantik. 
Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001. 
Gougeon, Len. “Emerson and Abolition: The Silent Years, 1837-1844.” American Literature 54, 
no. 4 (1982): 560-575. 
———. Virtue’s Hero: Emerson, Antislavery, and Reform. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1990. 
Gouldner, Alvin Ward. The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and 
Future of Ideology. New York: Seabury Press, 1976. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 291  
 
Gray, Thomas. The Poetical Works of Thomas Gray. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1862. 
Grusin, Richard A. Transcendentalist Hermeneutics. Institutional Authority and the Higher 
Criticism of the Bible. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991. 
Guarneri, Carl. The Utopian Alternative: Fourierism in Nineteenth-Century America. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Guizot, François. The History of Civilization in Europe. London; New York: Penguin Books, 
1997. 
Gunn, Giles B. Thinking across the American Grain: Ideology, Intellect, and the New 
Pragmatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Gura, Philip F. “Language and Meaning: An American Tradition.” American Literature 53, no. 1 
(1981): 1-21. 
Gustafson, Thomas. Representative Words: Politics, Literature, and the American Language, 
1776-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Hammer, Espen. Stanley Cavell. Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 2002. 
Harpham, Geoffrey Galt. Getting it Right. Language, Literature, and Ethics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Harris, Kenneth Marc. Carlyle and Emerson. Their Long Debate. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1978. 
Haverkamp, A. Deconstruction Is/In America: A New Sense of the Political. New York: New York 
University Press, 1995. 
Hazlitt, William. The Spirit of the Age, or Contemporary Portraits. Oxford: University Press, 1935. 
———. The Collected Works of WIlliam Hazlitt, ed. by P. P. Howe. 21 vols. London; Toronto: J. 
M. Dent & Sons, 1931. 
Hébert, John R. “The Map that Named America: Martin Waldseemüller’s 1507 World Map.” 
Coordinates: Online Journal of the Map and Geography Round Table of the American 
Library Association 4 (2005): 1-5.  
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Werke. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832-1845. Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969. 
Heidegger, Martin. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976. 
———. Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The task of Thinking (1964). San 
Francisco, Calif.: Harper, 1993. 
———. Ontology: The Hermeneutics of facticity. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
Hochfield, George. Selected Writings of the Transcendentalists. New York: New American 
Library, 1966. 
Hodder, Alan D. “‘After a High Negative Way’: Emerson’s ‘Self-Reliance’ and the Rhetoric of 
Conversion.” The Harvard Theological Review 84, no. 4 (1991): 423-446. 
———. Emerson’s Rhetoric of Revelation: Nature, the Reader, and the Apocalypse Within. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989. 
Hollander, John. The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton and After. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1981. 
Hollis, Carroll C. “Whitman and the American Idiom.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 43, no. 4 
(1957): 408-420. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 292  
 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell. Ralph Waldo Emerson. Boston, New York: Houghton, Mifflin and 
company, 1885. 
Howe, Daniel Walker. The Unitarian Conscience: Harvard Moral Philosophy, 1805-1861. 
Middletown, Conn; Scranton, Pa.: Wesleyan University Press, 1988. 
Howe, Irving. The American Newness: Culture and Politics in the Age of Emerson. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986.  
Hume, David. An enquiry concerning human understanding, ed. by T. L. Beauchamp. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Hummel, Hermann. “Emerson and Nietzsche.” The New England Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1946): 63-
84. 
Ingersoll, Charles Jared. A Discourse Concerning the Influence of America on the Mind. 
Philadelphia,: A. Small, 1823. 
Irving, Washington. The Sketch Book of Geoffrey Crayon, Gent, ed. by H. Springer. Boston: 
Twayne, 1978. 
Irving, Washington. History, tales, and sketches, ed. by J. W. Tuttleton. New York: Library of 
America, 1983. 
Jahraus, Oliver. Martin Heidegger. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004. 
Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1981. 
Jefferson, Thomas. The writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. by A. A. Lipscomb, A. E. Bergh, R. H. 
Johnston, and Thomas Jefferson memorial association of the United States. 
Washington, D.C: The Thomas Jefferson memorial association of the United States, 
1905. 
———. The life and selected writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. by A. Koch and W. H. Peden. 
New York: Modern Library, 1944. 
———. Writings, ed. by M. D. Peterson. New York, N.Y.: Viking Press, 1984. 
Jessop, Ralph. Carlyle and Scottish Thought. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 
Johnson, Barbara. A World of Difference. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. 
Kateb, George. The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1992. 
———. Emerson and Self-Reliance. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995. 
Kaufmann, Walter Arnold. Hegel: Reinterpretation, Rexts, and Commentary. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966. 
Kern, Alexander. “The Rise of Transcendentalism.” In Transitions in American Literary History, 
ed. by H. H. Clark. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1953. 245-314. 
Kittsteiner, Heinz Dieter. “Heideggers Amerika als Ursprungsort der Weltverdüsterung.” Deutsche 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie 45, no. 4 (1997): 599-617. 
Klein, Joe. “Inspiration vs. Substance.” Time Magazine, February 7, 2008.  
Kofman, Sarah. “Beyond Aporia?” In Post-Structuralist Classics, ed. by A. Benjamin. New York: 
Routledge, 1988. 7-44. 
Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Cornell University Press Ithaca, 1980. 
Koselleck, Reinhart. Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1989. 
———. Zeitschichten Studien zur Historik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 293  
 
Kronick, Joseph. G. American Poetics of History: From Emerson to the Moderns: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1984. 
———. “Romance and the Prose of the World.” In Theorizing American Literature, ed. by B. 
Cowan and J. G. Kronick. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991. 163-
193. 
Kummings, Donald D. A Companion to Walt Whitman. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006. 
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. London; New York: Verso, 2001. 
———. “Recasting Marxism: Hegemony and New Political Movements.” In Antonio Gramsci: 
Critical Assessments, ed. by J. Martin. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Lefebvre, Henri. Everyday Life in the Modern World. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. 
Locke, John. Two treatises of government, ed. by P. Laslett. Cambridge: University Press, 1966. 
Locke, John. An essay concerning human understanding, ed. by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Lopez, Michael. “De-Transcendentalizing Emerson.” ESQ 34 (1988): 77-123. 
———. Emerson and Power: Creative Antagonism in the Nineteenth Century. DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1994. 
Lukács, György. The Historical Novel. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988. 
Lytton, Edward Bulwer Lytton. England and the English. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970. 
Madison, James. Letters and Other Writings of James Madison. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & 
Co., 1865. 
Madsen, Deborah L. American Exceptionalism. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1998. 
Maier, Pauline. American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence. New York: Knopf, 
1997. 
Maletz, Donald. J. “The Spirit of Tocqueville’s Democracies.” Polity 30, no. 3 (1998): 513-530.  
Manent, Pierre. Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1996. 
Margolis, Joseph. “Schleiermacher among the Theorists of Language and Interpretation.” The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 45, no. 4 (1987): 361-368. 
Maritain, Jacques. Reflections on America. Garden City: Image Books, 1964. 
Marr, David. American Worlds since Emerson. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988. 
Marx, Karl. “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” In Marx: Later Political Writings, ed. 
by T. Carver. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 31-126. 
Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels. Werke. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961. 
Marx, Leo. The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Matthiessen, F. O. American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and 
Whitman. London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 294  
 
McCarthy, John A. “Emerson, Goethe und die Deutschen.” The Goethe Yearbook 7 (1994): 177-
193. 
McNay, Lois. “Michel de Certeau and the Ambivalent Everyday.” Social Semiotics 6, no. 1 
(1996): 61-81. 
Meehan, Sean Ross. “Emerson’s Photographic Thinking.” Arizona Quarterly 62, no. 2 (2006): 
27-58. 
Meek, Robert. “The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology.” In Economics and Ideology 
and other Essays. London: Chapman and Hall, 1967. 34-50. 
Meinecke, Friedrich. Die Entstehung des Historismus. München: Oldenbourg, 1936. 
———. Historism. The Rise of a New Historical Outlook. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972. 
Melville, Herman. Redburn, his First Voyage; White-Jacket, or, The World in a Man-of-War; Moby-
Dick, or, The Whale, ed. by G. T. Tanselle. New York, N.Y.: Viking Press, 1983. 
Mencken, H. L. The American Language: An Inquiry into the Development of English in the 
United States. New York: Knopf, 1980. 
Michael, John. Emerson and Skepticism: The Cipher of the World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1988. 
Michaels, Walter Benn, and Donald E. Pease. The American Renaissance Reconsidered. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 
Mikics, David. The Romance of Individualism in Emerson and Nietzsche. Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2003. 
Milder, Robert. “The Radical Emerson?” In The Cambridge Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
ed. by J. Porte and S. Morris. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 49-75. 
Mill, John Stuart, and J. B. Schneewind. Essays on literature and society. [1st ed. New York,: 
Collier Books, 1965. 
Miller, Perry. The Transcendentalists: An Anthology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1950. 
———. Nature’s Nation. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967. 
———. The American Transcendentalists, Their Prose and Poetry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1981. 
Montrose, Louis A. “Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture.” In The 
New Historicism, ed. by H. A. Veeser. New York; London: Routledge, 1989. 15–36. 
Morgan, Edmund Sears. Puritan Political Ideas, 1558-1794. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 
2003. 
Morrison, Michael A. Race and the Early Republic: Racial Consciousness and Nation-Building in 
the Early Republic. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 
Mott, Wesley T. The Strains of Eloquence: Emerson and his Sermons. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989. 
Mott, Wesley T. “Emerson, Second Church, and ‘The Real Priesthood’” 2003 [cited 24.06. 2008]. 
Available from http://archive.uua.org/aboutuu/emerson200/mott.html.  
Muirhead, John H. “How Hegel Came to America.” The Philosophical Review 37, no. 3 (1928): 
226-240. 
Musset, Alfred de. La Confession d’un enfant du siècle [1836]. Paris: Gallimard, 1973. 
Newhall, Beaumont. The Daguerreotype in America. New York: Dover Publications, 1976. 
Niethammer, Lutz. Posthistoire: Has History Come to an End? London: Verso, 1992. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 295  
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Sämtliche Werke kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. by G. Colli. 
München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980. 
Obama, Barak. “Our Time has Come [Transcript].” Washington Post, February 6, 2008 [cited 
15.07. 2008]. Available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2008/02/06/AR2008020600199.html 
Olson, Charles. Selected writings. New York: New Directions, 1967. 
———. Call me Ishmael. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
Packer, Babara L. “The Transcendentalists: Prose Writing 1820-1865.” In Cambridge History of 
American Literature, ed. by S. Bercovitch. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995. 329-604.  
———. Emerson’s Fall: A New Interpretation of the Major Essays. New York: Continuum, 1982. 
———. “Origin and Authority: Emerson and the Higher Criticism.” In Reconstructing American 
literary history, ed. by S. Bercovitch. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986. 
67-92. 
Paine, Thomas. The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine. New York,: Citadel Press, 1945. 
———. Common Sense. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1976. 
Pankhurst, Richard. The Saint Simonians, Mill and Carlyle: A Preface to Modern Thought. 
London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1957. 
Pearce, Roy Harvey. The Continuity of American Poetry. Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University 
Press, 1961. 
Pease, Donald E. “After the Tocqueville Revival; or, The Return of the Political.” boundary 2 
26, no. 3 (1999): 87-114. 
———. “New Americanists: Revisionist Interventions into the Canon.” Boundary 2, no. 17 
(1990): 1-37. 
———. “National Identities, Post-Modern Artifacts, and Post-National Narratives “ Boundary 1, 
no. 19 (1992): 1-13. 
Pickering, John. A Vocabulary; or, Collection of Words and Phrases, which Have Been Supposed 
to be Peculiar to the United States of America. To which is Prefixed an Essay on the 
Present State of the English Language in the United States. Boston, Cambridge: Hilliard 
and Metcalf, 1816. 
Pierson, George Wilson. Tocqueville in America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996. 
Poe, Edgar Allan. The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe. New York: Society of English and 
French literature, 1902. 
Poirier, Richard. A World Elsewhere: The Place of Style in American Literature. Madison, Wis.: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. 
———. The Renewal of Literature: Emersonian Reflections. New York: Random House, 1987. 
Porte, Joel. Representative Man: Ralph Waldo Emerson in his Time. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979. 
———. “Emerson, Thoreau, and the Double Consciousness.” The New England Quarterly 41, 
no. 1 (1968): 40-50. 
Porter, Carolyn. Seeing and Being: The Plight of the Participant Observer in Emerson, James, 
Adams, Faulkner. Middletown, Conn.; Irvington, N.Y.: Wesleyan University Press, 
1981. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 296  
 
Reynolds, David S. Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination in the Age of 
Emerson and Melville. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Richardson, Robert Dale. Emerson. The Mind on Fire. A Biography. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995. 
Riddel, Joseph N. Purloined Letters: Originality and Repetition in American Literature. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995. 
———. The Inverted Bell: Modernism and the Counterpoetics of William Carlos Williams. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991. 
———. “Reading America / American Readers.” MLN 99, no. 4 (1984): 903-927. 
Rilke, Rainer Maria. Briefe in zwei Bänden, ed. by H. Nalewski. Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 
1991. 
Rogin, Michael Paul. Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the 
American Indian. New York: Knopf, 1975. 
Rosenmeier, Jesper. “‘With My Owne Eyes’: William Bradford’s Of Plymouth Plantation.” In 
Typology and Early American Literature, ed. by S. Bercovitch. Amherst, Mass.: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1972. 69-105. 
Ross, Dorothy. “Historical Consciousness in Nineteenth-Century America.” The American 
Historical Review 89, no. 4 (1984): 909-928. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Essai sur l’origine des langues: où il est parlé de la mélodie et de 
l’imitation musicale, ed. by C. Porset. Paris: A. G. Nizet, 1976. 
Sacks, Kenneth. Understanding Emerson: “The American scholar” and his struggle for self-
reliance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
Santayana, George. Character and Opinion in the United States. New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers, 1991. 
———. The Genteel Tradition: Nine Essays, ed. by D. L. Wilson. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1998. 
Schlegel, Friedrich. Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. by E. Behler, J-J. Anstett, and A. 
Arndt. Paderborn; Zürich: Schöningh, 1959. 
Schueller, Malini. “Carnival Rhetoric and Extra-Vagance in Thoreau’s Walden.” American 
Literature 58, no. 1 (1986): 33-45. 
Seel, Martin. Eine Aesthetik der Natur. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991. 
Shelley, Percy Bysshe. Shelley’s Poetry and Prose. Authoritative Texts, Criticism, ed. by D. H. 
Reiman. New York: Norton, 2002. 
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
St. John de Crèvecoeur, J. Hector. Sketches of Eighteenth-Century America. More “Letters from an 
American Farmer”. New York,: B. Blom, 1972. 
Stack, George J. Nietzsche and Emerson: An Elective Affinity. Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1992. 
Stein, Maurice Robert. The Eclipse of Community: An Interpretation of American Studies. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. 
Story, Joseph “Characteristics of the Age. A Discourse Pronounced at Cambridge, before the Phi 
Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University, August 31, 1826.” In The Miscellaneous 
Writings of Joseph Story, ed. by W. W. Story. Boston Little and Brown, 1852. 358-381. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 297  
 
Strout, Cushing. “Tocqueville and the Idea of an American Literature (1941-1971).” New Literary 
History 18, no. 1 (1986): 115-127. 
Swedenborg, Emanuel. The Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically, Physically, and 
Philosophically, ed. by J. G. Wilkinson. London: Newbery, 1843. 
Sweet, John Wood. Bodies Politic: Negotiating Race in the American North, 1730-1830. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 
Szondi, Peter. Einführung in die literarische Hermeneutik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975. 
Thomä, Dieter. Unter Amerikanern. Eine Lebensart wird besichtigt. München: Beck, 2000. 
———. “Wie Europa versucht, Amerika auf den Begriff zu bringen. Über Condorcet, 
Tocqueville, Weber, Heidegger und andere.” In Die nationale Identität der Deutschen. 
Philosophische Imaginationen und historische Mentalitäten, ed. by W. Bialas. Frankfurt 
am Main: Peter Lang, 2002. 57-78. 
———. “Eine Philosophie des Lebens jenseits des Biologismus und diesseits der ‘Geschichte 
der Metaphysik’: Bemerkungen zu Nietzsche und Heidegger mit Seitenblicken auf 
Emerson, Musil und Cavell.” In Heidegger und die Anfänge seines Denkens (Heidegger-
Jahrbuch II), ed. by A. Denker and H. Zaborowski. Freiburg; München: Alber, 2004. 
265-295. 
Thoreau, Henry David. Walden, and Civil Disobedience. Authoritative Texts, Background, 
Reviews, and Essays in Criticism. New York: W. W. Norton, 1966. 
———. A week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers ; Walden, or, Life in the Woods ; The Maine 
Woods ; Cape Cod. New York, N.Y.: Viking Press, 1985. 
———. Civil disobedience, and other essays, Dover thrift editions. New York: Dover 
Publications, 1993. 
———. Walden. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
Tindall, George Brown, and David E. Shi. America: A Narrative History. New York: Norton, 
2004. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. De la démocratie en Amérique. Bruxelles: Soçiété Belge de Librairie, 
1840. 
———. Democracy in America. New York: Library of America, 2004. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de, and Gustave de Beaumont. On the Penitentiary System in the United 
States and its Application in France, Perspectives in sociology. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1979. 
Turner, Frederick Jackson. The Frontier in American History. New York: Dover Publications, 
1996. 
Turner, Victor Witter. Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors. Symbolic Action in Human Society. Ithaca 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974. 
———. On the Edge of the Bush. Anthropology as Experience. Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press, 1985. 
van Cromphout, Gustaaf. “Emerson and the Dialectics of History.” PMLA 91, no. 1 (1976): 54-
65. 
Van Leer, David. Emerson’s Epistemology: The Argument of the Essays. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Veyne, Paul. Writing History. Essay on Epistemology. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1984. 
 BIBL IOGRAPHY 298  
 
Vogl, Josef. Gemeinschaften - Positionen zu einer Philosophie des Politischen. Frankfurt a.M: 
Suhrkamp, 1994. 
Waldenfels, Bernhard. Antwortregister. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994. 
Warner, Michael. The Letters of the Republic. Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-
Century America. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
Warren, James Perrin. Culture of Eloquence Oratory and Reform in Antebellum America. 
University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. 
Webster, Daniel. The Great Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster. Littleton: F.B. Rothman, 
1993. 
Weisbuch, Robert. Atlantic Double-Cross: American Literature and British Influence in the Age of 
Emerson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. 
West, Cornel. The American Evasion of Philosophy. A Genealogy of Pragmatism. Madison, Wis.: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. 
Whicher, Stephen E. Freedom and Fate. An Inner Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. 
Whitman, Walt. Complete poetry and selected prose. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. 
———. Daybooks and notebooks. New York: New York University Press, 1978. 
———. An American primer. Stevens Point, Wis.: Holy Cow! Press, 1987. 
———. Poetry and prose. New York: Library of America, 1996. 
———. The Collected Writings of Walt Whitman. New York: New York University Press, 1961. 
———. Leaves of grass and other writings authoritative texts, other poetry and prose, criticism, 
ed. by M. Moon and S. Bradley. New York: Norton, 2002. 
———. Prose works, ed. by F. Stovall. New York: New York University Press, 1963. 
Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
Williams, William Carlos. In the American Grain. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971. 
Wills, Garry, Thomas Jefferson, and United States. Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. 
John Winthrop. The journal of John Winthrop 1630-1649. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1996. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Werkausgabe, ed. by R. Rhees Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989. 
Wolfe, C. “Alone with America: Cavell, Emerson, and the Politics of Individualism.” New 
Literary History 25, no. 1 (1994): 137-157. 
Wood, John. The Scenic Daguerreotype: Romanticism and Early Photography. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1995. 
Zabel, Morton Dauwen. Literary Opinion in America. New York,: Harper, 1951. 
 
 
 
Tobias Weber ! Curriculum Vitae 
Zürich ! September 2011  
TOBIAS WEBER, DR. DES.  – CURRICULUM VITAE  
 
 
 
ANGABEN ZUR PERSON  
 
Name Tobias Weber      
Adresse Voltastrasse 58 
 8044 Zürich  
Email t.weber@rgzh.ch 
Telefon +41 44 253 14 10 
Geburtsdatum 2. April, 1974 
Zivilstand verheiratet, 3 Kinder 
Geburtsort Glarus, GL  
Bürgerort Zürich, ZH 
 
 
ARBEITSERFAHRUNG MITTELSCHULEN / UNIVERSITÄT  
 
2011 Wahl zum Prorektor des Realgymnasiums Rämibühl  
2008 Wahl zur Mittelschullehrperson MbA am Realgymnasium Rämibühl, Zürich  
2000ff. Lehrbeauftragter für Deutsch und Englisch, Realgymnasium Rämibühl, Zürich 
2008ff. Experte Fachwissenschaft Anglistik, Pädagogische Hochschule Luzern  
2006 - 2009  Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Englischen Seminar der Universität Zürich, 
wissenschaftlicher Assistent am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Bronfen 
2002 - 2010 Lehrbeauftragter am Englischen Seminar der Universität Zürich  
1996 – 1997  Lehrbeauftragter für Deutsch an der Matthew Arnold School in Staines (GB) 
 
 
BILDUNGSGANG 
 
Nov 2008 Promotion zum Dr. des. (Summa cum laude)  
Nov 2008 Diplom Höheres Lehramt Mittelschulen mit den zwei Hauptfächern Deutsch und 
Englisch  
2005 – 2006 Forschungsaufenthalt als Visiting Scholar an der University of Chicago, USA  
2003 –2006  assoziiertes Mitglied des Graduiertenkollegs “Figuren des Dritten” der Deutschen 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Universität Konstanz, Deutschland 
2003 –2006 Forschungsstipendiat des “Forschungskredits”, Universität Zürich  
2002 Lizenziat lic. phil., Universität Zürich, Mai 2002  
- Hauptfach: Deutsche Literatur- und Sprachwissenschaft  
- 1. Nebenfach: Englische Literaturwissenschaft 
- 2. Nebenfach: Filmwissenschaften  
1994 Matura (Typus B), Kantonsschule Burggraben, St. Gallen 
Tobias Weber ! Curriculum Vitae 
Zürich ! September 2011  
VORTRÄGE, VORLESUNGEN, WEITERBILDUNGEN 
 
- “Das Ende der Aufklärung? Zur Aktualität des aufklärerischen Denkens heute”, Weiterbildung für das 
Zürcher Hochschulinstitut für Schulpädagogik und Fachdidaktik, Mai 2011.  
- “Schulische Schreibprojekte mit Wikis”, Veranstaltung im Rahmen der ICT-Weiterbildungen am 
Realgymnasium Rämibühl, Januar 2011 
- “Narratologie für die Schule?”, Vortrag im Rahmen einer Weiterbildungsveranstaltung des “Forums Alte 
Sprachen Zürich”, März 2010  
- “Crashkurs Filmsprache”, Workshop anlässlich des 175-Jahr-Jubiläums des Realgymnasiums Rämibühl, 
September 2008 
- “Educating Shakespeare – Mit Shakespeare in der Schule”, Workshop anlässlich des 175-Jahr-Jubiläums des 
Realgymnasiums  
- “Die ‘allgemeine Wohlfahrt’ als ‘Brechmittel’: Nietzsche und Amerika”, Forschungskolloquium am 
Englischen Seminar, Universität Zürich, FS08.  
- “Vom common sense zur ‘lauten, schrillen Stimme der Republik’: Poetisches und politisches Denken bei 
Emerson, Melville und Whitman”, Forschungskolloquium am Englischen Seminar, Universität Zürich, 
FS08.  
- “’Es begann mit dem Wunsch, mit den Toten zu sprechen’: Stephen Greenblatts Unterhaltung mit den 
Toten,” Konferenz “Totenkulte“, Graduiertenkolleg “Figur(en) des Dritten”, Universität Konstanz, 
Deutschland, Januar 2005  
- “Eine Forensik des Lesens”, Vorlesungsreihe On Narrative, Universität Zürich, Dezember 2004  
- “Was ist das, eine Poetik des Zeitgenössischen?”, German Department, University of Chicago, USA, Februar 
2004.  
- “Habits of Appropriation: Shakespeare as a Reader”, Vorlesungsreihe Shakespearean Refigurations, 
Universität Zürich, Mai 2004  
- “Ut pictura poiesis – Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Early Modern Visual Culture”, Vorlesungsreihe 
Shakespearean Refigurations, Universität Zürich, April 2004  
- “Probleme literarischer Zeitgenossenschaft”, Forschungskolloquium des Graduiertenkollegs “Figuren des 
Dritten”, Universität Konstanz, November 2003.  
- “Wahrnehmung, Perspektive, Fokalisierung“, Vorlesungsreihe On Narrative, Universität Zürich, Januar 2003  
 
PUBLIKATIONEN  
 
- Tobias Weber, Patrick Eiden, Nacim Ghanbari, Martin Zillinger, Totenkulte (Campus: Frankfurt am Main, 
2006).  
- Tobias Weber, Ariane Lüthi, Christian Villiger, Reto Zöllner, Sprache als Material / Matière du langage / The 
Materiality of Language, Variations, Nr. 17 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009).  
- Tobias Weber, “‘That indescribably small interval’: Ralph Waldo Emerson and the Problem of the American 
Epoch”, Variations, Nr. 15 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), S. 49-62.  
- Tobias Weber, “Rückkehr / Retour / Return – Einleitung”, Variations, Nr. 14 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), S. 9-
12.  
- Tobias Weber, “’I began with a desire to speak with the dead’”: Stephen Greenblatts Conversation with the 
Dead”, in Tobias Weber, Patrick Eiden, Nacim Ghanbari (Hrssg.), Totenkulte (Campus: Frankfurt am 
Main, 2006), S. 133-146.  
- Tobias Weber, Sylvie Jeanneret, Iman Laversuch, Hannes Schneider, Politik und Fiktion / Politique et Fiction / 
Politics and Fiction (Bern: Peter Lang Verlag, 2005 [= Variations, Nr. 13, 2005]).  
- Tobias Weber, Iman Laversuch, Hannes Schneider, Die Rückkehr / Le Retour / The Return (Bern: Peter Lang 
Verlag, 2006 [=Variations, Nr. 14, 2006]).  
- Tobias Weber, „Gegenwart und Ereignis: Don DeLillos ‚zeitgenössische’ Romane Libra, White Noise und The 
Names“ (Lizentiatsarbeit, 2002).  
 
Tobias Weber ! Curriculum Vitae 
Zürich ! September 2011  
LEHRTÄTIGKEIT AN DER UNIVERSITÄT ZÜRICH 
 
- Textual Analysis: Introduction to the Study of English Literature – B.A. Seminar, Englisches Seminar der 
Universität Zürich, HS0809/FS09; HS0910/FS10 
- Early American Literature: Beginnings to 1800, B.A. Seminar, Englisches Seminar der Universität Zürich, HS 
2007 
- Sense and Sound: The Study of English Literature: An Introduction Part II – Proseminar, Englisches Seminar 
der Universität Zürich, SS 2005. 
- Textual Analysis, Part I and Part II, B.A. Seminar, Englisches Seminar der Universität Zürich, HS 2006/2007, 
FS 2007 
- Sense and Sound: The Study of English Literature: An Introduction Part II – Proseminar, Englisches Seminar 
der Universität Zürich, SS 2005.  
- Reading, Writing, Narrative: The Study of English Literature: An Introduction, Part I – Proseminar, Englisches 
Seminar der Universität Zürich, WS 2004/2005.  
- Shakespearean Refigurations – Vorlesungsreihe, zusammen mit Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Bronfen und lic. phil 
Barbara Straumann, Universität Zürich, SS 2004.  
- Elizabethan Revenge Tragedies: The Study of English Literature: An Introduction, Part III - Proseminar, 
Englisches Seminar der Universität Zürich, WS 2003/2004.  
- Narrative Fiction – Colloquium in preparation of the Zwischenprüfung – Englisches Seminar der Universität 
Zürich, SS 2003.  
- Reading, Writing, Narrative: The Study of English Literature: An Introduction, Part I – Proseminar, Englisches 
Seminar der Universität Zürich, WS 2002/2003.  
 
ETC.  
 
- Mitglied der Robert-Walser-Gesellschaft 
- Mitglied des Orchesters ArgeTon, Zürich  
